The principle of command responsibility is an important doctrine in international criminal law that allows military commanders to be held accountable for crimes committed by subordinates under their control. This doctrine is grounded in the concept of hierarchical accountability, namely the obligation of superiors to prevent, supervise, and take action against violations of international humanitarian law. This study aims to analyze the normative construction and application of the principle of command responsibility in the Bosnia conflict of 1992–1995 based on the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as to assess its conformity with the principle of legality and the principle of culpability in international criminal law. This study employed a normative juridical method with statutory, case, and conceptual approaches. The results show that the main elements of command responsibility include the superior-subordinate relationship, effective control, and the knowledge element (knew or should have known), all of which must be proven factually. The ICTY affirmed that responsibility does not arise automatically from formal position, but rather from the actual ability to control and prevent crimes. Although there is debate regarding the limits of the interpretation of effective control and the should have known standard, the application of this doctrine in the Bosnia cases generally remained within the framework of the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine culpa. These findings indicate that the principle of command responsibility in ICTY jurisprudence is consistent with the fundamental principles of international criminal law and strengthens the legitimacy of this doctrine in enforcing command criminal accountability.

The concept of international criminal law has developed rapidly. The emergence of relevant institutions-from the ad hoc tribunals of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)-has enhanced governance measures to address transnational atrocities, but it has also led to fragmentation characterized by normative conflicts, functional overlaps and enforcement gaps. With globalization, the disintegration of the international criminal law undermines the global governance. This paper examines particular expressions of fragmentation at rule, institutional, jurisdiction, and implementation levelsand evaluates the adverse effects of fragmentation on enforcement effectiveness, coordinated governance and international fairness. In this paper, the comparative research approach is adopted to prove such issues as treatsy-based discrepancies in crime definitions, judicial inconsistencies due to inconsistent enforcement of soft and hard law, selective prosecution due to jurisdictional conflicts and accountability gaps in new fields of cybercrime and AI-driven offenses. To control these concerns, the proposals comprise developing the bodies of authority to interpret the soft law, quickening the process of the soft law being converted to hard law by instituting regional pilot programs, the adoption of the tiered jurisdiction system, homogenizing evidence, and introducing the global level of training. The goals of these strategies are to overcome interpretative disagreements, increase cooperation internationally, revitalize judicial fairness and promote equity of international criminal law.

Abstract In Western democracies the decision to go to war is made in ways that ensure decision-makers can be held accountable. In particular, bureaucracies rely on the production of a range of documents such as records of meetings to ensure accountability. Inserting AI into the decision-making process means finding ways to make sure that AI can also be held accountable for decisions to resort to force. But problems of accountability arise in this context because AI does not produce the type of documents associated with bureaucratic accountability: it is this gap in documentary capacity which is at the core of the troubling search for accountable AI in the context of the decision to go to war. This paper argues that the search for accountable AI is essentially an attempt to solve problems of epistemic uncertainty via documentation. The paper argues that accountability can be achieved in other ways. It adopts the example of new forms of evidence in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) to show that epistemic uncertainty can be resolved and accountability apportioned without absolute epistemic certainty and without documentation in the sense commonly associated with accountability in a bureaucratic context.

The Srebrenica genocide during the Bosnian war, perpetrated in July 1995 and marking its thirtieth anniversary this year, stands as the gravest crime committed in Europe since the end of the Second World War. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was decisive in consolidating the notion of genocide, as well as in clarifying substantive norms, developing procedural standards, and laying the foundations for the International Criminal Court. This study focuses on the ICTY’s main contributions to international law through its case law on Srebrenica, while also analyzing the insufficiency of criminal justice to achieve social reconciliation in the face of such atrocities. Issues such as minority returns, denialism, competing narratives, the absence of reparations, and the lack of a truth commission have resulted in the persistence of social fragmentation, the absence of a shared memory, and limited interethnic reconciliation. These dimensions are examined with the aim of presenting an overall panorama of transitional justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina thirty years after the massacre.

