Kant's View Research Articles

Întemeierea etică a spectacolului de teatru

The way we interpret artistic creations - and especially theatrical ones - is about value judgments based on what the eye holds and the spirit embodies. If we accept the Kantian view that we have a world of things and a world of people - which will shed light on the relationship between aesthetics and ethics, between the work of art and human behavior, between beauty and attitudes - we can accept that the supreme value that governs us is the moral law, understood as a necessary and universal principle. In our work we will try to show that, on the one hand, the stage creation and its reception are based on rules and norms not arbitrary, but deeply rooted in the human being, on the other hand, that the theatrical work (more precisely, the theatre performance) tends to free itself from any constraints, seeking solutions “beyond good and evil”, but not to invalidate their validity, but to make a return, through knowledge and interpretation, a return to the bosom of ethics.

The Highest Good and the Relation between Virtue and Happiness

The paper develops a Kantian view of the highest good and the relation between virtue and happiness. Several Kantian theses are defended, among them the thesis that the highest good is realized only if every virtuous individual is happy, the view that virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness, and the proposition that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for the worthiness of being happy. The author argues that the highest good ought to be realized and that it ought to be that everyone who is virtuous is happy. To prove these claims, the author will use techniques developed by modern deontic logicians. According to Kant, we do not have an immediate duty to promote our own happiness, the aim of morality being not personal satisfaction but rather virtue and the good will. The important question is not “How do I become happy?” but “How do I become good?”. The arguments in this paper support this view.

Skin color and race.

Skin color is the primary physical criterion by which people have been classified into groups in the Western scientific tradition. From the earliest classifications of Linnaeus, skin color labels were not neutral descriptors, but connoted meanings that influenced the perceptions of described groups. In this article, the history of the use of skin color is reviewed to show how the imprint of history in connection with a single trait influenced subsequent thinking about human diversity. Skin color was the keystone trait to which other physical, behavioral, and culture characteristics were linked. To most naturalists and philosophers of the European Enlightenment, skin color was influenced by the external environment and expressed an inner state of being. It was both the effect and the cause. Early investigations of skin color and human diversity focused on understanding the central polarity between “white” Europeans and nonwhite others, with most attention devoted to explaining the origin and meaning of the blackness of Africans. Consistently negative associations with black and darkness influenced philosophers David Hume and Immanuel Kant to consider Africans as less than fully human and lacking in personal agency. Hume and Kant's views on skin color, the integrity of separate races, and the lower status of Africans provided support to diverse political, economic, and religious constituencies in Europe and the Americas interested in maintaining the transatlantic slave trade and upholding chattel slavery. The mental constructs and stereotypes of color‐based races remained, more strongly in some places than others, after the abolition of the slave trade and of slavery. The concept of color‐based hierarchies of people arranged from the superior light‐colored people to inferior dark‐colored ones hardened during the late seventeenth century and have been reinforced by diverse forces ever since. These ideas manifest themselves as racism, colorism, and in the development of implicit bias. Current knowledge of the evolution of skin color and of the historical development of color‐based race concepts should inform all levels of formal and informal education. Awareness of the influence of color memes and race ideation in general on human behavior and the conduct of science is important.

Chapter 6 Mind‐Dependent Views of Knowledge

In the earlier chapters of Interpreting Kant in Education, a reading of Kant was developed that contrasts sharply with the widespread ‘Kantian’ picture in education theory. Having discussed aspects of Kant's view in relation to empiricist and naturalist (mind-independent) epistemologies, I turn in this sixth chapter to contrast them with Richard Rorty's social consensus (mind-dependent) view of knowledge. Attention is drawn to empiricist understandings of epistemological concepts to illustrate the enduring influence of the Cartesian legacy, which, I argue, has shaped interpretations of Kant in education. Alternative understandings of some familiar concepts (previously introduced) are expanded on, with mind, world and their relation again being a point of discussion. Drawing on the work of John McDowell, I focus particularly on the ideas of objectivity and ‘worldly constraint’ as a basis for arguments developed in Part Two and in order to bring into view a richer and more acceptable picture of Kant's idealist view of knowledge.

