Justice For Hedgehogs Research Articles

Truth, Ethics and Legal Thought—Some Lessons from Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs and Its Critique

This paper reconstructs some of the core elements of Dworkin’s epistemology of ethics. To understand why, for Dworkin, questions of legal philosophy lead to moral epistemology, the main points of Dworkin’s last restatement of his theoretical account of law are outlined. Against this background, the paper critically assesses the merits of Dworkin’s criticism of current prominent forms of skepticism and what it teaches us about the epistemology of legal thought.

Interpreting Interpretation in Private Law

Abstract The article addresses the following question: why do we interpret private law? My aim is, first of all, to make use of the theory of interpretation presented by Ronald Dworkin in Justice for Hedgehogs (Dworkin 2011) to emphasize the methodological importance of this issue. Second, the article casts doubt on the thesis that different interpretations of private law – for example, the so-called structuralist interpretations and instrumentalist interpretations such as the economic analysis of law – are rival interpretations. Like Dworkin, I argue that it is our interpretive responsibilities that define whether or not two interpretations of the same object should be treated as rivals. These responsibilities, in turn, are measured in light of the purpose of the interpretation. The interpretation of private law is a peculiar case of legal interpretation because it is not eminently concerned with determining the content of that law. On the other hand, if justification is the point of interpreting private law, then there seems to be no reason why different interpretations should necessarily be interpretations in competition with each other. The justification of private law may depend on a plurality of normative injunctions being met, and the features by which private law satisfies these injunctions can be highlighted sometimes by one interpretation, sometimes by another.

Market Harms and Market Benefits

Market Harms and Market Benefits

Ronald Dworkin’s Legal Non-Positivism: Main Characteristics 1and its Confrontation with Legal Positivism of the Twentieth Century (H.L.A. Hart)

This note is based on the legal non-positivist model of Ronald Dworkin, developed in important works such as Taking rights seriously, Law’s Empire, and Freedom’s Law —the moral reading of the American Constitution—. Furthermore, the consultation of the work of this jurist is taken into account, because in it a theory of justice is developed —Justice for Hedgehogs—. This note is complemented with the reference of other authors to confront this model with the legal positivism view of the Twentieth Century, in particular with the positivist legal model of H.L.A. Hart. The main purpose is to show extracts that are considered significant to the theoretical principialist Dworkinian model of law, in order to understand and distinguish this cognitive-moral non-positivist type of model. Therefore, an emphasis on fundamental rights and the exposure of the premise regarding the only correct solution, or the only answer to legal controversies submitted to the analysis of the judges in difficult cases —the so-called hard cases— is taken into account.

Una mirada a la evolución del concepto de Derecho y la fractura de la “novela en cadena” en Ronald Dworkin

Este articulo dara cuenta de una redefinicion del concepto de Derecho propuesto por Ronald Dworkin en su obra El imperio de la Justicia, dado que tras su ultima publicacion (Justicia para erizos) lo modifica sustancialmente. Se argumentara que hay una evolucion en su tratamiento de la justicia que consiste en delimitar cada vez mas la discrecion judicial, comenzando con una posicion de permanente interpretacion hacia la consolidacion y congelacion de los conceptos interpretativos del derecho.

The Differend of Justice: Violence and Redemption in Dworkin'sJustice for Hedgehogs

AbstractThis article uses Ronald Dworkin's argument for the unity of value to explore the redemptive core of modern legal order. Dworkin establishes a formal unity: all legal claims reside within a linked framework of moral justification. However, Jean-Francois Lyotard's concept of the differend exposes a lingering gap. Arguments within a moral universe do inevitably converge, but such unity is only possible due to the formative violence enactedbysuch orders. Dworkin hopes to provide the definitive statement against moral subjectivity, but in its purest form, he proves precisely the opposite. The lesson to draw from Dworkin's work is that ‘justice’ is ultimately only the means by which political orders categorize and thereby sustain their own formative acts of exclusion under the guise of offering their redemption.

