Kind Of Freedom Research Articles

Schillers zwei Arten der Freiheit. Eine ästhetische Transformation von Reinholds Theorie der Willensfreiheit

AbstractIn his treatment of a Kantian concept of moral freedom, Schiller argues for two kinds of freedom: freedom in the spirit of autonomous practical reason and freedom in which man is considered a mixed (sensual and rational) being. It is apparent that Schiller is on a Reinholdian path. He follows Reinhold’s theory of free will in conceiving of moral freedom primarily as the capacity to decide between the material drive as a sensible, self-interested drive and the formal drive as a rational, unselfish drive. But it is also obvious that Schiller modifies Reinhold’s results in order to obtain a concept of aesthetic freedom. This project is important in view of a deeper understanding of the concept of aesthetic consciousness but is of little use in achieving a better understanding of the concept of moral freedom.

Aesthetics, Interaction and Machine Improvisation

Departing from the artistic research project Goodbye Intuition (GI) hosted by the Norwegian Academy of Music in Oslo, this article discusses the aesthetics of improvising with machines. Playing with a system such as the one described in this article, with limited intelligence and no real cognitive skills, will obviously reveal the weaknesses of the system, but it will also convey part of the preconditions and aesthetic frameworks that the human improviser brings to the table. If we want the autonomous system to have the same kind of freedom we commonly value in human players’ improvisational practice, are we prepared to accept that it may develop in a direction that departs from our original aesthetical ambitions? The analyses is based on some of the documented interplay between the musicians in a group in workshops and laboratories. The question of what constitutes an ethical relationship in this kind of improvisation is briefly discussed. The aspect of embodiment emerges as a central obstacle in the development of musical improvisation with machines.

Freedom, Freedom... but What Kind of Freedom? Intrinsic and Extrinsic Sense of Freedom as Predictors of Preferences for Political Community and Attitudes Towards Democracy

In theoretical considerations on democracy freedom is sometimes understood in unconditional and conditional terms. This general distinction underlies I. Berlin's concept of negative and positive freedom, and E. Fromm's concept of 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. The authors of this paper introduce the concept of extrinsic and intrinsic sense of freedom which is meant to be psychological representation of the philosophical distinction on unconditional and conditional freedom, respectively. An extrinsic freedom results from a lack of external restrictions/barriers, whereas intrinsic freedom is based on the belief that being free means compatibility between one's own actions and preferred values, life goals or worldview. Based on nationwide survey data, the authors show that both forms of freedom are embedded in entirely different basic human values and moral intuitions. Further, it is shown that intrinsic freedom negatively predicts liberal orientation and clearly favors communitarian orientation, whereas extrinsic freedom clearly favors liberal orientation. The authors argue that both forms of experiencing freedom have different effects on support for the principles of liberal democracy. The positive effect of extrinsic freedom is indirect, i.e., entirely mediated by liberal orientation. On the other hand, the effect of intrinsic freedom can be decomposed into three components: a) as a positive direct effect, b) as a positive indirect effect (by strengthening the communitarian orientation), and c) as a negative indirect effect (by weakening the liberal orientation). In conclusion, the consequences of intrinsic and extrinsic freedom are discussed in the light of their relationships with support for democratic principles.

Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom

This paper treats a heretofore-unnoticed concept in the history of the philosophical discussion of human freedom, a kind of freedom that is not defined solely in terms of the causal power of the agent. Instead, the exercise of freedom essentially involves the non-occurrence of something. That being free involves the non-occurrence, that is, the absence, of an act may seem counterintuitive. With the exception of those specifically treated in this paper, philosophers tend to think of freedom as intimately involved with volition, the judging or deciding activity of the will that votes in favor of or against a proposed action. However, there are two thinkers who endorse a view where not willing constitutes human freedom. Our analysis focuses on the views of Malebranche and Locke. Both invoke a notion dubbed here as ‘absential suspension.’ On this view, freedom is associated not with the power of volition, but rather with this kind of suspension.

