This article reads the Gaza genocide through South Africa's governance experience and intellectual traditions, advancing complexity and care as an integrated ethical orientation. Building on the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry's September 2025 legal analysis-which finds Israel responsible for genocidal acts and failures to prevent and punish-I argue that single-day histories compress long-duration harm and blunt institutional obligation. Complexity functions as an ethical descriptor requiring pattern-literate reasoning across systems and time: combining direct statements with circumstantial evidence to test whether genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference from the totality of conduct. Care is specified as operational duty rather than sentiment: halting genocidal measures, restoring humanitarian access, enabling medical evacuation, ceasing arms transfers, and cooperating with international justice. Read alongside Gobodo-Madikizela's (2023) account of triadic temporality in post-apartheid South Africa, the Commission's findings expose how colonial temporality erases continuities between past, present, and foreseeable futures, and why reparative practice must widen decision-relevant testimony. I translate this synthesis into institutional design rules-representation as knowledge practice, testimonial parity, auditable reason-giving, material remedies, and iterative public review-that relocate ethics from exhortation to enforceable procedure under jus cogens and erga omnes duties.

Marking the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) principle under the framework of the UN World Summit is an opportunity to reflect on the significance of the principle as a strong political commitment of States to protect their populations from mass atrocities, but also on its legal implications, which are still not entirely clear. On the one hand, it is acknowledged that some elements of the principle do not introduce any new legal obligations on States, other than those already established in pre-existing legal instruments, such as the fundamental treaties of international humanitarian and human rights law, the UN Charter and other legal documents on the responsibility of States, particularly in relation to the breaches of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations. On the other hand, there are still ambiguities pertaining to specific issues of the responsibility of the international community to intervene in another State in case of a manifest failure of national authorities in discharging their responsibility for the protection of civilians facing large-scale atrocities. Since the R2P principle has not gained universal support in State practice twenty years after its formal introduction, it is crucial to discuss its relationship with the existing international legal framework binding on States, as well as its unspecified legal nature.

Abstract The Climate Change Advisory Opinion (AO) by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) demonstrates the growing prominence of general principles of law in international law. The Climate Change AO was handed down at the end of the International Law Commission's project on general principles of law with the adoption of its Draft Conclusions. In the Climate Change AO, the ICJ accords general principles of law particular importance in environmental protection. This article documents how States identified general principles of law as the bedrock of the international climate change regime, and how the ICJ employed a systematic approach to ‘thicken’ climate change law, both in terms of normative content, obligations and consequences of breach. It then examines the general principles of law affirmed by the ICJ, in particular, the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and intergenerational equity, both extracted from the broader general principle of equity. These principles guide the interpretation of ‘how far’ or ‘how much’, operating as balancing tools in relation to other obligations. The broader significance of this development lies in the ICJ's growing recognition of general principles of law as a means of supporting and structuring its legal reasoning. The article further argues that the normative development of these principles has been reinforced by reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and that Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute provides a broader gateway for taking account of normative contributions by actors such as the IPCC. The identification of customary law and peremptory norms ( jus cogens ) is more narrowly defined than general principles of law. The article concludes by examining the IPCC's role in underpinning the normative character of certain general principles of law, building on the interaction of law and science, and suggests that strengthening these principles may facilitate their more robust incorporation into future treaty‐design mechanisms.

ABSTRACT This paper critically and comprehensively examines whether gender equality qualifies as a norm of jus cogens within international law. It utilises the Afghan ‘Law on the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, 2024’ as a case study to contend that the global legal conscience increasingly recognises gender equality as a peremptory norm. The study illustrates how gender equality is both widely recognised and ingrained in customary international law through doctrinal analysis and a synthesis of key international legal instruments, such as the UDHR, ICCPR and CEDAW. Further, the paper examines philosophical foundations derived from Rawls’ theory of justice and emphasises the normative dominance of jus cogens over religious and cultural relativism. It is demonstrated how gender equality represents the fundamental principles of the global community by tracing the development of gender rights in state practice and human rights jurisprudence. Conclusively, it is established that recognising gender equality as an emerging jus cogens norm moves discriminatory legislation toward constitutional incompatibility and places an increasing universal obligation on nations to respect and implement this principle. This development strengthens international commitments to justice, human rights, and dignity, while signalling that states must progressively align their legal systems with this evolving peremptory standard.

