International Climate Negotiations Research Articles

Les ONG : moteurs de l'avant, actrices de l'après

As one of the nine major groups of the UN, NGOs have always taken part to the international climate negotiations. Their concrete approach and demand for coherence give them the status of real actors of the climate arena, preserving it from false solutions and unambitious positions. NGOs follow scientific recommendations. Following the audition of James Hansen in 1988 by the American Congress, where the scientist has exposed the threshold of the 350 ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere, the NGO 350. org was created. One year later, in 1989, marks the beginning of the Climate action Network, which gathers now 1100 NGOs form 120 countries. NGOs are not only coming from Northern countries, and they carry the expectations of vulnerable countries. Regularly consulted for their expertise, they are also politically active. Nowadays they show multiple skills – ocean, starvation, biodiversity-and carry various messages unified under the goal of protection of the most vulnerable populations and the climate.

Are China's climate commitments in a post‐Paris agreement sufficiently ambitious?

In international climate change negotiations, China's role is an issue of perennial concern. In particular, the lack of quantitative, absolute emissions commitments from China has often been the focus of this concern. In line with changing domestic and international contexts, China is recalibrating its stance and strategy. Its participation in international climate change negotiations has evolved from playing a peripheral role to gradually moving to the center. This article examines China's stance and role in international climate change negotiations from a historical perspective. In so doing, the article discusses the evolution of international climate negotiations and China's stance in the lead‐up to and at the Paris conference. With Paris behind us, the focus is now turning to the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The article discusses post‐Paris focuses, generally in the international context and in particular in China's context. They both affect the outcomes of post Paris subsequent negotiations and hold the key to actually achieving desired outcomes. WIREs Clim Change 2017, 8:e443. doi: 10.1002/wcc.443This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > International Policy Framework

In Between Rhetoric and the UNFCCC’s Detachment from the Lived Realities of the People on the Frontlines of the Climate Crisis

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the world’s main forum for climate change negotiations is in a deep and ever-growing crisis. Between the piece-meal and inadequate pledges on emission reductions by developed countries (historical high emitters) that threaten to quickly catapult us to a 3.5 degree global temperature rise that will disproportionately affect those in the Global South, to the undue influence by fossil fuel companies and their lobbyists both blocking and co-opting progressive action in the space, the UNFCCC almost seems completely incapable of delivering on its mandate. While it is clear that the international climate negotiations seem completely disconnected from the material realities of those on the front-lines of the climate crises, a growing transnational climate, food and energy justice movement(s) is stepping up to challenge the glaring incompetence of the international negotiating space while also providing real alternatives to the multiple and intersecting crises of climate change to local communities around the world.

Assessing the INDCs' land use, land use change, and forest emission projections.

BackgroundIn preparation for the 2015 international climate negotiations in Paris, Parties submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) expressing each countries’ respective post-2020 climate actions. In this paper we assess individual Parties’ expected reduction of emissions/removals from land use, land use change, and forest (LULUCF) sector for reaching their INDC target, and the aggregate global effect on the INDCs on the future development of emission and removals from the LULUCF sector. This has been done through analysis Parties’ official information concerning the role of LULUCF mitigation efforts for reaching INDC targets as presented in National Communications, Biennial Update Reports, and Additional file 1.ResultsOn the aggregate global level, the Parties themselves perceive that net LULUCF emissions will increase over time. Overall, the net LULUCF emissions are estimated to increase by 0.6 Gt CO2e year−1 (range: 0.1–1.1) in 2020 and 1.3 Gt CO2e year−1 (range: 0.7–2.1) in 2030, both compared to 2010 levels. On the other hand, the full implementation of the INDCs is estimated to lead to a reduction of net LULUCF emissions in 2030 compared to 2010 levels. It is estimated that if all conditional and unconditional INDCs are implemented, net LULUCF emissions would decrease by 0.5 Gt CO2e year−1 (range: 0.2–0.8) by 2020 and 0.9 Gt CO2e year−1 (range: 0.5–1.3) by 2030, both compared to 2010 levels. The largest absolute reductions of net LULUCF emissions (compared to 2010 levels) are expected from Indonesia and Brazil, followed by China and Ethiopia.ConclusionsThe results highlights that countries are expecting a significant contribution from the LULUCF sector to meet their INDC mitigation targets. At the global level, the LULUCF sector is expected to contribute to as much as 20% of the full mitigation potential of all the conditional and unconditional INDC targets. However, large uncertainties still surround how Parties estimate, project and account for emissions and removals from the LULUCF sector. While INDCs represent a new source of land-use information, further information and updates of the INDCs will be required to reduce uncertainty of the LULUCF projections.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s13021-016-0068-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Industrial and terrestrial carbon leakage under climate policy fragmentation

