ABSTRACT This article considers the nature and use of judging algorithms. Based on the nature of formal systems, legal indeterminacy and the nature of law as a socially normative force, we are sceptical about judging algorithms. We first consider the nature of algorithms and formal systems, noting that formal systems of more than trivial complexity are necessarily incomplete. Further, Turing’s halting problem and the P = NP problem provide evidence that legal algorithms are unlikely to be able to resolve some legal problems in a reasonable amount of time, if ever. This claim of legal indeterminacy is not a surprise to a student of jurisprudence, as it is a fundamental tenet of American Legal Realism. The Realists argued, although less formally than mathematicians, that legal systems contain legal propositions that are formally indeterminate. This Realist argument adds strength to our scepticism, by providing an ‘existence proof’ (or – at minimum – strong inductive evidence for the existence) of legally indeterminate propositions. Finally, we consider the social context of law and judging. Algorithmic judging fails to capture the social normativity needed to legitimately resolve common disputes. ‘Tell it to the judge’ might enhance the legitimacy of the judgment rendered; but ‘telling it to the algorithm’ may not.

ABSTRACT Several scholars have argued that the legal realists’ views presuppose legal positivism. This essay challenges this argument by showing that it is in conflict with the realists’ own writings where they showed little sympathy for legal positivism and occasionally openly embraced non-positivist views. In addition to general statements on the matter, the essay focuses on one idea, namely the idea of law as a ‘limited domain’. Based largely on the work of Karl Llewellyn (but adding examples from the writings of other legal realists), the essay demonstrates the realists’ rejection of the idea of law as a limited domain. The essay then presents a revised understanding of the difference between law in the books and law in practice and shows how it meshes well with the realists’ non-positivism. The essay concludes with a more general discussion of the place of narratives in jurisprudence as a partial explanation for why the legal realists have been seen as legal positivists, despite their many remarks to the contrary.

Russia has become famous for masterpieces of realism in art and literature. In the Soviet Union, realism (albeit with the definition of «socialist») became the dominant creative method. The leaders of the Soviet state, without abandoning communist phraseology and support for revolutionary movements, were able to pursue foreign policy and build relations with the capitalist world in line with political realism. However, before legal realism, the powerful flow of which covered two continents at once for half a century, a solid barrier was placed in Soviet jurisprudence, which has not been removed to this day. In the research the author sets the following tasks in this regard: 1) to form a general idea of legal realism, focusing on the promotion of realistic ideas in Russian legal science in general and criminal procedure science in particular; 2) to consider a number of the most relevant and controversial problems of the criminal process from the point of view of legal realism; 3) to propose the basic principles of scientific research in the criminal procedure sphere in the paradigm of legal realism. The subject of the study is the individual norms of criminal procedure law in the form in which they are applied in reality, the differences between the normative model and the real content of criminal procedural relations. Thus, the author discusses the purpose of criminal proceedings, as well as the principle of competition in relation to the methods of evaluating the results of investigative activities. The relationship between criminal procedural and managerial relations in criminal justice bodies is shown, and the assessment of the procedural independence of the investigator, the public prosecutor and the independence of judges in relation to the norms of organizational behavior is given. Applying legal realism as the main academic approach, the author uses both the dogmatic method in the article in order to identify the content of the norms of written law, and the historical method in combination with comparative law in order to understand the origins and meaning of the transformation of certain criminal procedural institutions, and the sociological method (interview of investigators). The hypothesis of the study is changing the paradigm of legal understanding from dogmatic to realistic will provide a more accurate explanation of the causes of the contradictions that arise in the application of criminal procedure law, and will help to develop ways to optimize it more than just a mechanical change in legislation.

This study investigates how judicial independence is discursively constructed and contested following controversial rulings by Indonesia’s Constitutional Court. Drawing on theories of legal realism, neo-institutionalism, and discourse analysis, the research explores whether formal guarantees of judicial autonomy hold symbolic weight amid growing perceptions of political alignment. Using a qualitative case study approach, data were collected through semi-structured interviews with legal scholars, civil society actors, and journalists, complemented by discourse analysis of court rulings and media texts. Findings reveal that the Court’s independence is widely framed as situational, with legitimacy perceived to fluctuate based on alignment with dominant political interests. Respondents highlighted themes of strategic judicial reasoning, media-driven delegitimization, and performative institutional responses, suggesting that public trust is shaped less by institutional design and more by narrative coherence and interpretive transparency. Rather than neutral arbiters, courts are increasingly viewed as political actors embedded within broader struggles for power. The study contributes to literature on judicial politicization and democratic resilience by emphasizing the role of discourse in shaping perceptions of legality and legitimacy. It also offers practical insights for reform, including the need for transparent appointments and greater communicative accountability. The findings suggest that in hybrid regimes, judicial independence must be understood not only as a structural condition but as an ongoing, contested performance shaped by elite discourse, public critique, and symbolic legitimacy.

