In his work The Spirit of the Laws (De l'esprit des lois), published in 1748, Montesquieu formulated his doctrine of the separation of powers, which has remained influential to this day. He distinguished between the legislative power, the executive power in matters of international law, and the executive power in civil law matters, the latter essentially referring to the judiciary (Montesquieu, 1899, p. 151). “According to Montesquieu, the English monarchy functioned because several powers were set against each other, and the legislative and judicial powers were particularly safeguarded against the executive power, which embodies the greatest danger of power concentration (Csűrös, 2007).” Contrary to popular belief, however, it was not Montesquieu who laid the foundation for the three classical branches of power; Aristotle had already mentioned the council deliberating on public affairs, the magistrates, and the judiciary, which correspond to the trichotomy of legislation, execution, and adjudication. Aristotle considered politeia–a mixture of democracy and oligarchy–to be the proper form of governance (Cservák, 2022). From the classical separation of powers, it follows that each branch inherently carries its own independence, while it must also be noted that “the three branches of power exercise their authority through multiple state bodies, and overlaps can be observed with regard to their competences (Cservák, 2015). This leads to the legitimate question of whether judicial enforcement–particularly the judicial officer–is independent, and to which branch of power this activity belongs. This is further supported by the fact that “the judicial officer, during the enforcement of the law, is a public official or civil servant who does not act on behalf of the creditor but on behalf of the state, in the name of the public (Sőréné, 2023).” This paper aims to analyze the key aspects of the institution of judicial enforcement, specifically the independence and responsibility of judicial officers within the Hungarian legal system. In my view, the enforcement system, which ensures the execution of enforceable court or notarial decisions, is indispensable for the functioning of the rule of law; however, the public authority powers vested in judicial officers require strict accountability. The purpose of this study is to explore the theoretical foundations of independence and responsibility, and in this context, to examine the legal status of judicial officers and enforcement offices as defined by Act LIII of 1994 on Judicial Enforcement, taking their system of accountability as a reference point. The paper also investigates the relationship between the appointment and remuneration system of judicial officers, highlighting the potential impacts of performance-based compensation on independence. Furthermore, it analyzes the types and mechanisms of civil, criminal, and disciplinary liability of judicial officers, with particular regard to mandatory liability insurance, crimes of abuse of office and corruption, as well as the role of disciplinary courts.

International courts are part of institutional solutions that are an answer to the necessity to solve various new problems affecting global society. However, for state, democracy and the rule of law this kind of role of the case law of international courts creates a problem. On the one hand it exists in competition to national judicial power and can verify its actions, and on the other hand it influences the content of provisions contained in international agreements, which is a clear example of the development of law (as to its substance) which bypasses the legislative power. Therefore, judgements of international tribunals have no direct effects, and their execution takes place by the actions of proper state organs on the basis of their national (constitutional) powers. This guarantees that the state has an impact on the manner in which aforementioned judgments are executed, and that it indicates the boundaries within which the state undertakes to abide by such a judgment. The possibility of the constitutional review of judgments delivered by international courts plays an important role in the process of their execution. It indeed deals with answering the question of whether broadly understood effects of a judgment can lead to a breach of the Constitution. A constitutional review is particularly advisable in the case regarding judgments of the ECtHR. They are indeed a tool by means of which the ECHR constitutes a living instrument. Thus, the probability of violating constitutional boundaries is higher than in the case of an ordinary international agreement. The consequence of this phenomenon in Poland is the activation of a review mechanism, such as that allowed by the existing legal system. It is a constitutional control of judgements of the ECtHR, although only in the formula of control of norms on which the judgement is based. In ongoing practice, the CT has made such a control twice, in the case ref. no. K 6/21 and K 7/21. And twice the CT decided that norms derived by judgements of ECtHR from art. 6 ECHR, are contrary to the Constitution. Poland has not executed judgments of the ECtHR based on unconstitutional norms.