Chapter 3 Kant as a Revolutionary

In the previous chapters of Interpreting Kant in Education, some different understandings of Kant's key terms were contrasted in order to begin to bring a more favourable picture of Kant into view. This third chapter continues the process through a discussion of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’. Most in education will be familiar with Kant's idea that objects conform to our knowledge, but this can be understood in different ways. Typically read as a subjectivist ‘mind makes nature’ move, Kant is widely characterised in educational theory as a constructivist, with mind often reified as ordering and structuring the sense data of experience, or imposing meaning and principles. Here Kant's Copernican insight is considered in relation to the prevailing metaphysics of his time, emphasising his rejection of this and showing how original his thinking is. Addressing the question of just what is mind-dependent on Kant's mind-dependent view involves considering the conceptions of the relation between subject and object, mind and world, that underlie different interpretations. The idea of objective constraints is introduced to begin to emphasise the objectivity of Kant's Copernican insight, which tends to be obscured in ‘mind imposes meaning’ portrayals in education.

Chapter 8 The ‘Layer‐Cake’ versus ‘Transformative’ Conceptions of Human Mindedness

Chapter Eight of Interpreting Kant in Education again illustrates the tendency in education theory to attribute to Kant a radical subjectivism, an all-powerful mind, that leads to accusations of intellectualism and a disembedded conception of mind, detached from real life. Interpretations of Kant's terms, previously introduced from contemporary Kantian exegesis and commentary, are contrasted with interpretations that make up the familiar ‘Kantian’ picture in education. Drawing on the work of James Conant, attention is given to pictures of human mindedness that are involved in different conceptions of experience and sensibility. These differences are central to understandings of the relation between mind and reality, subject and object, and affect how Kant's overall view is comprehended. John McDowell's work is used to illustrate both the objective and unreflective nature of most of our ongoing sense experience, which is obscured in typical ‘mind imposes meaning’ characterisations in education.

One more time on the alleged repugnance of Kant's ethics? Schiller's Kallias letters and the entirety of the human being

AbstractIn this paper, I consider the Kallias Letters in connection with Kant's account of moral action in order to analyse Schiller's characterisation of Kant's conception of constraint as aesthetically repugnant. I show how Schiller treats the difficulties inherent to the dualistic view that human beings consist in irreducibly sensible and rational natures. After elucidating the fundamental distinctions between Kant's and Schiller's views, I argue that, although Schiller's charge of repugnance appears too weak to pose a serious threat to Kant's ethics, it nevertheless indicates a significant problem in Kant's dualistic conception of the human being.

Bad Habits: The Nature and Origin of Kantian Passions

Abstract According to Kant, passions are a distinct type of inclination. Unlike normal inclinations, however, they are inherently destructive—much like addictions. Recent scholarship on Kant's view has left two important questions unanswered. First, what is the key trouble-making difference between passions and normal inclinations? Second, what mental processes give rise to passions in the first place? My article answers both questions. I argue that passions involve a form of tunnel vision or hyperfocus that corrupts practical reason by hijacking attention. This problem emerges when the imagination (or “fantasy”) distorts the processes that give rise to normal inclinations.

Realität als vermeintliche Grenze der Erkenntnis: Hegels Metaphysik im Anschluss an und in Abgrenzung zu Kant

While Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason aims to 'humiliate' reason by declining any possibility of knowledge of things 'in themselves', he does conceive such critique as 'the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics'. In this paper I examine in what sense Hegel's Science of Logic goes beyond that Kantian view without neither relapsing back into dogmatic metaphysics nor turning into a mere pragmatism. I argue that reality in itself is ontologically deficient so that it is already reality itself (and not just the categories of understanding) that makes true knowledge of real things impossible. Nonetheless I contend that there is something in Hegel's Science of Logic that is truly absolute and turns Logic into 'a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics', namely what Hegel calls the Concept or the Absolute Idea. Furthermore I point out the concrete importance of these metaphysical claims for human theoretical and practical knowledge. This finally provides a new reading of Hegel's Logic as a de-ontologised Aristotelian metaphysics that not just claims to regulate empirical knowledge in a Kantian manner, but to also conceptually constitute reality 'in itself'.

