Kant's Practical Philosophy Research Articles

The practical philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the modern ethics of responsibility

The article deals with the practical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, its transformation in the modern ethics of responsibility and the significance of «risks and threats» for modern society. It is emphasized that in Ukraine, in particular, in the H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, a powerful historical-philosophical tradition of research in German classical philosophy has developed, the foundation of which is the philosophy of I. Kant. This trend gained a new development after the restoration of Ukraine's independence. Special attention was paid in the investigation to the study of Kant's moral philosophy, its important component – the categorical imperative. It is shown that Kant's practical philosophy became an important driver of the leading trends of modern philosophy in the world, which was manifested in the process of «rehabilitation of practical philosophy», which includes the philosophy of responsibility of H. Jonas, communicative philosophy and ethics of discourse. These trends prompted the search for new formulations of the categorical imperative. The relevance of Kant's practical philosophy is evident especially today, under the conditions of modern technological civilization, the destruction of the normative order in the world, and the crisis of moral guidelines. Kant's concept of the primacy of the practical (moral and ethical) mind over the theoretical, technical and instrumental mind opens up ways to solve the global problems of our time, especially in the conditions of crisis and war. Kant's anniversary coincides with a special period of Ukrainian history: the modernization of Ukrainian society, the restoration of national identity, and orientation towards universal values. This event acquires special significance in view of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Distorting the enlightment, moral-ethical and universalistic direction of Kant's philosophy, Russian propaganda tries to use it for ideological and propaganda purposes. That is why events dedicated to Kant's anniversary are an important component in the fight against the Russian aggressor.

Reinhold's "letters on kantian philosophy": their significance for Kant and german philosophy

The article is devoted primarily to the analysis of Reinhold’s Letters on Kantian Philosophy, published in the “Der Teutsche Merkur” (German Mercury) 1786-1787. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal the peculiarities of Reinhold’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy, as well as the possibility of the influence of these letters on Kant's practical philosophy and the further development of German idealism in general. To more clearly define Reinhold's own position, the article turns to Reinhold's early works, written before Letters, as well as to the 1790 and 1923 editions of the Letters. Particular respect is given to three topics that are closely related to each other: “Why did Reinhold’s Letters bring fame to Kant?”, “To what extent was Reinhold an independent philosopher?” і “What kind of infusion did his Letters make into the development of Kant’s philosophy and German idealism?” The article proves that before 1786, Reinhold had, in general terms, formed a program for the reform of philosophy, which was critical in its nature and had a clearly expressed practical focus. However, Reinhold's criticism was closer to the criticism of the eclectics and Leibniz than of Kant: it was aimed at overcoming the limitations of the original points of view and assumed a deep knowledge of the history of philosophy. The main reason for the popularity of Reinhold’s Letters lies in his idea of the “scientific revolution” in Germany, which should have become an alternative to social revolutions in other countries of Europe. Formed in “pre-revolutionary” articles, this idea received its justification in the second edition of the Letters. It was the nationalist idea of transforming the Germans into a “nation of scientists”, that became the reason for the rise of national consciousness in Germany and attracted “thinking youth” to it Reinhold's program for the reform of all philosophical sciences from a generally valid point of view gave impetus and largely determined the further development of German classical philosophy: not only Fichte, but also Schelling and Hegel relied primarily on his program. The first edition of his Letters largely determined the main themes of the Critique of Practical Reason, and the second - the Metaphysics of Morals. The second edition inspired Kant to develop a system of criticism and the basic ideas of Kant’s philosophy of law.

From moral laws to The Moral Law: The categorical moment in Kant's practical philosophy

From moral laws to The Moral Law: The categorical moment in Kant's practical philosophy

Shadow students in Georgia: A Kantian condemnation

Millions of immigrants reside in the United States without legal authorisation to do so. This paper examines the educational opportunities available to those brought to the country illegally as children. While the 1982 landmark Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe protects access to K–12 education, in the past 25 years, legislation passed at the federal and state levels has made undocumented persons ineligible for postsecondary education benefits such as federal student loans and in-state tuition rates. This paper assesses postsecondary education policies in Georgia through the lens of Immanuel Kant's practical philosophy. Utilising Kant's formula of humanity and drawing on the work of Thomas E. Hill, I argue that because these policies cannot be justified from the impartial perspective, they fail to treat undocumented students as ends in themselves and are thus morally unacceptable. Insofar as educational opportunities directly impact our ability to set ends and live as self-directing, autonomous persons, these restrictions are deeply troubling from a Kantian perspective.