Abstract This article critically examines the efficacy of ratifying International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) within the complex relationship between a State’s sovereignty and its pre-existing, non-derogable obligations under international law. Many States may use reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs) to ratify treaties like ICERD while managing substantive obligations. This article analyze ICERD’s the challenges of domestic enforcement, scrutinizing how ratification by States, could be diluted by extensive RUDs, thereby analysing whether formal ratification translates to meaningful compliance. This analysis further interprets enforcement lacunae, including the jurisdictional barriers facing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in adjudicating human rights violations. By contrast, this article uses Malaysia as a critical case study to examine the legal implications of the persistent non-ratification of ICERD, a dimension of the international human rights scholarship that remains insufficiently examined. This article critically examine and analyse the domestic legal context to demonstrate that the State remains legally bound by the international principle of equality and non-discrimination through multiple legal nexus, the UN Charter membership, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as Customary International Law, and the ASEAN Human Rights Framework, which cumulatively reinforce the jus cogens character of racial equality. This analysis advances a novel legal argument by applying the framework of jus cogens norms and constitutional equality principles under Malaysian law, suggesting that non-ratification of ICERD may have implications beyond a neutral exercise of sovereignty. The non-ratification of ICERD constrains the efficacy of the international human rights machinery, avoiding the full scope of external monitoring and legal accountability, and raising questions regarding the alignment of its domestic constitutional integrity. It is submitted that the States that ratify ICERD even with RUDs, demonstrate a foundational commitment to human rights norms despite enforcement complexities. Non-ratification perpetuates structural inequality and directly challenges international mechanisms designed to uphold universal human rights.

The genocide case filed by South Africa against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stems from concerns over the escalation of violence in Gaza following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, which allegedly involved serious violations of the Genocide Convention as a jus cogens norm. This study aims to analyze the legal and political significance of the lawsuit, including its implications for Israel's international responsibility and the global response to its military operations. The methods used include a descriptive legal approach to describe the application of international legal norms in practice, as well as a normative approach to assess the legal obligations that should be complied with under the Genocide Convention. The two approaches are combined through case study analysis and comparison with the practices of other countries. The results of the study show that Israel's actions potentially fulfill the elements of genocide and that the ICJ's Provisional Measures have had a major political impact, as evidenced by Israel's increasing international isolation and the suspension of military aid by a number of countries. In conclusion, this case is not only important in upholding international law, but also plays a strategic role in encouraging Israel's compliance with humanitarian law and strengthening global accountability mechanisms.

This opinion critically analyses the ‘advisory opinion’ of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which concerns the obligations of States in respect of climate change (2025), and in doing so, identifies issues that remain unresolved with the advisory opinion. This opinion also considers the principle of erga omnes, which is briefly mentioned in the ‘advisory opinion’ and also discusses climate change obligations that have the character of erga omnes , that is, obligations that are owed by a State to members of the international community as a whole. It is suggested that the ICJ has missed opportunities to clarify the relationship between the obligation(s) concerning climate change, the principle of erga omnes , consent and customary international law. It is also argued that the list of obligations that were considered jus cogens by the International Law Commission could be expanded, in the context of climate change, and notes that these types of obligations are also owed to members of the international community as a whole ( erga omnes ).

It is no understatement to say that the “rules-based international order” doctrine, as opposed to the “international order based on law,” emerged as one of the most debated concepts in global politics during in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This concept presents a framework where general rules of conduct for states, though not jus cogens under general international law, are considered legally binding for all states and other participants in international relations. Consequently, it challenges the traditionally recognized supremacy of international law in governing these relations, seeking to erode established practices of international law making. This doctrine is actively used by leading Western powers to justify their political positions and accuse strategic competitors of refusing to adhere to these “rules,” which they have deemed legally binding. Understanding the essence and origin of this doctrine is crucial in unravelling its significance.

