Japan's Role Research Articles

Japan's Ascendancy as a Foreign-Aid Power: Asian Perspectives

Since 1978 Japan has been the leading source of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) to Asia. However, it is only during the last few years, as Japan rose to become in 1989 the world's leading aid donor, that serious attention to the international political implications of Japan's ODA role has drawn attention. Japan's global ODA ascendance in the mid-1980s has occurred alongside two important parallel developments: a dramatic growth in the volume of private capital flows from Japan to Asia, and the endaka phenomenon-the rapid appreciation of the yen. Taken together, these developments in Japan's program of keizai kyoryoku (economic cooperation) have encouraged considerable speculation about what the shifting balance of power in the global economy means. For example, in 1988 senior officials of the Japanese government began talking openly about how Japan could use the tools of economic cooperation more aggressively to integrate the Asian economies.1 In February 1989 Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan of Thailand announced: The World Economic War is over. Japan has won.2 Concerns about hegemonic intentions on the part of foreign aid donors and powerful trading partners are not new or unusual anywhere in the developing world. Asia is no exception. What is an exception, however, is the special concerns that surround assessments of Japan. Tokyo is aware of these concerns, and consequently, while there is evidence that some in

Japan's role in a post-fordist age

The shift away from mass production industries to new information-intensive industries is leading to speculation on what will supersede the Fordist model of industrial organization. This article outlines alternative models advanced as potential replacement for Fordism, and presents a new post-Fordist future, based upon exploration of the post-war evolution of Japan. Fujitsuism is posed as a potential post-Fordist form of industrial organization, and is investigated as a new mechanism for sustained economic growth particularly suited to the information age.

Japan´s Role in the Context of the Emerging Asia‑Pacific World

Japan used to be regarded as an inscrutable country with its diffident leaders acting in a complex system. An extreme view is that the country is no more than an animal lacking in diplomacy that is backed by military strength including nuclear weapons; this view is associated with the so-called Alice in Wonderland phobia. Another view portrays Japan as a would-be superpower which has become the world's biggest donor country, together with its highly competitive technology and the prospect of achieving third rank status in world defence expenditures. Whichever is the case, Japan's intentions and real capability need to be assessed objectively in order to understand its growing role in the international society. In recent years, the possibility of the advent of the is becoming clear in the shift of the centre of gravity of the world economy to this region. If Japan and the United States, facing each other across the Pacific Ocean, can complement each other, the former as the largest creditor nation and the latter as a major debtor, the Pacific Age may indeed materialize in due course. The relationship could be similar to that which existed between Britain and America across the Atlantic for more than a century. The Asia-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia, is heterogenous in its stages of economic development and in the forms of its cultures and polities. Notwithstanding this diversity, with the advent of the newly industrializing countries (NICs), the region is one of great economic vitality today and boasts of the world's most rapid growth performance. As part of this dynamism, a growing Japanese role in the world community, and as an extension of it, a strengthened role in the Asia-Pacific region, has attracted much attention and publicity, as exemplified by Japan's hyperbolic role at the 1988 Toronto summit. Concurrently, the past few years have witnessed significant developments in other parts of the world. One is the European Community's (EC's) decision to elevate itself as a truly common market by 1992. The other is the agreement reached in October 1987 between the United States and Canada to forge a free trade area. Given the fact that the United States can no longer afford to play the role of the world's policeman nor continue to be a booming market for Asian exports, Washington has encouraged Japan to help out in two ways: firstly, by sharing more of American defence costs in the region and secondly, by increasing its spending on foreign aid. Largely responding to these moves, the Japanese Government has initiated several policies, to be discussed shortly, both on a global and regional basis. From the region's perspective, the so-called NICs bashing and the withdrawal of American trade privileges have heightened the Asia-Pacific countries' expectation of a

From Fukuda to Takeshita: A Decade of Japan‑ASEAN Relations

This paper assesses the problems and trends in Japan's relations with the ASEAN countries in the political economic and cultural spheres. Despite the growing role of Japan in the ASEAN region, Prime Minister Nakasonefs preoccupation with resolving Japan's trade friction with the West produced a benign neglect of ASEAN in the mid-1980s. Politically, Japan's role in promoting a solution to the Kampuchean issue has been minimal, going little beyond the promise of aiding the post-settlement reconstruction of the Indo Chinese states. Cultural exchanges and diplomacy have not been sufficient in redressing anti-Japanese sentiments in the ASEAN countries caused by Japan's perceived economic domination of the region. Most importantly, the ASEAN countries have continued to express dissatisfaction over Japan's inadequate response to their demands for greater market access and more generous aid and technology transfer. In recent years Japan has adopted policies intended to tackle these problems, but, according to the writer, the successful implementation of these policies will require substantial sacrifices by Japan under the new government of Prime Minister Takeshita.