This comparative study examines the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage in two major late-twentieth and early twenty-first century conflicts: the Yugoslav Wars (1991-1999) and the Islamic State (ISIS) campaigns in Iraq and Syria (2014-2017). Despite occurring in different geopolitical contexts with distinct ideological frameworks ethnic nationalism in the Balkans versus religious extremism in the Middle East both conflicts witnessed systematic targeting of cultural and religious sites as instruments of identity erasure and population displacement. The Balkans experienced what has been characterized as the greatest destruction of European cultural heritage since World War II, with over 1,200 mosques destroyed in Bosnia-Herzegovina alongside hundreds of churches and iconic structures including Mostar's sixteenth-century Old Bridge and Sarajevo's National Library. ISIS destroyed over forty major archaeological sites including the ancient Assyrian cities of Nimrud, Hatra, and Nineveh, the Roman-era city of Palmyra, and numerous mosques, churches, and museums. International responses differed markedly: the Balkans benefited from prosecutions by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), while Middle Eastern destruction prompted UN Security Council resolutions and UNESCO-led documentation initiatives. This analysis reveals heritage destruction as a calculated strategy of cultural cleansing with profound implications for international law, heritage protection frameworks, and our understanding of contemporary conflict.

International criminal justice follows a model of therapeutic justice that punishes perpetrators in the name of providing justice to conflict-affected societies. In this article, I explore how the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (re)produces gendered colonial logics and discourses of therapeutic governance. Tracing these therapeutic discourses of international criminal justice, I explore how the ICTY depends on and reinforces colonial representations of the former Yugoslavia. Through a queer critique, I expose how these discourses gain meaning through constructions of victimhood and criminality. The ICTY’s ability to prescribe justice is possible through the designation of Yugoslav populations according to these gendered, colonial, and pathologising scripts. These are violent discursive practices, ones that disempower and cast the former Yugoslavia as prone to violence, queer (in the derogatory sense), and in need of therapeutic governance in the form of international criminal justice to heal their wounds.

Standards of proof in international criminal tribunals are a key element in ensuring fair justice in cases involving the most serious international crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, their application in the context of complex investigations conducted in conflict zones gives rise to numerous challenges, particularly regarding the collection of circumstantial evidence and the harmonization of legal approaches across different jurisdictions. The article analyzes the standards of proof, particularly the principle of «beyond a reasonable doubt», in the practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). It outlines problematic aspects of their practical application, including the complexity of assessing circumstantial evidence and the absence of mandatory corroboration in cases of sexual violence. The primary sources of regulation are the statutes of the tribunals and their respective rules of procedure and evidence, which establish the presumption of innocence and place the burden of proof on the prosecution. However, discrepancies between the national legal traditions of judges and prosecutors can complicate the uniform application of these standards. Special attention is given to a comparative analysis of tribunal practices, including the Čelebići, Martić, and Nzabonimana cases, as well as the ICC’s approaches to evaluating evidence in cases of mass atrocities. The experience of the SCSL in cases involving RUF and CDF leaders, where circumstantial evidence was assessed for consistency with a single conclusion of guilt, is also examined. In the context of Ukraine, where investigations of international crimes are ongoing, the importance of adapting proof standards to national practice is emphasized. It is proposed to harmonize Ukrainian legislation with international norms, particularly by refining evidence collection procedures, establishing specialized prosecution units, and supporting the creation of a hybrid tribunal for the crime of aggression. International experience, particularly the practices of the ICC and Eurojust, demonstrates the effectiveness of clear standards for digital and circumstantial evidence, which can be applied in Ukraine. The conclusions of the study highlight the need to improve the mechanisms of legal regulation of proof standards to ensure their consistency with international norms, protection of the rights of the parties, and the effectiveness of justice in the context of modern conflicts.

The aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1992-1995 resulted in the occupation of a large part of the state territory, which represented an attempt to realize the Greater Serbian project. This expansionist policy was accompanied by the practical execution of crimes against humanity and international law, based on a genocidal policy and practice that aimed at the physical, material, and cultural destruction and collapse of the Bosniak people's identity. Special emphasis is placed on the genocide committed in Srebrenica – a UN safe zone – in July 1995. All forms and scales of the committed crimes are denied and negated in the daily life of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society, including its public space. The most blatant forms of denial are manifested by political elites who follow the political path of those involved in the aggression and the attempt to achieve Greater State ideas. In the thirty-year period since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the establishment of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there has been a continuous minimization, denial, and negation of the committed crimes. Despite numerous judgments by international and national courts which have convicted individuals, as well as bodies and institutions, for committed genocide – judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), judgments of domestic and German courts – the continuity of denial is present in the public space. Attempts to sanction this phenomenon through the adoption of laws by state institutions and parliaments were unsuccessful, which resulted in the imposition of an amendment to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) that sanctions this criminal offense. The first judicial proceeding against Vojin Pavlović is currently underway, which should sanction the public denial of genocide and disrespect for the High Representative's decision, i.e., a violation of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The indictment against Miodrag Malić, for acts of glorifying war criminals, has been forwarded to the Court of BiH for confirmation. Milorad Dodik, who is unquestionably the most obvious denier of genocide, has not yet been accused or sanctioned, a fact that points to the weakness of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian judiciary. Although the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has filed an indictment against him for disrespecting the decisions of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it does not contain a point that would initiate the re-examination and sanctioning of denial in the public space, where he persists in using it for daily political purposes. We also place within this entire context Resolution (A/78/L.67/Rev.1) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on May 23, 2024, which should also serve as a tool to prevent further denial of genocide and prevent revisionism of historical facts. Namely, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution on the Srebrenica Genocide, declaring July 11 as „International Day of Reflection and Remembrance of the 1995 Srebrenica Genocide,“ to be commemorated annually. The process of preparing the text of the Resolution and its proposal for adoption was accompanied by a campaign launched against the adoption of the resolution. The campaign was based on the denial of facts and historical revisionism. The leaders of the campaign were Milorad Dodik (President of the smaller Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity) and Aleksandar Vučić (President of Serbia) with their close associates and political followers. The leader of Republika Srpska organized protests in Republika Srpska, while Vučić tried to mobilize public opinion in Serbia, presenting the Resolution as an injustice to Serbs at the global level. Hate speech, glorification of war criminals, and revisionism or open denial of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes established by final court decisions threaten the rule of law and represent a direct obstacle to peace, reconciliation, and confidence-building, and ultimately jeopardize the prospects for a safe, peaceful future for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This study analyzes the role of the crisis staffs established by the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1991–1992, with particular emphasis on their function in establishing the para-state structure of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SrRBiH), later known as Republika Srpska (RS). The crisis staffs were set up as the main organs of authority at the local level and served as a key instrument for realizing the “strategic goals of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Already in the first months of 1992, they violently usurped the executive functions of municipal bodies, coordinated the actions of political, military, police, and “paramilitary” structures, and oversaw mobilization, restrictions on movement, and the mass dismissal of Bosniak and Croat employees from their jobs. In practice, the crisis staffs functioned as the nucleus of the SDS para-state authority at the local level. Their role included coordinating arrests, deportations, forced relocations, and property confiscations, as well as organizing detention camps in schools, barracks, cultural centers, and factories. They also employed so-called real estate agencies and “apartment exchange commissions” to dispossess Bosniaks and Croats of their property, thereby institutionalizing discrimination and enabling crimes. They managed systems of detention that involved mass killings, torture, and sexual violence against civilians. Such activities were conducted across a wide area, demonstrating the coordinated and planned character of the crimes, which points to the institutionalized application of repressive measures and the execution of atrocities. A key role was played by the SDS’s “Instructions for the Organization and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina under Extraordinary Circumstances” (December 19, 1991), which facilitated the establishment of crisis staffs at the municipal level and parallel structures of authority, the mobilization of the Territorial Defense (TO) and police, and their subordination to the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). With the onset of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the crisis staffs were formally renamed as wartime presidencies and commissioners, while retaining the same function—providing the local infrastructure for the implementation of RS’s political and military project. This transformation formally reinforced the link between local authorities, the SDS leadership, and the self-proclaimed RS, but in practice allowed the continued operation of para-state structures outside the legal framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although formally presented as “state” organs, they continued to operate according to the crisis staff model, with the same tasks and powers. As Dorothea Hanson, whose analyses are foundational for this study, notes, due to frequent changes in terminology and overlapping roles, it is not always possible to clearly distinguish between crisis staffs, wartime presidencies, and wartime commissioners. The crisis staffs translated political decisions into concrete measures of repression, forced displacement, and killings of Bosniak and Croat populations. Their activities are documented through primary sources, official documents, meeting minutes, as well as expert reports and findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The research clearly shows that the mass crimes committed between April and June 1992 in the municipalities of Zvornik, Bratunac, Foča, Vlasenica, Višegrad, Bosanski Šamac, Doboj, Kotor Varoš, Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanska Krupa, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Rogatica, Sokolac, Ilijaš, Ilidža, Vogošća, Čajniče, Kalinovik, Pale, and others were the result of organized and institutionalized actions of the crisis staffs and their successors. The conclusion of this research is that the crisis staffs constituted the nucleus of the SDS para-state power, serving as the key instrument for implementing genocidal policies and as the operational channel for carrying out repressive measures, forced displacement, and mass killings of Bosniak and Croat civilians. They enabled the establishment and consolidation of Serbian rule over occupied territories, while their actions left lasting consequences on the demographic, political, and social fabric of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This study provides a basis for understanding the mechanisms of para-state institutions in the implementation of aggression and genocidal policy during the war in 1992.

