Kansas Law Research Articles

A Preliminary Study: The C-Vue Chromatograph as a Presumptive Tool to Assist Kansas Law Enforcement to Distinguish Between Legal and Illegal Forms of Cannabis

Since the federal government now controls cannabis based on the total tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content of 0.3% by dry weight, law enforcement, particularly in states in which cannabis is still controlled, faces many new challenges regarding the potential seizure of cannabis. No longer is the traditional Duquenois-Levine color reaction test utilized by law enforcement for many years able to distinguish between legal versus illegal forms of cannabis; both federally legal and illegal cannabis contain cannabinoids, which produce positive responses for this presumptive test. Law enforcement officers often need a quick answer when it comes to deciding whether or not to seize potential cannabis without the fear of a potential lawsuit. They often do not have the time to send a sample to an analytical lab and wait weeks for the results. This study evaluated the C-Vue Liquid Chromatograph (LC) as a simple, robust, affordable presumptive tool that, within less than an hour, allows officers to determine whether the sample is most likely legal (hemp) or illegal cannabis (marijuana) based on the 0.3% THC threshold. When this data was compared against a validated research-grade LC, using a set of 50 cannabis samples from different sources, the C-Vue correctly predicted whether the THC concentration was above or below the 0.3 wt. % threshold in 48 out of 50 samples, suggesting that the C-Vue may be useful as a presumptive tool.

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 69 Number 3

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 69 Number 3

Prior Involuntary Institutionalization Does Not Justify a Lifetime Second Amendment Ban: An Originalist Approach to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4)

Once mentally ill does not mean always mentally ill. This underlying premise is not only scientifically accepted, but has been long recognized in the history and tradition of our common law. However, rather enigmatically, two circuit courts have deviated from this long understanding to find that once an individual has been classified as mentally ill, that classification is permanent. This flawed understanding has not only created a rupture in our Second Amendment jurisprudence, but it has also produced a significant circuit split between three circuits, in which neither the conclusions nor analyses are uniform. Notwithstanding the judicial disarray, federal law historically—and currently— poorly addresses this issue as well. Federal law categorically prohibits the possession of a firearm from an individual who has been “adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” The United States deems this class of individuals worthy of a lifetime Second Amendment ban with only two avenues for relief: one that is nullified; and the other that is non-uniform and arbitrary. While this statute is imposing, it certainly does not lack justification. There is without a question a governmental interest and objective in protecting the citizens through crime reduction and suicide prevention. This objective, however, cannot be reached by categorically denying a constitutional right to a classification of individuals without due process. This article uses an originalist approach to demonstrate that the classification of “mentally ill” is not a permanent and static one; rather that it is fluid and subject to transformation and development. With this main premise in mind, this article critiques the insufficient statutory response to this issue and offers an originalist judicial approach to resolving the circuit split. In the end, this article analyzes recent circuit court decisions on this issue from the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits and offers a solution that safeguards the constitutional rights of an individual, ensures that due process rights are feasible, and preserves the governmental interest of reducing crime and preventing suicides. This is an article I wrote while I was a member of the Kansas Law Journal at the University of Kansas School of Law. I neither purport to be an expert in mental health initiatives nor Second Amendment litigation. I welcome all comments and criticisms. This article was selected to be published in the forthcoming issue of the Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy.

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 4

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 4

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 69 Number 2

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 69 Number 2

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 3

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 3

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 5

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 5

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 69 Number 1

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 69 Number 1

Executing Simon’s Law: A Case Report of a Neonate with Trisomy 18

Background: Signed into Kansas law in April 2017, Simon's Law dictates that a “do-not-resuscitate order or similar physician’s order” may not be placed in an unemancipated minor’s chart unless at least one parent or guardian has been informed orally and in writing of the intent to place the order, and a reasonable attempt has been made to reach the other parent. If there is a disagreement, either parent may petition the court, and an order may not be placed until proceedings are completed. …

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 4

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 4

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 1

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 1

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 2

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 68 Number 2

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 3

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 3

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 4

,,,Front Matter, University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 4

,,,Front Matter: University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 1

,,,Front Matter: University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 1

,,,Kansas Law Review Criminal Procedural Survey - 2018 Supplement

,,,Kansas Law Review Criminal Procedural Survey - 2018 Supplement

,,,Front Matter: University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 2

,,,Front Matter: University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 67 Number 2

Front Matter: The University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 66 Number 3

Front Matter: The University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 66 Number 3

Changes in spending and service use after a state autism insurance mandate.

Almost all states have insurance coverage mandates for childhood autism spectrum disorder treatment, yet little is known about how mandates affect spending and service use. We evaluated a 2011 Kansas law mandating comprehensive coverage of autism spectrum disorder treatments in the State Employee Health Plan. Data were extracted from the Kansas All-Payer Claims Database from 2009 to 2013 for enrollees of State Employee Health Plan and private health plans. The sample included children aged 0-18 years with >2 claims with an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis insured through State Employee Health Plan or a comparison group enrolled through private health plans. We estimated differences-in-differences regression models to compare trends among State Employee Health Plan to privately insured children. Average annual total spending on autism spectrum disorder services increased by US$912 (95% confidence interval: US$331-US$1492) and average annual out-of-pocket spending on autism spectrum disorder services increased by US$138 (95% confidence interval: US$53-US$223) among diagnosed children in the State Employee Health Plan relative to the comparison group following the mandate, representing 92% and 75% increases over baseline total and out-of-pocket autism spectrum disorder spending, respectively. Average annual quantity of outpatient autism spectrum disorder services increased by 15.0 services (95% confidence interval: 8.4-21.6) among children in the State Employee Health Plan, more than doubling the baseline average. Implementation of a comprehensive autism spectrum disorder mandate in the Kansas State Employee Health Plan was associated with substantial increases in service use and spending for autism spectrum disorder treatment among autism spectrum disorder-diagnosed children.

Front Matter: The University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 66 Number 2

Front Matter: The University of Kansas Law Review Vol. 66 Number 2