Legislative Productivity Research Articles

Military Service and Legislative Agendas: A Study of Legislators in Four States

Candidates often highlight military experience on the campaign trail. Do they also govern differently? This study examines whether and how military experience is associated with state lawmaking. We examine legislative productivity, success rates, and the substantive content of legislation with a large original data set. The data include over 60,000 bills introduced in four state legislatures over a 10-year time span, coded for their substantive focus. It also includes information on characteristics of over 4,000 legislators. Our analysis of these data indicates that veterans do not differ in overall levels of productivity but do have common legislative agendas. Veterans’ shared legislative agendas are not narrowly confined to defense or security issues but vary depending on state context. This is, to our knowledge, the most extensive empirical analysis of the legislative behavior of veterans in a single study.

Assessing the parliamentary activities of UK MPs

The goals of this paper are threefold: (1) to investigate whether Akirav’s legislative productivity scale first developed in Israel can be used in the UK; (2) to determine whether it is better to analyze parliamentary activities separately or consider the use of all of the parliamentary tools available; and, (3) to examine Mayhew’s electoral connection in the UK. We define and measure legislative productivity as the number of parliamentary questions asked, early day motions presented, and private members’ bills initiated by individual MPs in the UK parliament. In addition, we assess the effectiveness of their legislative activity by the number of private members’ bills that passed. We found that UK MPs behave in a manner similar to other parliamentarians in other countries with respect to the variation in their use of parliamentary tools and ultimately, their legislative productivity, defined in terms of their activity, and their effectiveness. In addition, in accordance with previous studies, individual differences such as gender and institutional explanations such as being a member of the government or the opposition and seniority explain differences in productivity levels.

Evaluating the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the European Union’s Legislative Productivity

The purpose of this article is to analyze whether the Treaty of Lisbon provisions have – as expected – increased the EU legislative productivity. To this end, the author tests the hypothesis that the TL has increased the number of legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. This expectation is verified using a negative binomial regression on a dataset containing 1116 draft acts proposed by the Commission in 2004‑2014. The analysis shows that, contrary to expectations, the Treaty of Lisbon has not led to a visible increase in EU legislative productivity. Despite the extension of treaty bases envisaging the OLP and QMV, the number of proposals submitted under this procedure after the entry into force of the TL remained more or less at the same level as before. In addition, the study reveals that adaptation, anticipation of future enlargement, closeness to the end of the EP term as well as annual schedule of legislative work are key predictors of the Commission’s productivity.

Electoral persistence and the quality of public policies: evidence from the dynamics of lawmaking in the Philippine House of Representatives, 1992-2016

ABSTRACT Can elections serve as vector of good public policy in fledgling democracies where electorally persistent elites circumvent institutional safeguards? Examining legislative productivity for each member of the Philippine House of Representatives from 1992 to 2016, we argue that while electoral persistence can be short-run welfare enhancing by inducing legislative attention on particularistic policies, it is ultimately electoral competition and the prospect of ouster that determine overall legislative behaviour. Using various measures of electoral competition, our panel estimates suggest that district incumbents who faced competitive elections, regardless of political pedigree, are more likely to work for the passage of their legislative proposals into legislation. The results lend credence to the disciplining effect of elections, even in precarious political settings where competition is between equally persistent political elites. Overall, incumbents who fought competitive elections are generally more likely to produce laws as a legislative preoccupation – a commitment they are likely to pursue even in the presence of institutional and political uncertainties.

Electoral Rules and Legislators’ Productivity

AbstractOver the years, there have been a variety of changes to candidate selection methods for the Israeli Knesset. As a result, there have been changes in the way the Knesset functions. This study investigates whether these changes have made legislators more productive. To explore this issue, we used Akirav’s (2016) legislative productivity scale with data from the 14th, 16th and 19th Knesset (Israel’s parliament) terms to test several hypotheses. We found that in Israel, the candidate selection process affects legislators’ productivity, with the 19th Knesset proving the most productive. Nevertheless, in Israel, legislators’ productivity does not affect the likelihood of them being reelected.