KONTRIBUSI GERRIT CORNELIS BERKOUWER TERHADAP PEMBAHASAN KEBEBASAN MANUSIA

At the end of the 20th century discussions about human freedom has become discussions about free will. Discussions about this topic end up with the polemic between autonomy and heteronomy. The idea of autonomy tries to eliminate all limitations that obstruct human freedom. But after all the limitations have been eliminated, there are some raise questions about internal authority in a person’s self that limits him or her. In the opinion of the writer, theologians who approaches the problem of human freedom as a ‘freedom from’ would never touch the essence of human freedom. Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer discusses human freedom not with the ‘free from’ approaches that will lead to a secularistic humanism but tries to look at the meaning of freedom biblically, that is “true freedom.” This kind of freedom does not depend on both external nor internal authorities, but rather depend on the hope of eschatological liberation where the believers will be in full obedience to Christ.
 KEYWORDS: freedom; free will; autonomy; heteronomy; authority

Basic income, social freedom and the fabric of justice

ABSTRACT This paper examines the justice of unconditional basic income (UBI) through the lens of the Hegel-inspired recognition-theory of justice. As explained in the first part of the paper, this theory takes everyday social roles to be the primary subject-matter of the theory of justice, and it takes justice in these roles to be a matter of the kind of freedom that is available through their performance, namely ‘social’ freedom. The paper then identifies the key criteria of social freedom. The extent to which the introduction of an UBI would meet these criteria is then examined, with a focus on the social role that stands to be most affected by an UBI, namely that of the worker-earner. It is argued that while an UBI is likely to be only partially effective as an instrument of specifically social freedom, its main justification lies not here, but in securing a basis for the subjective freedom that social freedom presupposes.

Feel Free: Essays by Zadie Smith

Reviewed by: Feel Free: Essays by Zadie Smith Haley Crigger (bio) Zadie Smith, Feel Free: Essays (Penguin Press, 2018) 464 pp. In the forward to her new book of essays, Feel Free, Zadie Smith insists: “I have no real qualifications to write as I do.” She then offers a catalogue of the many things she is not—philosopher, sociologist, political scientist, music critic, etc. This disclaimer does not stop her, however, from venturing into these realms. Part One, titled “In the World,” examines a number of current political issues, from global warming, to Brexit, to London’s gentrification, and it’s clear that her political compass points left. Compassion and social equality are the foundations of her political ideology, though she has asserted publically that she is “not an activist.” But Smith’s humility is neither false nor forced, despite her repeated claims at a recent [End Page 151] appearance in Washington, DC, that she is “in all ways inauthentic.” Still, her statements on that occasion carried the ring of committed engagement: “What’s going on [in Washington] doesn’t deserve the term conservatism; it’s terrorism.” “‘Guns don’t kill people; people kill people.’ One of the most profoundly illogical statements I have ever heard. It’s stupid on a level that is evil.” “There are different kinds of freedoms, and the freedom to think is the only one I really have.” The range of topics she covers in Feel Free is dizzyingly vast—from Brexit, to Facebook, to puppets, to Key & Peele, to toilets—but she repeatedly approaches her subjects through a particular philosophical lens: none of us is quite who we express ourselves to be. In “Fences: a Brexit Diary,” and partly in “On Hope and Despair,” two essays that appear in the collection’s first section, Smith unapologetically criticizes the infamous 2016 referendum that has set the United Kingdom on the path of withdrawal from the European Union. Smith’s thesis is not unique: the social binary— “Us” versus “Them”—is a false and ineffective one. Released in the second year of the Trump presidency, the national polarity expressed in Feel Free is all too familiar to an American audience. As Smith says, the “profound shock” many of us experienced “suggests at the very least that we must have been living behind a veil, unable to see our own country for what it has become.” Often, this sentiment is used to further entrench the separation: How could they do such a thing? Herein lies half of the illusion: there is no Them. The idea that there is a “Them,” a homogenous, hive-minded “Other,” is utterly divorced from reality. Responding to the problem while blinded by this misconception, she suggests, is ineffectual at best, catastrophic at worst. The Leavers (like those who voted for Trump) “had a wide variety of motives for their vote, and much of the Remain camp was similarly splintered.” Smith admits that she is far removed from Leavers in her country, which is the essence of a problem. As evidence for the multitudinous reasons Leavers could have had, she resorts to citing a secondhand conversation in which a “fellow north London leftist” explained to a friend’s mother that she “had voted Leave in order ‘to get rid of that bloody health secretary!’” All of this to say, of course, not all Leavers are rabid with racism and xenophobia; their motives are more complex. And Smith, at the moment of crisis, was not close enough with any of “Them” to arrive at this understanding. What’s refreshing about Smith’s approach is that the exercise in empathy is neither overly emotional nor strictly anthropological. She maintains that the ultimate decision, the vote to leave the European Union, was a very bad one. Despite the multifarious motivations behind the decision, despite also wanting to get rid of “that bloody health secretary,” Jeremy Hunt, “a referendum turns out to be a very ineffective hammer for a thousand crooked nails.” Here is where Smith’s exercise in empathy becomes something more than an exercise, a practical yet very human deconstruction of identity politics. Each side has been equally divisive and [End Page 152] self-interested...