Background The relationship between military necessity and the protection of cultural heritage under international humanitarian law has been and continues to be governed by a constant tension that has shaped both doctrine and practice. While the principle of military necessity, rooted in and derived from the 1863 Lieber Code and codified in later instruments such as the 1907 Hague Conventions, remains one of the most fundamental principles permitting the adoption of measures necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, it has also been used to justify the destruction of cultural property. Conversely, cultural heritage, deserving special protection under instruments such as the 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocols, represents the collective memory and identity of societies. Methods To evaluate the role of military necessity in the prosecution of crimes against cultural heritage, this paper uses a critical doctrinal and analytical approach, looking at both treaty law and international jurisprudence. It asks whether military necessity is a valid practical safeguard or a legal pretext for destruction. Results The paper contends that the incorporation of “imperative military necessity” has engendered critical legal loopholes resulting from warring parties’ exploitation of the prioritization of military interests over the preservation of cultural heritage, rendering cultural heritage vulnerable in armed conflicts. International tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), have endeavoured to restrict these justifications by criminalizing deliberate attacks and applying standards of necessity and proportionality. Conclusions The paper concludes that, despite treaties and jurisprudence limiting the scope of military necessity, the ongoing recognition of the necessity exception reveals structural weaknesses in international humanitarian law, thereby rendering cultural heritage vulnerable in armed conflict. Accordingly, it advocates for the strict limitation of the ‘imperative military necessity’ exception to provide better protection for cultural heritage during armed conflict.

It is indicated that Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine has been ongoing for more than eleven years, characterized by the systematic commission of war crimes by servicemen of the armed forces of the aggressor state, which highlights the need for the functioning of legal mechanisms for bringing to criminal responsibility for the commission of such crimes. This article examines the doctrine of command responsibility for war crimes in international law and Ukraine’s national legal system. Amid the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and numerous war crimes committed by the aggressor’s armed forces, the question of effective mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable remains highly relevant. The article traces the origins of the doctrine of command responsibility, from the earliest international legal instruments - such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Leipzig Trial, and the Yamashita case - to its modern development through the Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocol, the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It demonstrates that the core of command responsibility involves imposing individual criminal liability on military commanders or other superiors for inaction, specifically their failure to exercise proper control over subordinates who commit war crimes. Responsibility is not for the crimes of subordinates per se, but for their unlawful actions when the superior neglects the duty to prevent, stop, or punish such actions. Special attention is given to incorporating international legal standards into national law: in October 2024, Article 31-1 was added to Ukraine’s Criminal Code, which largely copies the provisions of Article 28 of the Rome Statute. Focus is on academic debates in Ukraine about the usefulness of enshrining this institution, the issue of the relationship between command responsibility and the institution of complicity, and potential challenges in applying this innovation practically. It is concluded that the institution of command responsibility is crucial for ensuring the principle of the inevitability of punishment for war crimes, especially in cases of mass or systematic offences. At the same time, effective implementation of this doctrine in Ukraine requires the development of consistent law enforcement practices and proper scientific understanding.

