Iraqi Territory Research Articles

Turkey’s Crisis Management in the Mosul Hostage Crisis

Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’nin Musul Başkonsolosluğu’nun işgal edilmesiyle tetiklenen Rehineler Krizi incelenmektedir. Bu krizde Türkiye’nin hasmı bir silahlı devlet dışı aktördür ve olay komşu Irak topraklarında gerçekleşmiştir. Irak topraklarının bir bölümünün IŞİD tarafından işgal edilmesi hem bu coğrafi alan özelinde hem de bölge genelinde devlet olgusunun temel niteliklerine bir meydan okuma yaratmıştır. Bu meydan okuma, sadece toprağı işgal edilen devletle sınırlı kalmamıştır. Türkiye ile silahlı devlet dışı aktör (IŞİD) arasında da yeni bir dış politika krizi doğurmuştur. Türkiye’nin Musul Başkonsolosluğu’nun IŞİD militanları tarafından işgal edilmesi ve kırk dokuz personelinin rehin alınması sürecinde Türkiye kriz yönetiminde farklı yöntem ve araçlar kullanarak krizi yönetmiş ve rehinelerin kurtarılmasını sağlamıştır. Türkiye, bu krizin yönetim sürecinde IŞİD'i doğrudan muhatap almak istememiş ve geleneksel diplomatik-siyasi araç ve yöntemlere başvurmaktan kaçınmıştır. Bu nedenle Türkiye, kriz sürecini Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MİT) aracılığıyla yönetmiştir. Bu süreçte bir ad hoc mekanizma olarak Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı’nın öne çıktığı görülmüştür. Bu çalışmada uluslararası sistem ve bölgesel alt sistemin gündeminin yaratmış olduğu baskılar, bölgedeki mekân-iktidar mücadelesi, Türkiye’deki iktidar-muhalefet ilişkisi, ülke sınırları içinde bulunan IŞİD militanlarının varlığı ve etkisi Musul Rehineler Krizi’ne ilişkin kriz yönetimi ve karar sürecinin analizinde göz önünde bulundurulmuştur.

Operacja w obronie jezydów w 2014 roku: od interwencji na zaproszenie do interwencji humanitarnej i odpowiedzialności za ochronę?

W artykule przedstawiona jest interwencja w obronie jezydów zapoczątkowana w sierpniu 2014 roku w północnym Iraku. Podmiotem operacji były przede wszystkim Stany Zjednoczone dysponujące zgodą irackiego rządu na prowadzenie działań zbrojnych na rzecz integralności terytorialnej oraz ochrony obywateli Iraku. Autor artykułu dowodzi, że w operacji w obronie jezydów, wbrew powszechnym przekonaniom, można odnaleźć znacznie więcej elementów interwencji humanitarnej niż odpowiedzialności za ochronę. W tym celu poszczególne komponenty operacji w obronie jezydów zostały zaprezentowane przez pryzmat koncepcji interwencji humanitarnej i odpowiedzialności za ochronę.

The impact of Islamic State’s ideological correction initiative on al Qaeda’s bid for relevance

ABSTRACT Al Qaeda following 9-11 experienced a period of stagnation which it sought to remedy through a project of re-branding. Critical of this approach, Islamic State claimed that al Qaeda was an elitist organization that had facilitated the stagnation of the Salafi Jihadist project. In an attempted to claim dominance over the jihad, Islamic State’s endeavored to discredit al Qaeda through a process it presented as ideological correction, linked to Islamic eschatology, sectarian agitation, permissive violence, and the caliphate. Following Islamic State’s acquisition of vast territory in Iraq and Syria, arguments proliferated that Islamic State had surpassed al Qaeda. As the caliphate has collapsed what effects will this have on al Qaeda’s fortunes and strategy? It is argued that Islamic State has provided al Qaeda’s strategic approach with renewed vigour to help ensure its survival and pursue resurgence. Al Qaeda acting in concert with the meta-strategy for survival concept, has altered an existential threat into an advantage through disavowing Islamic State’s methods, continuing to engage with localism, and pursuing rebranding by positioning itself as a moderate alternative. The cases of al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Syria, West Africa, and South Asia are instructive in assessing the effectiveness of al Qaeda’s resurgence.