The article offers a comprehensive examination of the current crisis in the architecture of international criminal justice built around the International Criminal Court (ICC) and ad hoc international criminal tribunals. It identifies the conceptual flaws inherent in the ICC’s model of functional permanence and traces their impact on the Court’s legitimacy and ability to fulfil its mandate. Particular attention is paid to the political and legal drivers of the ICC’s delegitimization, including the refusal of key states to recognize its jurisdiction, the imposition of sanctions by the United States, and sustained criticism from states of the Global South. Within a broader theoretical framework, the article engages with the emerging “bloc-based” structure of international law and the tension between two competing paradigms – jus cogens and the so‑called “rules-based order” – and assesses how this clash constrains the prospects for establishing a genuinely universal institution of international criminal justice. Against this background, the author articulates and substantiates three potential pathways for reforming the existing architecture of international criminal justice. Methodologically, the article combines formal legal, systemic and comparative approaches with historical legal analysis, enabling the author to relate current institutional models to their doctrinal and politico-legal foundations. The study draws extensively on treaty law, practice of international organizations and domestic judicial decisions. The article’s originality lies in linking a doctrinal critique of the ICC’s functional permanence to the broader hypothesis of a fragmented, bloc-based international legal order and the competition between two normative paradigms, thereby offering a fresh perspective on the limits of universalizing international criminal justice. It argues that, given the profound divergence between the positions of Russia and a number of Global South states, on the one hand, and those of the “collective West”, on the other, the creation of a truly universal international criminal court is not a realistic prospect in the near term. As an alternative, the article advances three institutional reform scenarios: transforming the ICC into an organically permanent court, abandoning the permanent‑court model in favour of a renewed system of ad hoc tribunals, and embedding international criminal justice within the structure of the International Court of Justice. The author concludes that the architecture of international criminal justice must be rethought as a coherent system grounded in effective accountability mechanisms for offences against the administration of justice. Special emphasis is placed on the proposition that the Russian Federation, as the custodian of the Nuremberg legacy and a jurisdiction with a well-developed doctrine of international and criminal law, is uniquely positioned to shape the future reform agenda in this field.

Violence against the Rohingya community in Myanmar has emerged as one of the most systematic and brutal humanitarian tragedies in contemporary history. Amidst the realities of genocide, crimes against humanity, and forced deportation, international law faces an acute challenge in demonstrating its normative and operational reach. This article aims to provide a philosophical and juridical analysis of the international legal constellation surrounding the crimes committed against the Rohingya ethnic group, the responsibility of the State of Myanmar, and the failure of the international community to uphold the principles of justice. This study employs a normative-juridical method using both conceptual and case-based approaches, and it critically examines international legal norms such as the Rome Statute, the 1948 Genocide Convention, the principle of jus cogens, and the doctrine of erga omnes obligations. The analysis reveals that the crimes committed against the Rohingya community constitute not only grave violations of fundamental norms of international law but also reflect a collective failure of the global community in fulfilling its responsibilities. Moreover, the study identifies a stagnation in the enforcement of legal accountability, rooted in political factors, institutional weaknesses, and the normalization of diplomatic relations. The article recommends strengthening transnational mechanisms and establishing an ad hoc tribunal as necessary measures for the restoration of substantive justice for victims and for reaffirming the supremacy of international law over impunity.

Almost forty years I have been watching developments taking place in international law doctrinal approaches and activities of international and domestic judicial bodies referring to interna onal jus cogens, the concept of which had emerged during the work of Interna onal Law Commission (ILC) (1963-1966) on the ar cles of the law of trea es, later embodied in the Vienna Conven on on the Law of Trea es.It can be easily noticed that unlike the previous period (1963-1980), contemporary judicial and dip- lomatic practices contain many references to jus cogens. Indeed, while working on this topic the ILC had to base its judgments on purely doctrinal contributions contained in publications or submitted papers by international law experts and comments made by the States, because there had not been a single judicial case on this subject matter.Despite of this fact, the ILC had managed to offer a well-elaborated draft on the issue of peremptory norms (jus cogens) resulted in Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. At the first glace it seems, that we had been witnessing progressive events aimed at further developing of the concept based on practical cases and pragmatic doctrinal suggestions interpreting these cases.Unfortunately, I cannot share such an optimistic view, because contemporary approaches ignore the real legal notion, that had been formed during the centuries beginning from the ancient time. The main mistake, in my understanding, consists in misunderstanding of the core of the legal notion of jus cogens. Jus cogens has nothing in common with the legal notion of violation (breach) of international law, that is, it deals only with the international law-making process, since every rule of international law cannot be violated by States, even if it has a character of jus dispositivum allowing States to change a legally binding rule. Only international jus cogens norm cannot be changed by the States inter se, if it is recognized and accepted by the international community as a whole as a norm, any derogation from which (to make a different legal rule) by states is forbidden.1I would not touch upon these, in my understanding, wrong approaches, which ignore this specific character of jus cogens, having nothing in common with the deeds of the States and is concerned with the content of a new rule which is supposed to be established by the individual States in their mutual relations. That is why I decided to remind the international community and authors of contemporary doctrinal and judicial approaches the events of 1960s while the International Law Commission was drafting the Articles53 and 64. (The more detailed and comprehensive analysis of contemporary approaches will be offered in a special publication).