JAPAN AND THE EAST ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER

Abstract : As of now, 13 years after the collapse of the American enterprise in Vietnam, dangers to the East Asian balance of power seem remote, despite growing Soviet military power and increased political interest in the area. However, the relations of the United States and Japan are pivotal to sustaining the current balance of power in the region. What could damage U.S. interests in the area is a change in Japan's role. No one expects Japan to become hostile, but, substitute the words indifferent, neutral, non-aligned, or aloof, and the relationship is changed ominously. What factors might change the Japanese-American relationship? First would be an attempt to revise the current formal treaty status to expand the scope of Japanese military obligations in East Asia and to relate these to contingencies in the Middle East or Europe. The second danger is clearly trade and finance. As the U.S. defense establishment warns, a trade war with Japan would endanger higher political and military interests. The third lever that might move Japan is defense expenditures. No one argues that Japan should not be able to defend itself to the extent of making a would-be aggressor at least calculate his probable losses. But continuing attempts to co-opt a greatly augmented Japanese force into American operational plans risk alienation of the Japanese public and Japan's neighbors. Arguments that the Seventh Fleet is doing Japan's job in the Indian Ocean break down on the assumption that Japan sees a job that needs doing; it doesn't. Fourth, there is a remote danger that the United States might eventually seek a special relationship with the People's Republic of China as a substitute for the Japanese one. If the balance of power in East Asia were to begin to turn against U.S. interests, there would be opportunities for the Soviets. But the argument here is that this balance is now at risk only if the United States mishandles its relations with Japan.

The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations

Research Article| July 01 1988 The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations Robert M. Orr,, Jr. Robert M. Orr,, Jr. Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1959) 28 (7): 740–756. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644698 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Robert M. Orr,; The Aid Factor in U.S.-Japan Relations. Far Eastern Survey 1 July 1959; 28 (7): 740–756. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2644698 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1988 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Japan-ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy

Research Article| May 01 1988 Japan-ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy Sueo Sudo Sueo Sudo Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1959) 28 (5): 509–525. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644640 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Sueo Sudo; Japan-ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy. Far Eastern Survey 1 May 1959; 28 (5): 509–525. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2644640 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1988 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

U.S., Japan Approach New Era In Science and Technology Relations

Despite feverish economic strife and vast cultural gaps, Japan and the U.S. are finding themselves bound on a joint course into a technological future. Conflicts may be hiding the commonalities, but most Americans who have visited Japan and worked within the Japanese technical establishment come away with the feeling that the two countries now share a common path. Through an elaborate effort to reshape its science and technology policy, Japan is in the midst of a growing technical drive into technologies based on the information sciences and advanced materials fields. The specifics are still being worked out, but every major science policy document, such as Japan's latest White Paper on Science and Technology, underscores Japan's new international role. For three decades Japan has been a taker in the global technology markets—selling products based on acquired Western know-how while closing its borders to imports. Now it says it wants to return the favors it received while ...

The Road to Becoming a Regional Leader: Japanese Attempts in Southeast Asia, 1975-1980

THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR in April 1975 brought about many changes in the international relations of Southeast Asia: rapidly declining American commitments, a growing Soviet influence and the polarization of Indochina and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Many studies have been undertaken to account for these changes, yet the growing Japanese role in the region has not generated any substantial analysis.' One of the reasons for the limited scrutiny of Japan's Southeast Asian policy is the view that Tokyo has never changed its traditional economic policy and that its reactions to the changing regional environment are being induced by external pressures.2 Also, the consistency of Japan's low-profile economic diplomacy has led many scholars to believe that Japan, without adequate military power, does not stand a chance of playing a significant role in Southeast Asia. This article intends to present a different perspective, focusing on how Japanese policy-makers have come to define Japan's new role in a turbulent region. In fact, Japan has gone through a significant experiment in playing a political role in Southeast Asia between 1975 and 1980. This period dates from the fall of Saigon to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978, which resulted in the termination of Tokyo's pursuit of a political role by 1980. The most pronounced statement of Japan's new role was the so-called Fukuda Doctrine announced by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda on August 18, 1977. In reference to changes in Japanese foreign policy, American Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke had this to say in 1980:

Japan's role in Gorbachev's agenda

Japan's role in Gorbachev's agenda

The Role of U.S. Foreign Investment in ASEAN Industrial Co-operation

The main focus of this paper is the regional impact of U.S.-ASEAN investment relations: Does U.S. investment complement ASEANs regional industrial co operation? Generally, the relationship is asymmetrical since U.S. investment is important for ASEAN countries, but ASEAN is not as important for U.S. investors. Further, Japan's role as a market and host/source of investment places the United States and ASEAN in a triangular relationship. The paper also looks at existing patterns of U. S. investment in five ASEAN countries. * Finally, there is analysis of U. S investors' role in three techniques of ASEAN co-operation: ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP), ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV). The paper concludes that past experience and an international environment of continued economic friction and uncertainty are likely to make ASEAN industrial co-operation of less importance than other U.S.-ASEAN economic relations.

