Terrorism has become a world problem now, due to the series of terrorist attacks worldwide. However, the challenge of terrorism is not new. From 1793 to 1794, the French revolutionary government used harsh and violent measures against citizens, accusing them as enemies of revolution. Terrorism can be traced back to ancient times Since September 11, 2001, during the terrorist attacks in America, the world has been shocked by these events. The terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIL, or Da’esh), are repeatedly mentioned because of their terrorist attacks. This paper analyzes the causes of terrorism and the best way to deal with it. The paper discusses the misconception that Islam in itself is the cause of terrorism, and the paper criticizes the idea that Islam is the root of terrorism, by providing evidence from Islamic sources and Islamic scholars who confirm that Islam does not support terrorism. Still, some Muslims, due to ignorance, use religious belief to justify their terrorist act, and this can occur in any religion, not only Islam. The paper uses the secondary analysis approach by examining the collected data and books on terrorism and analyse them using the Quran and Prophetic narration and the Jurisprudence of Islam.

Abstract For decades, Iran deployed male refugees from Afghanistan to fight against Iraq (1980–1988) and the Islamic State in Syria (2011–2024). Many of them returned disabled. Navigating their ambiguous status as refugees-turned-disabled veterans, Afghans blend discourses of sacrifice and pan-Shi'a solidarity to contest the exclusionary practices of Iran's state care bureaucracy. Based on two years of ethnographic research in Iran, this article examines how Afghans’ care negotiations forge an intimate attachment to the sovereign state. I argue that this attachment, mediated through documents, creates a sense of intimacy while evoking suspicion towards the state. In doing so, this article attends to the affective life of documents amid regional conflicts and protracted displacement, where desires for state care are woven into enduring transnational and sovereign histories of violence.

In the Levant, the Islamic jihadist ideology has occupied international attention for decades. During the Syrian crisis, the country became an incubator for radical movements to invest in a power vacuum and flourish under chaotic circumstances. Rapidly, Syria began attracting jihadists from all over the world to join radical organisations while a new kind of jihad - global jihad - indulged in a world-wide ideological firesale. Firstly, between 2011-2013, we saw jihadist armies associated with ISIS and al-Qaeda acting freely without a central authority, but on April 9, 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi shifted from localised jihadism to global jihadism, by declaring an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, to attack the international coalition as well as the Syrian regime. As a response, six months later in October 2013, Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham was launched in refusal of al-Nusra’s annexation to ISIS, and uniting all anti-ISIS militias on the ground against their common enemy. Since then, jihadism has become conflicted, especially when Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham cut its ties with al-Qaeda, and all three entered into conflict. This paper follows the breakdown of the al-Qaeda project, the setbacks of ISIS, and the crisis between al-Qaeda and its offshoot branch, al-Nusra, culminating in the creation of the “Guardian of Religion” or, Hurras al-Din. The methodology utilises an institutionalisation approach and primary resources of al-Qaeda's leadership and spokespersons in order to closely follow the confrontations it has had with other movements, and the steps it has taken in order to eventually fragment. The study seeks to answer what is happening on the terrorist scene today, and to evaluate the role of al-Qaeda in the Levant. The outcome is that there is a new group that has grabbed the baton from al-Qaeda and is continuing its work in the Levant, named Hurras Ad-Din. Received: 2 May 2024 / Accepted: 30 June 2024 / Published: 5 July 2024

ABSTRACT The Temple of Baalshamin in Palmyra was excavated by a Swiss team (1954–1956, 1966) led by the Swiss archaeologist Paul Collart. All of the field notes and other data are at the University of Lausanne. Today, these archives are the best existing source to study the temple, which was destroyed by ISIS (Islamic State in Syria) in 2015. Switzerland was not a colonial power, but, from a postcolonial perspective, it is interesting to study the dismantling process of the Byzantine structures as an assumption that the Roman-era Temple was more important. Based on a study of the historical archives, this article explores the question of whether this action can be seen as favoring a hegemonic narrative that the classical period supersedes all other periods represented by the site.

This paper discusses the inability of the US-led coalition to eradicate the existence of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). Even after ISIS’s territorial defeat in 2019, the group still poses a significant threat to this region. The success of the US strategy to defeat ISIS is called into doubt in light of the group’s apparent resurgence. The first section of this paper is focused on a review of the related literature. Whether or not the United States’ allegations regarding ISIS are accurate, and what the regional and global ramifications of a resurgence of the organization would be, are questioned in the existing literature. From a constructivist vantage point, the second chapter discusses how the Islamic State came to be as well as the difficulties it faces now. In addition, it clarifies the motivations and behaviors of terrorists. It also demonstrates the limitations of current strategies for eliminating ISIS. The United States-led coalition’s participation in the fight against terrorism in Iraq and Syria is laid out at the outset of the third chapter. Following its territorial defeat in 2019, the Islamic State has shown signs of resurgence. Furthermore, it details the current US strategy for countering the resurgence of the Islamic State. The final one evaluates potential counter-ISIS strategies. The difficulties of destroying ISIS are discussed. Moreover, it provides a potential strategy for eradicating the Islamic State and explores other aspects of the issues inherent with doing so. Final thoughts and suggestions are provided as the paper winds down.

