Level Of Logical Form Research Articles

On Internal Merge

Abstract The rule MOVE, used in various forms in generative grammars to capture displacement or discontinuous constituency, has recently been talked of as an “internal” version of MERGE, the operation of simple node- or set-formation. Internal merge “reconstructs” the displaced element in its original argument-structural position at the level of logical form via a “copy”, to which it has been identical throughout the derivation. Reducing MOVE to MERGE seems to be on the side of simplifying the theory of grammar, potentially eliminating the need for constraints on movement in order to limit overgeneration. The paper addresses the question of how internal merge should be defined in formal terms. An account of discontinuity is proposed in which copies originate in the lexicon, as seems to be required by a strict interpretations of the Inclusiveness Condition of Chomsky (1995b), where they can be thought of as binders and variables in lexical logical form (lf). Merger is defined via a small number of type-dependent combinatory rules, which apply to strictly string-adjacent categories to monotonically project from the lexical array varieties of discontinuous dependencies that have been described in terms of various forms of movement, including “A”, “Ā”, “remnant”, “head”, “parallel”, “sideward”, “covert”, “roll-up”, and “late merge”, without any attendant “constraints on movement” other than those projected from lexical types. The analysis extends to a plethora of other discontinuous operations that have been proposed in addition to or instead of MOVE, including AGREE, LABEL, TRANSFER, and DELETE, all of which are replaced by synchronous monotonic lf and pf merger of contiguous categories. The result is to eliminate structure-dependence and action-at-a-distance of all kinds from syntactic rules.

The Logicality of Language: Contextualism versus Semantic Minimalism

AbstractThe logicality of language is the hypothesis that the language system has access to a ‘natural’ logic that can identify and filter out as unacceptable expressions that have trivial meanings—that is, that are true/false in all possible worlds or situations in which they are defined. This hypothesis helps explain otherwise puzzling patterns concerning the distribution of various functional terms and phrases. Despite its promise, logicality vastly over-generates unacceptability assignments. Most solutions to this problem rest on specific stipulations about the properties of logical form—roughly, the level of linguistic representation which feeds into the interpretation procedures—and have substantial implications for traditional philosophical disputes about the nature of language. Specifically, contextualism and semantic minimalism, construed as competing hypotheses about the nature and degree of context-sensitivity at the level of logical form, suggest different approaches to the over-generation problem. In this paper, I explore the implications of pairing logicality with various forms of contextualism and semantic minimalism. I argue that to adequately solve the over-generation problem, logicality should be implemented in a constrained contextualist framework.

Utterances, Sub‐utterances and Token‐Reflexivity

AbstractThe popular interpretation of token‐reflexivism states that at the level of logical form, indexicals and demonstratives are disguised descriptions that employ complex demonstratives or special quotation‐mark names involving particular tokens of the appropriate expression‐types. In this article I first demonstrate that this interpretation of token‐reflexivism is only one of many, and that it is better to think of token‐reflexivism as denoting a family of distinct theoretical frameworks. Second, I contrast two interpretations of the idea of the token‐reflexive paraphrase of an indexical sentence. The utterance approach claims that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of entire utterances. The sub‐utterance approach maintains that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of the particular indexical words used in the utterance. Next, I pose a problem that shows that neither of the two approaches is correct. The problem shows that the only viable version of the token‐reflexive proposition must somehow take into account the referential intentions of the speaker of the context. Therefore I conclude the article by sketching the framework of restricted intentional token‐reflexivism. I argue that it is an attractive semantic theory of distributed utterances that, among other things, enables automatic and intentional indexicals to be distinguished.