The president of the United States has extensive executive power as the head of the executive branch. This administrative power derives from the principle of separation of powers and is an essential authority for the president to lead the administration and carry out national policies. However, if these powers are excessively expanded, they can lead to dictatorship, so they should be properly controlled through checks and balances between Congress and the judiciary. Article 2 (1) 1 of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that “administrative power belongs to the President of the United States of America.” Here, the term “administrative power” refers to the authority to enforce laws, that is, the unique authority of the administration that embodies the law. The President has an obligation to take care to ensure that the law is faithfully enforced (Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the U.S. Constitution), which gives him both responsibility for law enforcement and authority. The president's executive power is an open power to use the means necessary to enforce the law, especially in a national crisis, and the president has an obligation to save the state or citizens by all means possible, so he exercises enormous power in the name of privilege beyond the U.S. Constitution. Although the President does not have legislative power under the U.S. Constitution, he can issue orders necessary to enforce constitutional provisions or laws enacted by the Federal Assembly based on Article 2, Paragraph 3 (obligatory provisions to faithfully enforce the law), which is called administrative legislation, and there are declarations and executive orders. According to President Theodore Roosevelt's management theory, modern presidents are privileged to take any action deemed necessary for the national interest unless prohibited by the U.S. Constitution or law under Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution. For an executive order to take effect, it must be registered and promulgated in the Federal Register under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. The President has the right to appoint and dismiss public officials as the head of the administration. In other words, ambassadors, public corporations and consuls, Supreme Court judges and all other public officials are appointed with the recommendation and consent of the Senate (Article 2, Paragraph 2, No. 2 of the U.S. Constitution). Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution only stipulates that the President has the right to appoint public officials, but does not have a prestigious provision on the dismissal, so it was questionable whether the president could dismiss public officials alone or whether the Senate's right to consent applies to dismissal. In the Myers case of 1926, the Supreme Court finally recognized the president's right to dismiss. However, the ruling is criticized for violating the principle of separation of powers by completely delegating the right to appoint and dismiss public officials to the president. The term executive privilege means that if the Congress or the court requests the submission of documents or information held by the administration, the President may refuse to do so. The executive privilege is intended to ensure the president's freedom and confidentiality of decision-making, and is considered particularly important in matters related to national security and diplomacy.

Seven years ago, since the arriaval to the highest polítical power of Mexico by The Regeneration National Movement, Morena, under the lidership of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the political scene of the country has undergone radical changes, that on their turn have substantially modified the original carácter of the Constitutional Norm, the Tripartite figure of Government, and furthermore the Federal Type of Government Regime; plus, seriously enough, has been attempted the State Democratic Form. The continuous succession of the Dra. Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo has maintained the personalized centralization of the Executive Branch of Government, added the flagrant subordination to itself, from both the Legislative and Judicial Federal Powers. All these facts have taken place, pending from a great deceiving maneuver in the Senate composition by the Morenista fraction, calling for itself a Constitutional Qualified Majority. Since then, the fundamental institutions of the country have been dismantled. Perception that is broadly shared by analysts, politologues, academics, journalists and businessmen highly recognized. This context prevailing, in order to edit Public Politics follows the strategic interest to remain in power, from the governmental group. To preserve the electoral base that favours their hegemony, is finally the ruling criterion to elicit public politics. Observing this context, it seems imperative to me, looking into sources of knowledge most fitted, highly applicable and with reasonable viability. Also, it matters that these politics be anchored in truth, freedom, life protection and future sustainability. My decisión, therefore, is to offer an epistemological, ontological and teleological Project, able to reshape the genuine nature of the public life, the civil interaction, and mainly its future viability, in short a theoretical framework to elicit Public Policies.

Abstract The rational allocation of authority across government levels is crucial for the effective provision of environmental public goods. Based on China’s environmental policy texts (1973–2023) and case studies, this paper analyzes the division and adjustment of environmental governance powers. The findings reveal selective decentralization under the trend of centralization over the past fifty years in China’s environmental governance: (1) Legislative power has been conditionally devolved, to encourage distinctive local environmental legislation that is non-contradictory to central legislation; (2) Administrative power has transitioned from an ambiguous two-tier system to a three-category framework with attempts to quantify shared authorities. This recentralization aligns with the principle that national public goods are provided by the central government, while regional ones are supplied jointly; (3) Supervisory power has transitioned from local to vertical management, and its oversight has been elevated to a national initiative, receiving strong political endorsement.