POR UMA ÉTICA DA LINGUAGEM: SOBRE O SUPOSTO CARÁTER SOLIPSISTA E MONOLÓGICO DA RAZÃO PRÁTICA

O presente artigo pretende introduzir um conjunto de reflexões que versam sobre o problema da mentira e do dever de veracidade enquanto elementos que estruturam a filosofia prática de Kant. Para tanto, ocupa-se do primado da linguagem como questão fundamental da filosofia crítica. Em seguida, tematiza alguns dos principais momentos onde o referido problema se apresenta. Assim, além de uma reconstrução das teses gerais que constituem a parte transcendental da doutrina moral-prática, busca indicar em que medida os juízos sintéticos a priori práticos encontram na natureza humana, interpretada sensivelmente, seu domínio factual de aplicação. Tal esforço constituirá uma resposta indireta às críticas dirigidas por Karl-Otto Apel e Jürgen Habermas contra um suposto caráter solipsista e monológico da razão prática, de modo a sustentar que, em fim de contas, não seria Kant apenas o mais natural aliado desses dois pensadores, mas, sobretudo, que sua concepção de razão prática seria essencialmente dialógica.

Vocation and Destination in Kant's Practical Philosophy

Kant frequently employs the German term Bestimmung in his mature work, and depending on context, this term can signify the Latin determinatio , vocatio , or destinatio . These three senses of Bestimmung are interconnected within Kant’s system of moral teleology. Bestimmung as determination expresses our wills as formed and regulated by the moral law, via the categorical imperative. Bestimmung as vocation guides us toward a determination of willing by rational principles based on the moral law, and this “call” is inseparable from our capacity to will and act autonomously under phenomenal and historical conditions. Bestimmung as “destination” conveys the ends toward which moral cultivation is directed, both individually and collectively. Understanding the three integrated uses of Bestimmung provides a clearer picture of the scope of Kantian ethics encapsulating the long-term goals toward which we are directed individually, as members of communities, and as human beings.

칸트 후기 실천철학에서 근본악 테제의 두 측면

칸트 후기 실천철학에서 근본악 테제의 두 측면

Abismos da perversidade humana

O presente artigo elabora uma reflexão sobre questões éticas, tendo como pano de fundo o sistema do pensamento único de Arthur Schopenhauer. A questão central é constituída pelo problema filosófico do mal radical, uma figura de maldade extrema, que é recusada como possibilidade autenticamente humana na filosofia prática de Kant. A figura da alegria maligna (Schadenfreude), tal como esboçada na ética de Schopenhauer - ilustrada no artigo com exemplos da literatura universal – exibe um tipo de caráter capaz de transcender os limites do egoísmo e configurar uma modalidade de pura maldade, análoga ao caso do mal radical.

Do estruturalismo ao culturalismo: a filosofia das formas simbólicas de Ernest Cassirer

Resumo Ao investigar as origens neokantianas do estruturalismo e do culturalismo, este artigo analisa o desenvolvimento do pensamento de Cassirer, seguindo sua trajetória intelectual do conhecimento à cultura e da cultura à práxis. Este artigo está dividido em duas partes. Na primeira, o autor apresenta uma análise da concepção relacional do conhecimento de Cassirer. Na segunda, a crítica do conhecimento é suplantada por uma crítica da cultura. O autor analisa a filosofia antropológica das formas simbólicas e a compara criticamente com a teoria vitalista da cultura de Simmel. O artigo termina com a reivindicação por uma sociologia prática inspirada pelo retorno de Cassirer à filosofia prática de Kant.

Rigorismo y pluralidad de principios en Ética

The problem of the applicability of moral principles is one of the most significant issues of practical reflection. With Kant's practical philosophy, the ethical demands of universality and individuality came to seem incompatible. After reviewing the outlooks of Apel and Simmel, who both offer paradigmatic answers to the “rigorism” of the categorical imperative, this article presents the issue from the perspective of Maliandi's “Convergent Ethics”. It suggests that Maliandi's recognition of an “a priori of conflictivity” and of the bi-dimensional character of reason surmounts the shortages of both Apel's and Simmel's philosophies.