The Rediscovery of Teaching by Gert J. J. Biesta

Reviewed by: The Rediscovery of Teaching by Gert J. J. Biesta Xenia Coulter and Alan Mandell Gert J. J. Biesta. The Rediscovery of Teaching. New York, NY: Routledge, 2017. 111 pp. Softcover: $39.50. ISBN 978-1-138-67070-9 Gert Biesta is a highly respected European philosopher of education who deserves to be better known in the United States. His recent book, The Rediscovery of Teaching (2017), the 4th book of a previous trilogy, could be said to play a similar role to that of John Dewey's Experience and Education (1938) in that it focuses upon the nature of teaching and its critical role in the schools of purportedly free societies. Moreover, both books were written rather late in their authors' careers, and as relatively short texts, they seem to serve well as accessible descriptions of their philosophies for readers not yet familiar with their earlier works. In addition, although both men wrote primarily about the education of children, their conception of the goals and methods of education is readily applicable not only to younger students but to traditional-aged college students (those 18–25), and also to older adults seeking a college degree. For both men, progressive education, with its emphasis upon student independence and individualization, is singularly well-suited for life in an ever-changing, and thus uncertain, democratic world. For Biesta, such a world needs adults who are assertive "grown up" "subjects," rather than objects of someone else's attention, a perspective that is quite comparable to Dewey's insistence that learners be their own "agents." For both Biesta and Dewey, students need space to think for themselves about the subject matter they are considering, and teachers must trust their students' ability to do so. Thus, the teacher's activities as an educator and the student's activities as a learner are clearly separate–the teacher's role is to invite students to learn, to provide stimulation ("to arouse the desire in the student," p. 95) and support, and to interrogate and assess the student's knowledge during this process. For their part, students "encounter" (p. 98) a kind of freedom that permits them to learn for themselves. As Biesta notes, not only are teachers not "sages on the stage" (who, like Freire's knowledge bankers, pour knowledge into the heads of students [1972]), but they are also not "guides on the side" (who learn along with their students), nor are they "peers in the rear" (who let students learn whenever they wish). Thus, like Dewey, he knows how important teachers are to the learning process and champions the complex and challenging task that they face. Biesta thus sharply criticizes contemporary attempts to reduce teaching to that of a mirror image of what is to be learned–which he refers to as "the learnification" of education (p. 27). All told, Biesta, and probably Dewey too, seek to remind the reader, especially now in an age in which education is becoming increasingly mechanized, that true teaching is a deeply human endeavor–and badly needed. At first glance, this kind of teaching may seem appropriate only for unsettled content areas that allow for student speculation. But even in seemingly rigid forms of technical or professional education, the teacher at some point must relinquish control and allow students to perform on their own (i.e., to learn from their mistakes, practice, or even experiment) whether learning to ride a bike, play bridge, wire a house, or even solve mathematical problems. Indeed, in a recent TedX talk, math educator Finkel (2015) uses almost the same language as does Biesta. Rather than telling students what they need to know, he emphasizes instead the importance of inviting them into mathematical discussions where the learners' efforts to find out for themselves are [End Page E-15] taken seriously. Biesta uses an example of language learning to make the same point. Borrowing from French philosopher Rancière (1991), he offers the story of an "ignorant schoolmaster" who was able to successfully "teach" Flemish students the French language even though the teacher was unable to speak Flemish. To us, Dewey's view of teachers as creators of educative experiences rather than lecturers or...