Abstract A large literature has argued that domestic competition increases a militant organization's use and severity of terrorism to differentiate their “brand” and “outbid” other organizations. However, most empirical analyses infer such competition from the quantity of groups present in a geographic area. This approach neglects specific group relationships, such as cooperation, rhetorical or violent rivalry, or peaceful coexistence. We introduce a behavioral measure of group competition and argue that variation in the quality, rather than the quantity, of competition affects the violence profile of militant groups in unexpected ways. Violent competition, where militants attack one another, imposes significant constraints on group resources and increases groups’ dependence on civilian support, which exacerbates the costs of a popular backlash against brutality. Moreover, violent competition effectively substitutes for crowding out rivals via outbidding. As competition becomes extreme, we posit that groups increasingly opt for a strategy of terrorist restraint and reduce the share of high-profile attacks on soft civilian targets. We test this argument at the macro and micro levels with cross-national data on 290 organizations in civil war (1970–2018) and granular data on the subnational targeting strategy of the Islamic State in Syria (2013–2018). Both analyses provide robust support for our argument. The findings shed light on the strategic limitations of outbidding and provide important insights for research and policy.

ABSTRACT Special Operations Forces (SOF) played an important role in defeating the Islamic State (ISIS) physical caliphate in Syria. Acting as a force multiplier, SOF successfully mobilized, armed, supplied, and directed an indigenous guerrilla force across northern Syria against a numerically superior entrenched enemy. This effort was underpinned by a flexible operational approach that adapted operational art to the unique characteristics of unconventional warfare. This paper provides a case study on the conflict with ISIS in Syria, focusing on the first phase of the campaign from 2014 until 2016, examining the elements of operational art which had the most significant impact on the outcome of the conflict. The application of operational art throughout the campaign sought to preserve and strengthen the friendly center of gravity – the Syrian Defense Forces, or SDF – by improving access to critical capabilities, controlling tempo, recognizing culmination criteria, and properly phasing operations and resources. SOF’s practice of sustained engagement garnered influence with the SDF and provided situational awareness to key decision makers, connecting tactics to strategy, engendering mutual trust, and allowing the agility that led to battlefield success.

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, the cultural heritage of the Middle East has faced a serious threat, as Daesh (ISIS) and other extremist organizations turned archaeological sites into a financing tool. In 2016, around 100,000 cultural objects of great importance, including 4,500 archaeological sites, nine of which are included in the UNESCO World Heritage List, were under the control of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. However, not only these extremist groups are included in these dynamics. Part of the population of these countries does not hesitate to carry out this type of activity to get ahead.

This study asks questions about the understudied cultural, especially discursive, consequences of social movements at large, and rightist movements in particular. Focusing on the discursive repertoire of the Islamist rightist movement in Iran (known as principlism), I demonstrate that in response to the liberal Reform Movement (1997–2005), the principlist groups in Iran weaponized a millennial language against liberal reformists beginning in the early 2000s. The institutionalization of the Islamist principlist movement in 2005 mainstreamed this politicized language, giving rise to a new cultural reform politics in the country known under Aḥmadīnizhād as the Mahdavī discourse (millennialism). That is, the Mahdavī discourse represented a new cultural reconfiguration, or “cultural engineering,” in state politics. However, the Green Movement of 2009 as well as the Arab uprisings divided the unified Mahdavī discourse within the principlist movement into divergent millennial discourses. Drawing on millennial-oriented news stories and events from the early 2000s until the rise of the self-identified Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, I highlight the millennial discourses, as well as the Islamist-centered cultural engineering project, as the discursive outcomes of social movements.

