This paper examines ASEAN's role in the ongoing transition of regional order amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. It argues that both major powers are seeking to court ASEAN as part of their broader contest for leadership in the Indo-Pacific, recognizing that regional followership is essential to sustaining their strategic influence. Drawing on the three-pillar framework of international order, the paper contends that ASEAN's limited military capacity constrains its influence in the power-based pillar. However, ASEAN can still exert meaningful agency through institutional balancing, particularly within the institutional and normative pillars of the regional order. Specifically, ASEAN needs to pursue a strategy of selective engagement, i.e., promoting inclusive institutions, avoiding exclusive ones, and acting as a bridge-builder between competing powers, even as this task becomes increasingly challenging. The paper concludes that ASEAN's greatest test lies in maintaining its internal cohesion and unity. While the United States and China will remain the primary architects of the regional order transition, ASEAN's role as a stabilizing and mediating force should neither be overlooked nor underestimated.

Many African countries are facing severe debt distress amid growing competition between the Western-dominated economic order and an emerging Chinese-led order shaped by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China’s development banks. The weakening authority of traditional multilateral institutions particularly the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization has complicated debt resolution efforts, especially as China has become a major creditor whose cooperation is increasingly essential. Drawing on existing international datasets, this study examines how these competing economic orders address the debt challenges of highly indebted African states. It finds that BRI-related lending has contributed to unsustainable debt levels in several countries, with four African states unable to meet their repayment obligations, a significant share of which is owed to Chinese lenders. Zambia is examined as a case study, illustrating how limited coordination between China and Bretton Woods institutions prolonged the debt restructuring process. The analysis highlights how tensions between rival international financial frameworks hinder effective debt resolution. The study further considers the potential emergence of alternative or hybrid governance arrangements involving actors such as BRICS, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the European Union (EU), aimed at reinforcing a rule-based international economic order. Such arrangements could improve debt management, support debt-stressed countries, and promote stable trade and capital flows. This research contributes to the literature by linking the interaction between Western and Chinese economic orders to contemporary African debt crises.

In recent years, the continuous application and expansion of unmanned intelligent technology in military maritime equipment have spurred the rapid development of military unmanned maritime vehicles, represented by Unmanned Surface Vehicles and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles. Their accelerating deployment across various maritime domains is profoundly reshaping patterns of maritime military competition and the maritime security order, making them an urgent topic for discussion concerning international maritime peace and development. Furthermore, with their unique advantages such as low cost, potential for mass deployment, high concealment, long endurance, and the avoidance of personnel casualties, unmanned maritime vehicles are redefining maritime situational awareness capabilities for nations, especially small and medium-sized states, to an unprecedented degree. Their large-scale application not only poses severe challenges to traditional maritime rules based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but also creates uncertainty for the maintenance of the existing maritime security order. Military unmanned maritime vehicles will drive nations toward a re-balance of power. This paper aims to analyze the historical progression and practical application of military unmanned maritime vehicles. It will systematically discuss how they can constructively perform this re-balance function across dimensions such as peacetime, crises, and wartime, and re-examine their potential contributions to the international maritime security order.

Abstract The European Union (EU) faces a unique opportunity to lead a new rules‐based international order in an era of American retreat and heightened global uncertainty. Yet its path to leadership is rife with obstacles. In this article, we draw on international relations literatures on international political economy and comparative politics literatures on state formation to assess the EU's potential as a hegemonic leader. We argue that the EU could spearhead a coalition of like‐minded countries in the post‐American hegemony era, responding to a strong international demand for an open and rules‐based global economy. But whilst the EU possesses considerable strengths, it currently lacks a centralised fiscal capacity and remains militarily underprepared. Nevertheless, we contend that external threats – particularly a second Trump administration and Russian expansionism – have the potential to act as catalysts for deeper European integration, leading to the creation of autonomous military capabilities, a more robust fiscal union and an enhanced international role for the euro. Should this potential be realised, the EU could act as a leader of the new global order.

