Investment In Myanmar Research Articles

Analysis of the Influencing Factors of Neighboring Countries’ Direct Investment in Myanmar

Analysis of the Influencing Factors of Neighboring Countries’ Direct Investment in Myanmar

The Nexus Between Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Investment in Myanmar: A Panel ARDL Approach

Foreign direct investment is the main driver of the growth. The development of Myanmar mainly depends on FDI and domestic investment. The objective of this article is to analyze the relationship between FDI and domestic investment in Myanmar from 1990 to 2020. The mean group estimator ARDL model was applied in this empirical study to evidence the relationship between them. This study employed newly collected sector-specific FDI inflows and domestic investment data for detailed examination. In line with the target of this article, the question arises whether FDI crowds in or crowds out DI in Myanmar. According to the outcomes, FDI and DI have a positive and insignificant relationship in the short-run results. However, they are positive and statistically significant in the long-run. There are unique causalities between FDI and DI; between EMP and DI and between EXCH and DI. Hence, FDI does Granger-cause DI. Thus, FDI crowds in DI in the short- and long-hauls in Myanmar. Therefore, the Government should actively do investment promotion for the investors to attract more FDI inflows into the country by facilitating business to sustain the country’s development and encourage the local businesspeople by educating how to use modern technology to shift from labor- to capital-intensive industries for increasing production and efficiency in Myanmar. Implications of the finding are explained with theoretical contributions, recommendations and research limitation are discussed.

Local partners and social engagement strategies: Explaining public responses to Chinese investment in Myanmar

In developing countries hosting Chinese-financed infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), some projects gain public support while others encounter opposition. This article seeks to provide an explanation for these different reactions, testing in particular the extent to which the differences stem from the nature of the investment coalitions, including the local partners that Chinese companies choose to work with, and the social engagement strategies that are adopted. Based on 2 survey experiments conducted among the general public and elite college students in Myanmar, the article concludes that Chinese firms, regardless of whether they are state-owned or privately owned, gain the most support when they partner with independent companies with no links to the Burmese military and when they engage directly with the local community. In addition, public reaction is colored by political affiliation, as supporters of the National League for Democracy and groups with access to non-state media were the most critical of projects involving military-linked companies. Overall, this article debunks the myth that Chinese-financed projects can be treated in a monolithic way and has significant implications for BRI. As the BRI aims to promote high-quality development in host states, projects need to be built through inclusive investment coalitions and companies should be encouraged to engage directly with local communities.

China, India and Myanmar Triangular Relationship: In the Context of Rohingya Issues

Myanmar’s geo-political and geo-economic position is very important to China and India. India and China are the two regional powers of Southeast Asia, although it shares border with the two coutries. Basically, Myanmar is the center of connectivity to South Asia and Southeast Asia with the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. The new economic super power of the world. China’s ambitious project BRI connects Myanmar with two corridors. Especially in the case of importing fuel oil and exporting products to the global market, Chinese ships have to go around the Malacca Strait, which is time consuming and costly and strategically risky. But using Kukpyu Port in Rakhine State will reduce China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait and expand trade. That is why the bilateral relationship between the world’s second largest economy China (GDP $14.140 Trillion, 2019) and the 73rd economy Myanmar (GDP $ 69.994, 2019) is very important (Ahamed, Rahman & Nur, 2020) . China has been playing an important role in Myanmar’s economic development through bilateral trade relations since 1988. From 1988 to 2018, 26% of all foreign investment in Myanmar came from China and as of June 2020, Chinese investment in Myanmar was US $21350.668 Million (DICA, 2020). India shares a 1643 km land border with Myanmar with 4 northeastern states of Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur. Myanmar is the gateway to the implementation of ‘Act East Policy’ and ‘Neighborhood First Policy’ announced by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 (Ahamed, Rahman & Nur, 2020). In addition, the world’s two most important sea routes, The strait of Malacca and The strait of Hurmuz, are connected to the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean through the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar has a 725 km coastal boundary with the Bay of Bengal. Because of this, Myanmar is geo-politically and geo-strategically India., important to the Western world including China. Due to US presence in Indian Ocean, recent Sino-Indian conflict and Myanmar’s strategic location, Sino-Myanmar relations have become one of the research topics at present. This article will analyze the multifaceted aspects of China-Myanmar relations.