The article examines the illegal activities of terrorist Islamist groups in the Sinai Peninsula. Within the framework of this study, the main attention is focused on the analysis of those links that make up the modern structure of local takfiri jihadist organizations that oppose the secular government of Egypt and demand the establishment of an Islamic order in the country based on Sharia law. The author reveals the reasons that turned one of the most famous resort areas in the world into a hotbed of terrorism and Islamist extremism. After the destruction of the quasi-state structures of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Lebanon, a significant part of its militants moved to hard-to-reach areas of the Sinai Peninsula. An extensive network of well-armed bandit formations was created here, which carried out hundreds of terrorist acts. On October 31, 2015, a Russian Airbus A320 belonging to the Kogalymavia campaign was blown up over the central part of the Sinai Peninsula. As a result of this plane 224 people were killed, and the Russian government was forced to interrupt air traffic with Egypt, as a result of which the Egyptian budget suffered multibillion-dollar losses. A significant part of the article is devoted to an analysis of the response measures taken by the current Egyptian government to eliminate hotbeds of terrorist threats in the Sinai and establish an effective security regime on the peninsula. At the same time, the author reveals all the shortcomings admitted by the authorities of the Arab Republic of Egypt during counter-terrorism operations. The article presents consolidated recommendations for the Russian state foreign affairs agencies that currently determine the level of security in the areas where Egyptian attractions and resorts are located and, therefore, the possibility of restoring in full the cooperation of the Russian Federation with Egypt in the tourism sector. The article may arouse the interest of all those who associate themselves with the Middle East scientific community, as well as those who are professionally involved in the problems of terrorism and the fight against terrorist threats and challenges in the region.

O terrorismo, os ataques violentos e o islamismo político têm afetado o Norte do Cáucaso desde a desintegração da União Soviética. Se no passado o Emirado do Cáucaso era a principal organização terrorista da região desde 2014, o Estado islâmico ganhou popularidade e estabeleceu o Vilayat Kavkaz (província do Cáucaso) como parte do Califado, explorando a condição socioeconómica crítica local e promovendo a propaganda jihadista em língua russa (ou seja, a revista 'Istok') também graças à presença considerável de combatentes estrangeiros do Cáucaso do Norte entre as fileiras de Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Embora atualmente as forças da coligação internacional tenham derrotado principalmente o Estado islâmico na Síria e no Iraque, esta organização ainda compromete o Norte do Cáucaso, frequentemente identificado como a zona mais volátil e empobrecida da Federação Russa, caracterizada por conflitos étnicos, o aumento do salafismo, a estagnação e a corrupção. Este estudo visa salientar que o governo russo elaborou uma estratégia baseada principalmente em operações militares especiais e investimentos maciços no turismo e na logística que podem exacerbar ainda mais o precário status quo da região, favorecendo a difusão da propaganda jihadista porque não considera o contexto histórico, sociocultural, étnico e religioso. A região não está isenta da propaganda jihadista e do terrorismo e, se o governo russo não puder apoiar financeira e economicamente os líderes regionais ou não quiser mudar a sua abordagem, o terrorismo e o islamismo político poderiam influenciar de forma crítica o Cáucaso do Norte, colocando uma perigosa ameaça à estabilidade e segurança da Federação Russa e de toda a Eurásia.

ABSTRACT This article focuses on innovative conceptual definitions to capture the various terms and ideas that abound concerning the delivery of military assistance, aid, and training in fragile states, often subsumed under the term security force assistance (SFA). It highlights different Kurdish militias and units within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to demonstrate inherent problems with any SFA program. We conduct a conceptual, theoretical, and empirical analysis to evaluate variations, concluding that in these contexts the definition of success and military effectiveness is contextual, often deviating from what the providers, such as the U.S. and other nations, may desire.

ABSTRACT With the collapse of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, international governments are scrambling to understand the process of leaving violent networks as large numbers of former fighters return to their home countries. Studies of foreign fighters have tended to emphasize the importance of ideology or trans-national identity in explaining the desire to travel across borders to participate in war. This paper looks to move beyond these accounts and investigates how embodied attachments to militarism shapes foreign fighters enduring involvement in jihadi networks. Feminist studies of militarism and armed violence have emphasized the importance of gendered forms of attachment and desire in making war possible. While this research has paid increasing attention to attachment and embodiment in shaping military personnel’s identities, far less attention has been paid to those involved in foreign fighter networks. Based on life-history research with three generations of former foreign fighters from Java (Afghanistan 1980s, Philippines 2000s, Syria/Iraq 2014-ongoing) this paper explores the complex and contradictory forms of attachment that shape their attempted transition to in civilian life. Focusing on the embodied practices of these former fighters, the article highlights the role of structural factors play in recrafting attachment and belonging.

The present article examines the sparing of cultural heritage by Islamic fundamentalist groups. Several incidents are compared regionally, considering the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Ansar al-Dine in Mali. It appears that despite regional differences certain motives are generally valid, not only regarding religious legitimation but also media-oriented acting. It is argued that the examined Islamist groups try to reach out to a local, regional or global audience. Thereby, Islamist groups’ reactions depend on the question if an object constitutes a cultural signifier which provides a source of identity for certain groups.