Japan's United Nations Policy in the 1980s

Thirty years after its admission, Japan has begun to show a new activism in the United Nations. Upon Japan's initiative in 1985, a Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts was organized to examine ways to improve the U.N. administrative and financial situation. In trying to determine whether Japan's role in the United Nations is likely to grow, we need to look at the areas of activity in which Japan can be expected to exert its influence and what international and domestic factors affect its future course of action. This article attempts to analyze Japan's recent actions in the United Nations in order to evaluate the evolving role of multilateralism in Japanese foreign policy.

Japan's Role in the World Economy: A New Appraisal

Ohmae, President of McKinsey & Company of Japan, provides a critical appraisal of Japan's self-image which not only challenges the Japanese to reassess how they see themselves, but also gives American readers a rare insight into the thinking of its major competitor. Japan, Ohmae admonishes, must stop thinking of itself as a resource-poor nation that must protect itself at all costs and should instead focus on the wealth of its human resources. Both Japan and the United States consider themselves to be open trading nations and advocates of free trade, yet they both practice protectionism while accusing the other of keeping its markets closed. What is needed is a new perspective on both sides that will both preserve jobs and a free and competitive international marketplace.

Assessing Japan's role in telecommunications: Building on successes in devices and small systems, Japan's R&D turns to making the large systems in which the United States has excelled

Building on success in devices and small systems, Japan's R and D has turned to making the large systems in which the United States has excelled. Ideas first presented by the Japanese Technology Evaluation Program (JTECH), are explored. The JTECH study compared the probable near-future status of the Japanese telecommunication industry with that of the US. It was found that Japanese companies were lagging behind US concerns in some key telecommunications areas, like software and system integration. If Japanese expertise in software improves, however, their market incursions will extend to higher and higher levels of subsystems. A number of strategies were suggested: fuller use of R and D resources in universities; more extensive design training of engineers in schools rather than in industry; and the nurturing of entrepreneurism within big companies. Various examples and company case histories are presented to support the JTECH point of view.

Japan, Vietnam and ASEAN

The year 1984 witnessed a good deal of movement in the search for a solution to the Kampuchean question. Despite the fact that a solution remained as elusive as ever, a few proposals were made not only by the ASEAN countries, but by Japan and Australia as well. Japan continued to pursue a policy of strongly supporting the ASEAN group in political and economic terms. Its support to the ASEAN countries was seen in various forums. Its trade and investment links with the ASEAN region remained strong. There was some significant, though yet marginal, mobility, in Japan's relations with Vietnam after a few years of almost total diplomatic inactivity. To be sure, bilateral relations still continued to remain in a state of suspension. There was, however, considerable speculation on Japan's possible role in the setdement of the Kampuchean question. But, soon it became evident that Japan's ability to influence decisions on Kampuchea was somewhat constrained by the closeness of its relations with the ASEAN countries. Had Japan's economic involvement in Indochina been substantial, its clout to initiate a peace formula could have been much stronger. Yet both sides involved in the Kampuchean question thought it fit to discuss it with the Japanese leaders, and Tokyo served as a centre for consultations among the parties concerned. But Japanese efforts however small should be seen in conjunction with certain peace parleys conducted by Indonesia, Australia, and other countries. An indication of a slight change in Japan's attitude towards Vietnam was seen in the closing stages of 1983 itself, though its importance, judging by what followed it, was marginal. Firsdy, in December 1983 the Japanese Government sent Hashimoto Hiroshi, Director-General of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Hanoi, and Hashimoto undertook his trip in response to the Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister, Hu Van Lau's visit to Tokyo earlier in March 1983. Hashimoto held talks with both Lau and Nguyen Co Thach, Vietnam's Foreign Minister, and the significance of his visit lay in the fact that no ranking Japanese official had visited Hanoi since November 1982.' Secondly, following a severe typhoon which caused considerable human and material loss to Vietnam in the same month, the Japanese Government extended token aid of US$100,000 on humanitarian grounds. Japan's aid indeed came in response to Vietnam's request.2 Though this was a positive development in Tokyo-Hanoi relations, it did not constitute a decisive trend indicating a change in the mutual attitudes and orientations. By the beginning of 1984, their relations remained by and large the same as at the commencement of 1983. The Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach summed up as follows his country's position: (a) There was a possibility of AS FLAN desiring a setdement of the Kampuchean question, but it was hampered by the People's Republic of China.

Japan's role in the new international division of labour — a reassessment

Japan's role in the new international division of labour — a reassessment

Japan's Role in Asia: A United States Surrogate?

Japan's Role in Asia: A United States Surrogate?

Japan's Role in Asia: A United States Surrogate?

Japan's Role in Asia: A United States Surrogate?

Japan's Security Role in Asia

Japan's Security Role in Asia

The Silent Power. Japan's Identity and World Role.

The Silent Power. Japan's Identity and World Role.