AGENTS, PRINCIPALS, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN? BUREAUCRATS AND POLICY CONTROL IN THAILAND

AbstractIn the aftermath of the 2006 and 2014 Thai coups, observers declared the resurrection of the bureaucratic polity. Bureaucrats, though, remained influential even during the period of 1992–2006, when elected politicians were thought to command the Thai state. Bureaucratic involvement in politics poses a challenge for dominant political science theories of politician–bureaucrat relationships, which draw heavily from principal–agent frameworks. I apply agency theory to Thailand, testing three different hypotheses derived from the theory. Examining legislative productivity and control over bureaucratic career trajectories, I find that elected politicians increasingly acted as principals of the Thai state from 1992 through 2006, and to a lesser degree from 2008 to 2013. Thai bureaucrats, though, have frequently engaged in the political sphere, blunting political oversight and expanding their independence vis-à-vis politicians. This suggests that the principal–agent model overlooks the range of resources that bureaucracies can bring to bear in developing countries, granting them greater autonomy than anticipated. As such, theories of the politician–bureaucrat relationship in developing states need to better account for the mechanisms through which bureaucrats exercise policy discretion and political influence.

"국회선진화법의 입법 영향과 발의주체별 입법생산성 분석: 19대 국회를 중심으로"

의원입법의 증가는 입법 활동의 주도권이 행정부에서 국회로 이전되고 있음을 보여주는 중요한 지표이다. 그러나 민주화 이후 의원 발의안은 양적 팽창을 이루었음에도 불구하고, 파행적 국회와 잦은 입법 교착 등 문제가 끊이지 않고 있다. 특히, 정부 제출안과 비교하여 의원 발의안의 낮은 가결률은 입법부로서 국회의 역할에 대한 의문과 문제의식을 야기하였다. 의원입법의 낮은 생산성을 극복하고, 입법주체로서의 역할을 회복하기 위하여 국회는 19대 국회 시작 전인 2012년 5월 국회선진화법을 통과시켰다. 본 연구는 국회선진화법이 적용된 19대 국회의 발의 주체별 입법생산성을 분석하였으며, 그 결과 19대 국회에서 입법 활동이 기존 정부･여당 중심에서 정부-여당-야당의 협력체제로 전환되고 있음을 확인하였다. 첫째, 국회선진화법이 적용된 19대 국회는 이전 국회보다 의원입법의 비중이 3배 증가하였다. 둘째, 의원입법의 비중이 증가는 하였으나, 세부적으로 여당입법보다는 야당입법의 비중이 더 크게 증가하였다. 이 결과는 국회선진화법의 목적인 여･야의 협력정치가 실제 작동되고 있음을 증명하고 있다. 셋째, 여당 위원장의 주요 상임위(예, 기재위, 국방위 등)에서는 정부 제출안의 가결률이 매우 높은데, 이는 여당과 행정부의 협력 및 입법역량 집중으로 설명된다. 반면에, 야당 위원장 또는 여･야가 분점한 상임위에서는 위원장의 정당 편향성과 입법생산성 간의 관련성은 무의미해지고, 대신에 여･야 의원들의 활발한 입법 활동이 확인되었다. 즉, 소속 상임위에서 의원들은 지역구 이익 대변, 그리고 재선 가능성 제고 등 이익분배이론적 입법 활동을 펼치고 있다.

Electoral Competition and Legislator Effectiveness

How do legislators respond to electoral competition? We consider this question by looking at the relationship between legislative productivity and the competitiveness of legislators’ primary and general elections. Building on Volden and Wiseman’s preliminary investigation of the electoral connection to legislative productivity, we introduce to that analysis the critical and often-overlooked distinction between primary and general election competitiveness. Employing panel data of U.S. House members spanning three decades (1979-2009), we find significant evidence of a positive relationship between primary vote share and legislative effectiveness, much of which is explained by having primary opposition at all. These results have substantial implications for our understanding of both the electoral connection and legislative behavior.