Иракский Курдистан во внешней политике Израиля: истоки отношений и современное состояние

The study revealed the main characteristics of Isra-el’s policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan. In particular, the research demonstrated that originally Israel’s strate-gy for this part of Iraqi territory was limited to gain-ing tactical advantages in the face of confrontation with the Arab States. However, Israel gradually real-ized the importance of its relations with Iraqi Kurdi-stan. This was facilitated by people from the Kurdish lands in Israel, the growing threat of the Islamic State (illegal in Russia), and the build-up of trade and economic contacts (including the 2015 Oil Deal). Israel’s relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan had under-gone three stages throughout the entire period of Israel’s existence: the establishment of mutually beneficial relations on the basis of the struggle against the Iraqi political regime (1963–1975); the strategic lull caused by the change in Iran’s position in the region (1975/1979–1991); the restoration of relations with a focus on economic benefits rather than political expediency (since 1991).

PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk

After the September 25 referendum, the political and military developments in the disputed territories resulted in significant threats toward Iraqi Kurdistan and also deepened the internal rivalry between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The Kurdish lost control of Kirkuk, which was the strongest Kurdish-held disputed territory in Iraq. Subsequently, on October 16, the Iraqi military attacked the city, and the Kurdish forces fled, unable to defend it. This article discusses the various disputes between the PUK and KDP vis-à-vis Kirkuk. It will also identify possible scenarios for the future role of the Kurds in Kirkuk and the wider implications of the city being ruled by an acting governor representing the Kurds. This article concludes that electing a new governor and returning the Kurdish parties in the Brotherhood List to the Council of Kirkuk is the best scenario.

«Исламское государство 2.0»: нарастающая угроза на евразийском пространстве

The article is devoted to the study of the new situation in the framework of the problem-historical approach after the defeat of the terrorist group “Islamic State” (December 2017) in Syria, the essence of which is the formation of a new model of religious extremism, called “IG 2.0” experts. The basis of this model is the use of pendulum migration of radical Islamists to the countries of Central Asia and Russia, which become the nucleus of various kinds of extremist organizations.Formed in 2006, the radical terrorist group “Islamic State” (banned in Russia and other CIS countries) proclaimed the idea of forming a united front of the “global jihad” in the interests of armed opposition to “the main enemies of Islam”, among which were the United States, the countries of Western Europe , Russia and Muslim states with a secular form of government. The maximum influence of the “Islamic state” was in 2014, when the caliphate was declared on the territory of Iraq and Syria under its control. In the summer of 2014, the Khorasan grouping of the IG was formed, which includes the territory of five Central Asian states. In November 2014, the number of IG militants exceeded 200,000. Given the ineffectiveness of the actions of the in-ternational anti-terrorist coalition under the auspices of the United States, Russia embarked on its own anti-terrorist operation, which resulted in the defeat of terrorists in Syria in December 2017, the remnants of which moved to Afghanistan. This was followed by the migration of the defeated radical Islamists to Syria and Iraq to the countries of Central Asia and Russia. It is shown that currently the main complex threat to the national security of Russia and the Central Asian states is the formation on the territory of Afghanistan of “IG 2.0”, which openly proclaims its goal to overthrow the legitimate authorities of the Central Asian states, as well as spread its influence throughout the Eurasian space. The author justifies the conclusion that it is necessary to increase Eurasian integration in all possible directions as a condition for effective opposition to this radical grouping.

The Way of the Strangers

Despite the considerable scholarly work which has gone into understandingthe Islamic State (IS), the depths of the motivations and psychology ofits members and supporters have not been truly plumbed. Graeme Woodchronicles his forays into the minds of adherents of the organization in TheWay of the Strangers: Encounters with the Islamic State and does an impressivejob of laying bare the thought behind the group and its attention-grabbingbrutality. While it is regarded by most of the world as a collection ofpsychopaths, notably by the vast majority of Muslims, who consistently denouncethe group and its claims to religious legitimacy, Wood argues that itdoes have a logic and basis in religious scripture that is by and large internallyconsistent, if morally repugnant, and notes that only by understandingthis logic—and, therefore, the beliefs of its ardent supporters—can therest of the world combat it most effectively. He also provides an interestingwindow into the group’s recruitment process by examining some individualswhom he terms “seducers”, those who encourage others to immigrateto the group’s territory in Iraq and Syria. While this last part may seemsomewhat outdated, it will unfortunately retain importance as IS coalesceselsewhere and perhaps even attempts a resurgence in those two countries;the examination of this possibility falls far outside the scope of this review,but its existence at all sees this aspect of the book retain its importance ...

