International Fisheries Agreements Research Articles

Research on the implementation and practice of the CCAMLR System of Inspection

Abstract The CCAMLR System of Inspection has been in place for more than 30 years, but its implementation and impact have yet to be summarised and analysed. The purpose of the research is to clarify the legal basis, analyse the implementation and make suggestions for further improvements. By analysing the CAMLR Convention and historical files, the System of Inspection has been further improved and many details have been added based on some international fisheries agreements and domestic laws regulating fisheries. Article XXIV of the CAMLR Convention, various Conservation Measures and documents form the legal basis of the System of Inspection. The System is divided into two types, namely At-sea inspection and Port inspection. Combined with the annual reports of CCAMLR meetings over the past 30 years, the System has become relatively complete as a “Compliance Monitoring Mechanism” under the CCAMLR Compliance Evaluation Procedure with other monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) tools. However, inspection data have not been stable over the years. Since 2017, the increase in catches has not led to an increase in the number of inspections in the annual reports. In addition, At-sea inspections do not cover all Subareas of the Convention. At present, the objects of inspection have been extended to Non-Member vessels, so that it should also be sanctioned through various mechanisms. In addition, the System of Inspection is different from the Compliance Evaluation Procedure and the relationship between the two needs to be confirmed in practice. Due to the change in inspection methods, the lack of inspection data and the increase in other MCS tools, At-sea inspection does not cover all Subareas of the Convention. The System of Inspection is constantly being practised and improved. The study calls on Members to continue to carry out inspections and to improve the System in order to achieve the conservation and rational use of fishery resources.

Stability of international fisheries agreements under stock growth uncertainty

Scientific evidence reveals that renewable resource stock dynamics are subject to uncertainty due to changes in environmental conditions. Despite its critical impacts on management, little is known about the effects of such uncertainty on the formation of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). In this paper, we design a dynamic stock recruitment framework to examine this issue in a common pool setting. We find that stock growth uncertainty critically affects equilibrium behaviors under both open loop membership and dynamic membership. For instance, we delineate conditions under which uncertainty induces full non-cooperation in equilibrium. Strategic behaviors may also shift equilibrium outcomes from full non-cooperation under deterministic conditions to full cooperation under uncertainty when countries anticipate a small environmental variability. Moreover, strategic interactions to extract the resource stock may lead to higher individual payoffs under uncertainty. We also outline the differences in equilibrium responses of membership, harvest, and payoff to mean preserving spreads under both open loop membership and dynamic membership.

Biodiversity protection in the 21st century needs intact habitat and protection from overexploitation whether inside or outside parks

Biodiversity protection in the 21st century needs intact habitat and protection from overexploitation whether inside or outside parks

International fisheries agreements and non-consumptive values

The management of internationally shared fish stocks is a major economic, environmental and political issue. According to international law, these resources should be managed cooperatively under international fisheries agreements (IFAs). This paper studies the formation and stability of IFAs through a coalition game that accounts for both direct consumptive values (harvesting profits) and non-consumptive values of the fish stock per se. The results show that accounting for non-consumptive values helps conserve the fish stock in that equilibrium fishing efforts are smaller and fish stock larger than without non-consumptive values under all possible coalition scenarios (full, partial and no cooperation). However, considering non-consumptive values does not affect the outcome of the game in terms of the prospects for cooperation: even with substantial non-consumptive benefits, the outcome is full non-cooperation. Hence, the trap of non-cooperation in international fisheries management cannot be overcome simply by explicitly accounting for non-consumptive values within IFAs. It is suggested that strengthening the role of IFAs and limiting the ability of non-member countries to free-ride be further investigated as measures fostering cooperation.

On international fisheries agreements, entry deterrence, and ecological uncertainty

A prerequisite for an international fisheries agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect the benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is true. The agreement, therefore, implicitly builds on an expectation of the ecological condition of the natural resource. Game theoretical models often assume that all parties have the same (often perfect) information about the resource and that the exploitation is an equilibrium use of the stock. As stated by experts in natural science, the fish ecology still has many open questions, for example how to predict population dynamics, migration patterns, food availability, etc. In some cases, parties disagree about the state, abundance, and migration of a stock, which can reduce the possibilities of reaching an agreement for exploitation of the stock. This paper develops a model and applies it to the North-East Atlantic mackerel fishery, in order to analyze an IFA under different ecological scenarios, and also combines the model with the economic theory of entry deterrence. The model is used empirically to determine whether the parties with original access to the resource have an advantage when forming an agreement with a new party in having the ability to fish the stock down to a smaller size and thereby prevent another party from entering into the fishery. With a basis in entry deterrence, combined with lack of information, the paper illustrates the obstacles that have made an agreement for the North-East Atlantic mackerel so difficult to achieve.