Introduction. The article examines the specifics of the development and historical legacy of the Russian party system and European democratic institutions. The root causes of the emergence of popular representation in the political sphere of life are investigated, and a comparative analysis of the experience of Western and Russian countries is carried out. The subject of the research is the Russian society and the political structure of modern Russia. The purpose of the study is to identify and substantiate the need to start considering the possibilities of reforming political institutions in order to create a new architecture of legislative power radically different from the Western model. Materials and methods. The article uses materials from domestic and foreign scientific sources. The methodological basis of the research is based on the following general scientific and special methods: comparative method; method of system analysis; analytical method; institutional method; historical method; civilizational and identitarian approaches. The results of the study. In Russia, the evolution of government institutions, starting with the Veche assemblies and Zemstvo Councils, has laid the fundamental foundations of legitimacy and legality in the public consciousness, which are radically different from the Western political culture of Great Britain and the United States of America. Contrary to popular opinion, the article draws conclusions about the fallacy of believing in the axiom of universality and the lack of alternatives to the Western democratic model of the party system, shows the impossibility of its effective implementation in Russia, due to the uniqueness of Russian civilization and culture and the peculiarities of spiritual, historical and social development. Discussion and conclusion. Attempts to transform Russian political consciousness, ignoring the prevailing historical and socio-cultural realities in building the party system, are currently not yielding the expected results. Moreover, orientation towards Western patterns has repeatedly undermined Russia's stability and unity, which means that a new crisis is likely to arise in the future if the country refuses to form its own approach to political governance. It is necessary to start discussing the possibilities of creating a new architecture of legislative power that is fundamentally different from the models of another Western civilization.

As he faced conviction for sedition in 1793, Thomas Muir lamented ‘this trial is no trivial matter. It affects me, but it affects the country more.’ This statement echoes the sentiment of the time wherein the carrying out of British penal policy impinged on the autonomy of Scots law, which was protected by the 1707 Act of Union. During a period of heightened political tensions at home and abroad the state looked to deter challenges to authority, including sedition, by ensuring that justice was enacted in the harshest sense without provoking accusations of tyranny. However, the case of Muir and his fellow ‘Scottish Martyrs’ posed major contentions to the authorities in Edinburgh, Whitehall and New South Wales. This article examines the spaces in which the bounds of criminality, the definition of punishment and the distinctions between English and Scots law were played out—namely, the courtroom, the transport ship and the penal colony. It demonstrates that the journey of the Scottish Martyrs through the legal system was shaped by political and legal frictions between Scotland and England, which encouraged British and imperial discussions around freedoms, legislative power and penal policy.

Public libraries are quickly losing the ‘culture war’ being waged against them (Jones, 2024). They also lack the coordinated support, resources, and legislative power of those leading the national assault on the right to read, intellectual freedom, and the First Amendment (ALA, 2024). Few resources provide timely and relevant guidance for public libraries on negotiating book challenges with concerned community members, elected officials, and interested parties. This research study responds to nascent ‘culture war’ developments in Virginia – specifically, recent government interference in public library governance in Warren County in December (Schneider, 2024) and a new bill targeting ‘obscene’ materials tabled in January 2025 (VA Senate Bill No. 931)– to propose a pilot research study with Virginia public library staff, administrators, and volunteers familiar with local book challenges and negotiations to understand better how organizational negotiation capability impacts their outcomes (Gordon & Furlong, 2023). It uses qualitative (semi-structured interviews) and quantitative (Negotiation Assessment Tool) methods to provide invaluable local and state research and evidence-based approaches to inform these increasingly high-stakes negotiations (Gordon & Furlong, 2023; Seidman, 2019). It builds on the co-Principal Investigators strong body of research in equity, assessment, and public librarianship (Harper et al., 2021; Matthews, 2020, 2021a, 2021b, 2025; Matthews & Thomas, 2022, 2025; Mongeon et al., 2021) along with their combined thirty years of professional experience in librarianship and community development to propose a timely study to advance a more comprehensive understanding of book challenge negotiations and support public libraries on a state and national level.