Le quasi-réalisme de Dworkin et la responsabilité de juger

Dworkin invented a fictional character: Hercules. Super-judge he has the capacity to reveal the hidden structure of judgments. In his famous judgment Solomon’s wisdom is recognized as divine. It is no longer sufficient for a secularized philosophical reflection. However, Dworkin’s Hercules is endowed with a capacity of unconventional coherence, which allows him to overcome the judge’s instinct. It is somehow in the position of a god. Salomon, who is called wise, has undoubtedly invented an unexpected resolution in his judgment, which is tested here in the light of the richness of the meaning of responsibility. For Salomon, as for Dworkin, responsibility is a rock. - This chapter examines in-depth his latest book, Justice for Hedgehogs, from a moral realism perspective, in order to critically analyse his narrow conception of moral realism and the various opponents of this meta-ethical theory as powerful as it is diverse.

On the Interpretation of Religious Freedom: A Conversation with Ronald Dworkin

The death of Ronald Dworkin in 2013 was an immense loss. His moral, political, and legal theories constitute an exceptional academic legacy, and through his reflections on issues in contemporary politics and jurisprudence, he leaves a similar gift to our public life. He persistently—and, I believe, rightly—advocated conceptions and analyses in which politics is responsible to moral principles and, moreover, moral principles that are universal, and I join many who were often persuaded by his address to specific public problems. In recent books, Dworkin discussed more fully how democratic politics properly relates to religion and thus how a constitutional principle of religious freedom should be interpreted. The debt we all owe to him counsels those whose thought about democracy includes express interest in that constitutional provision to consider critically his account of it. Another understanding is, I believe, more coherent. This essay will not pursue how the alternative it commends provides a better context in which to affirm many of the political sensibilities Dworkin advocated, but that wider purpose is the background for the engagement here with him. Further, I will in this conversation dramatically abstract from his detailed arguments, although I intend sufficiently to capture his proposal that I do not neglect something relevant to the critique. Also, I will not seek to relate his more recent discussions to earlier work in his massive legacy but, rather, will focus on three publications: Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate, Justice for Hedgehogs, and his final book, Religion without God. In what follows, then, I will first summarize Dworkin’s

Owning Up: Dworkin on Responsibility

The concept of responsibility is frequently discussed in Ronald Dworkin's important book Justice for Hedgehogs.11 Hereinafter JfH. In an evaluative system with the holistic character of Dworkin's, ...

Can Religion Without God Lead to Religious Liberty Without Conflict?