Kant's deontological Ethics and Korsgaard's neo-Kantian Constructivism

칸트의 실천철학은 선의지의 개념으로부터 무제약적인 당위명령과 의무개념을 도출시키는 의무론적 윤리학으로서 무엇보다 정언명령의 정식을 통해 표현된다. 칸트의 정언명령은 중세적 신의 권위와 인간의 주관적-경험적 제약성모두로부터 벗어난 실천이성의 무제약적이고 보편적인 원리이다. 이 정언명령에 대해서는 여러 비판과 재구성의 시도들이 있었고, 그 대표적인 것이 칸트주의자 코스가드의 구성주의적 해석이다. 그는 무제약적-보편적인 정언명령이 주는 규범적 부담을 덜어 내기 위해, 구성주의의 관점에서 합리적 의지를 지닌 인간이 자아구성 및 행위자성에 기초하여 어떻게 도덕 원리에 대한 복종 대신자기 이유로 인한 규범적 행위선택에 이르는지 설명해 주었고, 정신에 관한 구성주의적 모델을 통해 자아구성 내지 정체성 구조가 어떻게 이성의 지배를 낳게 되는지 보여 주었다. 코스가드의 구성주의적 해석에 대해서는 행위의 이유인식에서 무한소급에 빠지게 되고 자기인증적 설명에만 의존할 뿐이라는 비판이 있음에도, 자아구성 및 그와 연관된 행위의 구성적 원리에 대한 그의 호소는 도덕성을 합리성에 기초지우려는 시도로서 우리에게 `인간의 규범성은 정체성과 함께 간다`는 것을 확신시켜 준다.

Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics by Frederick Rauscher

Reviewed by: Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics by Frederick Rauscher Jeanine M. Grenberg Frederick Rauscher. Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. xiii + 264. Cloth, $99.99. Making sense of how intelligible notions in Kant's moral philosophy make a place for themselves in the sensible, natural world is perhaps one of the greatest challenges to a Kantian moral philosopher. In this book, Rauscher takes on that question with great aplomb, by looking carefully at an impressive array of Kant's texts, and assessing the extent to which one can say Kant is a realist, or naturalist. Rauscher's intelligent and creative conclusion, in his words, is as follows: I have identified a Kantian transcendental moral idealism that is also an empirical realism, thus dissolving some of the realist/constructivist disagreement. I show, however, that Kant is himself hesitant to endorse this transcendental validity for morality and, particularly in light of the priority of the practical point of view as an agent-perspective rational ordering of nature with no ontological claims of its own, that the more appropriate conclusion is that Kant was an empirical moral idealist. (10) The category of 'empirical moral idealism,' developed by bringing the (usually) theoretical notions of transcendental idealism and empirical realism into the moral realm, is entirely Rauscher's creation. This is a complex and interesting thesis, one that only someone deeply familiar with epistemological, scientific and ethical ideas in Kant could have brought together. It is, furthermore, a thesis that moves toward realism and naturalism not by peremptorily rejecting the anti-realist constructivist position but, instead, by "dissolving some of the realist/constructivist disagreement" (10, emphasis added). This is a mature, [End Page 354] attractive philosophical position which defends Kant's transcendental idealist approach to morality as also a morality that is firmly located within nature. There are times, however, when Rauscher's naturalistic tendencies take him too far. His chapter 2 discussion of "first-person freedom," which provides a central and orienting methodological point of view for the chapters to come, provides the starkest example of this excess. While rightly prioritizing the first-personal point of view in Kant's discussion of freedom, Rauscher fails to realize the metaphysical power of that point of view when he suggests that "free acts understood from the agent perspective have no ontological status" (76, emphasis added). This rejection of all ontological import for things practical is a central methodological commitment Rauscher makes. As Rauscher puts it: "not only is there no object involved that can be said to exist [when considering freedom first-personally], there is also a priority of the agent's perspective over any theoretical understanding even of the nature of action" (76). The practical agent's perspective gains priority over the theoretical or speculative, but only by refusing it all ontological import. Rauscher is right, of course, that practical cognition cannot give us theoretical understanding of intelligible objects; that would be "fanaticism" (see, e.g. Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe 5:135–36). But to deny all ontological import to our practical point of view puts Rauscher at odds with a number of points in Kant's practical works that suggest at least a trace or hint of things intelligible being obtainable from the first-personal practical perspective. To say that there is no theoretical cognition to be accomplished from the practical point of view is not the same as saying that there is no practical cognition of things metaphysical, ontological or intelligible. Even as I find this naturalism line drawn too harshly in Rauscher's book, I still find in it many other things with which I have deep sympathy. Methodologically, I admire Rauscher's emphasis upon the first personal point of view implicit in Kant's practical philosophy. His discussion of the postulate of God, for example, in chapter 5, makes its non-realist-but-naturalist point through appeal to the first-personal practical point of view. Here is his summary of his God discussion: The postulate of God in particular . . . is supposed to have immanent reference, that is, to empirical agents' moral lives, rather than transcendent reference, that is, to a...