PETROGRAPHICAL AND GEOCHEMICAL FEATURES OF VOLCANIC FRAGMENTS OF THE WADI AL-BATIN IN IRAQ

The volcanic rocks of the Wadi Al-Batin, in the form of sand-pebble fragments form large-scale sedimentary deposits. Delta of this valley - an «alluvial fan» - covers most of Kuwait and southeast of Iraq. With the general study of these rocks, their geochemical features remain unclear. In this paper, a detailed analysis of the chemical and component composition of the rocks of Wadi Al-Batin volcanic fragments is given. It is established that reddish-brown and dark-colored rocks of volcanic rock are widely distributed in the territory of Iraq. Samples of reddish color are mainly represented by rhyolites, while dark ones represent trachyte, dacite and shale. Rheolites are typical examples of calc-alkaline perglinose volcanic rock and exhibit geochemical characteristics of anorogenic intraplate media. On the other hand, tra-chyte and dacite are tholeiitic perglinozems and have geochemical characteristics of oro-genic arc type. It has been confirmed that the wreckage of Wadi Al-Batin rocks originated from the highlands of western and north-western Saudi Arabia, where indigenous rhyolites are developed, which are in many respects similar to the rhyolites of Wadi Al-Batin.

Morphoneotectonics and prospects of oil and gas presence in deserts of Iraq

The article deals with the prospects of Iraq’s oil and gas potential. It should be noted that there has not been much attention payed to the desert regions of Iraq located on the Arabian plate. However, recent studies show prospectivity of the Iraq deserts. As a result of the recent investigation of river valleys in the region, the following main morphotectonic processes were identified: rejuvenation of the river network and emergence of new river basins; division of individual rivers into two or more parts; interception of the river network. As a result of long-term field and cameral geological and geomorphological studies in the area of the Western and Southern deserts, it was possible to reconstruct the existing tectonic activity of the area from the Miocene period to the present day. It is established that the regional Euphrates fault on the territory of Iraq occupies an exceptionally important place, which was previously underestimated. Adjacent echelon faults of the following order formed a system of pre-existent tectonic blocks with different kinematics and morphology. The causes and mechanism of neotectonic Neogene-Quaternary movements of the earth’s surface are established. Thus, separate tectonic blocks are identified, which generally form zonal regions of uplifts or valleys. The areas of elevated blocks (for example, the raising of Al-Najaf Al-Ashraf of the third order) are created by plicative dome structures in the cover near the Euphrates fault, favorable for the accumulation of HC.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2199 & 2253

In June 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged on the world stage when its fighters seized Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, after moving into Iraq from its original base in Syria. Led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed caliph, ISIL's goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. At its peak, ISIL was considered the wealthiest international terrorist organization in the world, estimated to have an annual budget of over $2 billion. ISIL controlled large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, seizing control of Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's Anbar province, and the historic city of Palmyra in central Syria. In Iraq and Syria, ISIL also seized towns along important supply routes, and controlled critical infrastructure and border crossings. In 2015, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that ISIL had between twenty thousand and thirty-one thousand fighters in Iraq and Syria, and approximately fifteen thousand of its members were foreign recruits. The acts of brutality committed by ISIL include beheading American journalists; the torture and ruthless slaughter of civilians; the persecution of ethnic minorities and Christians; and gross violations of international human rights that constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

The evolution of Islamic State’s strategy

Despite having a vast number of forces arrayed against it – the United States-led coalition, Putin’s Moscow, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, Kurdish Peshmerga and the regimes in Baghdad and Damascus – Islamic State (IS) has expanded into other areas. Despite losing territory in Iraq and Syria, IS is growing in the Far East, the Caucasus and Africa. Reasons for the resilience displayed on the part of the jihadis are encouraging polarisation between groups and then benefiting from this process. Its diverse funding sources from oil sales to the trafficking of antiquities and narcotics have allowed IS to build a war chest in excess of US$ 2 billion. With these funds, IS has deployed soft power – digging sewage systems and providing stipends to families – to earn the loyalty of its ‘citizens’. IS has also displayed superior military strategy combining conventional military doctrine with asymmetric warfare. As IS are confronted with superior conventional forces in their heartland, however, they embrace more asymmetric warfare.