This Article engages with Ronald Dworkin’s final book, Religion without God, which proposes to shrink the size and importance of the fierce “culture wars” in the United States between believers and nonbelievers —theists and atheists— by separating out the “science” and “value” components of religion to show these groups that they share a “fundamental religious impulse.” Religion without God also calls for framing religious freedom as part of a general right to ethical independence rather than a “troublesome” special right for religious people. This article compares the argumentative strategy of Religion Without God with prior Dworkin works, such as Life’s Dominion and Is Democracy Possible Here?, which tackle a polarizing is sue where parties are at “war” —such as abortion rights or the place of religion in public life— and submits that, by dispelling intellectual confusion and offering a fresh understanding of what is really at issue, they may be able to have a ceasefire or, at least, a substantial reduction of hostility and conflict. The article also highlights how Religion without God, with its appeal to the aesthetic and the scientific and to the challenge of living well, incorporates characteristic features of Dworkin’s philosophy of ethical liberalism, articulated most fully in Justice for Hedgehogs but dating back at least to Foundations of Liberal Equality. Finally, the article asks how persuasive Dworkin is as a theologian or philosopher of religion and whether the new constitutional frame he offers will help to reduce conflicts over religious liberty. Or, as some critics assert, does Dworkin make religion safe for liberals and liberalism in a way that denudes or marginalizes it? Because the current controversy over same-sex marriage is a particularly significant test case, I compare Dworkin’s approach, centered on a right to ethical independence, with that of natural law theorist Robert P. George and his co-authors Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis. Resumen: Este articulo discute el ultimo libro de Dworkin, Religion sin Dios, el cual propone disminuir la importancia de la feroz “guerra cultural” en los Estados Unidos entre creyentes y no creyentes al separar el componente “cientifico” y de “valor” de la religion y demostrar que los involucrados en la guerra comparten un “impulso religioso fundamental”. En el libro Religion sin Dios Dworkin tambien sostiene la necesidad de ubicar la libertad religiosa como parte de un derecho general de independencia etica, mas que en un derecho especial para la gente religiosa, lo cual solo genera confusiones y problemas. Comparo la estrategia argumentativa de Dworkin en Religion sin Dios con trabajos previos como Life’s Dominion y Is Democracy Possible Here? en donde tambien se atienden debates entre gente polarizada en Guerra, debates como el aborto y la ubicacion de la religion en la vida publica, donde Dworkin de nuevo argumenta la necesidad de disipar confusiones intelectuales para saber de manera clara que esta realmente en discusion, para asi lograr un cese al fuego o por lo menos una reduccion de las hostilidades y el conflicto. Tambien en esta colaboracion resalto como Dworkin, en Religion sin Dios al apelar a lo es- tetico a lo cientifico y a los desafios de vivir bien, incorpora caracteristicas de su filosofia del liberalismo etico defendida mas claramente en Justicia para Erizos pero que data de Foundations of Liberal Equality. Finalmente me pregunto que tan exitosos son los argumentos de Dworkin como filosofo de la religion y si este nuevo marco constitucional que ofrece, real- mente disminuye los conflictos sobre la libertad religiosa. O como lo sostienen algunos criticos, me preguntare si Dworkin hace que la religion sea algo aceptable para los liberales y el liberalismo de una manera que la marginaliza o elimina sus rasgos principales. Dado que las discusiones contemporaneas sobre el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo constituyen una prueba importante, comparare el enfoque de Dworkin basado en el derecho a una independencia etica, con el de teoricos del derecho natural como Robert P. George y sus coautores Ryan Anderson y Sherif Girgis.

From Justices in Robes to Justice for Hedgehogs

In this Lecture de livered at the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas of Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, after receiving the Premio Internacional de Investigacion en Derecho Hector Fix-Zamudio, in Mexico City, November 23, 2006, the author describes the implications for Legal Theory and Philosophy of two recent phenomena, which have be come trends in legal practice, and challenges an idea closely as sociated with legal positivism, i.e. law is identified with a State through its sovereigns or conventions, by proposing that law escapes from national boundaries and territories. Resumen: En su conferencia magistral dictada en el Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, despues de recibir el Premio Internacional de Investigacion en Derecho Hector Fix-Zamudio, en la Ciudad de Mexico, el 23 de noviembre de 2006, el autor describe las implicaciones para la filosofia y teoria juridica de dos fenomenos recientes, los cuales se han convertido en tendencias en la practica juridica, y cuestiona una idea estrechamente relacionada con el positivismo juridico, i.e. el derecho es identificado con un Estado a traves de sus soberanos o convenciones, al proponer que el derecho es capa de las fronteras y territorios nacionales.

Life on the Grid: Implanting Humans. A Look at the Ethical & Moral Considerations for Relative Legislation in Ireland Relating to Implanted RFID Tags.