Pre-verbal position in BP: a reinterpretation of the "avoid pronoun principle"

The aim of this paper is to analyze the changes occurring in Brazilian Portuguese, regarding the possibility of null subjects, and suggest the kinds of constraints that explain its present distribution. In this paper, we will propose that the null subject parameter is defi ned at the interfaces. At the level of Logical Form, a constraint like Chomsky’s (1981) Avoid Pronoun will be atwork for languages that are prototypical null subject languages, like Spanish and Chinese. For languages like BP, a system with a particular distribution of null subjects, the constraint will be more specifi c: Avoid non-referential pronouns. We will also propose that at the other interface, the Phonetic Form, languages have fi lters regarding their rhythm. To account for the preference for certain forms, a constraint of the form: Avoid V1 will be proposed. This constraint hasnothing to do with an XP constituent in Spec of C, like in V2 languages, but with a phonetic requirement. This means that the initial element can be a head or an XP.

What do speaker judgments tell us about theories of quantifier scope in German?

In this paper we use German data to evaluate configurational and multi-factor approaches to quantifier scope. Configurational theories derive scope relations syntactically at the level of Logical Form; semantic and pragmatic factors are either built into the syntactic representation or ignored, at least during the first derivational step. By contrast, multi-factor approaches consider syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of quantifiers as multiple constraints affecting quantifier scope. We examined predictions for quantifier scope in German of the configurational theory by Frey (1993) and of the multi-factor account by Pafel (2005). These fundamentally different approaches were tested in a series of picture verification experiments to assess scope preferences in doubly quantified German sentences. The results show that at least three factors affect the preferred scope. Our findings are neither fully consistent with Frey’s configurational theory nor with Pafel’s multi-factor approach; both theories made incorrect predictions for German doubly quantified sentences with a subject-before-object word order. For object-before-subject sentences, however, the experimental data by and large support the predictions of Pafel’s (2005) multi-factor approach.

On the unification argument for the predicate view on proper names

The predicate view on proper names opts for a uniform semantic representation of proper nouns like ‘Alfred’ as predicates on the level of logical form. Early defences of this view can be found in Sloat (Language, vol. 45, pp. 26–30, 1969) and Burge (J. Philos. 70: 425–439, 1973), but there is an increasing more recent interest in this view on proper names. My paper aims to provide a reconstruction and critique of Burge’s main argument for the predicate view on proper names, which is still used by several current philosophers in defence of this view. I have called this argument the unification argument. I will present a stepwise interpretation and reconstruction of this argument, consider several possible responses to it and defend a specific response to it in detail.

Logical form in Principia Mathematica and English

The theory of descriptions, presented informally in “On Denoting” and more formally in Principia Mathematica, has been endorsed by many linguists and philosophers of language as a contribution to natural-language semantics. However, the syntax of Principia’s formal language is far from ideal as a tool for the analysis of natural language. Stephen Neale has proposed a reconstruction of the theory of descriptions in a language of restricted quantification that gives a better approximation of the syntax of English (and, arguably, of other natural languages). This has led to resistance from some Russell scholars who object to the identification of descriptions with quantifiers at the level of logical form in this new language on the grounds that the identification fails to respect the Russellian conception of descriptions as incomplete symbols. I defend Neale’s reconstruction of the theory and argue that he has preserved everything essential to the theory, including the notion of an incomplete symbol. However, I then go on to argue, contrary to Neale and his objectors as well as Russell himself, that the doctrine of incomplete symbols is a superfluous and undesirable element of the theory that is best jettisoned from the theory.

Logical Form in <em>Principia Mathematica</em> and English

The theory of descriptions, presented informally in "On Denoting" and more formally in Principia Mathematica, has been endorsed by many linguists and philosophers of language as a contribution to natural-language semantics. However, the syntax of Principia’s formal language is far from ideal as a tool for the analysis of natural language. Stephen Neale has proposed a reconstruction of the theory of descriptions in a language of restricted quantification that gives a better approximation of the syntax of English (and, arguably, of other natural languages). This has led to resistance from some Russell scholars who object to the identification of descriptions with quantifiers at the level of logical form in this new language on the grounds that the identification fails to respect the Russellian conception of descriptions as incomplete symbols. I defend Neale’s reconstruction of the theory and argue that he has preserved everything essential to the theory, including the notion of an incomplete symbol. However, I then go on to argue, contrary to Neale and his objectors as well as Russell himself, that the doctrine of incomplete symbols is a superfluous and undesirable element of the theory that is best jettisoned from the theory.