International Fisheries Agreements with a Shifting Stock

When a fish stock shifts from one nation to another nation, e.g., due to climate change, the nation that loses the resource has incentives to deplete it, while the other nation, receiving the resource, has incentives to conserve it. We propose an analytical model to study under which circumstances self-enforcing agreements can align incentives. Our setup allows to distinguish between a fast and a slow shift and between a smooth or a sudden shift in ownership. We show that the shorter the expected duration of the transition, the higher the total equilibrium exploitation rate. Similarly, a sudden shift implies—by and large—more aggressive non-cooperative exploitation than a gradual shift. However, a self-enforcing agreement without side-payments is more likely for a sudden than for a smooth shift. Further, the scope for cooperation increases with the expected duration of the transition, and it decreases with the renewability of the resource and the discount rate. Most importantly, we show that concentrating on in-kind transfers can be very detrimental for shifting renewable resources: In some cases, there is no efficient bargaining solution without side-payments, even when there are only two players.

Scope and compatibility of measures in international fisheries agreements

We set up a model that captures the spatial dimension of international fisheries in legal (i.e., internationally accessible high seas versus state-owned exclusive economic zones) and biological (i.e., various intensities of fish migration between zones) terms. We compare the success of regional fishery management organizations (RFMOs) for the first-best and two alternative management scenarios, related to restrictions regarding the scope and compatibility of measures. Whilst the performance of a given RFMO declines in the presence of these alternative management practices, participation might improve as free-riding becomes less attractive and the overall net effect may well be positive.

International Fisheries Agreements and Non-Consumptive Values

International Fisheries Agreements and Non-Consumptive Values

Farsightedness, Changing Stock Location and the Stability of International Fisheries Agreements

Changes in stock location may affect the stability of international fisheries agreements. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the stability of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) in a non-cooperative, coalition formation game based on the classic Gordon–Schaefer model. We employ a new stability concept which modifies Farsighted Stability (Chwe, J Econ Theory 63:299–325, 1994). We call this concept farsighted downwards stability (FDS). We also employ the internal stability (IS) concept for comparison. Analytical results regarding FDS for symmetric players without changing stock location show stable Grand Coalitions for $$n\le 4$$ player games and the possibility for partial cooperation. Sensitivity analysis deals with changing stock location and cost asymmetry. Stability decreases in $$n$$ , increases when costs are asymmetric and increases when FDS is employed. Farsighted conjectures on behalf of RFMO members can thus help to maintain cooperation as stock location changes. However, FDS is more sensitive to changes in stock location than IS.

International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach

This paper surveys the application of game theory to the economic analysis of international fisheries agreements. The relevance of this study comes not only from the existence of a vast literature on the topic but especially from the specific features of these agreements. The emphasis of the survey is on coalition games, an approach that has become prominent in the fisheries economics literature over the last decade. It is shown that coalition games were first applied to international fisheries agreements in the late 1990s addressing cooperative issues under the framework of characteristic function games. Then, progressively, this cooperative approach was combined with non-cooperative elements such as the stability analysis of the agreements. Finally, partition function games, which model coalition formation endogenously, were introduced and became the standard approach to study the formation and stability of international fisheries agreements. A key message that emerges from this literature strand is that self-enforcing cooperative management of internationally shared fish stocks is generally difficult to achieve. Hence, the international legal framework and regulations play a decisive role on ensuring cooperation over the use of these resources.

Book review: International Regimes in China: Domestic Implementation of the International Fisheries Agreements

Book review: International Regimes in China: Domestic Implementation of the International Fisheries Agreements

On International Fisheries Agreements, Entry Deterrence and Ecological Uncertainty

From a game theoretical perspective, a prerequisite for an international fishery agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect their benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is true. The agreement, therefore, implicitly builds on an expectation of the ecological integrity of the natural resource. Typically, the game theoretical models assume that all parties have the same (often perfect) information of the resource and that the exploitation is an equilibrium use of the stock. As stated by experts in natural science, the fish ecology still has many open questions, e.g. how to predict population dynamics, migration patterns, food availability, etc. In some cases, parties disagree about the state, abundance, and migration of a stock, which can significantly disturb the possibilities of reaching an agreement for exploitation of the stock. This paper develops a model and applies it to the North-East Atlantic mackerel fishery, in order to analyze IFA under different ecological scenarios, and also combines the model with the economic theory of entry deterrence. The model is empirically used to determine whether the original parties to the agreement have an advantage in that the results from fishing the stock down to a smaller size prevents another party from entering into the fishery. The paper presents a novel method for illustrating the obstacles that have made an agreement for the North-East Atlantic mackerel so difficult to achieve.