This paper introduces the concept of Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) technology and its inevitable use in humans. Generally speaking, these technologies should theoretically enable us to be better and stronger human beings, but at what cost? Philosophers have countered that such alterations are unethical and/or immoral, yet it remains unclear on what basis such rights would rest. I propose that answers may come from an angle of rights issues. Therefore, I have principally focused on the notions of ‘bodily integrity’ through privacy issues, fundamental rights of the individual, and the collective social responsibility in Ireland. As a global community, we frequently waive rights in the quest for technological participation . It is because the synergy between man and machine is both equally a seductive and profitable enterprise, security of basic human rights becomes vital as the RFID technology takes on a revolutionary status. As acceptance grows, so too does its reliance through familial integration in every aspect of modern day life - thus it becomes an inevitability, and exerts an indirect pressure for conformity throughout society. Historically however, it has been the vulnerable classes who have had need of protection of their basic human rights and dignity through the law. For the purposes of this work, sexual offenders have been used to represent one vulnerable class in an effort to demonstrate how this technology could effectively lead us to balance the needs of the many against the needs of the few, in light of legislative measures. Research of this subject revealed however, that despite being in existence for over 50 years, RFID technology information has only recently been taken seriously by academics. I propose to bring some level of substance to RFID implantation as a real possibility, and how Ireland may have to look not just to the EU or Constitution for guidance, but ultimately to ourselves. I sought to demonstrate this using Ronald M. Dworkin’s final theory of justice, and implemented his normative focus of putting human dignity at the centre of what he constituted to be a good moral system. A basic requirement one would expect legislators to wholly regard when creating legislative justice is the consideration of both the moral and ethical issues this technology raises, and subsequently its consequences. Dworkin ultimately summed up this premise in Justice For Hedgehogs where he wrote, “Without dignity our lives are only blanks of duration. But if we manage to lead a good life well, we create something more. We write a subscript to our mortality. We make our lives tiny diamonds in the cosmic sands.”

Can an incompatibilist outfox a compatibilist hedgehog?

This article raises some incompatibilist challenges for, and queries some of the implications of, Ronald Dworkin’s arguments in his Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), that responsibility is compatible with both determinism and epiphenomenalism.

Ronaldo Dworkino filosofinės revoliucijos nesėkmė

Straipsnio tikslas – įrodyti Dworkino knygoje „Teisingumas ežiukams“ bandytos įgyvendinti filosofinės revoliucijos nesėkmę. Ši revoliucija nepasisekė dėl dviejų priežasčių. Pirma, Dworkino mokslo poveikio etikos teorijai kritika yra suaugusi su pirmenybės mokslui teikimu. Kritikuodamas etikos pajungimą mokslinio mąstymo epistemologijai, šis autorius nori ją sieti su moksline pasaulėžiūra. Antra, Dworkinas pernelyg susiaurina metaetikos kritiką, apsiribodamas polemika su mokslo epistemologijos jai primestu „išoriniu skepticizmu“. Metaetika yra daug didesnė filosofinė klaida, negu atrodo Dworkinui. Mokslas veikia ne tik teorijos, bet ir „įprasto požiūrio“ lygmeniu.

Death’s Dominion: An Appreciation of Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013)

Most of us hope to write our magnum opus before we die and never do (and it doesn’t matter!). Ronald Dworkin, the distinguished jurisprudence scholar, did—shortly before his recent death from leukemia at age 82 in London. Dworkin’s last book, Justice for Hedgehogs, published in 2011 certainly matters; indeed, it was lauded, in a magisterial New York Review of Books column by A. C. Grayling (2011), as “The Birth of a Classic.” The book is all the more impressive for offering unity to Dworkin’s life’s work, integrating his weighty contributions, and culminating in the notion of value as “one big thing.” He is also very quotable, as the dust jacket of the book demonstrates:

Jurisprudence for Hedgehogs

The aims of this essay are, first, to present the jurisprudential position that Ronald Dworkin set out in his penultimate book, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011); and, secondly, to elaborate it a little further than Dworkin himself was able to. The position is a distinctive and interesting one. Although Professor Dworkin argued in all his earlier work that moral facts (about rights and justice) were among the truth conditions of legal propositions, now in Justice for Hedgehogs he argued that law is itself a branch of morality. This is a bolder and more radical claim and it requires some quite careful exposition to see how it might be made plausible.