BackgroundThe relationship between military necessity and the protection of cultural heritage under international humanitarian law has been and continues to be governed by a constant tension that has shaped both doctrine and practice. While the principle of military necessity, rooted in and derived from the 1863 Lieber Code and codified in later instruments such as the 1907 Hague Conventions, remains one of the most fundamental principles permitting the adoption of measures necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, it has also been used to justify the destruction of cultural property. Conversely, cultural heritage, deserving special protection under instruments such as the 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocols, represents the collective memory and identity of societies.MethodsTo evaluate the role of military necessity in the prosecution of crimes against cultural heritage, this paper uses a critical doctrinal and analytical approach, looking at both treaty law and international jurisprudence. It asks whether military necessity is a valid practical safeguard or a legal pretext for destruction.ResultsThe paper contends that the incorporation of “imperative military necessity” has engendered critical legal loopholes resulting from warring parties’ exploitation of the prioritization of military interests over the preservation of cultural heritage, rendering cultural heritage vulnerable in armed conflicts. International tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), have endeavoured to restrict these justifications by criminalizing deliberate attacks and applying standards of necessity and proportionality.ConclusionsThe paper concludes that, despite treaties and jurisprudence limiting the scope of military necessity, the ongoing recognition of the necessity exception reveals structural weaknesses in international humanitarian law, thereby rendering cultural heritage vulnerable in armed conflict. Accordingly, it advocates for the strict limitation of the ‘imperative military necessity’ exception to provide better protection for cultural heritage during armed conflict.

Background The relationship between military necessity and the protection of cultural heritage under international humanitarian law has been and continues to be governed by a constant tension that has shaped both doctrine and practice. While the principle of military necessity, rooted in and derived from the 1863 Lieber Code and codified in later instruments such as the 1907 Hague Conventions, remains one of the most fundamental principles permitting the adoption of measures necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives, it has also been used to justify the destruction of cultural property. Conversely, cultural heritage, deserving special protection under instruments such as the 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocols, represents the collective memory and identity of societies. Methods To evaluate the role of military necessity in the prosecution of crimes against cultural heritage, this paper uses a critical doctrinal and analytical approach, looking at both treaty law and international jurisprudence. It asks whether military necessity is a valid practical safeguard or a legal pretext for destruction. Results The paper contends that the incorporation of “imperative military necessity” has engendered critical legal loopholes resulting from warring parties’ exploitation of the prioritization of military interests over the preservation of cultural heritage, rendering cultural heritage vulnerable in armed conflicts. International tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), have endeavoured to restrict these justifications by criminalizing deliberate attacks and applying standards of necessity and proportionality. Conclusions The paper concludes that, despite treaties and jurisprudence limiting the scope of military necessity, the ongoing recognition of the necessity exception reveals structural weaknesses in international humanitarian law, thereby rendering cultural heritage vulnerable in armed conflict. Accordingly, it advocates for the strict limitation of the ‘imperative military necessity’ exception to provide better protection for cultural heritage during armed conflict.