The article analyze the evolution of the relationship between state and individual in contemporary public international law, highlighting the transition from the paradigm of absolute sovereignty to a conception centered on responsibility and the protection of human rights. The study capitalize son the theoretical contributions of the Moldovan and international doctrine in order to demonstrate how the individual haspassed from the position of object of state protection to that of subject in affirmation of the international legal order. At the same time, it is argued that the sovereignty of the stateis not diminished, but reinterpreted by the obligation to respect and guarantee fundamental rights

ABSTRACT How has China responded to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and what does this reveal about its role in the international order? Moving beyond the ‘pro-Russia’ binary, this article examines China’s behavior across five domains: strategic surprise, refusal of lethal aid, economic support, nuclear opposition, and ceasefire-first diplomacy. Analysis shows China’s interest in the global balance of power supersedes its commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity. The conflict serves as a stress test for Chinese statecraft, forcing a balance between preserving Russia as a counter-hegemonic partner and maintaining relations with Europe. Ultimately, China’s vision of order-making is instrumental: it prioritizes systemic power shifts over consistent international principles, except when defending its own claims regarding Taiwan.

ABSTRACT This article reexamines the historical origins of global think tanks and their role in shaping global governance within the broader context of state-capital relations. While the post-Cold War era popularized the term ‘global governance’, the study traces its conceptual and institutional foundations back to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Drawing on archival materials on President Wilson’s Inquiry group and its links to elite financial circles, it shows how institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Chatham House emerged as part of an early search for international order. The analysis contributes a historical perspective to debates on the political economy of knowledge and the growing influence of non-state actors in global politics. It argues that global think tanks were not late products of globalization but early instruments through which capital, expertise, and state power interacted, offering a new lens on the evolution of global governance.

This article develops the Adaptive Sovereignty framework explaining how Westphalian sovereignty transforms in cyberspace. Introduction: The Peace of Westphalia (1648) established international order through territorial integrity, sovereign equality, non-intervention, and jurisdictional authority, yet cyberspace challenges these foundational principles through borderlessness, deterritorialisation, and attribution complexity. Objective: This study examines how cyberspace challenges and transforms Westphalian sovereignty, and what theoretical framework best explains observed adaptation patterns. Method: The study employs structured comparative case analysis of four illustrative cyber incidents (Estonia DDoS 2007, Stuxnet 2010, NotPetya 2017, and SolarWinds 2020) using process tracing and pattern analysis to identify conditional mechanisms determining state responses. Results: Rather than dissolution or persistence unchanged, sovereignty demonstrates institutional resilience through adaptive transformation: territorial control shifts to functional control; jurisdiction expands via effects-based principles; diplomatic practice evolves multilaterally through coordinated attribution mechanisms. Attribution confidence, disaggregated victim state power across four dimensions (economic, cyber-technical, diplomatic, normative), and geopolitical alignment jointly determine whether sovereignty violations generate targeted responses, norm entrepreneurship, or strategic silence. Conclusions: Integrating realist, liberal, constructivist, and postcolonial perspectives, this framework establishes how cyberspace creates neo-Westphalian order where traditional principles persist whilst operational modalities transform radically, extending historical institutionalism's layering and conversion mechanisms to sovereignty institutions.

ABSTRACT The article analyses the foreign and international policy orientations of Italy’s main political parties in the post-Cold War international order. It pays special attention to the two most significant political forces of the time: the Christian Democrats (D.C.), the largest party in Italy and a pivotal actor in all governments for over forty years; and the Italian Communist Party (P.C.I.), the main opposition force, which dissolved in early 1991 and was succeeded by the Democratic Party of the Left (P.D.S.). The article draws on a wide range of sources, including documents from the D.C. and the P.C.I.-P.D.S., the party press, the electoral programmes of the P.C.I.-P.D.S. and the D.C., and American and British archive documents.

Transforming global critical minerals governance: is a green new international economic order possible?