Land Laws and Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar: Why American Investors Need to Reconsider the Customary Rights of Smallholder Farmers

This article looks into the issue of the government’s usage of land laws to release land from the smallholder farmers in Myanmar, which is considered not just a matter of striking a delicate balance between an individual’s customary rights of land tenure versus the need for more efficient land redistribution to sustain the country's economic development, but also about how social stability of the rural villages in Myanmar are uprooted when the agricultural livelihood and homes of those smallholder farmers are taken away by the government’s new land policies, and how cultivation flexibility and labor employment of small-scale agriculture have been sacrificed for the introduction of large-scale farming. Given the ample investment opportunities available at both ends of the supply chain in Myanmar, American investors have to be aware of the need to sustain their corporate social responsibilities by avoiding unnecessary suffering being done to smallholder farmers in Myanmar when their lands have been confiscated to accommodate the spatial needs of foreign direct investment (FDI). This article provides recommendations to help American investors maintain their ethical stance and reputation when operating their cross-border businesses in Myanmar.

A Study on the Determinants of Conversion Investment in Myanmar : Focusing on Companies entering Vietnam

본 연구는 글로벌가치사슬(GVCs)이 역동적으로 변화하는 상황에서 베트남에 최초투자(first investment)한 중소기업 91개를 대상으로 미얀마 전환투자(conversion investment) 결정요인을 분석하였다. 베트남 진출 기업들 다수가 미얀마 전환투자 의사가 있었고, 해당 기업들의 특성을 보면 시장지향성과 네트워크지향성이 확인되었고, 의사결정 과정을 보면 최초투자를 통해 비재무적 투자성과(non-financial investment performance)를 확인하고 이를 바탕으로 신흥 생산기지로 떠오른 미얀마에 전환투자를 하는 경향이 나타났다. 반면, 가치사슬 정보력(value chain informedness)과 같은 기업의 통상정보역량은 기업의 시장지향성, 네트워크 지향성과 유의미한 관련성을 확인할 수 있었지만 가치사슬 정보력 향상이 전환투자 의사에 직접적인 영향을 주는 것은 확인되지 않았다. 이처럼 후속투자 유형 중 전환투자와 같은 특별한 경우는 기업 정보역량보다는 최초투자를 통한 투자성과에 대한 확신과 시장에 대한 이해, 네트워크 역량이 핵심적인 영향요소임을 알 수 있다. 또한, 우리 기업들이 비교적 안정적이고 성과에 기반한 보수적인 후속투자를 결정하는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 연구결과를 바탕으로 미․중무역분쟁속에서 글로벌공급사슬 다변화를 추진하는 우리 중소기업의 해외투자 활성화를 위해서는 최초투자 성공을 통해 투자성과를 확인하고 시장대응역량을 높이고 투자대상국의 네트워크를 지원하는 점진적인 전환투자 지원이 필요함을 알 수 있다.This study analyzed the determinants of sequential investment targeting 91 companies operating in Vietnam. In particular, it was analyzed targeting companies that have conversion investment in Myanmar among companies operating in Vietnam. Among these companies, it was found that non-financial investment performance was strengthened in those with market-oriented and network-oriented. In addition, it was found to have a positive effect on Myanmar conversion investment through non-financial investment performance. On the other hand, it was found that even a company that can respond to uncertainty by acquiring value chain informedness through first investment cannot make a decision to conversion investment in Myanmar. As such, the type of conversion investment among sequential investments showed a stable investment trend based on the performance of the first investment, understanding of the market, and network capabilities rather than internal information capabilities of the company. Currently, the global supply chain is being diversified, and at this time, successful experience through first investment is necessary to revitalize SMEs overseas direct investment. In addition, policy support is needed to improve market response capabilities and strengthen networks to confirm the performance of the first investment and then induce sequential investment.