Constitutionalism plays a fundamental role in limiting state power and ensuring that government authority operates within ethical, legal, and democratic boundaries. Indonesia and Thailand offer two contrasting examples of constitutional development in Southeast Asia. Following the 1998 Reform era, Indonesia successfully strengthened mechanisms of checks and balances through the establishment of the Constitutional Court, decentralization reforms, and the empowerment of independent oversight bodies. In contrast, Thailand has experienced repeated cycles of military intervention, where post-coup constitutions have served not as tools to restrict state power, but rather as instruments legitimizing centralized authority and military dominance.This article synthesizes existing scholarly literature and identifies critical research gaps related to constitutionalism studies in both countries. First, there remains a scarcity of long-term empirical and quantitative studies assessing the effectiveness of constitutional limitations on executive, legislative, and judicial power. Second, current research has insufficiently examined informal political practices, including patronage networks, oligarchic influence, and military entrenchment within state institutions. Third, comparative constitutional studies covering the 2014–2025 period remain limited, particularly in assessing post-authoritarian and post-coup constitutional dynamics.The findings of this review highlight the need for deeper interdisciplinary research, integrating political science, legal studies, and institutional analysis to better understand the evolving nature of constitutionalism in Southeast Asia.

ABSTRACT The article analyses how interest groups lobby at different levels of government to influence national legislation. Adapting Greenwood’s (2017) argument about routes for influence-seeking in the EU to national policymaking in a multi-level system, we argue that interest groups can pursue three distinct multi-level routes to circumvent the national executive and parliament: a Brussels route, a domestic subnational route, and a subnational-Brussels route to national policymaking. Investigating the case of Germany, our analysis of survey data on interest group behaviour shows that, firstly, multi-level-lobbying is a complement rather than a substitute to national-level lobbying. Secondly, interest groups try to affect federal legislation much more often via the subnational than via the supranational level, especially when they share a common goal with their subnational government. A third finding is that groups also address venues without formal legislative power. Overall, our study shows the strategic importance of multi-level lobbying in national policymaking.

ABSTRACT This article tests the impact of district features and constitutional prerogatives on the presence of legislative particularism and constituency orientation in legislative bills. We use data on bill introduction by Chamber of Deputies legislators in Chile between 1932 and 1973. We find different determinants for particularistic, constituency-oriented bills and initiatives targeting interest groups and lobbies. The district magnitude does not explain the introduction of particularistic bills and is negatively associated with introducing constituency-oriented bills. Deputies from the capital were less likely to target specific constituencies and those from rural districts were more likely to introduce particularistic bills. When changes in lawmaking rules give more legislative power to the executive and restrict those of legislators, legislators respond by strategically finding alternative ways to provide constituency service.

The Singapore Court of Appeal held a law prohibiting male–male sexual intercourse (s 377A of the Penal Code) unenforceable on non-rights-based grounds. The court's remarks about the rights to life and liberty (including whether sexual orientation is mutable), freedom of expression, and equality are obiter . But they are significant, since in Singapore, there are few constitutional rights cases and the courts focus on spelling out the limits to executive and legislative power without necessarily striking down exercises of such power on rights grounds. Indeed, the obiter dicta prompted the Legislature to repeal s 377A. Given the repeal, the obiter dicta about constitutional rights have receded into the background of public discourse. This article refocuses attention on these dicta , unpacking them in their constitutional, sub-constitutional, and societal context and critically analysing their implications, and presenting them as a case study about the role of obiter dicta in rights adjudication generally.

Abstract This article critically examines the claim that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has acquired “legislative powers”, as suggested by the practices over the last two decades. This purported “legislative” role derives from Resolutions 1373, 1540, and 1422. However, an expansive interpretation of Chapter VII powers or viewing the UNSC as a legislative body within a “World Government” does not hold. Additionally, shifts in the international political landscape have made the expansion of UNSC’s legislative powers impossible, and the UNSC has largely refrained from adopting legislative resolutions in the past decade as they have learned the lessons from Resolution 1540. Finally, this article proposes a solution that although these resolutions do not qualify as a direct source of law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), their binding nature remains as acts détournement de pouvoir and shall not be regarded as ultra vires.

The establishment of a modernized university teaching management operation mechanism is an important element of the comprehensive reform of higher education. University teaching management is characterized by the weakening of academic power, the expansion of administrative power, and the lack of clarity in the responsibilities and powers of universities and colleges. To realize the modernization of the governance system and governance capacity of higher education, it is necessary to reconstruct the internal power structure and power operation mechanism of university teaching management, to make the teaching management organization shift to flattening, the power of the university ministry to the power of the faculties and departments vertically downward, and to form a governance mechanism of division of labor and collaboration between academic power and administrative power. A case study on the reform of the operation mechanism of teaching management was shared, which illustrated a teaching management model applied in University G. Through the Undergraduate “Faculty Committee,” “Teaching Working Committee” and the “Teaching Steering Committee,” a teaching management operation mechanism integrating the separation of powers of “legislative power, administrative power and supervisory power” was gradually constructed, and the implementation effect was good.