A Neoliberal Rentier System: New Challenges and Past Economic Trajectories in Iraq

ABSTRACTThe Islamic State’s conquest of swathes of Iraqi territory, combined with falling oil prices, revealed the fault lines of a model of economic development that made the country extremely vulnerable to the events of 2014. Over the last 13 years, the consolidation of the rentier economy in parallel to the promotion of a neoliberal model – a neoliberal rentier system – has not initiated a process of sustainable economic development. The main factors explaining this missed opportunity can be found in the tensions that exist between the two models and, in particular, between the relative roles of the state and the private sector as drivers of economic development.

The displacement of the Yezidis after the rise of ISIS in Northern Iraq

In the summer of 2014 the expansion of “The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL/ISIS) from Syria into Iraqi territory triggered the displacement of two to three hundred thousand members of the Yezidi community in Northern Iraq. Displaced from Sinjar and other districts in the Nineveh governorate, the majority of Yezidis are hosted in the Dohuk governorate and are living there as internally displaced persons. The article explores the impact of the displacement from different angles and investigates the impact on the Yezidi community as well as the impact on ethnic and religious aspects of social life in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.Abstract in KurmanjiKoçberbûna Êzdiyan piştî peydabûna DAIŞê li Bakurê IraqêHavîna 2014an, belavbûna “Dewleta Îslamî ya Iraq û Şamê” (DAIŞ) ji Surî bo nav axa Iraqê, bû sebebê jicihbûn û koçberiya dused-sêsed hezar endamên civaka êzdî li Bakurê Iraqê. Piraniya êzdiyên ji Şingalê û navçeyên din ên wîlayeta Mûsilê penaber bûyî, li wilayeta Duhokê dihewin an jî wek penaberên navxweyî li wir dijîn. Ev gotar berê xwe dide vekolîna tesîra jicihbûn an koçberbûnê ji nêrînên cuda û tesîra wê li ser civaka êzdî ligel tesîra wê ya li ser aliyên qewmî û dînî yên jiyana civakî li Herêma Kurdistanê ya Iraqê. Abstract in Sorani

Capturing the Character of Future War

Abstract: This essay proposes a conceptual framework combining elements of Clausewitz's On War with trend-forecasting techniques to describe future operational environments. This framework captures how the interaction of megatrends--the rate of technological change, the composition of the international system, and the strength of state governance--shapes the character of competition, confrontation, and conflict in each period. We argue this framework can help military officers build the future force. ********** How should military officers describe the future operational environment? In February 25, 2016, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, US Air Force General and EUCOM Commander, General Philip M. Breedlove referred to a resurgent Russia as an existential threat. (1) Moscow continues to challenge multiple NATO members while investing in a military-modernization program that includes significant increases in autonomous systems. Despite those facts, Russia has a gross domestic product the size of Italy, and it spent less on defense in 2015 than Saudi Arabia. (2) The Islamic State continues to hold terrain in multiple countries, and it has been a magnet for foreign fighters. The group is pressing a 21st-century terror campaign by attacking European cities and waging complex operations in the cyber domain, including the use of social media and hacking the names and addresses of adversaries in an effort to encourage lone-wolf attacks. (3) Yet, the group has lost, by some estimates, as much as 40 percent of its territory in Iraq and Syria, multiple leaders, and as many as 10,000 fighters since 2014. (4) From the Islamic States' use of cyber and traditional guerilla and terror tactics to Russian experiments of combining massive fires with drones and broad-spectrum information warfare in Ukraine, there are signs the future of warfare may already be here. Just as the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict were harbingers of future conflict, we may be at the juncture where events from Eastern Ukraine to Syria and Iraq signal how warfare is likely to evolve and shape the world of 2030 to 2050. Describing the future character of war should be a central task for the military profession. (5) As bureaucracies, resourcing strategies, and programming processes increase in complexity, often unnecessarily, senior leaders need to make long-term bets on whether to innovate by combining legacy forces with new concepts and incremental improvements or to invent breakthrough capabilities for future contingencies. The future force is built now to be used later. Failing to meet that task abdicates a central responsibility of the military profession. This article introduces an analytical framework for describing the future operational environment based on integrating Clausewitz's concept of the character of war unique to each period with trend analysis techniques common in scenario-planning. (6) We contend macro-trends--specifically, the rate of technological change and through it the available means of coercion, the composition of the international system, and the degree to which political units in that system can secure their internal domains--interact in a trinity-like manner. As these trends interact, they produce an emergent character of war. To describe the future operational environment, military professionals should first define the likely future character of war and use the resulting forecasts to develop new concepts and modernization priorities. The article proceeds by establishing what the character of war is and uses the construct to situate a new approach to describing the future operational environment. From this vantage point, we look at major findings in future studies by the Army and the broader US national security community since the 1970s, highlighting how the interaction of technology, the international system, and governance tends to produce evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary change. …