Motivating Certain Variation Patterns in Degree Constructions: Semantics Meets Grammaticalization

We analyze patterns of variation in degree constructions as ultimately semantically motivated (Beck et al. 2004); more precisely, as rooted at the (structured) level of logical form via a pa3 rameter based on binding. The paper pursues two related objectives. First, we complement the sharp distinction between languages like Japanese vs. English with a case of a language that seems to be parametrically intermediate. We suggest that Modern Romanian is sensitive to largely the same configurations which are conspicuous in the Japanese/English split, but that it marks the relevant dependencies overtly. Second, we probe for the grammaticalization process of the pertinent functional items involved in marking degree dependencies by conducting a dia3 chronic pilot study. In this part of the article, we analyze data from (literary) Old Romanian. We investigate the degree constructions at this stage of the language in preliminary fashion and point out that they display a particularly instable situation with regard to the diagnostics of the degree parameter discussed, a factor which may have enhanced the grammaticalization of the particular strategies under discussion and hence co3motivates the apparently idiosyncratic current distribu3 tion in the language.

Emphatic multiple negative expressions in Dutch

Double Negation languages like Dutch and German still exhibit constructions, such as Dutch niemand niet ‘nobody not’ or nooit geen ‘nothing no’, that seem to have a Negative Concord reading. Since these constructions normally have an emphatic reading, they are called Emphatic Multiple Negative Expressions (EMNEs). In this article I discuss the difference between so-called EMNEs and plain Negative Concord constructions. I demonstrate that EMNEs are fundamentally different from Negative Concord constructions, and that for this reason EMNEs should not be taken to be instances of Negative Concord in Double Negation languages. Instead, I argue that EMNEs are best analyzed as lexical items that consist of two semantic objects, of which only one is semantically negative. By applying overt movement, followed by partial reconstruction at the level of Logical Form both semantic objects can take scope from a different position in the tree. I argue that the single negation an EMNE consists of is the result of the disappearance of Negative Concord in Dutch: after the loss of the preverbal negative marker en/ne, strings containing two n-words or an n-word and a negative marker niet could no longer act as a cue for NC and therefore had to be stored in the lexicon. The death of Dutch NC, so to speak, led to the birth of EMNEs.

Binding principles and ACD constructions in child grammars

. Antecedent-contained deletion (ACD) constructions have been the focus of much recent literature in linguistic theory. These constructions have been instrumental in arguments against dispensing with the operation of Quantifier Raising (QR) and a level of Logical Form (LF) (e.g., May 1985; Fiengo & May 1994; Fox 1999, 2000). In fact, it has been argued that in ACD constructions, the binding principles apply at LF (e.g., Fiengo & May 1994). The present paper assesses 4- and 5-year-old children's knowledge of ACD constructions in which principles B and C are relevant. The empirical findings show that children interpret these ACD structures like adults, suggesting that they invoke the binding principles at LF, and target vP, rather than IP as the landing site for QR, as claimed for adults by Fox (2000) and others. These central properties of ACD constructions in child grammars present a challenge to learning-based theories of language development, because the input to children cannot inform them how to interpret the ellipsis site of ACD structures or which binding principle is in effect. Nevertheless, preschool children are found to have adultlike interpretations of the structures investigated here. The data are taken to provide support for the view that binding principles are part of our innate human endowment for language.

Proclus’ division of the mathematical proposition into parts: how and why was it formulated?

