ABSTRACT Internalists and externalists about moral motivation debate whether moral opinions can come without motivation to act. But it has also been suggested that no such theory is uniquely correct: Moral Motivation Pluralism is the view that different people have different concepts of moral opinions, such that an internalist theory can be correct in relation to some such concept, while externalism can be correct in relation to other people’s concept. This view has been suggested as an explanation of the intuitive deadlock in the moral motivation debate, but it has been objected that it implausibly implies that internalists and externalists do not really disagree. In this paper, we reply to this objection through rejecting the implication: we argue that there is a clear way in which internalists and externalists disagree even given moral motivation pluralism. There is also a more general conclusion: Pluralist or variantist views are sometimes suggested in other areas of philosophy too – stating roughly that certain philosophical debates can be dissolved since the disputes are due to mere conceptual differences. If our proposal is correct, such views do not have the implausible implication that the parties to the relevant debates do not disagree.
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