The paper is dedicated to the analysis of the Council of Peoples of the Republic of Srpska, an institution that was introduced into the constitutional system of the Republic of Srpska subsequently, after the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the decisions of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council of Peoples, together with the National Assembly, exercises legislative power, but only from the aspect of protecting the vital national interests of the constituent peoples. In the introductory remarks, the author deals with the origin of the Council of Peoples, then analyzes its structure, organization and jurisdiction. Special attention is focused on the analysis of the protection of the vital national interest and the procedures that follow after the submission of the request by the Council of Peoples. The author normatively analyzes the actions of the Council of Peoples, as well as the current practice. In the final presentation, it is concluded that the Council of Peoples does not represent the second house of parliament, and that the interpretations that equalize the Council of Peoples of the Republic Srpska with the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are groundless. Furthermore, the author analyzes the legal nature of the Council of Peoples and in the concluding remarks he points out problems related to this institution, as well as possible solutions.

The position of the Regional People's Representative Council at the provincial and district/city levels essentially acts as a people's representative institution that exercises legislative power at the regional level. The purpose of research are: 1) analyze the DPRD’s authority in forming regional regulations lacking justice values; 2) identify weaknesses in regulatory authority; and 3) reconstruct DPRD authority based on justice values. The research uses a constructivist paradigm, the research applies a normative legal approach and descriptive method. Data sources include primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. This research uses analysis of legal materials to assess DPRD legislation’s alignment with justice principles. The result of research are: 1) DPRD’s authority in forming regional regulations lacks justice values, with unclear roles between DPRD and regional government; 2) Weaknesses include unclear legal substance, structural flaws from Ministry annulments, and legal culture where compliance is driven by tradition, not legal understanding; 3) Reconstruction aligns DPRD’s authority with justice values by clarifying roles, strengthening legal foundations, and promoting genuine public participation based on legal awareness. Norm reconstruction of DPRD’s authority in forming regional regulations based on justice values refers to Law No. 9/2015 Article 101(1) and Law No. 23/2014 Article 236(4) on Regional Government.

This study analyzes the shifting authority in legislative formation under the amended 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which grants the power to initiate laws to the House of Representatives (DPR) with the President's approval. However, the President retains the authority to enact emergency government regulations equivalent to laws under specific urgent conditions, as specified in Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Historically, all presidents have exercised this constitutional decree authority, although based on differing interpretations of the term "compelling urgency" and influenced by the dynamics between the executive and legislative branches. This normative legal research, supported by empirical legal materials and statutory approaches, reveals that emergency legislative authority remains essential for resolving crises without the delay of standard legislative processes. The study emphasizes the importance of checks and balances among the President, DPR, and the Constitutional Court. Particularly, the Constitutional Court plays a critical role in reviewing the legitimacy of such presidential actions, as affirmed in Decision No. 138/PUU-VII/2009. Therefore, a clear separation of powers is vital in restructuring the application of emergency legislative authority within Indonesia's constitutional framework.

Legislative power is an important branch of power in the state apparatus organization model. To ensure the effective implementation of legislative power, the division of labor among state agencies in the implementation of this power is a top important technique, because the division is the basis for coordination and the premise for controlling the implementation of power. This article analyzes the current legal provisions on the division of labor in the implementation of legislative power, clarifies the limitations of the law on this issue and on that basis proposes a number of related recommendations.

The principle of state power is unity, assignment, coordination, control between state agencies in the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial power is an important constitutional principle, a core characteristic of our state’s machinery. This article presents an overview of the contents of this principle, evaluates the current situation, and suggests some recommendations.

In the unified state power structure in Vietnam, although the Government is the agency that exercises executive power, it has an important legislative role, actively participating in the process of building, drafting and submitting draft laws. The article analyzes and evaluates the role of the Government in the mechanism of division and coordination of legislative power implementation in Vietnam today, points out limitations and proposes directions for improvement.