D. KATSAROV ON THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF PEDAGOGY

Prof. D. Katsarov was a prominent scholar who worked in the field of Psychology and Pedagogy in Bulgaria during the 20th century. In his rich pedagogical heritage, he defined three basic pedagogical principles - love, freedom and experience.D. Katsarov's humanism is expressed in his deep faith in man, in his conviction that every human being possesses good talents and that every child deserves trust. His humanism manifests itself in his love of both the child and the adult, in his deep faith in their powers and capabilities.He declared this love to be the first basic pedagogical principle, without which upbringing, training or education cannot exist to the full extent of their meaning.The pedagogical principle of love is not perceived as a temporary emotional state but as an active attitude both in the child and the teacher. Love is expressed through concern, attention to the needs and interests of the child, and through active attitude to what is necessary to satisfy these needs and interests.The importance of this basic, according to Prof. D. Katsarov, principle can be seen in its three dimensions: the attitude of the child, of the teacher and of the education system.D. Katsarov formulated several kinds of freedom. Physical freedom, according to him, is expressed in freedom of deeds and actions. Any limitation of the freedom of the child inevitably leads to obstructing of their proper physical development "because this freedom enables the child to come into the widest range of contacts with the things that surround them, which is the only opportunity to get to know them comprehensively".According to Prof. D. Katsarov, it is the American philosopher, pedagogist and psychologist John Dewey that provides the most profound analysis of experience as a pedagogical principle, in its broad sense, as the basis of education.The true educational experience, according to the author, is a social process of sharing. Educational work is a source of social control only when it is a common work involving all individuals and those individuals feel somewhat responsible.

Meanings of Failed Action: A Reassessment of the 1946 Royal Indian Navy Uprising

The exhibition, Meanings of Failed Action: Insurrection 1946, opened in Mumbai on 17 March 2017, and then in New Delhi on 8 February 2018. The second part of Vivan Sundaram's ‘The History Project’, this new installation was intended to mark seventy years of Indian Independence and Partition by exploring an often forgotten moment of Indian history: the uprising of the Royal Indian Navy's ratings in February 1946, when 10,000 naval ratings took charge of 66 ships across the Indian subcontinent in the name of the ‘Quit India’ movement. The event has since been erased from Indian national history, perhaps because, had the insurrection succeeded, India's struggle for freedom might have taken a different turn. In what follows, I focus on the documents we unearthed while researching for the exhibition—pamphlets, slogans, the ratings’ statements to the police and to the Commission of Enquiry, their memories and prison letters—and examine the motivations and hopes that defined the strikers’ action. What kind of freedom did the ratings stand for?

La libertad posible. Acerca de la noción leibniziana de «inclinar sin necesidad»

Leibniz, in order to avoid both determinism and indifferentism, says that knowledge inclines the agent towards the best action without necessitating it. According to his modal theory, an action is contingent if the opposite is (logically) possible. The article examines the coherence of Leibniz’s notion of «inclining but not necessitating» in the context of contemporary philosophy of action, profiting from the distinction between reasons and causes. The kind of freedom which is possible according to Leibniz philosophy depends on this question.

The Liberty Coerced by Limitation: On Subtitling Fengming: A Chinese Memoir

This essay steps into the long history of translation theory, which is replete with examples of translators contemplating their own work of transporting a text from one language to another and deploying metaphors to theorize the task of the translator. The author, a student of Chinese aesthetics and contemporary philosophy, is also a veteran subtitler. In this essay, she describes her own subtitling of Wang Bing’s Fengming: A Chinese Memoir. She begins with a common observation about film translation: Facing extreme limitations in space and time, subtitlers often mourn the many limitations with which they must contend and look with envy at the translators of literature, who appear so free. But the strictures of subtitling can also produce a certain kind of freedom. Akiyama’s essay uses the subtitles for Fengming to illustrate the liberatory possibilities hidden within the act of translation.

Marriage Equality and the African American Case: Intersections of Race and LGBT Sexuality

In Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality, Katherine Franke asks what kind of freedom and what kind of equality the capacity to marry mobilizes. She explores this question comparatively through, on the one hand, the case of African Americans after slavery and, on the other, the options for sexual minorities in the United States after the legal case of Obergefell v. Hodges. This essay considers the role of the contemporary marriage equality movement as a vehicle for lgbtq political transformation through the experiences of a group that lies at the intersection of the arguments advanced in Wedlocked: African American lgbtq people interested in the right to marry. Drawing from the experiences of African American lgbtq people and their intraracial relationships as they relate to the marriage equality campaign, the author explores what might be gained for socially oppressed populations when marriage is used as the platform for reducing the stigma associated with same-sex desire.