One of the main concerns in international climate negotiations is policy fragmentation, which could increase the carbon emissions of non-participating countries. Until very recently the carbon leakage literature has focused mainly on ‘industrial’ carbon leakage. However, there is another potential channel that has received little attention so far: the carbon leakage triggered by land-use change (‘terrestrial’ carbon leakage). In this article we use an integrated assessment model to explore these two forms of leakage in a situation where CO2 emissions in all sectors, including those from land-use change, are taxed equally. Our results show that under different fragmentation scenarios terrestrial carbon leakage may be the dominant type of leakage up to 2050. When participating regions tax land-use emissions, forest area expands partly by shifting food and bioenergy production to non-participating regions. This reduces forest area in non-participating regions and increases their land-use emissions.Policy relevancePreventing industrial carbon leakage has been an important aspect of climate policy design. One clear policy implication of our study is that anti-leakage policy measures should also be considered for land-use change sources.

Addressing Indigenous Peopless Marginalisation at International Climate Negotiations: Adaptation and Resilience at the Margins

Indigenous Peoples (IP) are a critical and inadequately considered population in the climate change crisis. IP represent much of the world’s cultural diversity – and this environmental knowledge and adaptability should be considered a crucial source to contribute to global solutions. Yet IP globally face systemic discrimination and exclusion from political and economic power. IP face three tiers of marginalisation – political, geographical and economic – and these are also present at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Yet it is precisely this arena that IP can contribute significantly. Specifically, a) Environmental knowledge of IP can improve understanding of climate impacts at the local level; b) A wide diversity and capacity in adaptation solutions amongst IP can inform solutions; c) The relatively new workplan on Loss & Damage, especially Non-economic Loss & Damage (NELD), is particularly relevant for, and should be developed in participation with, IP; and d) Improved participation of IP at the negotiations constitutes human rights, including the right to self-determination. This paper presents observations and interviews from COP21 in Paris to present the case for a restructuring of the UNFCCC to improve participation of IP. We conclude with recommendations to improve the situation: 1) Promote IP to full member status at the UNFCCC; 2) Employ IP as experts in work-streams and decisions around adaptation and loss & damage; 3) Direct and restructure financial streams, including the Green Climate Fund, towards increasing the autonomy and voice of IP; and 4) Ensure respect for IP and their rights and livelihoods at all levels of the negotiations, and decisions and programmes arising therefrom.

Are China's Climate Commitments in a Post-Paris Agreement Sufficiently Ambitious?

In international climate change negotiations, China’s role is an issue of perennial concern. In particular, the lack of quantitative, absolute emissions commitments from China has been the focus. In line with changing domestic and international contexts, China is recalibrating its stance and strategy. Its participation in international climate change negotiations has evolved from playing a peripheral role to gradually moving to the centre. This article examines China’s stance and role in international climate change negotiations from a historical perspective. In so doing, the article discusses the evolution of international climate negotiations and China’s stance in the lead-up to and at the Paris conference. With Paris behind us, the focus is now turning to the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The article discusses post-Paris issues in the international context and in particular in China’s context. These affect the post Paris negotiations and hold the key to achieving desired outcomes.

Securing the World's Water: International Climate Negotiations and Their Impacts

The Conference of Parties, coordinated by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, is a series of conferences focused on climate change and finding solutions to ease its effects on agriculture, health, the economy, and other global sectors.