There are a number of ways in which Greek mathematics can be seen to be radically original. First, at the level of mathematical contents: many objects and results were first discovered by Greek mathematicians (e.g. the theory of conic sections). Second, Greek mathematics was original at the level of logical form: it is arguable that no form of mathematics was ever axiomatic independently of the influence of Greek mathematics. Finally, third, Greek mathematics was original at the level of form, of presentation: Greek mathematics is written in its own specific, original style. This style may vary from author to author, as well as within the works of a single author, but it is still always recognizable as the Greek mathematical style. This style is characterized (to mention a few outstanding features) by (i) the use of the lettered diagram, (ii) a specific technical terminology, and (iii) a system of short phrases (‘formulae’). I believe this third aspect of the originality—the style—was responsible, indirectly, for the two other aspects of the originality. The style was a tool, with which Greek mathematicians were able to produce results of a given kind (the first aspect of the originality), and to produce them in a special, compelling way (the second aspect of the originality). This tool, I claim, emerged organically, and reflected the communication-situation in which Greek mathematics was conducted. For all this I have argued elsewhere.

Reciprocity and Cumulative Predication

This paper investigates different readings of plural and reciprocal sentences and how they can be derived from syntactic surface structures in a systematic way. The main thesis is that these readings result from different ways of inserting logical operators at the level of Logical Form. The basic operator considered here is a cumulative mapping from predicates that apply to singularities onto the corresponding predicates that apply to pluralities. Given a theory which allows for free insertion of such operators, it can then be shown that the lexical semantics of the reciprocal expressions each other/one another consists of exactly two components, namely an anaphoric variable and a non-identity statement. This receives further support from the observation that it is exactly these two components that can be focused by only; all that remains to be done is to correctly manipulate these components at the level of LF.

Subjects in Japanese and English

Originally published in 1994, this volume shows that the structural relation 'government' holds not only between the verbal head and its object but also between the verbal head and its subject at least at the level of Logical Form in both Japanese and English. The book provides an analysis of complex predicate constructions in Japanese, discusses phrase structure in Japanese and English and develops a theory of binding.

Meinongian Theories of Generality

Facing problem of making semantic sense of some complex expression in ordinary language, one can sometimes adopt easy way out claiming that expression is not to be taken at face value. Then one feels free to appeal to some purportedly deeper level of analysis, where no urge is felt, for one reason or another, of assigning any one semantic value to it. E.g., one can claim that what appears to be a complex but unitary expression is such only at surface level, whereas it is to be paraphrased away at level of logical form. Being entirely faithful to ordinary language, i.e., keeping appeal to surface/depth dichotomy to a minimum, is usually much more difficult. Meinong, it seems to me, tried to adopt latter strategy, while Russell gave an outstanding example of former in his theory of definite descriptions. In this, however, as in so many other ways, he was simply following Frege. There are sentences containing definite descriptions for which Russell's analysis obviously fails, namely those such as whale is a mammal, horse is a four-legged animal, etc., where no individual whale or horse is meant in particular. Russell, however, did not have to bother with them: in fact, Frege had already dealt with them and way he had done so is paramount example of strategy of paraphrasing away. As we all know, sentence horse is a four-legged animal is taken by Frege to mean All horses (or, all normal specimen of horses) are four-legged. The expression the horse, as a whole, has disappeared from logical form and so has need of making semantic sense of it and assigning it some entity or other. In fact, idea of having indefinite entities play this role was ridiculed by Frege (see, e.g., What is a Function?) just as much as he did in case of variable

Categorial semantics and scoping

Certain restrictions on possible scopings of quantified noun phrases in natural language are usually expressed in terms of formal constraints on binding at a level of logical form. Such reliance on the form rather than the content of semantic interpretations goes against the spirit of compositionality. I will show that those scoping restrictions follow from simple and fundamental facts about functional application and abstraction, and can be expressed as constraints on the derivation of possible meanings for sentences rather than constraints of the alleged forms of those meanings.

Processament d'informació ambigua

This paper is an attempt to explain the phenomenon of neutralization to which certain negative adverbial structures are submitted when the stage of processing the corresponding utterances is reached. This notion of neutralization is to be understood as the disappearance of an ambiguity at the very moment at which people's representation of the world is built and modified. The analysis of the data shows that the level of Logical Form (at which a certain ambiguity is formally represented) and the level of representation at which propositions are conceptualized are different.