Development Versus Justice: International Criminal Law and Investment in Myanmar

Though many international and domestic actors have documented violations of human rights in Myanmar and pressured for ‘justice’, others have preferred a narrative of the violence that invites a development-oriented approach. This chapter draws on the ‘peace versus justice’ debate to consider the narrower tension between development and international criminal justice. Both concepts have been associated with fulfilling human rights and the provision of aid, including to support institutional reforms. While there are exceptions, the development and international criminal law paradigms have typically been portrayed as normatively aligned. This chapter analyses public statements concerning the violence in Myanmar and assesses their contribution to debates about the relationship between development and international criminal law. It identifies a ‘development and/versus international criminal justice’ conversation in relation to prosecuting international crimes alleged to have been perpetrated in Myanmar. Finally, it raises questions about the possible dangers and opportunities of emphasising development in opposition to international criminal justice for the future.

Economic Effects of Inward Foreign Direct Investment in Myanmar

This paper aims to examine the effects of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth and domestic investment at the regional-level and sectoral-levels of Myanmar economy, by applying a panel vector-autoregressive model framework. The major research questions are twofold: whether inward FDI causes economic growth or economic growth attracts inward FDI, and whether inward FDI crowds in or crowds out domestic investment. The main findings are summarized as follows. In the regional level analysis, there is a difference in the FDI-economic growth relationship between the FDI-intensive region and the FDI-less-intensive one. In the FDI-intensive region, the bidirectional FDI-economic growth relationship is found, supporting the both hypotheses of FDI-driven growth and growth-driven FDI, while the FDI-driven growth effect is larger than the growth-driven FDI one. In the FDI-less-intensive region, on the other hand, FDI deteriorates economic growth whereas economic growth still induces FDI. The difference in the FDI-economic growth relationship between the regions might come from the gap in agglomeration effects. In the sectoral level analysis, the crowd-in effect of FDI on domestic investment is found in the non-oil and gas sectors, since the FDI in the oil and gas sector has less linkages to domestic investment.

The Specificity of Myanmar’s Relations with China in the Beginning of the XXI Century (2001-2010)

The article gives a critical insight into Myanmar’s relations with China between 2000 and 2010. Starting from an analysis of the political vector of these relations, the article explores the specificity of economic coopera-tion, including China’s investment in Myanmar’s infrastructure projects to finally turn to the grass-root perception of China’s policy in Myanmar. In the author’s opinion, China’s influence in Myanmar should not be overestimated owing to a gap between official declarations of the Tatmadaw regime and the grassroot-level Sinophobia premised upon perceptions that Chinese business practices were inefficient, corrupted, and were implemented without due regard to the interests of local citizens.

International Investment Arbitration in Myanmar: Bounded Rationality, But Not as We Know It

Abstract In 2011, following almost fifty years of one-party military rule, Myanmar began a process of transition toward democracy. Alongside this process, the Government of Myanmar is pursuing a variety of reforms in the hope of attracting new foreign investment. This article examines elements of the national and international legal environment governing foreign investment in Myanmar. The focus is on Myanmar’s current approach to investment treaties and Myanmar’s experience of investor-state arbitration under such treaties to date, although the article also reviews Myanmar’s national laws that are relevant to international investment arbitration, notably its laws on foreign investment and on arbitration. The article highlights Myanmar’s position to date as a ‘rule-taker’ in the investment treaty regime. It draws attention to important differences between Myanmar’s experience with investment treaties and the experiences of other developing countries, as well as possible points of similarity.

Myanmar as an Investment Destination: A Regional Evaluation

Once considered a pariah state because of its military regime, Myanmar has been taking giant strides towards becoming one of the most promising countries for investing in business ventures. At a time when the global economic scenario is reeling from Britain’s exit from the European Union, foreign investment in Myanmar continues to attain unprecedented growth. Lifting of international sanctions, a promising economic outlook with a GDP growth rate averaging close to 8% and a sizeable labor force have attracted overseas investment in diverse sectors like energy, manufacturing, power generation, and construction. The country still faces formidable challenges in developing basic infrastructure, ensuring fiscal stability and curbing sectarian conflict. For the nascent democratic government, formulating and implementing effective policies are uphill tasks in a system fraught with bureaucratic inefficiencies, systemic corruption, and interference from the still-powerful military. Myanmar has ample opportunities to overcome internal roadblocks by utilizing its huge market with a predominantly young population, its expansive pool of low-cost labor and the heightened influx of international commercial ventures after the political transition of the mid-2010s. Investments in Myanmar’s promising telecommunications sector, in ready-made garment manufacturing and in the tourism industry are projected to give substantial dividends over the next few decades.Journal of Business and Technology (Dhaka) Vol.11(1-2) 2016; 11-39