The Paris Agreement: China’s ‘New Normal’ role in international climate negotiations

The political success of the Paris COP 21 in 2015 contrasted sharply with the diplomatic breakdown at Copenhagen six years before in 2009. Contributing to this success was China’s emergence as a more positive participant in the international climate change negotiations. Despite efforts to reduce energy and carbon intensity since the mid-2000s, Chinese negotiators in Copenhagen were careful not to link domestic action on climate change to any presumptions of international obligation. This stands in marked contrast to Paris where, for the first time, China was willing to commit to an absolute cap on emissions subject to international measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV). This article examines what changed between 2009 and 2015 such that China was able to play a more constructive role in the global climate regime. It argues that a key driver of change was China’s shift to a ‘New Normal’ model of economic development. Beginning in the 12th Five Year Plan Period (2011–2015), China’s economic policy prioritized a transition from energy-intensive growth based on heavy industry, exports and investment, to a more balanced economy characterized by slower growth, an increasing role for services and domestic consumption, and a focus on innovation and low-carbon technologies. This transition gave China the opportunity to re-formulate its priorities in international climate negotiations and helped pave the way for increased climate cooperation with the US, the lack of which had been a major roadblock to success in Copenhagen. Progress was further facilitated by a range of external factors, including impressive French diplomacy in the run-up to COP21 and the important shift to a bottom-up, voluntary approach to commitments.Policy relevanceThis article analyses the reasons behind China’s more constructive engagement at COP 21 in Paris, which contributed to the Conference’s successful outcome. It is important for policy makers to better comprehend China’s shifting position and the motivations behind it, given the country’s key role in keeping temperature rise at a safe level. The deal reached in Paris now needs to be implemented, and success is by no means guaranteed. A deeper understanding of the position of this key player can only help with the negotiation process, implementation phase, and further negotiations that are needed to strengthen targets.

Mind the Gap – The Discrepancy between the Normative Debate and the Actual Use of Human Rights Language in International Climate Negotiations

There has been an emerging normative debate in political theory literature on how the impacts of climate change not only affect the environment, but also have dire consequences for the enjoyment of basic human rights in vulnerable regions. A human rights-based approach to climate negotiations could improve the debate beyond a mostly scientific and technical discussion. This paper analyzes a case study of how human rights are actually articulated within international climate negotiations and what role they play in the international political debate on climate change. Through an inductive analysis of state submissions and interview data collected at the 2 nd session of the ADP during UNFCCC COP-19, we examine how state parties make use of human rights in international climate negotiations. The paper shows that despite the growing normative debate on the topic, almost no parties refer to human rights directly in the actual climate negotiations. When human rights are mentioned, they are more likely to be articulated by state groups, they are often referred to in an indirect way, and non-binding rights are articulated more often than universally binding human rights. This shows that there is a clear gap between the normative debate and the political realities of the linkages of human rights and climate change. Author’s Note The authors are graduate students of political science and are finishing their Master of Arts in International Studies/Peace and Conflict Studies at the Universities of Frankfurt am Main, Germany and Darmstadt, Germany. They regard the fight against climate change as an important step towards sustainability.

Attributing Weather Extremes to Climate Change and the Future of Adaptation Policy

Until recently, climate scientists were unable to link the occurrence of extreme weather events to anthropogenic climate change. In recent years, however, climate science has made considerable advancements, making it possible to assess the influence of anthropogenic climate change on single weather events. Using a new technique called ‘probabilistic event attribution’, scientists are able to assess whether anthropogenic climate change has changed the likelihood of the occurrence of a recorded extreme weather event (e.g. an extreme storm season, extreme rainfall, heatwave, drought, etc.). These advancements raise the expectation that this branch of climate science can contribute to climate adaptation efforts. This paper examines the normative underpinnings of these policy discussions. To date, the debates revolve around whether the findings of attribution science can be used to establish moral liability for harms resulting from climate change. On close analysis, this normative framework has serious shortcomings. The paper rejects the moral liability framework and suggests, through a review of the international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC, that the science of event attribution can inform adaptation policy within a risk-pooling and climate risk insurance framework. The proposed framework is defended both on normative grounds and on the basis of its potential application within the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage under the Cancun Adaptation Framework.

Whose Utopia? Our Utopia! Competing Visions of the Future at the UN Climate Talks

Social movements move and grow by autopoesis—by calling their prospective ranks to order using public pronouncements replete with consequential assumptions about the world as they see it. In the same way, governing bodies and vested economic interests stake out opposing public positions. In the wake of the crucial international climate negotiations in Paris, December 2015, at which the nations adopted the first truly universal climate treaty, we look back over five years of participatory ethnographic research inside the UN climate talks and the social movements for climate justice, identifying key lifeworld assumptions inscribed in the public position-taking of central economic, public, and political sphere actors. Our findings include grounds for skepticism that UN climate policy can transcend the power of the fossil fuel companies to attenuate both international ambitions and national contributions to the universal effort, but also an exciting possibility that climate justice philosophy and tactics, aided by bold counter-spectacle techniques from the Occupy movement, might return to the stage in the coming years and lead the necessary deep culture shift that decarbonization will require.