Patriotism & Moral Theology

This essay examines the question of the moral justification of patriotism, given a Kantian view of morality as requiring an equal respect for every human being. The essay considers the background in Kant's moral theology for his cosmopolitanism. It then considers an extreme version of cosmopolitanism that denies a proper place for love of one's country, and it engages with a contemporary atheist cosmopolitan, Seyla Benhabib, suggesting that there are resources in Kant's moral theology to ground the hope that she expresses but does not succeed in grounding. Finally, it considers patriotism as a perfection of cosmopolitanism, in the same way that love of an individual can be a perfection of love of humanity. The essay suggests that defensible versions of cosmopolitanism put constraints on what kind of love of one's own country is morally permissible. But these constraints require the background in a Kantian moral theology.

Jan Śniadecki’s Philosophical Interpretations of the Concepts Explaining Beauty and Art

Analysing Śniadecki’s articles and chapters from his “Philosophy of Human Mind” dealing with the problems of aesthetic taste, style, wit, imagination and essence of beauty, we question a view of Śniadecki as a dogmatic proponent of Classicism and an enemy to Romanticism, which, in our view, is based on in-depth studies of his most famous nevertheless only one article “On Classical and Romantic Writings”. We suppose that French aesthetics is not the exclusive keystone of Śniadecki’s ideas. Therefore, we examine the peculiarities of his thought in the context of their relationship with the ideas by philosophers of the Scottish school of common sense and argue that these are close. His descriptions of taste and style, of the roles of imagination and sensory expressions are similar to Reid's and Stewart's ones. We show that Śniadecki strives to substantiate the objectivist view of aesthetics and rationally explain the essence of beauty and art, but, by surprise, his thought about the relationship between genius and rules is recalling Kantian view. Our conclusion is that Sniadecki's ideas might be attributed to at least neo-Classical, or even to pre-Romanticist period.

Edith Landmann-Kalischer on Aesthetic Demarcation and Normativity

Abstract Two perennial questions in aesthetics, among others, are the demarcation question, viz., what, if anything, distinguishes the aesthetic domain from the cognitive or moral domains, and the normative question, viz., what kind of normativity, if any, does the aesthetic domain involve. Although recent attempts to answer these questions can be found in contemporary literature, in this paper I examine the answers defended by the early phenomenologist Edith Landmann-Kalischer. I show that Landmann-Kalischer answers the demarcation question by blending together a cognitivist account of aesthetic judgment with an objectivist account of beauty, and that she builds an account of aesthetic normativity on this cognitivist and objectivist basis. I contend that her subtle and unified account of aesthetic demarcation and normativity has advantages over other competing hedonist and Kantian views and, as such, merits further consideration in contemporary debates.

On the Wrongness of Lies

Why are lies wrong? The Kantian answer sees lies as a close cousin to coercion; they are a violation of individual autonomy and a demonstration of contempt. By contrast, the utilitarian answer is that lies are likely to lead to terrible consequences, sometimes because they obliterate trust, sometime because they substitute the liar’s will for that of the chooser, who has much better information about the chooser’s welfare than does the liar. The utilitarian objection to paternalistic lies is akin to the utilitarian embrace of Mill’s Harm Principle. It is possible to see the Kantian view as a kind of moral heuristic, welcome on utilitarian grounds. The Kantian and utilitarian objections to lying have implications for the family, the workplace, advertising, commerce, and politics, and also for constitutional law.

Moral Cognition in Criminal Punishment

Abstract Scholars often appeal to Kant in defending a retributivist view of criminal punishment. In this paper, I join other scholars in rejecting this interpretation as insufficiently attentive to Kant's wider theory of justice, particularly as found in the Rechtslehre, a section of the Metaphysics of Morals. I then turn to the Tugendlehre, where I examine analogies between Kant's treatments of morality and justice. In particular, I argue that Kant's own views about conscience and moral cognition should cause us to rethink the importance of lex talionis (an integral retributive principle) in the criminal justice system, and to adopt a more merciful attitude toward punishable criminals than we might otherwise be inclined to do. I end with a few policy proposals aimed at encouraging such moral cognition in contemporary Anglo-American criminal justice systems

Gramática del ethos y comunidad ética en Julio de Zan

El presente trabajo realiza una reconstrucción de la filosofía práctica de Julio De Zan poniendo de relieve su filiación kantiana y deteniéndose en cuatro momentos teóricos. En primer lugar, se presenta la noción de una “gramática del ethos”, mediante la cual De Zan presenta –siguiendo a Kant– los aspectos formales de su perspectiva. En segundo lugar, se discute el modo en que De Zan toma en cuenta las críticas a Kant desde la filosofía hegeliana, y el modo en que propone superar esas críticas. En tercer lugar, se examina a la ética discursiva como una actualización válida –según este autor– del pensamiento kantiano. Finalmente, se aborda la idea de comunidad ética como un antecedente kantiano de la sociedad civil.