A teologia de Marx explicada às crianças

A doutrina de Marx pode ser entendida como uma sobreposição de quatro camadas de pensamento. 1) Um interessante, embrionário, materialismo prático, secularizado, moderno, que demanda recuperação e desenvolvimento em nossos dias em diálogo com aquisições da filosofia prática contemporânea. 2) Um materialismo histórico, lamentavelmente esquemático, dualista, determinista, cripto-normativo, com todo jeito de filosofia idealista da história, do qual sua crítica do capitalismo, luta de classes etc., é o capitulo decisivo - um materialismo que poderia ter sido uma melhor conversão de Hegel para fora do idealismo e da metafísica. 3) Um humanismo especulativo, do ser-genérico, que assume a critica feuerbachiana do cristianismo como seu pressuposto/fundamento, junto como o próprio cristianismo (especulativa, feuerbachianamente traduzido), e que toma como medida e telos a plena reunificação da sociedade como verdadeiro corpo político. Esse humanismo, para desespero dos que percebem sua debilidade, v.g. Althusser, nunca é abandonado por Marx nem pelos marxistas tradicionais, embora seja desenvolvido por Marx, na crítica da economia politica, como “determinação pelo nível essencial”, efetivamente social, mascarada, por trás de uma “aparência real” onde toda liberdade e particularidade é ilusão. Aqui nos ocuparemos principalmente do ponto três.

Senses of memory in dementia care: the transcendent subject

Sensory stimuli are a whole body, mind, time, and space experience. During the arts therapy encounter memories are recalled through sensory stimulation and scent, sound, texture and taste amongst people with dementia, which can encourage transcendence from the temporal realities of loss. Gerotranscendence (Stephenson 2013) occurs when arts and the unconscious combine. This article reflects upon sensory arts therapy processes and outcomes in an aged care home, with one case study as a focus. Theories of memory, sensory perception and technologies of care, throw light upon the transcendent subject. I take Foucault’s views on the contingent subject further to extend the idea of the transcendent subject as one whose preconscious is more prevalent and active than the conscious (Foucault 2003). This transcendence is not ‘madness’ but rather a kind of freedom that is often outside of the immediate politics of institutional care and one in which arts therapy has noticeable agency. Keywords: Arts therapy; aged care; body; memory; senses; transcendence.

The Freedom to Work: PUDR vs. Union of India and the Meaning of 'Forced Labour' Under the Indian Constitution

Article 23(1) of the Indian Constitution prohibits traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour. With begar – a system of inter-generational bonded labour unique to India – at its heart, Article 23 may, at first glance, seem only a narrow protection from debt slavery and its variants. However, in PUDR vs Union of India, the Supreme Court held that the right against forced labour included the right to a minimum wage. Remarkably, the Court framed this not as a positive right or as a socio-economic guarantee that it was importing from the Directive Principles, but in the pure language of freedom: freedom from economic compulsions that drove workers to accept employment at wages even lower than the minimum rates. This essay is a reconstruction and a defence of the transformative vision of freedom articulated by the Supreme Court in PUDR vs. Union of India. I will begin with an analysis of the judgment, the background in which it was delivered, and the Court’s insistence that the term “forced labour” was not simply limited to physical or legal force, but applied equally to the “compulsion of economic circumstances.” This interpretation of “forced labour”, I will argue, necessarily depended upon a theory of freedom. In other words, in interpreting Article 23, the Court had to – and did – answer the question: what kind of freedom did the Constitution envision? (I). To place this in context, I will then set out three different historical accounts of freedom: first, the dominant “liberal” view, that limits freedom to a protection against intentional interference from other human beings; secondly, the “republican” view, which takes a broader approach, and argues that what is relevant is not interference, but the existence of arbitrary power that one individual or a group of individuals might wield over others; and thirdly, the “labour-republican” view, which, dispensing with the requirements of agency and intentionality, extends the domain of freedom from merely protection from the intentional acts of others, to protection from the operation of human institutions and practices, such as the market (II). I will go on to argue that PUDR’s adoption of this third view was justified in view of both the text of Article 23, as well as our constitutional history. The Indian Constitution did not take the existing economic structure and economic arrangements as “natural”, immutable states of affairs, which had no moral bearing on freedom. Rather, much like it sought to actively intervene in social structures through provisions like Article 15(2) and 17, the Constitution also aimed at transforming the economic structure – but to a limited extent. Article 23, and the guarantee against forced labour, were at the heart of this constitutional design, which for the first time was recognized by the Supreme Court in PUDR (III). I will conclude by examining the consequences of PUDR, both in the domain of the workplace, and in other domains which are not usually thought to raise issues of constitutional freedom – such as the household (IV). In the three-and-a-half decades since it was delivered, the promise of PUDR is yet to be followed through by the Supreme Court. However, it remains a standing invitation: an invitation to the Court to view the fundamental rights chapter as embodying not merely a charter of political freedom, but also through Article 23 – in the words of a contemporary scholar – a realization of “labour’s constitution of (economic) freedom.”