This article critically examines the treatment of sexual violence against children within the framework of international criminal justice, with a particular focus on how the gender of victims shapes visibility, prosecution, and judicial recognition. Through a comparative analysis of landmark cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), it reveals a persistent gender bias in the interpretation and application of international criminal law. While crimes such as rape and sexual slavery committed against girls have gradually gained legal recognition as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (as seen in Akayesu, Foča, Ongwen, and Ntaganda), sexual violence against boys remains largely underreported, underprosecuted, and often categorized under gender-neutral terms such as torture or inhuman treatment, as observed in the Čelebići case. The article argues that this disparity does not stem from the legal texts themselves, which define sexual violence in a gender-neutral way, but rather from how legal actors interpret and implement these norms. It further demonstrates that entrenched gender stereotypes, which associate masculinity with power and femininity with victimhood, have created an implicit hierarchy of victimhood in international jurisprudence. The author calls for a shift in prosecutorial priorities, targeted support mechanisms for male child victims, and the elimination of judicial bias through comprehensive training that addresses gender dynamics. Ultimately, the article contends that achieving gender-neutral justice in the context of conflict-related sexual violence requires not only legal reform but also a transformation of the institutional mindset that shapes international criminal adjudication.

The tradition of international criminal tribunals started with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after the second world was and it was returned with the establishment of International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As a result of the bloody wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Security Council of the United Nations in1993 decided to establish the ICTY as an ad hoc tribunal, I hypothesise that the procedures and judgments it developed have had a significant impact on international justice and the workings of the later international courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC). The study of the ICTY is important not only from a legal point of view, but also from a social and political one, as its decisions have influenced the reconciliation processes in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of the Tribunal has been the subject of much debate, and it is worth analysing its functioning. The paper is to highlight the features of the ICTY during its mandate from 1993 to 2017, and this examination of the ICTY provides an opportunity to understand the potential and limitations of international justice. For the realization of this research are used qualitative methods, based on the bibliography that is related with international criminal law.

The article provides an interdisciplinary legal analysis of the international responsibility of states for the use of acoustic terror in armed conflicts. Acoustic terror is examined as a method of violence employed to inflict psychological pressure, demoralization, and systematic sleep deprivation of civilians or adversaries. In the context of modern hybrid warfare, the author emphasizes the destabilizing and destructive effect of sound-based attacks. Particular attention is paid to examples of acoustic means used during the Russian-Ukrainian war (since 2022) and Russian military operations in Syria (2015–2020), where airstrikes and shelling created continuous noise exposure affecting the civilian population. The paper argues that although international humanitarian law lacks explicit norms regarding acoustic terror, existing legal mechanisms allow analogies to non-conventional weapons, such as chemical or psychological weapons. The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is thoroughly reviewed, including cases such as DRC v. Uganda, the Lockerbie bombing, chemical weapons in Syria, and rulings on Karadžić, Milošević, and the shelling of Sarajevo. While none of these cases directly addressed acoustic terror, they establish legal foundations for recognizing such actions as violations of international humanitarian law. The article also highlights the evidentiary challenges in classifying acoustic terror as torture. It proposes improved documentation methods, including psychiatric assessments, acoustic monitoring, and sound impact technologies. The author calls for international standards to assess psychological harm resulting from sonic attacks. In conclusion, the article stresses the urgent need to establish a specialized legal regime to classify acoustic terror as a separate category of war crime or crime against humanity. Specific directions are proposed: codifying the definition of acoustic terror in international instruments, introducing sanction and accountability mechanisms, and creating an international register for documenting sound-based attacks. The study contributes to the evolution of international law by drawing attention to emerging forms of violence within hybrid armed conflicts.

This article examines the extent of destruction of rural cultural landscapes and vernacular architecture in the Žepa region of eastern Bosnia during the 1992–1995 attacks by Bosnian Serb Forces, led by Generals Ratko Mladi? and Zdravko Tolimir, both later sentenced for genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). These attacks culminated in the capture and devastation of the UN-designated safe enclave in late July 1995. Building on existing legal and scholarly findings that identified the systematic and deliberate nature of such destruction, this study enhances those conclusions through localized and quantified evidence. Using field surveys conducted between 2022 and 2024, combined with satellite imagery, the study applies a Destruction Index (DI) to measure the extent of physical devastation across 1,840 structures in 23 rural settlements. The findings showed that a destruction index of 0.98 reflects deliberate and systematic destruction consistent with the objectives of cultural genocide and the typical tactical approach of Ratko Mladi?’s forces. These findings confirm the scale and uniformity of targeted erasure across the region. By correlating patterns of destruction with spatial positioning the study reinforces International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) jurisprudence that classified such acts as part of a coordinated campaign of persecution and ethnic cleansing. It further contributes to academic debates on cultural genocide by offering concrete, quantified data that localize the broader strategy of territorial and cultural elimination in eastern Bosnia.