Kant and the Science of Logic by Huaping Lu-Adler

Reviewed by: Kant and the Science of Logic by Huaping Lu-Adler J. Colin McQuillan LU-ADLER, Huaping. Kant and the Science of Logic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 272 pp. Cloth, $74.00 Huaping Lu-Adler's Kant and the Science of Logic represents the very best that contemporary Kant scholarship has to offer. Lu-Adler's book combines analytical rigor, sensitivity to the historical context in which Kant thought and wrote, and mastery of an extensive body of scholarly literature with methodological insight and clarity of presentation. It is essential reading for Kant scholars, historians of logic, and other historians of philosophy. The structure of Kant and the Science of Logic is straightforward. In the first chapter, Lu-Adler surveys the sources and materials that are necessary to reconstruct Kant's views on logic and explains how they are to be evaluated. She is rightfully suspicious of the textbook published as Kant's Logic (1800) by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche. While Jäsche's logic can be helpful, it should never be read apart from Kant's Reflexionen, the transcripts of his lectures, and his other published works. It is only when these sources are compared, using what Lu-Adler calls a "perspectival approach," that Kant's distinctive views on logic can be understood. Once this approach has been adopted, Lu-Adler argues, the "critical eclecticism" of Kant's approach to logic becomes apparent. According to Lu-Adler, Kant's conception of logic is both critical and eclectic, because it begins [End Page 375] with "a constructive analysis of how past philosophers might have sought to build and support their systems." However, this is merely a preliminary phase in the construction of a system, in which one must evaluate one's own opinions and those of one's contemporaries, in order to arrive at sound principles and architectonic unity. Lu-Adler thinks this approach helps to avoid the problems of uncritical syncretism and dogmatic system-building, while connecting fruitfully with "Kant's view of what it means to become a genuinely independent thinker," which can be achieved only within "a community of autonomous truth-seekers, through an honest exchange of ideas and perspectives." Chapters 2 and 3 reconstruct the problems that Kant's conception of logic was meant to address. Lu-Adler surveys, in chapter 2, the history of logic from antiquity to the renaissance, highlighting the place logic was thought to occupy within philosophy as well as the utility it was thought to have. Lu-Adler's chapter brings into sharp relief the ambiguous place logic has occupied in the history of European philosophy, showing that it is by no means clear, within that history, whether logic was a science; whether it is a theoretical or practical discipline; whether it has its own subject matter; whether it is merely an aid to grammar, ethics, or metaphysics; and whether the development of a technical, formal logical is to be celebrated or condemned. In chapter 3, she extends this inquiry into the early modern period. Lu-Adler argues that early modern European philosophers faced many of the same problems as their medieval and renaissance predecessors, though their views on logic were also affected by the new methods being developed in the natural sciences (Bacon), a new emphasis on intellectual freedom (Locke), as well as a desire to formalize the rules of thinking and explain their relation to mathematics (Leibniz and Wolff). In chapter 4, Lu-Adler identifies two "breakthroughs" in Kant's philosophy of logic during the pre-critical period. The first is a distinction between (1) the logic of the common understanding and (2) the logic of learned understanding, which corresponds, roughly, to the distinction between pure and applied general logic. Kant insists in the transcripts of some of his logic lectures that the logic of the learned understanding is a science, because it is grounded in a priori principles, but he denies that the logic of the common understanding is a science, because it is grounded in empirical principles. The second breakthrough is the development of Kant's conception of transcendental logic, which Lu-Adler traces back to Kant's characterization of ontology as a subjective...