Abstract It is a commonplace that the legal realists argued that law is deeply indeterminate. According to this familiar account, the legal realists insisted that legal materials do not constrain judges, who are therefore free to decide cases in almost any way they want. An influential argument has been that the only way to explain this view is by showing that the legal realists presupposed a legal positivist theory of law. This essay offers a different understanding of the relationship between realism, positivism, and determinacy, challenging the commonplace interpretation of the realists as both historically false and philosophically unwarranted. I provide many examples showing that the prevailing view that the legal realists thought law was deeply indeterminate is mistaken. As part of this argument, I contend that one of the best-known realist articles has been widely misunderstood. Typically read as showing that judges are free to interpret statutes in almost any way they want, its actual message was almost the exact opposite, seeking to show how law can be determinate, despite competing theories of interpretation.

This article examines the current of postmodern legal theory and its relevance in the context of Indonesian law. Legal postmodernism was born as a critique of the failure of modernism projects that were considered too rigid, schematic, and ignored the complexity of social reality. Postmodern legal theory is influenced by deconstructivism, relativism, and pluralism, and is significantly influenced by the school of legal realism and Critical Legal Studies. The main characteristics of postmodern legal theory include the rejection of absolute truth, criticism of grand narratives, recognition of plurality of values, and attempts to legitimize laws that are biased in political and economic interests. In Indonesia, postmodern thought has influenced the development of law through various manifestations such as feminist legal theory and progressive law. However, the implementation of postmodern legal theory in Indonesia requires contextualization by considering the cultural values and religious norms of the Indonesian people. This study concludes that postmodern legal theory is a form of critical and dynamic theoretical reflection, which can be used to understand, study, and apply law in Indonesia, which is complex and pluralistic, noting the need for caution in deconstructing the law to remain relevant to the local context of Indonesia.

Introduction. Traditionally, the problem of defining the foundations of legal values is studied within the framework of natural law interpretivism and formal epistemology. The epistemic approach asserts the degree of evidence, consistency and truthfulness of the studied concepts and worldviews. However, due to the substantive connection acknowledged between law and morality, there arises the problem of correlating the epistemic and axiological principles within the concept of legal values. The aim of the study is to develop a holistic understanding of epistemic legal values and determine their functional advantages in the legal practices. Materials and Methods. The article presents a comparative analysis of the attitudes towards the concept of legal values from the point of view of natural-law and positivism. The provisions and arguments demonstrating practical applicability of both approaches were arranged and structured. The analysis of relevant scientific research made it possible to distinguish the hierarchical structure of the concept under study and its components. Results. The original neutrality of a legal value has been ascertained. Systematization of the arguments in favour of the natural law approach makes it possible to explain the moral basis of the legal values. However, morality cannot be universally applicable due to sociocultural differences. Therefore, the theory of equal unity of axiological and epistemic values of law proves to be untenable. In the frame of legal realism, the theory of axiological values does not contradict the principles of positivism, on condition of adhering to the principle of the supremacy of law, which results in increased significance of the epistemic values aimed at ensuring the efficient legal practices (consistent and predictable), and eliminating bias and discrimination. Discussion and Conclusion. The epistemic values that affirm the principle of legal objectivity are the functional core of any legal system, whereas an alternative thinking paradigm (the moralizing interpretation) can be considered only as a predictor of the methodological changes in social legal relationships. The definition of the notion of “epistemic legal values” developed by the authors contributes to the expansion of the analytical toolkit of modern science. The results of the study can be implemented into the process of epistemic modeling of legal practices.