Ronald Dworkin: An Appreciation

This is a brief tribute to Ronald Dworkin and an overview of the contributions that he made to jurisprudence. It is a written version of remarks that were presented at the Memorial Service for Professor Dworkin, at St. John's Smith Square, London, on Wednesday, June 5, 2013. The remarks cover his view of adjudication, the right answer thesis, and the obligation that lawyers, scholars and judges have to the whole body of the law. It also covers the view – which I call the artery of Dworkin's jurisprudence – that legal reasoning is a form of moral reasoning. And it relates all this to the unifying ideas about dignity in Justice for Hedgehogs.

Dignity: The Last Bastion of Liberalism

Dignity:The Last Bastion of Liberalism John R. Wallach (bio) Justice for Hedgehogs, Ronald Dworkin Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011. 539 pp. Human Dignity, George Kateb Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011. 271 pp. Dignity: Its History and Meaning, Michael Rosen Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012. 219 pp. Dignity, Rank, and Rights, Jeremy Waldron and commentators, edited by Meir Dan-Cohen Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 183 pp. WHEREAS recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world …1 So pronounces the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved 48–0 (with eight abstentions) on December 10, 1948, by the 56 member states of the United Nations, linking “the inherent dignity and … equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” to the foundation of global freedom, justice, and peace. This surely is an ambitious mouthful, but it was an auspicious moment. Considerable disappointment followed, what with the Cold War and the many lives lost in the wrenching process of decolonization, but not utter disaster (at least for those not tormented or killed). Yet the intellectual promise of the Universal Declaration has been difficult to parse in theory or enact in practice in subsequent years. Nearly as much ink has been spilled as practical work done in relation to human rights since 1948, and the phrase now embodied in international law has reached new peaks of popularity in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Thus a newly operational International Criminal Court (2002) can indict persons for “crimes against humanity,” “war [End Page 313] crimes,” and “genocide,” even though the absence of the United States, China, and Russia as signatories considerably weakens its authority and scope. Indeed, another effect of the abundant attention given to human rights in public rhetoric and politics has been the elusiveness of clarity about what they mean. Of late, exasperation has set in about ever stabilizing the meaning of human rights, except in judicial settings. And in fact human rights have recently suffered more intense argumentative assaults on their coherence and reach than at any point since their codification by the United Nations, if not the French Revolution. Where do human rights come from? Is their orientation primarily Western, hence ideological? Or are they primarily a moral fig leaf for justifying the real power of a few states, professions, and corporations over millions or billions of human beings, as well as the work of poorly funded (but nonetheless important) non-governmental organizations mostly dependent on Western philanthropy? If there can be good answers to these questions, such that human rights can lay claim not only to being a hook for ambitious intellectuals and states but a meaningful tool of global political ethics, what, indeed, is the relation of their transpolitical, “human” dimension to their political dimension as a manifestation of “rights” that collective institutions ought to protect and promote as best they can?2 Given this barrage of questions, political philosophers and theorists have sought to get behind or around the discourse of human rights, looking for firmer ground. That ground, for many, has become the notion of human dignity. During the past year, major presses have published five books that include “dignity” in the title, have it serve as the focus of analysis, or associate it with a psychological model for resolving human conflict. There’s also a new, picturesque book of photographs, titled Dignity, honoring indigenous peoples and the fiftieth anniversary of Amnesty International.3 Apart from the basic intellectual challenges noted above, the growth industry of intellectual interest in dignity by professionals perched in the academy seems intent on linking traditional Western notions of liberalism (discussed below), tapping dignity’s prevalence in religious discourse, and drawing on its ability to signify both distinction and human value to define global ethics. In any event, the general phenomenon and the particular books reviewed here deserve our attention. The spate of new books on dignity not only refers to but also transcends the confines of traditional questions about human rights, such as: how can we (if...

On Knowing One Big Thing: Thoughts on Ronald Dworkin's Justice for Hedgehogs

Unlike the fox who knows many things, the hedgehog knows one big thing. Ronald Dworkin claims that his hedgehog knows one very big thing: the unity of value.1 But that is not all the knowledge that...

Review of "Justice for Hedgehogs"

Review of "Justice for Hedgehogs"