The Displacement of Human Judgment in Science: The Problems of Biomedical Research in an Age of Big Data

The Displacement of Human Judgment in Science:The Problems of Biomedical Research in an Age of Big Data Paul Scherz (bio) in the human condition, hannah arendt lamented the state of the mathematical natural sciences. While recognizing their power to transform the world, she thought that they leave much to be desired in terms of providing an explanation for the world once they lose contact with human senses and intuitions. Surveying fields like quantum mechanics in which we still do not have a good picture of the world described by the equations, Arendt suggested that science was being reduced to mere technical intervention into nature rather than an understanding of it. "But the mathematization of physics … had in its last stages the unexpected and yet plausible consequence that every question man puts to nature is answered in terms of mathematical patterns to which no model can ever be adequate" (Arendt 1998, 287). Understanding is lost, leaving "us a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the way they affect our measuring instruments" (261). Of course, similar critiques were levelled throughout the mid-twentieth century by many other scholars—Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hans Jonas, and Georges Canguilhem. As Husserl put it, "This arithmetization of geometry leads almost automatically, in a certain way, to the emptying of its meaning" (1970, 44). Physical science had lost hold of the original [End Page 957] intuitions underlying the quantification of nature, driving it from the grasp of human understanding. To many scholars who shared this critique, one natural science seemed like an exception: biology. Heidegger argued that "all sciences concerned with life must necessarily be inexact just in order to remain rigorous. A living thing can indeed also be grasped as a spatio-temporal magnitude of motion, but then it is no longer apprehended as living" (1977, 120). Because of the rich complexity of organisms, it was not thought that they could be understood purely mathematically. Instead, one needed to understand their purposes, aims, and goals; that is, their teleology. Even those like Ernst Mayr, attempting to mathematize biology as part of the Modern Synthesis of evolution, understood this need, although he preferred the cybernetically derived term "teleonomy" to the older "teleology" (Mayr 1989). For example, a complete, detailed description of the chemical and signaling reactions that lead to birds migrating would still be a deficient explanation if we did not also include an account of why birds migrate. Because it deals with living things, biology requires richer forms of judgment and explanation than other natural sciences. This exceptional feature of biological explanation had been recognized already by Immanuel Kant, who argued that science needed something beyond the mathematics of Newtonian physics. While he would have liked to submit all of nature to that mathematical form of description, it was impossible because living organisms demanded this richer teleological description (Kant 2000, 386–88). Most philosophers in prior generations shared Kant's view. A science of purely mathematical relations between entities could not capture the complexity and goal-directedness of biological life. Then, two decades ago, the Human Genome Project brought a sea change. Biology began to be inundated by massive amounts of genetic and other data, much of which was produced and interpreted by machines. Analogous to developments in other fields like medicine and education, human judgment began to look inadequate to the task of analyzing this data and using it to develop the therapies that [End Page 958] had been promised in exchange for the massive public and private investment in the machine infrastructure. Scientists began suggesting that these vast accumulations of data, "mined" and interpreted by machines, could reveal knowledge. For instance, an editorial in Nature entitled "Can Biological Phenomena Be Understood by Humans?" quoted a biologist arguing that scientists "have to free [themselves] from the hypothesis-driven approach" and rely more on computer models (Anonymous 2000). After 2000, practicing scientists and philosophers of biology joined a broad debate over the relationship between the scientist, computer-analyzed data, and human reason in biological knowledge production (Allen 2001a, b; Gillies 2001; Smal-heiser 2002; Kell and Oliver 2004). The argument for the seeming promise of artificial intelligence in science was put...

Kant On Temporal Extension: Embodied, Indexical Idealism

Abstract I defend what I take to be a genuinely Kantian view on temporal extension: time is not an object but a human horizon of concrete particulars. As such, time depends on the existence of embodied human subjects. It does not, however, depend on those subjects determined as spatial objects. Starting with a realist notion of “apperception” as applied to indexical space (1), I proceed with the need for external criteria of temporal duration (2). In accordance with Kant’s Second Analogy of Experience, these criteria are found in concepts and laws of motion and change (3). I then see what follows from this for a reasonable notion of transcendental idealism (4). Finally, in support of my Kantian conclusions, I argue for the transcendentally subjective nature of particular temporal extension (5).