Realism, Law and Economics, and LPE Now

One of the classic principles for resolving legal conflicts - “lex superior derogat legi inferiori” - presupposes the priority of norms derived from a legal act that holds greater legal force or occupies a higher position in the normative hierarchy. However, contemporary legal systems do not operate as straightforward vertical hierarchies, which necessitates further study into the ordering of such systems and the arguments supporting the validity of the norms within them. The purpose of the study is to analyze the approach of the Italian legal scholar Riccardo Guastini concerning four types of normative hierarchies he identifies. The article extensively presents arguments from Guastini’s “Lex Superior” (2013), originally published by the proponent of Genoese legal realism in French, to make them accessible to Russian-speaking researchers. According to R. Guastini, first, there is a formal hierarchy, which exists between norms that govern the creation of law and the laws produced in accordance with those norms. Second, a material hierarchy exists when contradictions between two norms are clearly prohibited by a third, higher-ranking norm. Third, there is a logical hierarchy, wherein one norm refers to another at a metalinguistic level. Finally, fourth, an axiological hierarchy depends on the value judgment of the interpreter, where one norm is considered superior based on interpretive assessments. The article also traces Guastini’s development of the concept of “metanorm”, which, he argues should be reserved exclusively for norms that explicitly reference other norms. Practical examples illustrating the application of these four types of normative hierarchies, in particular, such as the self-restraint exhibited by legislators and the revision processes within the Italian Constitution, are provided toward the end of the article. The study concludes by challenging the views that any hierarchy necessarily precedes interpretation and highlights the susceptibility of Guastini’s hierarchy types to manipulation when used to justify the validity of specific norms.

This policy paper critically examines the legal dilemma arising from the presidential rehabilitation granted to former PT ASDP Director Ira Puspadewi, a convicted corruption defendant, which epitomizes the profound tension between the positivist principle of final court decisions as pillars of legal certainty and the realist intervention of executive prerogative to achieve substantive justice. Employing a normative-juridical methodology analyzed through the dual lenses of Legal Positivism and Legal Realism, the study dissects this conflict between law as codified rule and law as a social instrument. The findings reveal that while procedurally anchored in Article 14 of the 1945 Constitution, the act creates systemic inconsistency in anti-corruption enforcement and dangerously blurs the line between criminal misconduct and permissible business judgment risk within State-Owned Enterprises. Consequently, it is concluded that such ad-hoc resolutions undermine long-term legal predictability. To resolve this, a triad of integrated policy reforms is recommended: the urgent codification and limitation of the presidential rehabilitation prerogative through specific legislation, the explicit integration of the Business Judgment Rule doctrine into the SOE and anti-corruption legal framework to shield good-faith corporate decisions, and the establishment of a transparent mechanism, potentially under the Supreme Court, to publish binding and accountable considerations for any prerogative use, thereby ensuring future actions are both just and systematically consistent.

Abstract Purpose: To aim of the study was to analyze the regulatory responsiveness and policy adaptability in managing emerging digital evidence within criminal justice systems. Methodology: This study adopted a desk methodology. A desk study research design is commonly known as secondary data collection. This is basically collecting data from existing resources preferably because of its low cost advantage as compared to a field research. Our current study looked into already published studies and reports as the data was easily accessed through online journals and libraries. Findings: Regulatory responsiveness and policy adaptability significantly enhance the effective management of emerging digital evidence within criminal justice systems by improving evidentiary admissibility, case resolution efficiency, and judicial consistency. Jurisdictions with flexible and clear legal frameworks demonstrate faster adaptation to new technologies, reduced procedural disputes, and higher conviction reliability. Conversely, rigid or outdated regulations contribute to evidentiary exclusion, case delays, and inconsistent judicial outcomes. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: Adaptive governance theory, legal realism theory& institutional theory may be used to anchor future studies on the regulatory responsiveness and policy adaptability in managing emerging digital evidence within criminal justice systems. From a practical standpoint, criminal justice institutions should prioritize capacity building to enhance the handling of emerging digital evidence. At the policy level, governments are encouraged to adopt technology-neutral and forward-looking legal frameworks that can accommodate evolving forms of digital evidence.

Abstract It is often said that natural law and interpretive perspectives of adjudication are incompatible with the notion of judicial law-making—in contrast to positivist and legal realist perspectives, which are hostile to the declaratory theory. One must either accept the declaratory theory or accept that judges make law, but one cannot accept both views. This article draws upon the jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart, Karl Llewellyn, Lon Fuller, and Ronald Dworkin to push against the idea that these conceptions of the common law judicial method are fundamentally discordant. It is argued that, properly understood, the declaratory theory can be reconciled with the notion of judicial law-making.

