Curriculum theorizing has focused on how curricula ought to be constructed (prescriptive theory) and, to a lesser extent, on how curricula are formulated and implemented (explanatory theory).’ There is a chasm separating the two approaches. The first type of theorizing focuses on questions of what ought to be and employs normative and instrumental appeals, while the second approach examines what is and utilizes descriptive and explanatory theories. Generally curriculum theorists and analytically oriented philosophers have emphasized the distinct and heterogeneous features of each type of endeavor. This “traditional” position argues that one can never derive an ought from an is: that is, for example, one cannot derive what knowledge ought to be taught from a description of existing curricula. Furthermore, it is often argued, decisions over what knowledge ought to be taught are the outcome of individual value preferences. Curricular choices are reducible to individuals’ values.‘ Finally, proponents of this position usually maintain that an investigation of the facts can be assessed objectively and should not be influenced by social or political values. Truth is to be found independent of ideological beliefs. Recently Marxist (radical or ~r i t ica l )~ theorists of curriculum have taken exception to many of these “traditional” propositions. These writers argue that the reputed separation between questions of fact and questions of value is simply mistaken. There are two distinct but related strands to the critical position. According to one view, knowledge claims (descriptive and explanatory theories) are always connected to some value position, tied to specific interest~.~ Employing the writings of Jurgen Habermas, these theorists argue that different knowledge claims serve either technical, practical, or emancipatory interests. The preoccupation with separating questions of fact from value is, according to this viewpoint, misguided. The critical tradition “emancipates” theorists from this predicament since it is able to “transcend dialectically” the false dichotomy separating questions of fact from questions of value. In the end, these authors maintain, the issue is not one of separation but rather a recognition of what knowledge serves which interests. The second strand in the Marxist position argues that it is both a peculiarity and an asset of the critical framework that it integrates explanatory and ethical concerns.’ While this view tends to support the Habermasian linkage of knowledge and interests, it more explicitly joins explanatory investigations
Read full abstract