Australia's Trade and Investment in Myanmar and Corporate Social Responsibility

How much corporate social responsibility should Australian companies practise if and when they enter Myanmar? Should there be additional obligations placed on Australian firms over and above expecting their compliance with any (voluntary) international codes of conduct under the United Nations or the OECD? Should Australian firms operating in Myanmar be expected to conform with reporting requirements by the Australian Government, as US firms are expected to do for the State Department? Should Australian firms be encouraged to go through an “education” process about responsible business in Myanmar, as British firms are to by the Foreign Office? Are there other ways of getting better business behaviour in a “regulation free zone” like Myanmar, or will market-driven international companies be able exploit loopholes in Myanmar laws?

Authors’ Response: The Continuing Evolution of China’s Resource Quest

We wrote By All Means Necessary: How China's Resource Quest Is Changing World to illuminate one of most discussed but least understood dimensions of China's rise, and we are grateful for four kind and thoughtful review essays. Indeed, months since book was published have only made importance of subject clearer. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has begun drilling for oil near Paracel Islands, sparking heated confrontation with Vietnam that United States and regional powers are struggling to respond to.1 The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has signed 30-year gas supply deal with Russian company Gazprom, reflecting mix of confidence on China's part in its ability to manage imports, desire to increase use of natural gas, and, critically, continuing motivation to diversify its sources of supply.2 Meanwhile, countries around world are shifting their policies partly in response to Chinese investment. Chinese investment in Myanmar, for example, continues to fall precipitously-in just three short years, China is estimated to have moved from first to tenth place in overall FDI in Myanmar-reinforcing importance of host-country politics in shaping opportunities for Chinese business.3 As analysts and policymakers struggle to understand and respond to these and other developments, we are heartened that reviewers see By All Means Necessary as valuable guide.Nonetheless, they have some concerns. Llewelyn Hughes writes that we do not convey sense of how effective [state control over Chinese firms] is and what implications are for China's external behavior. Elizabeth Wishnick similarly comments that the focus of By All Means Necessary is primarily on China's commercial relationships, and it would have been interesting for book to explore foreign policy implications of these relationships further. These issues are central thread running through chapters four through six, though many of our findings are dispersed. We summarize some of those findings here.By All Means Necessary does not provide single strong bottom line, but that is because there is none-the answers to these questions, as Wojtek Wolfe observes in his essay, vary with circumstances. We show, for example, that state control is weaker over private firms than over state-owned ones; that state influence varies depending on market structure; that government is only inconsistently able to direct even state-owned firms toward its political ends; and that these limitations are not unique to Chinese firms operating abroad, but rather reflect relationships between state and firms that play out at home too. To extent that Chinese government can harness individual firms toward its political ends, this is primarily by influencing them through general conditions, such as availability of financing for overseas projects or leadership incentives related to party promotion, rather than through specific directives. The most immediate consequence for Chinese external behavior is simple: China cannot use its firms to fulfill its foreign policy goals nearly as effectively as many assume. Indeed, as we show in By All Means Necessary, Chinese experience fits with what Hughes describes as more general one, with poor governance outcomes at home and often result. For example, we document China's repeated but failed efforts to raise standards of its extractives firms operating abroad, and note that firms operating abroad but outside Chinese state control can create foreign policy headaches for Beijing.Hughes also writes that a second important issue given insufficient attention relates to Chinese firms' entry into markets unrelated to fossil fuel-based In particular, he is concerned with our neglect of Chinese firms' activities in green technologies, which he claims are related to growing [Chinese] demand for natural resources. …

China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and its Implications

With China's increasing investment in Myanmar, a prosperous economic corridor is expected to be formed along China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines. This economic corridor project is part of Beijing's broader strategy of diversifying its sources of imported energy, as well increasing its economic integration with Myanmar. Although China has long-term strategic energy investment plans in this country, it does not necessarily mean that China has free rein over the outcomes.