This paper explores how emotions, which once were deeply personal and connected, are now gradually turning into commercial assets that can better be labelled as “Intimacy Economy”. But now with fast-paced innovation in technology, emotions are no longer felt; instead, they are surveilled, exploited, and commodified through algorithms, AI tools, and digital platforms. The so-called sacred space of conscience has been converted into analysable content. To comprehend this shift better, this paper analyses information from different schools of legal thought, mainly the natural school of law, sociological, historical, and finally legal realism. From this vantage point, it evaluates the growing conflict between three forces: an individual’s right to emotional privacy, society’s interest in technological innovation, and the market’s hunger for prediction and monetisation. By providing tangible examples of Emotional Perception AI Ltd, the EU AI Act, the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, and Indian court cases involving emojis, the article seeks to reveal how unprepared current legal systems are in dealing with emotional data. Despite the rising awareness and recognition of concepts like neurorights and cognitive liberty, existing laws still focus on external behaviour rather than inner experience. This paper puts forward the argument that we urgently need a legal framework that understands human emotions not as tradable data but as amplifications of dignity and individual liberty.

The article is dedicated to the problem of explicating the philosophical and legal approaches of A.F. Koni to the analysis of various aspects of legal reality related to court proceedings. In particular, an attempt is made to answer the question of why, when studying the activities of judges, A.F. Koni tends to lean more towards methodologies characteristic of traditional philosophical and legal schools, primarily referring to the legacy of German idealism, relying on the practical philosophy of I. Kant and G.W.F. Hegel, while in relation to other participants in the court proceedings—defendants, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and jurors—he resorts to psychology and sociology of law. The latter connects him with representatives of Russian legal realism, in particular with his younger contemporary, the founder of the St. Petersburg School of Philosophy of Law and the creator of the psychological theory of law, L.I. Petrażycki. The research is conducted based on the works of A.F. Koni on judicial ethics and psychology, as well as the history and sociology of law. The main research method is critical interpretation of primary sources and comparative analysis. It is shown that, since the judge is a special subject obliged to rise above the conflict of the other parties in the court proceedings, performing largely a metaphysical function, delivering justice not in their own name but in the name of society, the activity of such a subject should be considered primarily from the perspective of obligation rather than existing fact. Therefore, A.F. Koni, when analyzing the behavior of judges, resorts to classical concepts of law and morality. In turn, regarding defendants, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and jurors, as they personally participate in the judicial process, preference is given to psychological, including psychiatric, and sociological methods that allow analyzing the rich empirical material accumulated over the years of A.F. Koni's service in judicial institutions. The article also demonstrates the unity of the socio-pedagogical approaches of A.F. Koni and L.I. Petrażycki.

Abstract Functionalists, especially those inspired by American Legal Realism, downplay the importance of abstract concepts and their interrelations in legal reasoning. Hence, they stress shallow, narrow, and isolated concepts, in order to be close to the facts in a transparent way. In this paper, we address an often-overlooked function of law: managing legal concepts themselves. That is, one aspect of law is partially self-referential. Various devices involved in legal reasoning are designed to make the system of legal concepts work better, from fine-tuning the results of the use of concepts to tinkering with the concepts themselves. This requires us to look at law as a system, but one that is both inward-looking and operating on itself, and, at the same time, concerned with how law operates in the real world. Law also uses various devices to manage the system of concepts, and these devices in turn serve various functions. These functions include maintenance, modulation, and modification of concepts, depending on the actual or potential misfiring of the concepts in question. As we will suggest, this offers deeper insight into the role that legal fictions, equity, and presumptions play in the law.

Abstract This introductory essay to a symposium issue of The American Journal of Jurisprudence starts from the observation that the relation of legal realism and formalism can be (much) more complicated than is often assumed. Instead of setting realism and formalism in opposition only, a more productive way to proceed is to concentrate on the insights legal realists may gain from formalism and, vice versa, what modern formalists have to learn from legal realism. Natasha Sarna and Kevin Tobia, Andrew Gold and Henry Smith, Shyamkrishna Balganesh and Taisu Zhang, Thilo Kuntz, Paul B. Miller, Emily Sherwin, and Marietta Auer consider these questions from different angles. This introductory essay brings the individual contributions together and indicates how their insights may interrelate. Moreover, it sketches avenues for future research. Section I takes up the theme of the use of concepts and conceptual change. Section II addresses tensions between realism and formalism. Section III closes the Introduction by charting two paths for future research. First, this essay argues that legal concepts, even where they constrain, may induce or facilitate legal creativity. Second, it considers the significance of a complex legal system for understanding approaches to legal concepts.