Pivotal Politics and the ideological content of Landmark Laws

AbstractThe Pivotal Politics model (Krehbiel) has significantly influenced the study of American politics, but its core empirical prediction – that the size of the gridlock interval is negatively related to legislative productivity – has not found strong empirical support. We argue that previous research featured a disconnect between the exclusively ideological theory and tests that relied on outcome variables that were not purely ideological. We remedy this by dividing landmark laws (Mayhew) into two counts – those that invoke ideological preferences and those that do not – and uncover results consistent with Pivotal Politics’ core prediction: the size of the gridlock interval is negatively related to the production of ideological legislation. We also find that the size of the gridlock zone is positively related to the production of nonideological legislation. These results hold up in the face of various sensitivity analyses and robustness checks. We further show that Pivotal Politics explains variation in ideological legislation better than alternative theories based on partisan agenda control.

규제 관련 정부제출법안 입법생산성의 영향 요인 분석 : 대통령의 규제개혁 의지를 중심으로

규제 관련 정부제출법안 입법생산성의 영향 요인 분석 : 대통령의 규제개혁 의지를 중심으로

The Analysis of White House Occupant and Political Polarization in the United States

<p>This paper examines a previously unidentified causal factor – White House Occupant (WHO) – in political polarization and then investigates its impact on legislative productivity and the aggregate economy. Objective pundits would agree that the United States has entered a new phase of “pandemic political polarization” because Congressional Republicans had racial resentment of Obama and they did everything to obstruct his policy agenda; and now, in retaliation and on policy issues, Democrats resent Trump. In view of the changing American electorate, we consider WHO’s race or gender or perceived religious affiliation or policy positions to be an important causal factor that will contribute to extreme political polarization in the foreseeable future. We model how political polarization will in turn depress economic growth. In addition to introducing a novel element to the ongoing research on the consequences of political polarization, this paper contributes to the broader literature by asserting that a WHO is one of the determinants of political polarization and Congressional productivity; and that the remarkable contraction in Congressional productivity during Obama’s presidency, which we found to be statistically and significantly different from the other three two-term presidents who served in the past four decades, supported this assertion. </p>

Decision-making potential and ‘detailed’ legislation of Western European parliamentary governments (1990–2013)

The first and foremost task of all governments is to make decisions. Consequently, studies on governments should deal above all with their ability to produce legislation. To this respect, this article analyses the legislative productivity of 112 parliamentary governments in 12 Western European democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) from 1990 to 2013. My independent variable is an index offering an immediate picture of the decision-making potential of parliamentary governments, while the dependent variable is the ‘detailed’ legislative production of those governments. If we are able to differentiate between governments who decide, and governments who do not, we could answer a considerable number of interesting questions: which Western European parliamentary democracies tend to produce more (detailed) laws and which – on the contrary – are used to facing greater difficulties for achieving that goal? What are the reasons behind these opposing trends? The empirical results largely confirms that the more a parliamentary government has got decision-making potential (in terms of the proposed index), the more likely it will pass ‘detailed’ legislation.

Tried and Tested? Dynastic Persistence and Legislative Productivity at the Philippine House of Representatives

Examining the determinants of legislative success at the Philippine House of Representatives, this study shows empirically why continuous entrenchment by political families can be detrimental to political institutions. Using count regression models, the study analyzes the patterns of law production in the Philippine Lower House beginning from the opening of the first post‐Marcos Congress (8th Congress) in 1987 to the adjournment of the 15th Congress in 2013. The study finds that successive terms in office facilitate the ability of legislators to engage in legislative activities but only up to a point. Neophyte legislators who have yet to gain a foothold in their districts appear to be more proactive in concretizing proposals into actual legislation, at least initially. Over time, when legislative districts have become family turfs, incumbents cease to invest in vote courting activities such as legislation, lending credence to the unhealthy effect of political persistence on accountability.

Competing Gridlock Models and Status Quo Policies

Spatial theories of lawmaking predict that legislative productivity is increasing in the number of status quo policies that lie outside the gridlock interval, but because locations of status quo policies are difficult to measure, previous empirical tests of gridlock theories rely on an auxiliary assumption that the distribution of status quo points is fixed and uniform. This assumption is at odds with the theories being tested, as it ignores the history dependence of lawmaking. We provide an alternative method for testing competing theories by estimating structural models that explicitly account for temporal dependence in a theoretically consistent way. Our analysis suggests that legislative productivity depends both on parties and supermajority pivots, and we find patterns of productivity consistent with a weaker, contingent form of party influence than found in previous work. Parties appear to exert agenda power only on highly salient legislation rather than strongly influencing outcomes through voting pressure and party unity.