Abstract Iran is one of the most stigmatised countries of the twenty-first century: having been sanctioned by the US since 1979, the Islamic Republic was declared part of the ‘axis of evil’ by President George W. Bush in 2002, and from 2006 onwards, it has been subject to multilateral, comprehensive and wide-reaching economic sanctions. In June 2025, this discursive and economic attack on Iran transitioned to direct military bombardment. For the United States and its allies, Iran is a pariah state. This stigmatisation of Iran is an example of the kinds of practices that contribute to the social construction of the international order, whereby some countries are designated as ‘inside’ and others as ‘outside’ the community of established states. Needless to say, Iran has been placed firmly in the ‘outside’ category ever since 1979. At the same time as accepting and even at times embracing this ‘outsider’ status, however, Iran has also sought to raise its own international standing and to be accepted as an ‘insider’.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted multiple resolutions condemning the aggression and calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces. While some Global South countries supported these measures, many refrained from taking a critical stance toward Moscow, despite clear violations of international law. What accounts for this divided response? Departing from existing explanations that focus on contemporary geopolitical or economic interests, this paper traces Global South countries’ positions to the Soviet Union’s extensive Cold War–era interventions in the developing world. We argue that states that received greater volumes of Soviet aid are significantly more likely to align with Russia today, driven by both material dependencies and ideational legacies. Empirically, we demonstrate that the observed association withstands extensive robustness tests and is substantiated by evidence for both material and ideational mechanisms. These findings underscore the importance of a historical-institutional approach to understanding international alignment in the Global South and call for moving beyond the Liberal International Order framework when analyzing global responses to contemporary conflicts.

Abstract This article offers a role theoretical perspective on transitional orders, the liminal space between one order and the next. Role theory understands international order as an evolving role system, in which states seek and reject roles for themselves and others. We argue that established international orders can be destabilized by widespread role change dynamics, giving rise to transitional orders that are marked by deep uncertainty about available and appropriate roles in the role system. We identify the spread of order-related domestic role contestation and the weakening of international role socialization as the main mechanisms driving towards transitional orders. These two interlinked processes—domestic contestation and international socialization—are also entwined with particular role dynamics within transitional orders. Specifically, we propose that the uncertainty of order transitions results in three types of role dynamics: Transitional orders confront role holders with dilemmas that require them to interrogate existing role relationships; put order-related questions at the center of role-seeking behaviors; and elevate existential sovereignty concerns, both domestically and internationally. In these ways, role dynamics shape the major features of transitional orders, including their intentionality, fluidity and temporality.

The framework of liberal peace – once the hallmark of a Western-led international order – is now in deep crisis. Its decline coincides with the rise of non-Western actors proposing alternative models of conflict management and resolution. This article challenges the assumption that Western states always pursue conflict resolution objectives, while non-Western states focus on conflict management tasks through illiberal approaches. Drawing on role theory, we reinterpret how states conceptualise and perform their responsibilities in the conflict management and resolution arena. We treat the Western/non-Western and liberal/illiberal divides as role conceptions, while the rhetoric preferences towards conflict management/conflict resolution are understood as role enactments. Using Latent Semantic Scaling, we analyse over 14,000 United Nations Security Council speeches (1992–2023). While the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia conform to their expected roles, China and France deviate from them. Our results suggest that conflict management and resolution strategies align more closely with conflict-specific and temporal factors than a rigid P3–P2 divide.

Abstract The liberal international order (LIO) is transitioning, marked by rising non-Western powers and norm contestation. However, current research often overlooks how varying reactions to norm contestation shape this process. This raises two questions: Why do states differ in their responses to norm challenges, and what implications do these patterns hold for the LIO? This study addresses this gap by advancing a theoretical framework that positions reactions to norm contestations as key indicators of order transition, arguing that patterns of alignment and divergence reveal fluctuating norm strength and signal an order’s transitionality. Employing fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), the study analyzes 28 non-Western middle powers’ responses to Russia’s actions in Ukraine (2022) and Crimea (2014) and China’s human rights practices in Xinjiang and Tibet. The analysis identifies four pathways to norm alignment or acquiescence, highlighting the combined influence of external dependency on China or Russia, regime type, membership in non-Western organizations, and post-colonial experience. Findings reveal a disparity between responses to sovereignty challenges, which are increasingly condemned, and human rights controversies, where tolerance or even support for alternative interpretations is growing, suggesting a fragmentation of the human rights (sub)order. This research contributes a novel theoretical framework for analyzing the LIO’s transition, demonstrating how oscillating norm strength, reflected in reactions to norm contestations, provides crucial insights into the processual nature of order change and the potential emergence of alternative normative structures.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine challenges the liberal international order and tests the capacity of Western democracies to maintain long-term military and financial aid for Ukraine in a foreign war. Understanding whether governments’ pledges of resolve are backed by their citizens is crucial for the credibility of these commitments. Here we show, based on survey experiments with 10,011 respondents in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy, that these countries’ publics share a similar pattern of preferences. In all countries, citizens strongly endorse Ukraine’s sovereignty and self-determination while weighing human suffering and conflict escalation risk, but less so economic costs. However, within countries, attitudes are polarized: roughly one quarter of citizens with pro-Western orientations show firm resolve, whereas another quarter with anti-Western views remain largely indifferent to political outcomes for Ukraine. These divisions indicate that democratic party competition could constrain the unity and durability of Western resolve against autocratic aggression.