Foreign Investment in Myanmar: A Resource Boom but a Development Bust?

Contemporary Southeast Asia (CSEA) is one of the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute"s flagship publications. Now in its fourth decade of publication, CSEA has succeeded in building up an international reputation as one of Southeast Asia"s premier academic journals. The aim of the peer reviewed journal is to provide subscribers with up to date and in-depth analysis of critical trends and developments in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. The primary focus of the journal is on issues related to domestic politics in Southeast Asian countries, regional architecture and community building, military, strategic and security affairs, conflict zones and relations among the Great Powers. CSEA publishes authoritative, insightful and original contributions from scholars, think-tank analysts, journalists and policy-makers from across the globe. The Editorial Committee is guided by the advice of the International Advisory Committee which is composed of eminent scholars from Asia, the United States, Australia and Europe.

At the Cross-Roads of US and Canadian Trade Controls: The Cuba Conflict

Canada and the United States are each other’s best trading partners. Our supply chains are deeply integrated. Corporate ownership criss-crosses the border many times over. In the context of foreign policy, although we have differed from time to time in the past, we generally target the same list of ‘bad actors’ – Iran, North Korea, Myanmar among them. Indeed, many of our sanctions programmes have been adopted pursuant to the same United Nations Security Council resolutions that are applied in similar fashion by UN member countries. Our controls on the export of goods and transfer of technology arise from our common commitments under the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms, Dual-use Goods, Technology and other international agreements. It should come as no surprise therefore that in this environment many companies impose a single set of rules or principles regarding export controls and doing business with sanctioned countries. Under the assumption that Canadian and US laws are similar and, that any differences arise from more restrictive elements of US policy, a common default approach is for US companies to graft their US-based export control, economic sanctions policies, and procedures on to their Canadian operations; even some Canadian-based companies doing business in the United States will follow this approach. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Contrary to popular belief, Canadian export controls and economic sanctions can be more restrictive than those of the United States – aspects of the control regime for cryptographic goods and technology and the rules governing trade with and investment in Myanmar are two such examples. More importantly, there are instances in which there is direct conflict between Canadian and US law – that is, compliance with the requirements of one nation’s laws results in contravention of the laws of the other. Two examples of such conflict arise with US military controls under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Canadian human rights legislation and with Cuban trade and investment. The latter conflict is the focus of this article.

Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988

One of the most important features of the Sino-Myanmar relationship since 1988 has been the growing bilateral economic relations in the areas of trade, aid or development assistance, and investment. Since 1988, China has become one of the most important sources of trade and development assistance for Myanmar, and China is using the trade and aid as a diplomatic instrument to pursue its strategic interests in Myanmar. Chinese investment in Myanmar, though small in volume and value, is heavily concentrated in a few strategic sectors, such as oil and gas. This paper examines Sino-Myanmar relations in terms of trade, investment and aid and provides detailed figures for these relations since 1998. It concludes that the growing geopolitical significance of Myanmar in Asia will further ensure China's economic engagement with Myanmar.

Doing Business with Rights Violating Regimes Corporate Social Responsibility and Myanmar’s Military Junta

Whether to do business with rights violating regimes is one of many dilemmas faced by socially responsible corporations. In this article the difficult case of Myanmar is considered. Ruled for decades by a closed and sometimes brutal military elite, the country has long been subject to informal and formal sanctions. However, as sanctions have failed to trigger political reform, it is necessary to review the policy options. The focus here is on the contribution socially responsible corporations might make to change. The article sketches contextual features of the case, examines the recent history and present pattern of business links with Myanmar, and assesses whether current approaches can stimulate reform. Concluding that they cannot, it considers fresh possibilities for corporate engagement. The argument is that socially responsible corporations, committed to improving individual life chances through engagement with developing societies, should undertake collaborative and principled direct investment in Myanmar. The underlying strategy and problems of codification and implementation are all analyzed. To close, the article contends that, by doing business with Myanmar’s rights violating regime, multinational corporations can extend the frontiers of global corporate social responsibility.