Signing Statements, Gridlock, and Presidential Strategy

During George W. Bush's second term, controversy emerged over president's perceived handling of hundreds of duly enacted congressional statutes. Phillip Cooper (2005) was among first to call attention to Bush's propensity for using signing statements as a way to construe intent of a bill he had just signed, and others quickly followed suit. Charlie Savage of Boston Globe reported in early 2006 that President Bush has quietly claimed authority to disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office, and a year later, American Bar Association (2006, 1) released a report decrying the misuse of presidential signing statements, urging a different course of action that would limit undue presidential influence. A surge in research on presidential signing statements followed in wake of controversy (Berry 2009; Conley 2011; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2009, 2010; Korzi 2011; Ostrander and Sievert 2013; Sollenberger and Rozell 2011). The belief that Bush's usage of signing statements was unprecedented (Savage 2006) was significantly overstated, but nevertheless, focus among many presidential scholars, especially scholars of unilateral presidential power, began to shift to causes and consequences of signing statements. Signing statements are not new, but perception at least is that their use is consequential, prompting many to ponder when and why will use these statements. Extant research has advanced two theories about use of presidential signing statements. The first is a political perspective, which holds that signing statements are at least in part a reaction to ideological differences with Congress (Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 2010; Whitford 2012). The second view is a separation of powers perspective, which takes signing statement as a presidential reaction to infringement by Congress on powers of president (Evans 2011; Ostrander and Sievert 2012). This view holds that political considerations can be secondary to more fundamental presidential concerns about encroachment of Congress on president's prerogatives. As Ostrander and Sievert (2012, 10) write, presidents and Congress are interested not only in policy outcomes but also in their relative balance of power vis-a-vis one another. These two views are not mutually exclusive. Berry (2009) and Kelley and Marshall (2008) contend that institutional prerogatives matter to president when it comes to use of signing statements. Thus, signing statement is, as Ostrander and Sievert suggest, a story of multiple considerations, meeting together to shape presidential strategy. However, scholars have not adequately considered ideological differences between president and Congress as well as gridlock within Congress when developing models to test usage of signing statements. Principally, measures of separation between two branches have largely been dichotomized to represent differences between unified and divided government (Berry 2009; Kelley and Marshall 2008; Ostrander and Sievert 2012). When ideology is considered (Kelley and Marshall 2010), it is done independent of gridlock within Congress. This article argues that varying levels of legislative gridlock interact with nature of Congress's relationship to president (i.e., whether government is unified or divided) to change presidential motivations and use of signing statements. Gridlock and Presidential Strategy Gridlock and divided government, when visited in conjunction with study of legislative productivity and government action, received quite a beating in realm of public opinion and among scholars for years before David Mayhew's (1991) groundbreaking study. James Sundquist (1988, 629) captured conventional wisdom of time when he described divided government as both unhealthy and debilitating. However, with Mayhew (1991) came argument that divided government hampers legislative productivity (at least in face of important legislation) either not at all or not as much as is expected. …

Politics to the extreme: American political institutions in the twenty-first century

Foreword Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein Introduction Scott A. Frisch and Sean Q Kelly PART I: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PARTISAN POLARIZATION 1. Appropriations to the Extreme: Partisanship and the Power of the Purse Geoffrey W. Buhl, Scott A. Frisch and Sean Q Kelly 2. The Gingrich Senators, the Tea Party Senators, and Their Effect on the U.S. Senate Sean Theriault 3. The Weaponization of Congressional Oversight: The Politics of the Watchful Eye, 1947-2010 David C.W. Parker and Matthew Dull 4. Party Polarization, Member Incivility, and Legislative Productivity: A Two-Dimensional Perspective on Conflict and Moderation in Congress Lawrence C. Dodd and Scot Schraufnagel 5. Let's Play Hardball: Congressional Partisanship in the Television Era Douglas Harris 6. Profile Politics: Examining Polarization through Congressional Member Facebook Pages Jose Marichal 7. Necessary and Damaging: Presidential Base Electoral Strategies and Partisan Polarization Lara Brown 8. A Polarizing Supreme Court? Judicial Decisions in a Red/Blue America Kevin J. McMahon PART II: BRIDGING THE PARTISAN DIVIDE 9. Growing Apart: 'Civilista' Attempts to Bridge the Partisan Rift Frank Mackaman 10. Can Polarization be Mitigated? California's Experiment with the Top-Two Primary Seth Masket 11. How to Turn Democrats and Republicans into Americans Mickey Edwards