State-Building: America's Foreign Policy Challenge

ABSTRACT: This article provides an overview of the domestic security environments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria today and discusses the danger new radical-inspired states pose to the United States and the international community. Ultimately, state-building remains the primary strategic means to address this new challenge. However, the world should prepare for the rise of radical-inspired states if state-building proves to be impossible. ********** Washington is not ready to dispense with the Global War on Terror. The scourge of radical Islam still constitutes a serious threat to the stability of the international system. Recently, the world has witnessed a series of terrorist attacks take place in the West, while the governments of countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and others, struggle to quell insurgent forces and terrorist groups. Four countries in particular merit America's close attention over the span of the next several years: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. All represent a new type of menace. They resemble or collapsed states in form. (1) Yet they are inherently precarious because new radical-inspired states (or terror states) are developing within their borders. (2) This past decade, the conventional academic wisdom argued certain failed states undermined global stability because terrorists could operate with impunity from inside such countries. (3) Nowadays this threat is undergoing a stunning metamorphosis, with insurgent-based movements transforming into new states and challenging the host governments of these four countries for supremacy. Today, the Afghan, Iraqi, Libyan, and Syrian governments are all fighting for their very survival, and America has the ability to play a role in determining whether they ultimately endure or perish. Surely, some policymakers and scholars believe the protracted conflicts raging within these countries are not (or no longer) America's primary concern, that such wars can only be resolved by local political actors, and that the United States should not be bestowing foreign aid upon politically inept governments led by corrupt utilitarian-minded elites or rushing to the defense of human rights and international law every time some beleaguered autocrat clinging to power violates the rules of war. While such views hold merit, the domestic security environments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria are seemingly becoming more hazardous by the day. Hence, the United States risks a great deal in terms of its national security interests if it decides to turn away from these countries. In Iraq and Syria, terrorists fighting under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have murdered US citizens, massacred and enslaved ethnic and religious minorities, and looted and pillaged centers containing historical and cultural artifacts. (4) In Libya, the country has descended into anarchy since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Rival militias fight for control over stretches of territory, while ISIL-affiliated and other terrorist groups infiltrate the country due to the lack of a central government. In Afghanistan, a recent deadly wave of terrorist attacks has called into question whether the Afghan government could survive should the remaining US military forces depart. (5) Overall, if America decided to disengage from these countries, radical Islamists could capture greater swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, Libya may devolve into a terrorist haven, and Afghan cities may soon start falling to the Taliban. Can anything be done to prevent these scenarios from happening? This article describes the deteriorating domestic security environments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. It then discusses the options available to the United States in terms of addressing these concerns. Thereafter, it analyzes the nature of the new threat facing the United States in the Global War on Terror. …

Compared Some Water Characteristics of Tigris River With Euphrates River

: A number of physical and chemical ambient water characteristics of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers were studied on a monthly basis over the year (2011). Samples through 61 sampling station was collected, which distributed by 39 stations along the Tigris river and 22 station along the Euphrates river. Samples collected were analyzed to find a number of variables. The variables measured include cations group (Ca, Mg Mg, Na Na), anions group (Cl, SO4), nitrate NO3, phosphate PO4, total dissolved solids TDS, in addition to measuring pH.Data were analyzed statistically to extract the results. Results showed that average concentrations of calcium ions to the Tigris River 69 mg /L, and the Euphrates River 139 mg /L. The average concentration of magnesium ions of the Tigris River is 34 mg /L, while of the Euphrates River is 67 mg /L. Average concentration of sodium ions of the Tigris River is 58 mg /L, and the Euphrates River is 247 mg /L. Average concentration of sulfate ions of the Tigris River is 154 mg /L, and the Euphrates River is 425 mg /L. Average concentration of chloride ions of the Tigris River is 98 mg / L, and the Average of the Euphrates River is 375 mg /L. Average concentration of nitrate ions of the Tigris River is 3.48 mg /L and the same average value registered to the Euphrates River. Phosphate ions concentration rate of the Tigris River is 0.24 mg / L, and the Euphrates River is 0.20 mg /L. Average concentration of total dissolved solids of the Tigris River is 530 mg / L, while the Euphrates River is 1419 mg /L. Average pH value of the water for the Tigris River is 7.6 and 7.8 for Euphrates River. Water quality of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers varies from one section to another. Water quality is better in the upstream sections of the rivers. There is a general trend to increase salinity and degradation of water quality whenever river stream Turn south because of decreasing water level and accumulation of pollution loads. Water quality of the Tigris generally better than the quality of waters of the Euphrates, where many tributaries supply Tigris river with freshwater inside Iraqi territory while Euphrates River exposed to different effluent inside Syrian territory before entering the Iraqi border. Recorded values of most variables measured of the Euphrates river greater than the values of Tigris River at the beginning of the entry of the rivers into the Iraqi border. Euphrates River compared with the Tigris River was exposed to different effluent discharges especially agricultural discharge in the central and southern regions in addition to changing hydrological conditions.