The Global Gateway represents a strategic adaptation of the EU’s role enactment amid an increasingly fragmented international order. Confronted with the challenges posed by China’s Belt and Road Initiative and a weakened Liberal International Order, the EU recalibrated its external action to preserve liberal norms and institutions. Drawing on role theory, this article interprets the Global Gateway as a manifestation of role adaptation, enabling the EU to assert itself geopolitically while promoting a development model grounded in liberal principles and values. This initiative underscores the EU’s evolving self-conception as a defender of the Liberal International Order in a competitive global landscape.

The article is devoted to the XVII BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro on July 6-7, 2025, which took place amid increased international tensions and tariff pressure from the United States. The decisive role of the 2024 summit in Kazan is noted, which emphasized the high status of the BRICS and served as a kind of trigger for expanding cooperation and developing partnerships between the member states. In 2025, Indonesia joined the group as a full member, and 10 more states joined as partner countries. As a result of the Brazilian summit, a Declaration was adopted, which reflected the common positions of the countries on a number of important international issues, the main of which were raised by the author. The document highlights the role of emerging economies in promoting a more equitable international order based on international law. The strengthening of ties and strategic partnership, the growth of mutual investments and mutual settlements in national currencies have been noted between the BRICS countries in recent years, as well as the growing role of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement contributing to the development and modernization of the BRICS countries. For the first time, attacks in the Bryansk, Kursk and Voronezh regions of the Russian Federation are openly condemned and the importance of dialogue for resolving international disputes is emphasized. It is noteworthy that for the first time in the Declaration, several paragraphs are devoted to the development of Artificial Intelligence, which provides ample opportunities to strengthen the influence of developing economies in the international arena. The increase in trade duties for a number of BRICS countries by the United States is criticized as contrary to international law. The extraordinary summit of the group, held on September 8 in an online format, was a kind of reaction to such a policy and showed that the countries are ready to prepare a collective response. The article concludes that the tightening of sanctions by the West may turn into deepening mutual cooperation and even greater cohesion of the BRICS countries.

The decentralized international legal order arguably creates structural incentives for states to utilize INTERPOL—an entity of virtually universal membership—to reduce gaps in transnational police cooperation. One of INTERPOL’s iconic actions is the release of a Red Notice. It is the publication of decentralized requests by a member country or approved international entities such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), 1 asking police worldwide to locate and, if applicable domestic law and treaties permit, provisionally arrest wanted persons or restrict their movement, pending extradition or surrender. 2 Although INTERPOL does not have legal authority to oblige members to arrest persons in question, a Red Notice regularly leads to border stops or arrest pending extradition, travel or visa denials, and knock-on effects such as banking and employment difficulties. The fragmented international legal order may have paradoxically generated structural incentives to support a level of centrality represented by INTERPOL.

This article examines the principle of sustainable development in international law and its potential recognition as a general principle of law. The aim of the work is to analyze the legal nature of sustainable development and assess its role in shaping the modern international legal order. The research addresses the objectives such as studying the historical, legal, and conceptual foundations of the principle, analyzing its enshrinement in international treaties and soft law acts, examining judicial practice and doctrinal approaches. Particular attention is paid to the criteria for recognizing general principles of international law and comparing them with the characteristics of sustainable development. Sustainable development is gradually acquiring the characteristics of an integrative principle of international law, capable of uniting environmental, economic, and social norms. Based on the analysis, recommendations are proposed for defining the principle of sustainable development in international treaties, integrating it into national legislation, strengthening the role of judicial practice, and developing a scientific and doctrinal framework.