The Right to Climate Action as Jus Cogens

The subject of the study is the ethical and metaphysical foundations of the principle of sovereign equality of states in their historical dynamics and in the context of contemporary challenges. Key attention is given to the analysis of the established Western doctrine, which derives the equality of states from the principle of moral equality of individuals, considering states as analogues of persons in a state of nature. This anthropocentric approach is critically examined in light of current transformations in the international legal order. The focus of the study is the search for and assessment of alternative models of justification for sovereign equality that attempt to overcome or reframe the anthropocentric core. This includes an analysis of the civilizational approach, economic-instrumental concepts, and projects of global constitutionalism. The study aims to determine whether a consistent ethical justification for the equality of states is possible outside a direct connection with the equality of people, and if so, on what metaphysical or normative basis. Thus, the subject covers both the historical reconstruction of the doctrine and the design of possible paths for its future reconstruction. The methodology of the research is based on an interdisciplinary approach that combines dogmatic and historical-legal analysis to reconstruct doctrinal positions. A philosophical-legal method is applied to identify ethical prerequisites, a comparative method to compare the Western paradigm with alternative approaches, as well as elements of critical legal studies to analyze the ambiguity of legal language. During the research, key historical-doctrinal approaches to the justification of the equality of states were systematized, revealing their fundamental connection with the idea of the equality of individuals. Furthermore, the methodological impasse of attempts to justify the equality of states outside this anthropocentric core is demonstrated, for example, through civilizational metaphysics or economic analysis, as such attempts encounter insurmountable semantic and normative contradictions. At the same time, a paradox of the civilizational approach is established, which, even while declaring the primacy of the collective, necessarily relies on the anthropocentric core of imperative norms (jus cogens) that protect human dignity. Ultimately, the thesis is justified that the promising path for reconstructing the principle lies not in a simple rejection of anthropocentrism, but in its dialectical synthesis with the idea of the equality of states. Such a synthesis is proposed to be realized on a new sensory-ethical basis that unites the concepts of unity, solidarity, and common destiny.

Euthanasia has been the subject of much legal, religious, moral, and human rights debate in recent years. At the center of this debate is how to reconcile competing values: the wish of patients to choose to die by waiving their right to life through voluntary consent, and the necessity to uphold the inviolable right to life of every person, as recognized by Article 6 (1) of the ICCPR. Even though euthanasia is mostly illegal, there is an ever-increasing drive towards legalization. As more States begin to re-examine and, in some instances, rescind their bans on euthanasia, the international human rights legal community needs to re-examine and reconfirm its viewpoint on the utmost essential human right, that is, the inviolable natural law right to life. By validating euthanasia through national Statute, the fundamental human right to live is de facto nullified for many more people than the few whose assumed right to die is compromised. Regrettably, illogical arguments based on obscure and fictional rights, such as "the right to die with dignity," largely go unopposed, while insistence on respect for true natural law and fundamental human rights, as well as established international jus cogens norms, including the right to life, are negated. The key medical moral criteria - autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice - are characterized and illuminated in the context of euthanasia to provide a general, ethical, and moral analytical framework that AIDS policymakers in making ethically sound judgments.

<b>Moving Toward a Crimes Against Humanity Treaty: </b><i> A Qualitative Research Study on the Draft Articles on  Prevention and Punishment at the United Nations</i>

The article presents a comparative review of the approaches of post-Soviet jurisdictions to the regulation of compensation and social rehabilitation mechanisms protecting the rights of convicted persons, the infringement of which violates the concept of jus cogens (e.g., non-compliance with the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment, or other types of coercion and abuse in the penitentiary sector) or constitutes high-profile serious penitentiary incidents of international scale (including unlawful restriction of contacts of convicted persons with the outside world or access to independent preventive mechanisms). The author believes that the rights of convicted persons to decent conditions of confinement, including the right to compensation in case of violation, is differentiated into a transversal (international and national) institution of the legal status of convicts. The paper discusses international legal standards and national legal regulation of a set of rights of convicted persons to decent conditions of confinement. Based on the identified similarities in the legislative approaches in post-Soviet countries to regulating the procedure and conditions of the execution of sentences, the paper notes innovative approaches to regulation of the legal status of convicts (including data protection, socially vulnerable categories of detainees, providing access to preventive control mechanisms, etc.).