Legal legitimation is one of the least examined topics in the philosophy of law. It is often confused with the validity of law or studied from a procedural approach. This article contrasts the legitimation of law, from a metatheoretical approach —following the main schools of legal philosophical thought, such as legal positivism, legal naturalism, legal realism—and the discursive theory of law. We conducted an analytical, synthetic, dialectical and legal syllogism methodology to deconstruct and bring into question some ideological views around the legitimation of law, and outlined a balanced prospective looking to a smooth ontological transit of legal norm from a political product to a social product. The legitimation of law is linked to other notions of legal science, such as truth and democracy.legitimation of Law is linked to other figures of legal science, such as truth and democracy.

General Election Result Dispute is a Vote Result Dispute that is the authority of the Constitutional Court, but in several decisions of the Constitutional Court in the Settlement of Regional Head Disputes not only questioned the difference in election results, but also examined and assessed the administrative process of the election stages, to cancel the vote results, which resulted in the cancellation of the general election results. This raises the dialectic of the competence of the Constitutional Court in examining and deciding on the Election Result Dispute case as follows: First, How is the Scope of the Conception of the Election Result Dispute for Regional Heads and Deputy Regional Heads reviewed in the Constitutional Court decision No. 70 / PHPU.BUP-XXIII / 2025?, Second, How is the Constitutional Court Authorized to Examine and Assess Administrative Violations of the General Election Stage Process in Deciding on the Settlement of the General Election Result Dispute for Regent and Deputy Regent?. This study uses the theory of Pragmatic Legal Realism which emphasizes the active role of judges in upholding substantive justice, as well as the Election Theory which places elections as an instrument of democracy that must guarantee the principles of justice, representation, and people's sovereignty. This type of research is descriptive. The analysis method of this research is normative juridical. Data collection techniques are carried out using field studies and literature studies.

State supreme courts have become increasingly salient as the U.S. Supreme Court has deferred more politically contentious questions to the states. Yet, despite growing scholarly attention to state high courts, we know relatively little about how the public evaluates them. We argue that perception of a state court’s partisan composition is an important factor shaping public attitudes. Using a nationally representative survey, we find that individuals who believe their state supreme court has more in-party justices feel better represented, view the court’s decision-making as more grounded in legal formalism, and rate the court as more legitimate. Conversely, perceiving more out-party justices is associated with feeling less represented, stronger belief in legal realism, and lower legitimacy ratings. These findings contribute to the literature on state courts by showing that perceptions of partisan makeup are central to understanding how the public evaluates state supreme courts.

The subject of the study is the process of qualitative transformation and international reception of analytical jurisprudence at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. The work overcomes simplified stereotypes that identify this direction solely with Anglo-Saxon legal culture (Bentham, Austin) and proves that its true evolution was a complex, multifaceted process that transcended national boundaries. The focus is on analyzing the programmatic changes, content, and interconnections of the views of key theorists of this period (Hohfeld, Zomlo, Rogen, Katkov), whose works laid the foundations of the modern conceptual apparatus of legal science in its analytical interpretation. Special attention is given to the transition from the classical theory of law as a command to a systematic analysis of the internal logical-conceptual structure of law and its creative adaptation in continental Europe and Russia. The basis of the work lies in historical-legal and comparative-legal methods used to analyze the intellectual legacy of key representatives of the analytical tradition in various national contexts. A conceptual analysis method is also employed to identify the transformation of basic legal categories. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the re-examination of established historiographical views on analytical jurisprudence as a single and strictly English movement. The article argues that at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, it transformed into an international intellectual movement, giving rise to original and often forward-looking projects in different countries (e.g., the linguistic-analytical method of Katkov in Russia). It is established that the collective efforts of theorists of this period (Hohfeld, Zomlo, Rogen, Katkov) to systematize legal concepts and develop formal-logical tools represent an independent and key stage in the evolution of the entire direction, determining its development in the 20th century. The main conclusion is that the significance of analytical jurisprudence lies not in creating a monolithic "pure" theory but in providing an accurate conceptual language and continuously stimulating methodological dialogue in legal scholarship, as well as in its contradictory interaction with alternative approaches (sociological jurisprudence, legal realism).