This paper aims to explain why the International Criminal Court (ICC) fails to arrest the sitting head of the state and provides recommendations to improve the efficiency of arresting the sitting head of the state. To identify the factors that hinder the arrest, this paper incorporates a literature review and case study analysis of four existing arrest attempts on the sitting head of the state initiated by The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ICC. In the literature review and case study analysis, in addition to cases affiliated with the ICC, the ICTY, and its related case were introduced as a reference to reflect further the problems faced by the ICC in arresting sitting heads of state. Through the literature review and case studies, this paper finds that the ICCs arrest of the sitting head of the state can hardly be achieved with the ICCs limited jurisdiction, sole dependence on state cooperation, untimely interference, and inadequate supportive political power to address non-cooperation. Therefore, the ICC needs to expand its jurisdiction to reduce the room for indictees to evade arrest and also to include more supportive political powers. The ICCs cooperation model should also be reformed by authorizing cooperation with functional third-party forces to timely substitute the states function for executing the arrest in uncertainty.

Abstract This article assesses the contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to a clearer understanding of the use of human shields, both as a war crime and as a violation of international humanitarian law (IHL). To date, the ICTY is the only international criminal tribunal to address multiple allegations of shielding conduct. To assess the Tribunal’s contribution, the article rigorously analyses ICTY jurisprudence concerning shielding thematically, in line with the offences under which such conduct has been charged. It demonstrates that a combination of prosecutorial policy and a failure by the Tribunal to seize opportunities to further elaborate upon shielding, has resulted in the offence developing almost exclusively through reference to other crimes. Thus, detailed discussion of shielding within the relevant judgments is scarce and there remains work to be done within the fields of IHL and international criminal law to develop the offence and clearly distinguish it from those with which it overlaps. Nevertheless, the article will argue that the Mladić trial judgment does offer a significant contribution to an understanding of human shielding. Additionally, the Tribunal’s shielding jurisprudence as a whole, despite its limitations, still proves useful as an indicator of the elements of the act that require further development as an international crime, and for building a fuller understanding of the precise nature of the act as a violation of IHL.

ABSTRACT The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has sculpted the story of July 1995 in Srebrenica. In working to hold accountable the perpetrators of the crime of genocide, among other crimes against humanity, the ICTY’s prosecutors gathered an immense amount of evidence, presented cases in the courtroom, and obtained numerous convictions. These legal proceedings have engendered bitter, ongoing disputes among various actors in Bosnia–Herzegovina over their validity. All these dynamics have affected how historians approach this history. In general, they have not posed questions that stray far from the objectives that are firmly tied to the ICTY’s genocide narrative, with its clear categories of perpetrators and victims, and objective of establishing the guilt of the former and the victimization of the latter. Nearly thirty years since July 1995, perhaps the time has come to ask: what can we learn from this approach that is new? Rather than retelling what we already know about these events, we might consider turning our analytical gaze toward what is called here, “uncomfortable evidence.” This is a shorthand for stories about July 1995 that resist our desire to domesticate them into binary categories of black and white, which are more relevant for legal proceedings, and those who seek to use history to affirm or deny their results. Instead, stories based on uncomfortable evidence – three of which are told and analysed here – invite us to enter a grey zone where we embrace the complexity of human behaviour and take up the challenge of accounting for it. In so doing, historians of Srebrenica can more effectively return to a primary challenge of their discipline: to explain this violent past, while resisting the urge to make sense of it with rigid categories based on their contemporary moral and political positions.