Abstract We study cartel detection when two public authorities operate separate leniency programs within the same jurisdiction, as in Korea. We develop an infinitely repeated triopoly model to compare single-agency enforcement with dual-agency enforcement, to distinguish independent operation from cooperation, and to examine how the structure of immunity and fine reductions affects incentives to apply for leniency. When programs operate independently and do not recognize each other’s leniency marker, firms can have weaker incentives to self-report and applications can concentrate in a single program. Cooperation that recognizes leniency priority across authorities restores the race to the courthouse and enlarges the set of enforcement environments in which self-reporting occurs. Cooperation is most reliable when first-in applicants receive comparable treatment across authorities: when reductions for subsequent applicants are available only in the administrative program, greater criminal sanctions can reduce the effectiveness of cooperation by increasing residual liability for subsequent applicants. The results identify limited coordination and harmonization of leniency benefits as key margins for effective dual-agency leniency.

Identifying and prosecuting cartels, which is often called the supreme evil of antitrust, is still among the most difficult issues of competition authorities around the world. The cartels are very dangerous to consumer welfare, they suppress innovation, and they pervert market efficiency due to the secretive nature and the coordinated anti-competitiveness behavior of such cartels. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has increasingly been using its leniency program, which has been based on Section 46 of the Competition Act, 2002, to unravel these illegitimate arrangements in the Indian context. This is a research paper that offers a detailed analysis of the development and the success of the leniency mechanisms in the Indian competition arena. It follows the path of the development of the Lesser Penalty Regulations of 2009 to the ground-breaking amendments of 2017 and the introduction of the so-called 'Leniency Plus' regime by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023. The paper estimates the practical difficulties that limit a vigorous race to the CCI by examining some of the trends and legal precedents in enforcement, such as the initial case of Brushless DC Fans and the broad Battery Cartel decisions. These obstacles comprise procedural ambiguity, the elevated evidentiary bar to vital disclosure, the threat of follow-on damages, and the threat of public procurement debarment. Additionally, the paper looks at the mechanism of Leniency Plus in detail, the mechanism that is capable of incentivizing self-reporting in various markets of the product, and conforms to the international best practice in the US and EU. The study employs a descriptive and analytical approach, which uses the provisions of the statutes, regulatory guidelines, and critical analysis by scholars. The results imply that the Indian leniency regime has grown considerably, but the bottom line to its success is the improvement of transparency in the procedures, the high level of confidentiality protection, and a balance between the carrot and the stick of penalties reduction and effective deterrence. The paper ends with a series of policy recommendations to tighten the leniency framework in order to have a more competitive and transparent market environment in India. Keywords: Cartels, Leniency Mechanism, Competition Commission of India, Leniency Plus, Section 46, Competition Act 2002, Anti-competitive Agreements, Market System, Bid-rigging

Cartel Desistance and (Non-)Automatic Promises in Leniency Policy Design

Abstract The number of competition authorities applying national competition law extraterritorially has grown significantly in recent years. This increasingly concerns cases in which several antitrust authorities and courts get involved in the same cases around the world simultaneously. This sometimes even concerns jurisdictions in which the infringement had minor or no appreciable effects at all. Such developments can increase the risk of international policy conflicts. The coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency of the international antitrust order, however, depend on predictable and reasonable approaches. This is especially true for instruments like remedies decisions, settlements, and leniency programs. An uncoordinated, multipolar enforcement landscape, where agencies pursue overlapping actions independently, risks undermining these tools. Against this backdrop, our study describes the prerequisites and limits of extraterritorial application of competition law, not least with regard to the “effects doctrine” and the idea of comity. Above all, the study explains that qualified requirements regarding the impact on domestic circumstances must be met in order to grant a right to extraterritorial application. The authority pursuing this claim bears the burden of proof for these requirements to be met.

The new Argentine leniency programme

The aim of this paper is to analyze the penal policy and the implementation of the leniency program within the competition law of the Republic of Serbia, focusing on their effectiveness in combating cartels. The research applies normative-analytical and comparative methods, with special attention to the practice of the Commission for Protection of Competition. Particular emphasis is placed on the economic effects of sanctions and incentives for cooperation among market participants. The paper highlights the limitations of the current implementation of the leniency program, as well as the need to strengthen institutional capacities and establish clearer criteria for assessing cooperation. The main conclusion is that a combination of repressive measures and incentive mechanisms can yield better results in preventing serious violations of competition, but only if applied consistently and transparently.

ABSTRACT This article examines the effect of firms’ lobbying expenditures on penalties received from public competition authorities. We show that lobbying expenditures are negatively associated with the amount of the cartel sanction, across and within cartel. Our estimates also report that cartel sanctions are more responsive to lobbying expenditures when the lobbying firm qualifies for the leniency programme. If we consider lobbying expenditures as a proxy for informativeness, more uncertainty in uncovering the cartel incentivizes the antitrust authority to reduce the cartel sanction in exchange for lobby.