Matej Szlávik’s Analysis of Kant’s Moral Philosophy

Work of Immanuel Kant is subject matter of investigation not only in modern Slovak history. Already in the past, it had a great influence on intellectual development of Slovak region within The Kingdom of Hungary. One of the attentive and critical readers of Kant's works was Matej Szlavik, a professor of Evangelical College in Presov. The study analyses Szlavik’s interpretation of Kant's works and it particularly focuses on analysis of Szlavik’s evaluations of Kant's practical and moral philosophy.

Secularizing Kenosis

Secularizing Kenosis: Review of Sacrifice in the Post-Kantian Tradition: Perspectivism, Intersubjectivity, and Recognition, by Paolo Diego BubbioPaolo Diego Bubbio, Sacrifice in the Post-Kantian Tradition: Perspectivism, Intersubjectivity, and Recognition (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014)The idea at the heart of Paolo Diego Bubbio's new book is a provocative and unusual one. It is that the Kantian transcendental turn, which foreclosed the possibility of achieving an understanding of things as they are 'in themselves,' had an intrinsically ethical or religious dimension, one best captured or symbolized by the Christian notion of kenotic sacrifice. Just as Christ was willing to renounce divinity in order make room in himself for human finitude, Bubbio reads the transcendental turn as enjoining us to give up our attempt to understand things as they are in themselves (thus rejecting the God's eye view of traditional metaphysics) in order to make room for the perspectives of others. Bubbio claims not only that this is a fruitful way to think about the Kantian revolution, but also that the notion of kenotic sacrifice played an important and explicit role in the writings of several major figures in the post-Kantian tradition: particularly, Solger, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. These thinkers, he claims, employed the concept of sacrifice as a way of coming to grips with the basic structure and significance of Kant's revolution. Bubbio shows that their reflections thus constitute a remarkable and unappreciated tradition of meditation on the nature of sacrifice-one that can allow us to see the deficiencies of more recent redeployments of the concept that we find in thinkers like Bataille, Derrida and Girard.As all of this suggests, Bubbio takes Kant's decision to reject traditional metaphysics, with its attempt to understand objects as they are in themselves, in favor of a revisionary conception of metaphysics in which reason is concerned only with itself or with its own products, as the most important event in modern philosophy. Although Bubbio clearly thinks Kant's revolution was quite justified, he thinks it left Kant and his successors with some unfinished business. The biggest remaining issue was to understand the source of the authority of the norms that reason supposedly imposes on itself. Bubbio shows that their reflections on this problem were often clothed in religious language, though the God that was invoked in these contexts was more a symbol for the kind of knowledge we should aspire to than a theological reality. We see the first instance of this kind of use of the notion of God in Kant's suggestion that we should understand the authority of practical norms by treating them as if they were issued by God himself. The Post-Kantians, who came to think that the authority was rooted in the self or in society, developed a modified conception of God. They conceive God as necessarily renouncing his transcendence or otherness or in order to become immanent in human consciousness or in social reality. Although Bubbio does not put it in just this way, Nietzsche's parable of the madman marks the clear endpoint of these quasi-theological reflections. With his announcement of the death of God, Nietzsche enjoins us to stop looking for some suitably post-Kantian equivalent of the God's eye view, encouraging us instead to fully embrace a conception of knowledge that is thoroughly and utterly perspectival. Despite the deep differences between these thinkers, Bubbio shows that in each case we can detect the basic structure of kenotic sacrifice: we are asked to give something up (an overly transcendent conception of knowledge or value) in order to make room for something else (a finite, properly human one).In Kant, however, these sacrificial themes are mostly implicit. Bubbio notes that the notion of sacrifice does not play any explicit role in Kant's theoretical philosophy, and plays only a minor role in Kant's practical philosophy, as when Kant speaks of sacrificing desire for duty. …

The Idea of God in Kantian Philosophy

The issue of existence and justification of the Supreme Being is constantly approached by Immanuel Kant in his entire work. For Kant, the ultimate goal of the nature created by God id man as a moral being: the world was created according to man's moral needs. This is why it is said that, after Kant, teleology leads to a moral theology, one that is not about the possibility of proving rationally God's existence but which is about stating that moral life is possible only if God exists. Under these circumstances, though the “idea of God” is presupposed in most Kantian works, we insist, below, particularly on what is debated when appealing to practical reason. In the theoretical philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason, the idea of God as Unconditioned, as a being that is absolutely necessary, is seen as a transcendental ideal determined through an idea as a prototype of perfection necessary to everything that is contingent and determined in our sensible world: what we can do to conciliate sensible experience with the Absolute Being is to presuppose an extra-phenomenal reality designated as transcendental object: we presuppose its existence but we cannot get to know it. Later, in Critique of Practical Reason, God is postulated (together with soul's immortality) as a condition of the supreme value of moral life, the Sovereign Good (union of virtue with happiness). Since in the sensible world moral conduct does not warrant proportional happiness, the virtuous ones has strong reasons to believe in the reparatory intervention of a superior power: God, as moral ideal and warranty of moral order. “Morality leads, inevitably, to religion, through which it (morality) extends over a moral Lawgiver” claims Kant. Under these conditions, religion, understood as the belief in the existence of a supreme Lawgiver, has, for Kant, an exclusively moral substance. In the last part of the present study we insist on the work Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, we attempt at arguing the possibility of discovering some elements of “philosophical Christology” in Kant's practical philosophy: first, because, for the philosopher of Konigsberg, Christian doctrine provides the only concept of Sovereign Good that meets the exigencies of practical reason; and second, because we consider significant Kant's debates on God's Son as impersonated idea of the Good, the Perfect Man well-pleasing to God, Moral Personality, noumenal archetype originating in mankind, etc.