Rules of Procedure as a Cause of Legislative Paralysis: The Case of Costa Rica, 2002–2012

AbstractResearch on executive-legislative relations in Latin America has focused on the impact of minority presidents and multiparty legislatures on legislative productivity. But an additional deadlock scenario, the blocking of a majority president by a minority through filibustering, has been understudied. This article analyzes filibustering in Costa Rica and explains the legislative paralysis in the wake of the nation's transition to a multiparty system in 2002. Legislative paralysis is seen as a product of the interaction between increased legislative fragmentation and polarization and the legislature's preexisting rules of procedure, which enable legislators easily to block bills they oppose, even when those bills are supported by supermajorities. This argument is tested through a comparison of major economic reforms in the 2000s to the reforms tackled in the 1990s. The role of filibustering, well acknowledged in U.S. politics, should also be studied in comparative politics.

Do Higher Salaries Lead to Higher Performance? Evidence from State Politicians

We study the impact of politician salary on electoral competitiveness and political performance using new data on US state legislators and governors over the last sixty years. Higher salary is associated with statistically significant, but economically small, increases in electoral competitiveness and legislative productivity, the latter measured with bill-passing and missed roll-call votes. Salary has no effect on politician quality, corruption, or fiscal policy. To address the possible concern of salary changes being correlated with politicians' outside options, we implement a spatial discontinuity design using legislative district pairs straddling state borders and find modest impacts of salary, similar as in our other research designs. The impact of politician salary is weakest in states with strong political parties, suggesting that parties may reduce entry. Despite small impacts on performance, higher salary is significantly correlated with behavior on another margin, namely time-use: time-use data suggests that politicians in higher wage states spend greater time on fund-raising and on constituent services, but no more time on legislative activities. Our results lend caution to common claims that increasing politician salary would significantly increase the quality of US state government.

Divided Government, Legislative Productivity, and Policy Change in the USA and France

The concept of “divided government” is more complicated than scholars have allowed. In the USA, truly unified government, where the president enjoys a filibuster‐proof majority in the Senate as well as a majority in the House, is rare. In France, truly unified government has been more common, but divided government has also occurred several times. Democratic governance requires that parties address important issues and they do so regardless of the patterns of institutional control. Nevertheless, policy changes or important laws are affected by the higher level of institutional friction associated with divided government. Looking at both the USA and France, we find that periods of unified government show higher levels of production of important laws in the USA, but we find no difference for overall legislative productivity.

Do Higher Salaries Lead to Higher Performance? Evidence from State Politicians

We study the impact of politician salary on electoral competitiveness and political performance using new data on U.S. state legislators and governors over the last sixty years. Higher salary is associated with statistically significant, but economically small, increases in electoral competitiveness and legislative productivity, the latter proxied with bill-passing and missed roll call votes. Salary has no effect on politician quality, corruption, or fiscal policy. To address the possible concern of salary changes being correlated with politicians' outside options, we implement a spatial discontinuity design using legislative district pairs straddling state borders, and find modest impacts of salary, as in the fixed effects and selection-on-observables designs. The impact of politician salary is weakest (i.e., totally absent) in states with strong political parties, suggesting that parties may reduce entry. Despite small impacts on performance, higher salary is significantly correlated with behavior on another margin, namely time-use; time-use data suggests that politicians in higher wage states spend greater time on fund-raising and on constituent services, but no more time on legislative activities. Our results lend caution to common claims that increasing politician salary would significantly increase the quality of U.S. state government.