Whistleblowing and leniency programmes are important instruments to detect and successfully solve crimes. Whereas whistleblowers are natural persons who report or disclose legal violations in which they are not necessarily involved, principal witnesses are involved in criminal activities and report their knowledge to the authorities. Legal systems must provide incentives for people to report their knowledge and make it available to the authorities. Whistleblowers must therefore be guaranteed adequate protection, and principal witnesses must benefit from disclosing their knowledge by having their penalties reduced or waived entirely.

This study aims to examine the application of indirect evidence in handling cartel practices in the cooking oil industry, focusing on a case study of Decision No. 24/KPPU-I/2009 Jo. No.03/KPPU/2010/PN.JKT.PST Jo. Number 582K/PDT.SUS/2011. The research method used is the juridical-normative approach, which relies on legal sources such as laws and regulations, legal principles, norms, principles, and expert opinions to analyze the issues studied. In the KPPU decision No. 24/KPPU-I/2009, the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) stated that 21 cooking oil producers were proven to have practiced cartels. However, business actors applied with the Central Jakarta District Court, which then overturned the decision through Decision No. 03/KPPU/2010/PN.JKT.PST. The cancellation was based on the consideration that KPPU only relied on analysis, theories, and definitions considered speculative and not supported by substantial evidence. KPPU then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court rejected the appeal and upheld the settlement of the first-level court through Decision No. 582K/PDT.SUS/2011. This study also highlights that challenges in indirect evidence can be overcome by implementing a leniency program, as has been implemented in various countries. This program incentivizes parties involved in the cartel to disclose information to the competition authority.

The longevity of cartels has been a highly contested topic among economists and policymakers, with numerous researchers arguing that cartels are inherently unstable, and their endurance is usually short-lived. Understanding the main factors that influence cartel duration is essential from a managerial point of view let alone the competition policy perspective. The present paper employs quantile regression techniques thus allowing for a more thorough and precise depiction of the data in terms of estimations compared to the traditional OLS analysis. The empirical findings support that the number of cartelists imposes an asymmetric effect, reducing (increasing) the lifespan of collusion only in the short (long)-lived cartels. Operating internationally and having a third-party facilitator both lengthen cartels, but the magnitudes of these effects decline monotonically over the range of the distribution. Relative to price-fixing, bid-rigging lengthens cartels in the bottom 20% of the distribution but has no significant effect elsewhere. Finally, the institutional effect such as the prevalence of leniency programs appears to have no significant effect on cartel duration, except at the very bottom of the distribution where the effect is small in magnitude. The results survive robustness checks addressing endogeneity and reverse causality.

Alternative prioritization for mitigating competition-related issues in Tanzania sugar industry using an integrated multi-criteria decision-making approach.

ABSTRACT The competition literature documents that leniency programmes can either destabilize or reinforce the sustainability of horizontal cartels. We contribute to this body of literature by looking at a specific type of cartels, namely hub and spoke cartels. Drawing on earlier work of Van Cayseele and Miegielsen (2013)1 on hub and spoke cartels, and Chen and Rey’s dynamic leniency model for horizontal cartels (2013),2 this paper builds a model that measures the impact of leniency programmes on hub and spoke cartels. From our model it follows that it is always desirable to offer some ex-ante leniency to the first-reporting hub and spoke cartel member to discourage cartel formation and that this optimal leniency rate is unique for both the hub and spokes.

The Leniency Program is a partial or total reduction in fines or penalties granted by competition authorities to companies involved in cartel practices. This program is implemented in various countries, including the European Union, the United States and Australia, to uncover cartel practices by providing incentives in the form of reduced or eliminated sanctions for businesses that report their involvement and provide evidence. The negative impact that cartel practices have on competition and consumers, as well as the legal framework in various countries, including Indonesia. This research uses a qualitative desk study approach, analyzing secondary data from relevant literature. The findings show that leniency programs are an effective tool to uncover hidden cartel activity, although challenges remain, such as ensuring legal protection for whistleblowers and tailoring strategies to the local legal context.

The Brazilian Antitrust Law established the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) as the body responsible for investigating and imposing sanctions for acts that violate the economic order, as well as for supervising acts of economic concentration. The field of game theory is concerned with the actions of decision-makers who are aware that their decisions affect one another. The objective of the proposed article is to analyse the legal framework of the Leniency Programme implemented by Brazil's Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) using the tools provided by game theory, in particular sequential games with perfect information. The methodology employed is classified as theoretical research, utilising the deductive method with the objective of enhancing the proposed theme. In order to achieve this, two game models will be developed. Initially, it was observed that the benefits offered by the current Brazilian leniency programme are insufficient to persuade a potential cartel member to propose a leniency agreement. Conversely, in a second step, the introduction of immunity for applicants from civil damages caused by the cartel resulted in the conclusion that the Brazilian antitrust leniency programme becomes an important tool for deterring and combating cartels. KEYWORDS: Antitrust Law. Cartel. Game theory. Leniency. Sequential games.