The Advisory Opinion (OC-32/25) delivered on July 03, 2025 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) on “climate emergency and human rights” (CEHR) constitutes a groundbreaking development in the field of international environmental and human rights law. Building on OC-23/17, the Opinion explicitly recognizes the human right to a healthy and stable climate, as well as Nature as a subject of rights, marking a decisive shift toward an ecocentric paradigm within the Inter-American System. This article analyzes the Opinion's legal reasoning, its articulation of substantive, procedural, and intersectional State obligations, and its contribution to consolidating an “Inter-American ecological constitutionalism.” Through a comparative and normative approach, it examines the Opinion's implications for the progressive realization of environmental and climate rights, the emergence of environmental jus cogens , and the advancement of global climate justice. Ultimately, the CEHR AO is argued to be both a regional and universal milestone, positioning Latin America as a normative innovator in the protection of human and ecological integrity in the face of the climate emergency.

The article is dedicated to the study of the legal nature of jus cogens norms. The relevance of the topic is stipulated by the need to ensure compliance with the general international law peremptory norms, which is a prerequisite for ensuring stable and reliable functioning of the international security system. The article emphasizes the special status of these norms. The purpose of the article is to identify and study the cases of functioning of general international law peremptory norms in a special regime. The achievement of this goal was made possible by applying a comprehensive approach which forms the methodological basis of the study. In the article a number of general scientific and special research methods are used, in particular: comparison, dialectical analysis and synthesis, comparative legal method, formal legal method, logical legal method. The author examines the features of certain jus cogens norms under the normal functioning of the international security system and in time of serious threats – in the context of an act of armed aggression. The author confirms that under the normal functioning of the international security system, compliance with jus cogens norms is an unconditional obligation of each State. It is established that within the framework of international law there are signs of the existence of a special regime in which certain jus cogens norms operate. It is found that when exercising the right to self-defence in the context of armed aggression, the protective effect of certain general international law peremptory norms against the aggressor State temporarily ceases to be effective, giving the affected State the right to legitimately use force and violate the territorial integrity of the aggressor, but only within the external aspect of the territorial integrity of the State – territorial inviolability. Furthermore, the author suggests that within the framework of exercising the right to self-defence, the victim has the right to take enforcement measures which formally contain signs of interference in the internal affairs of the aggressor. In addition, the author puts forward the idea that the existence of a special regime for the operation of certain peremptory norms of general international law is evidence of the possibility of its extension to legal relations of international legal responsibility, which outlines the prospects for further research.

This paper examines Israel's deliberate use of starvation and deprivation against Palestinian children in Gaza since 7 October 2023, arguing these are not collateral effects but a systematic, discriminatory strategy. By impeding food, water and medical care and destroying civilian infrastructure, the conduct meets thresholds for starvation as a method of warfare, torture, and genocide. We conducted detailed interviews using a semi-structured protocol (Defense for Children International-Palestine, 2024) triangulated with secondary human-rights reporting and legal data. Evidence shows coordinated, prolonged obstruction of humanitarian aid and destruction of agricultural land, water systems, and medical infrastructure, producing catastrophic child malnutrition and documented deaths from starvation and disease. Where these practices are intentional and pursued with knowledge of their effects, they constitute torture under international law. The discriminatory impact on Palestinian civilians, especially children, supports an inference of genocidal intent and grounds state responsibility and universal jurisdiction. Israel's starvation policy toward children in Gaza qualifies as torture and amounts to genocide. The paper urges recognition of starvation as torture under jus cogens, immediate unimpeded humanitarian access, and prompt criminal investigations. States must enforce obligations under CAT, the Geneva Conventions, and the Rome Statute to protect Palestinian children's rights and dignity.

The article focusses on a specific aspect of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2024 Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, namely the statement that the right to self-determination constitutes a peremptory norm of international law. The article submits that the finding of the ICJ can be at variance with the basic criteria set forth by the International Law Commission in the 2022 Conclusions on identification and legal consequences of peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens). In particular, limiting the peremptory effect of self-determination to cases of foreign occupation that lead to annexation risks undermining the unitary, universal character of peremptory rules. Overall, the case confirms the divisive potential of the concept of jus cogens in the international legal community.