Allocation and sharing in international fisheries agreements

Abstract This paper provides an introduction to the allocation and sharing of benefits in international fisheries agreements. The reader is introduced to the concept of sharing the benefits from cooperative fisheries agreements and to several different sharing imputations. The paper summarises the lessons learned from the literature. In the literature review, several policy-relevant issues emerging from game theory and fisheries literature on the topic are identified.

An Intra-National Perspective on Regime Implementation: The Case of Marine Fisheries in China – Keen Conficts and Hazy Contents

The international legal framework developed by the United Nations for the management and sustainable use of fisheries resources has not prevented the severe depletion of world fish stocks. In order to be effective, international agreements have to be voluntarily implemented by national governments. This process of domestic implementation has been little investigated by regime theory, despite the rich array of frameworks developed by policy studies. Therefore, this article seeks to contribute to regime theory through the use of insights coming from implementation research. In order to do so, the domestic implementation of international fisheries agreements in the People’s Republic of China is investigated. Responsible fisheries are not yet a common practice in China, although the country has adapted its legal framework to international requirements. The execution of new laws has been jeopardised not only by the lack of resources, but mainly by institutional conflicts and unclear policy contents.

Challenges and opportunities for fisheries managers in developing countries: a case for economic eclecticism

Fisheries managers and advisors in developing countries face challenges that may be difficult to overcome, because they use doctrines, principles and models of management and economics that do not adequately explain the problems that need to be solved. This may perpetuate non-sustainable policies, because broader issues important to fisheries sustainability are not accounted for more eclectic studies of the economic behaviour of humans within the context of their respective societies may be useful. Advice and policy based upon a more varied knowledge of different branches of economics provides insights into how managers might deal with the more difficult problems they confront. The author motivates these ideas by discussing new international trade theory and fisheries agreements, New Institutional Economics (NIT) applied to public management of fisheries conflicts and applications of Public Choice (PC) theory to the economics of corruption. These theoretical ideas are discussed with references to observations in the field.

Implementing international fisheries agreements in Russia—lessons from the northern basin

Abstract The article discusses the implementation of Russia's international fisheries agreements in the country's northern fishery basin, focusing in particular on the implementation activities undertaken by public authorities and target groups. In the post-Soviet period, three features stand out: the diffusion of management responsibility, the degeneration of implementation performance and the reduction in target compliance. The established fisheries management system has been challenged from different angles. A decline in implementation performance and target compliance has followed partly from the fact that the ‘newcomers’ are less fit for their tasks than the traditional agencies, and partly from confusion following unclear division of responsibility between ‘new’ and ‘old’ management bodies.

Fishing impacts and the degradation or loss of habitat structure

The wider effects of fishing on marine ecosystems have become the focus of growing concern among scientists, fisheries managers and the fishing industry. The present review examines the role of habitat structure and habitat heterogeneity in marine ecosystems, and the effects of fishing (i.e. trawling and dredging) on these two components of habitat complexity. Three examples from New Zealand and Australia are considered, where available evidence suggests that fishing has been associated with the degradation or loss of habitat structure through the removal of large epibenthic organisms, with concomitant effects on fish species which occupy these habitats. With ever‐increasing demands on fish‐stocks and the need for sustainable use of fisheries resources, new approaches to fisheries management are needed. Fisheries management needs to address the sustainability of fish‐stocks while minimizing the direct and indirect impacts of fishing on other components of the ecosystem. Two long‐term management tools for mitigating degradation or loss of habitat structure while maintaining healthy sustainable fisheries which are increasingly considered by fisheries scientists and managers are: (1) protective habitat management, which involves the designation of protected marine and coastal areas which are afforded some level of protection from fishing; and (2) habitat restoration, whereby important habitat and ecological functions are restored following the loss of habitat and/or resources. Nevertheless, the protection of marine and coastal areas, and habitat restoration should not be seen as solutions replacing conventional management approaches, but need to be components of an integrated programme of coastal zone and fisheries management. A number of recent international fisheries agreements have specifically identified the need to provide for habitat protection and restoration to ensure long‐term sustainability of fisheries. The protection and restoration of habitat are also common components of fisheries management programs under national fisheries law and policy.

International Fisheries Agreements – needed: a jump-start

The Year of the Ocean in 1998 provides NGOs a good opportunity to make sure that the UN Agreement and the FAO Code actually take off.

The External Competence of the European Economic Community in Relation to International Fisheries Agreements

The External Competence of the European Economic Community in Relation to International Fisheries Agreements

The enforcement of International Fisheries Agreements

The urgent demand for improvement in food production for a growing world population necessitates, inter alia, a mere intensive exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the oceans. This higher level of exploitation can be realized by an increase in effort and by the development of new techniques for maritime fishing. However, at the same time it has become apparent that the living resources of the oceans are not inexhaustible. In many areas of the seas the dangers of overfishing have been amply demonstrated. This makes effective regulation of maritime fishing operations a matter of increasing urgency.