Kant and applied ethics: the uses and limits of Kant's practical philosophy

Preface vi Note on Sources and Key to Abbreviations viii Introduction: Why Kant Now 1 Part I. Applying Kant s Ethics 11 1. Animal Suffering and Moral Character 13 2. Kant s Strategic Importance for Environmental Ethics 45 3. Moral and Legal Arguments for Universal Health Care 71 4. The Scope of Patient Autonomy 90 Part II. Kantian Arguments against Kant s Conclusions 115 5. Subjecting Ourselves to Capital Punishment 117 6. Same-Sex Marriage as a Means to Mutual Respect 139 Part III. Limitations of Kant s Theory 165 7. Consent, Mail-Order Brides, and the Marriage Contract 167 8. Individual Maxims and Social Justice 194 9. The Decomposition of the Corporate Body 217 10. Becoming a Person 241 Conclusion: Emerging from Kant s Long Shadow 283 Bibliography 289 Index 311

Estructura de la filosofía práctica de Kant

One of the principal errors when trying to interpret Kant's practical philosophy is the failure to look at the elements into which it is divided. The philosopher of Konigsberg structured practical philo- sophy into three main parts. The first constitutes the critical or propedeutic system of the metaphysics of morals, which deals with the supreme principle of morality. The second part contains the set of duties or obligations pertaining to pure practical reason, and the third is a moral anthropology or, in a pragmatic sense, the empirical part of Kant's practical philosophy.

‘Letting the Phenomena In’: On How Herman's Kantianism Does and Does Not Answer the Empty Formalism Critique

AbstractInMoral Literacy, Barbara Herman informs us that she will defend an ‘enlarged version of Kantian moral theory’ (Herman 2008: ix). Her ‘enlarged version’, she says, will provide a much-needed alternative to the common but misguided characterization of Kant's practical philosophy as an empty formalism. I begin with a brief sketch of the main features of Herman's corrective account. I endorse her claim that the enlarged Kantianism she defends is true to Kant's intentions as well as successful in correcting the objections she outlines. I then argue that there is another version of the empty formalism worry Herman does not address. Not only does she not address it, but her form of Kantianism provides fuel for its fire.

What is the Use of the Universal Law Formula of the Categorical Imperative?

Many of its students are first drawn to Kant's practical philosophy because it seems to promise a theory of morality both objective and practicable. Moral theory, as Kant conceives of it, must abst...

Kant's Account of Motivation: A Sartrean Response to Some Hegelian Objections

Ethical motivation represents an important aspect of Kant's practical philosophy, one without which much of Kant's distinctive position would be lost. Not surprisingly, it is also one of those aspects of Kantianism to which Hegelian criticism directs its focus with predilection. Central to Kant's account of moral motivation is the distinction between acting merely in accordance with duty and acting from duty. When he introduces this distinction, in the Groundwork, Kant also points to the epistemic difficulties of properly drawing the distinction. A key concept here is, without any doubt, that of duty, and Kant begins with a preliminary definition: the notion of duty is a notion ‘which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances’ (G: 4: 397).What this definition tells us is that, although beings which are only governed by practical reason without any admixture of inclinations and sensuous drives, that is, purely rational beings, will also have a good will, such beings do not have duties precisely because they lack the ‘subjective limitations and hindrances’ of sensuous motivating forces, such as desires, passions, habitual responses. If a person spontaneously and necessarily acts as duty requires, then it does not make sense to talk about an obligation for this person to act as duty requires. Such a person must be a purely rational person, since only she can always and necessarily act as (practical) reason requires. By contrast, beings with limitations and hindrances, like us, act spontaneously and necessarily as natural laws require and, hence, it does not make sense to talk about our obligation or duty to observe the laws of nature.