Remote assessments of the archaeological heritage situation in Afghanistan

This article discusses how Armenians have collected, displayed and exchanged the bones of their murdered ancestors in formal and informal ceremonies of remembrance in Dayr al-Zur, Syria – the final destination for hundreds of thousands of Armenians during the deportations of 1915. These pilgrimages – replete with overlapping secular and nationalist motifs – are a modern variant of historical pilgrimage practices; yet these bones are more than relics. Bone rituals, displays and vernacular memorials are enacted in spaces of memory that lie outside of official state memorials, making unmarked sites of atrocity more legible. Vernacular memorial practices are of particular interest as we consider new archives for the history of the Armenian Genocide. The rehabilitation of this historical site into public consciousness is particularly urgent, since the Armenian Genocide Memorial Museum and Martyr’s Church at the centre of the pilgrimage site were both destroyed by ISIS (Islamic State in Syria) in 2014.

This paper analyses the influence of religion on identity, especially the political identity and political behavior of the non-orthodox people of Montenegro. Goal of this paper is to show that non-orthodox minorities in Montenegro have a mass influence on the politics of this country. For example, without their votes, the independence of Montenegro would not be possible. This is very easy to calculate. 55% voted for the independence, and Muslims represents a little bit more than 19% of the Montenegro's population. All of them say they voted for the independence of Montenegro in 2006 referendum. Therefore, this political decision was highly dependent on the Muslim votes, and had a great influence on the Serbian interests. This fact should be highlighted. Moreover, one can say that this was one of the major defeats of Serbs in the last century. This paper shows that the identity of the Serbian speaking population of Montenegro is dependent on their religious background. Bosnians, Muslims, Montenegrin Muslims or Croats base their national identity on their Islamic or Roman Catholic confession. Moreover, this paper shows that the Albanian national question in Montenegro is a great example of how both Serbian science and politics failed to explain this issue. Serbian politicians and scientist are wrong in saying that Albanians are motivated only by antireligious nationalism in their actions, basing their attitude in complex Albanian society made of Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Christians. Due to this fact religious aspect was completely ignored. However, a great number of Albanians fighting for Islamic State in Syria and Iraq are quite opposite to this attitude, and making Serbians to ask themselves - how is it possible that an atheist Albanians are fighting in the name of Islam? The situation is similar in Montenegro. In this paper we show that Albanians are also divided on religious lines and that this division has huge consequences. If Serbs has analyzed Albanians interreligious relations based on what we have in Montenegro, it would be easier for them to understand that Albanians failed to overcome their religious differences in the name of national unity, and consequently to understand why so many of them are fighting for ISIL. We also deal with the Croatian question in Montenegro. This paper will show that Montenegrin Croats are a part of the same Serbian body, like Bosnians or Muslims. They are divided from this body only because of their religious belonging to Roman Catholic religion. Under the pressure of the First Croat Catholic Congress in 1900 they accepted to declare as Croats as their national belonging. Prior to this, they were divided between the idea of Slavs and Serbs, all sharing the same Serbian background and language.

The Non-Economic Functions of Rebel Taxation: New Data from the Islamic State in Syria

Greed-based theories of civil war predict that rebel groups will only engage in taxation and other state-building activities in areas where they lack exploitable resources. However, this prediction is contradicted by the Islamic State’s pattern of taxation across time and space. A new data set mapping seven types of revenue-extracting policies imposed by the Islamic State, a jihadist rebel group, in the 19 Syrian districts that it governed between 2013 and 2017 indicates that these policies were just as prevalent in resource-rich as in resource-poor districts. I propose a new theory that better explains this pattern—a rebel group’s pattern of taxation is codetermined by (1) ideology and (2) the costs of warfare—and establish the plausibility of this theory through a case study of al-Mayadin, the most oil-rich district governed by the Islamic State and therefore an ideal site in which to investigate the puzzle of taxation by resource-rich rebels.

Abstract. In our paper, we document experiments and results of image-based 3d reconstructions of famous heritage monuments which were recently damaged or completely destroyed by the so-called Islamic state in Syria and Iraq. The specific focus of our research is on the combined use of professional photogrammetric imagery and of publicly available imagery from the web for optimally 3d reconstructing those monuments. The investigated photogrammetric reconstruction techniques include automated bundle adjustment and dense multi-view 3d reconstruction using public domain and professional imagery on the one hand and an interactive polygonal modelling based on projected panoramas on the other. Our investigations show that the combination of these two image-based modelling techniques delivers better results in terms of model completeness, level of detail and appearance.