Background: Several bills were proposed during the 20th and 21st National Assemblies to grant special judicial police powers to employees of the National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) to improve the low recovery rate of unfair profits collected by non-medical practitioner hospitals. The Ministry of Health and Welfare made a pre-announcement of legislation regarding the revision of the Enforcement Decree of the Medical Law, aiming to delegate certain enforcement responsibilities, including investigations into illegally established hospitals. This study discusses the contents and issues related to the bill, focusing on the revision of the Enforcement Decree of Medical Law and the bill proposed by the 21st National Assembly. Furthermore, it proposes improvements to address the challenges posed by non-medical practitioner hospitals.Current Concepts: We pointed out concerns regarding the bill to grant special judicial police powers to NHIC employees, such as the potential infringement of basic rights due to a lack of expertise among these special judicial police, a reversal of procedural thinking, challenges in identifying illegal hospitals, the appropriateness of granting investigative rights to NHIC employees, and the risk of abuse of these rights.Discussion and Conclusion: We propose strengthening the establishment, operations, and supervision of medical corporations; introducing a preliminary monitoring system for the establishment of medical institutions through branches of medical personnel organizations; and implementing a leniency program.

Abstract We analyze the self‐reporting incentives fostered by a leniency program within a criminal network formed by a supplier of an illegal good and his dealers who compete against each other in the product market. We show that when it is viable, a first‐informant rule always performs better than an all‐informant rule—that is, it induces a lower level of crime. Nevertheless, the viability of a first‐informant rule may be compromised if the baseline probability of conviction is sufficiently low, thereby placing disproportionate reliance on leniency over other investigative efforts for securing convictions.

The paper discusses a model describing corrupt interactions among agents in network structures, based on game-theoretic models and experimental methods. Inspired by the work of R. Ferrali (2020), this model aims to study the formation and disruption of corrupt coalitions among agents interacting within a network, where agents have incentives to involve each other in illicit activities, thus forming a coalition. Key aspects of the model include the probability of detecting opportunistic behavior and the influence of the network structure on corrupt interactions. The study demonstrates the existence of two equilibria within the system – one favorable and one unfavorable. The possibility of corruption elimination through auditing and leniency program mechanisms are discussed. The remarkable thing is that the stated issues hold significant potential for further scientific research, particularly in analyzing the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms within the framework of laboratory economic experiments.

Abstract: Indonesia's abundant natural resources, particularly minerals and coal, prompted this study. Article 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution explicitly states that natural resources should benefit the people. However, illegal mining persists, profiting only a select few. Therefore, implementing the Leniency Program in Indonesia is crucial to fostering ecological citizenship. This legal research employs a normative juridical approach, incorporating conceptual and legislative perspectives. The findings indicate ongoing law enforcement issues in the mining sector, involving mining mafias. Consequently, the Leniency Program could serve as a novel strategy to eradicate mining mafias. Abstrak: Penelitian ini dilatarbelakangi oleh kekayaan sumber daya alam Indonesia, khususnya mineral dan batu bara. Sebagaimana yang diamanatkan dalam Pasal 33 Ayat 3 UUD 1945, sumber daya alam harus dimanfaatkan untuk sebesar-besarnya kemakmuran rakyat. Namun pada kenyataannya, praktik pertambangan ilegal masih marak terjadi dan hanya menguntungkan segelintir pihak. Oleh karena itu, penerapan Program Leniency menjadi penting untuk dikaji dalam rangka penegakan keadilan ekologi di Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan konseptual dan perundang-undangan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan masih adanya permasalahan penegakan hukum di sektor pertambangan, yang melibatkan mafia pertambangan. Dengan demikian, Program Leniency dapat menjadi strategi baru untuk memberantas mafia tambang.

This article summarizes last year’s developments in anti-cartel enforcement by the European Commission as well as a number of selected key judgments by the EU Courts. It covers the period from June 2022 to September 2023. As in past editions, we have classified the most relevant cases by theme, starting with a general summary of the European Commission’s recent anti-cartel enforcement activity, followed by issues surrounding the European Commission’s leniency programme. It proceeds with procedural, substantive, and fining issues addressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the relevant time frame.

Abstract This study investigates the effects of leniency programs on cartel duration, cartel fines, and the length of investigations, providing empirical insights that contribute to the ongoing debate regarding their theoretical and empirical implications. The introduction of leniency programs in two different jurisdictions (EU and Spain) at different times and the exogeneity of the introduction date enable us to identify their impact using difference-in-differences estimations. We empirically show that leniency programs, by destabilizing existing cartels, allow for the detection of the longer-lasting ones in the short run. In the long run, our results suggest that destabilization effects prevail, and leniency programs discourage the creation of new cartels. Specifically, our findings indicate that the duration of detected cartels almost doubles in the short run and nearly halves in the long run. Finally, our study reveals that the introduction of leniency programs results in a significant increase in the average fines per cartel case, both before and after taking into account the fine reductions resulting from these programs. This suggests that leniency programs contribute to stronger sanctions against cartels, enhancing their general deterrent effect. However, our findings also indicate that leniency programs lengthen the average duration of cartel investigations, which may hinder the ability of competition authorities to proactively pursue other cases.