Animality and Rationality (On how John McDowell's Kantian view of moral experience could accommodate research on emotion)

My main goal in this article is methodological: I want to spell out how a Kantian perspective could accommodate current empirical work on cognition, and in particular on emotion. Having chosen John McDowell as a guide, I try to characterize his view of moral experience and underline its Kantian traits (McDowell 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f). I start by identifying the conception of freedom as exemplified in the rational wolf thought experiment in Two Forms of Naturalism as the main Kantian trait. I then go through the characterization of two other crucial aspects of our moral experience – (responsiveness to) reasons and value. I suggest that McDowell’s approach to moral experience, although not itself strictly Kantian in all of its details, is an instance of a transformative view of rationality, as defended by Matthew Boyle (Boyle 2016) and that such transformative view is the key to accommodate empirical research on cognition within a Kantian perspective.

Laws of Nature by Walter Ott

Reviewed by: Laws of Nature by Walter Ott Michael J. Futch OTT, Walter and Lydia Patton, editors. Laws of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. ix + 264 pp. Cloth, $65.00 This wide-ranging collection of essays examines the metaphysical underpinnings and implications of competing accounts of laws of nature. The first six essays offer interpretations of key figures in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the remaining six essays providing contributions to current debates on the topic. This is not to suggest a sharp bifurcation between the exegetical and the philosophical, however, as most authors show an appreciation for the reciprocal illumination of contemporary philosophy and its history. To avoid a fragmented discussion, I will focus only on those essays of most interest to readers of this journal. One way to understand early modern debates about laws of nature is in terms of a bottom-up as opposed to a top-down approach. On the former understanding, laws are grounded in things' natures and powers, whereas the latter sees them as being externally imposed by God. Using this framework, Walter Ott argues that Bacon and Spinoza both opt for a bottom-up approach that renounces an unalloyed mechanism. Laws just are the powers of things inscribed into their natures, and yet are still lawlike insofar as they express unchanging dispositions. One [End Page 803] consequence of this is that the world is governed by a multiplicity of natures and laws that can obstruct each other. Stathos Psillos also employs these interpretive categories in his discussion of Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley, Leibniz, Hume, and Newton. For these thinkers, laws, like the powers they displace, impose either metaphysically or naturally necessary connections in nature, even if such necessities cannot be inferred from observed regularities. This necessity, however, is top-down and not bottom-up since it emanates from a law giver and not bodies' powers. In their contributions, Helen Hattab and Mary Domski examine Descartes's relation to his predecessors and successors. Hattab identifies three features of Descartes's laws—they are universal, play a causal role in nature, and determine every outcome in nature—whose provenance she seeks to trace. Hattab shows that the first two features are presaged in the works of late fifteenth-century Aristotelians, but since these same thinkers posit bottom-up active powers that determine changes, the third is not. Sebastian Basso, contrariwise, is a more direct precursor to Descartes since one finds all three characteristics of laws in his oeuvre. Domski defends Descartes against the criticisms of Newtonians that his derivation of the laws of nature from God's immutable nature compromises divine freedom and overstates the capacity of human reason to comprehend the God's essence. On her reading, Descartes's laws are certain and necessary only from the vantage point of human reason. Similarly, Newton's laws are best understood as principles that, as applied to mathematical bodies, are indubitable and rationally certain. The differences between Descartes and Newton are therefore not as sharp as might initially appear. Angela Breitenbach elucidates Kant's views on laws of nature in a way that simultaneously preserves their nomic necessity and knowability. Arguing against alternative accounts that achieve one at the expense of the other, Breitenbach maintains that our access to specific natural laws is through "empirical reflection." This means that empirical inquiry searches for laws that systematically unify nature and that take the necessary form imposed by a priori principles of reason. Several of the later essays revolve around the Best System Account, which sees laws as true generalizations that supervene on nonnomic facts and are part of the system that achieves the best balance between strength and simplicity. Especially notable here is Michela Massimi's convincing argument in favor of a perspectivalist version of the BSA that recognizes that, rather than being fixed, standards of simplicity and strength differ throughout the history of science. Natural laws are nomically necessary just in case they figure in perspectives that vary across time and scientific communities. This account both remains grounded in the actual practice of scientific communities and yields laws resilient to theory change. Of the entries not principally historically oriented, those by Stephen Mumford and by...