Countering the Islamic State: U.S. Counterterrorism Measures

This research note discusses the tactics and strategies of the United States to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from the onset of Operation Inherent Resolve beginning on 8 August 2014 and continuing into early 2015. Through both kinetic and non-kinetic actions, the United States and its coalition has sought to degrade and defeat ISIL. But how effective have these measures been with regard to the group's ability to maintain control over parts of the Iraqi population and territory? ISIL's fast growing affiliate network poses a unique challenge and this study suggests that the kinetic measures of Operation Inherent Resolve have weakened ISIL's tactical capabilities but U.S. efforts to stem the group's recruitment have not been as successful.

Legalność amerykańskich ataków lotniczych na ISIS w Iraku i Syrii jako reakcja na zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego

The aim of the articleis to present the threatcaused by a terroristorganization– IslamicState of Iraq and Syria to internationalsecurity and to Americaninterests and nationals in particular as well as American airstrikes as a specialkind of reaction to thisasymmetricaldanger. The keyissueis the legalityof US actions on the territory of Iraq and Syria. Iraq’scaseis not as controversialas Syria’sbecauseIraqconsented to American airstrikes and isclearlycooperatingon the ground. The moreproblematicis, however, the case of Syria. IsthisStatewilling and able to cooperate and react to the ISIS threat? Can the USAignoreanoffer of cooperationwhen one ismade? Whatifthereis no consenton the part of the Syriangovernment? The authorattempts to answerallthesequestionsusinginternationallegalrules on the right to self-defence, includingpreventive and collectiveself-defence as well as American test of a State (hereSyria) being “unwillingorunable” to react as a precondition to useforceevenwithout the consent of such a State.

Legalność amerykańskich ataków lotniczych na ISIS w Iraku i Syrii jako reakcja na zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego

The aim of the articleis to present the threatcaused by a terroristorganization– IslamicState of Iraq and Syria to internationalsecurity and to Americaninterests and nationals in particular as well as American airstrikes as a specialkind of reaction to thisasymmetricaldanger. The keyissueis the legalityof US actions on the territory of Iraq and Syria. Iraq’scaseis not as controversialas Syria’sbecauseIraqconsented to American airstrikes and isclearlycooperatingon the ground. The moreproblematicis, however, the case of Syria. IsthisStatewilling and able to cooperate and react to the ISIS threat? Can the USAignoreanoffer of cooperationwhen one ismade? Whatifthereis no consenton the part of the Syriangovernment? The authorattempts to answerallthesequestionsusinginternationallegalrules on the right to self-defence, includingpreventive and collectiveself-defence as well as American test of a State (hereSyria) being “unwillingorunable” to react as a precondition to useforceevenwithout the consent of such a State.

Hydrochemistry of Tigris River Water from its Iraqi‘s Territory Entry to Baghdad city

The present work deals with hydrochemistry of the major elements in Tigris River water, along the area stretching from the beginning of the river entry into Iraqi territory in the north, and to Baghdad city in the south. The results revealed an increase in the concentrations of the major elements in general, during the trajectory of the river to the south, as well as a relative increase in the concentrations of the elements during the winter, compared with their concentrations during the summer. The result also clarified that the composition of the river basin rocks plays the main control of the major elements hydrochemistry. The results indicated that the controlling rocks type of the Tigris main reservoirs are rang between carbonate and silicate compositions.