Freedom’s Poses

Kathy Ferguson’s anarchist women enact walking as freedom’s pose. In my response, I ask how the way we imagine poses and postures, comporting our bodies this way or that, alone or together, shapes the way we practice freedom. I worry that the focus on walking, a dominant and frequent metaphor for freedom in many diverse political registers, occludes our ability to see freedom in other poses, registers, and spaces. I argue that highlighting walking as freedom’s preferred pose hovers too close to the replication of the posture (and maybe the perspective too?) of the masculine self. These moves, and this movement, make it harder to discover other sites and kinds of freedom, and to fully appreciate contingency, non-necessity, and the unexpected possibilities available in every encounter. Drawing on the work of Adriana Cavarero, Simone de Beauvoir, and Hannah Arendt, I explore postures of inclination—Beauvoir’s housewives stooped over pots and pans—and consciously chosen inactivity—Arendt lying on her daybed thinking. These postures and poses open up our ability to see freedom in the encounter, an affective and agonistic freedom enacted only with others, and too easily hidden or missed.

DEMOKRASI PENDIDIKAN DALAM PERSPEKTIF FILSAFAT PENDIDIKAN ISLAM

Democracy has a set of value that becomes its characteristic to achieve the purpose of democracy itself. Through time to time, democracy has shown a significant progression and becomes a crucial topic not only in politic and economy but also in education. Democracy in education is kind of freedom that is used by the educator to develop the quality of education. Islam has emphasized Islamic people to treat human in a good way and also the equality especially in education. All people have the same right and opportunity in education furthermore to build the consciousness of them to study without any discrimination in all aspect of life

Marginalised Identity in Timberlake Wertenbaker’s Play: New Anatomies

The purpose of this study is to discuss the space for a marginalized feminine identity in contemporary British feminist dramatist Timberlake Wertenbaker’s play. The play New Anatomies dramatizes the life of a historical woman called Isabelle Eberhardt, who disguised herself as an Arab man called Si Mahmoud living among Algerians. The focus of the play is the construction of a marginalised identity through dislocation of a woman from the European culture. Finding no space for her radical identity, she disguises herself as an Arab man to escape the constraints imposed on women by European ideals of femininity. Eberhardt disrupts the conventional gender codes by showing how gender is dramatized within the space of the salon. In contrast, Eberhardt is received as a man in male attire when travelling in Algeria trying to find out a space for her radical identity. She achieves a certain kind of freedom by her dislocation although this eventually leads to her death in desert.

Existential Freedom in The French Lieutenant’s Woman

The purpose of this study is to trace the philosophical implication of John Fowles’s literary texts to explore the organic link between existential freedom and his writing of The French Lieutenant’s Woman. Fowles is dealing here with three kinds of freedom: social, individual and narrative. The author first interprets Fowle’s concern of freedom from social support. Then the author is devoted to the study of individual freedom. Finally, the author goes on to argue that narrative freedom is a metaphor for freedom from God, a precondition for existential freedom. Fowles’s FLW bears his philosophical assertion that freedom of will is the highest human good.