A Review of Carbon Markets: EU-ETS, RGGI, California, the Clean Power Plan and the Paris Agreement

This paper is a comprehensive historical, economic and legal review of the development of carbon markets, from the Acid Rain Program (US) to the European carbon market, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the US, and the California/Quebec market. The impact of international climate negotiations, from Kyoto to Paris, on the evolution of carbon markets is discussed, as well as the potential for new US carbon markets created by the Clean Power Plan. I review the success and failures of these markets, and the political forces that constrained their development.

The Power of Strategy: Environmental NGO Influence in International Climate Negotiations

Surprisingly little is known about how government representatives pay attention to the input of nongovernmental organizations in international negotiations. This article presents an analytical framework and illustrates, with findings from the climate change negotiations 2009–2012, the conditions under which government representatives pay attention to the input from transnational advocacy networks like the Climate Action Network. Demonstrations and lobbying attempts on the international level are frequently ignored, given that negotiation mandates with little leeway are agreed on beforehand. This requires a longer-term perspective toward changing government positions for the next round of negotiations following high media attention. Governments value NGO involvement because they grant legitimacy and signal public support. Successful lobbying requires policy entrepreneurial strategies, close networks, and early input on the domestic level.

Differentiated Responsibilities and Prosocial Behavior in Climate Change Mitigation: Behavioral Evidence from the United States and China

The recent Paris agreement has increased optimism that climate change might be successfully mitigated through international agreement. However, the commitments of countries are unenforceable. Therefore domestic political will, including on the part of citizens to make regular sacrifices, will be required in order for countries to meet these commitments. Understanding prosocial behavior in climate change mitigation is thus more important than ever. Many behavioral studies model the mitigation dilemma using public goods games: But, because wealth creation in a carbon-based economy inevitably leads to the appropriation of the global climate commons, climate change and its mitigation actually constitute a dual, interdependent social dilemma. Acknowledging the interdependence of this dilemma is necessary to capture but differentiated responsibilities,'' the equity principle that underlies international climate negotiations. To do so, we introduce the compound climate dilemma: a new behavioral game that expands the public goods approach to the mitigation dilemma by combining it with a preceding common pool dilemma. To explore the implications of the compound climate dilemma for prosocial behavior, we conduct experiments in the United States and China, the world's two largest emitters of carbon. Though the pattern of prosocial behavior is virtually identical across the two countries, the introduction of differentiated responsibilities nonetheless has a deleterious effect on successful mitigation.

Alleviating inequality in climate policy costs: an integrated perspective on mitigation, damage and adaptation

Equity considerations play an important role in international climate negotiations. While policy analysis has often focused on equity as it relates to mitigation costs, there are large regional differences in adaptation costs and the level of residual damage. This paper illustrates the relevance of including adaptation and residual damage in equity considerations by determining how the allocation of emission allowances would change to counteract regional differences in total climate costs, defined as the costs of mitigation, adaptation, and residual damage. We compare emission levels resulting from a global carbon tax with two allocations of emission allowances under a global cap-and-trade system: one equating mitigation costs and one equating total climate costs as share of GDP. To account for uncertainties in both mitigation and adaptation, we use a model-comparison approach employing two alternative modeling frameworks with different damage, adaptation cost, and mitigation cost estimates, and look at two different climate goals. Despite the identified model uncertainties, we derive unambiguous results on the change in emission allowance allocation that could lessen the unequal distribution of adaptation costs and residual damages through the financial transfers associated with emission trading.

Transdisciplinary co-design of scientific research agendas: 40 research questions for socially relevant climate engineering research

Interest in climate engineering research has grown rapidly owing to the slow progress of international climate negotiations. As some scientists are proposing to expand research and conduct field tests, there is an emerging debate about whether and how it should proceed. It is widely accepted both by the supporters and critics that public engagement from the early stage of research is necessary. Nonetheless, most, if not all, of existing research projects of climate engineering were designed predominantly by experts. To produce socially relevant knowledge, and hence, pursue transdisciplinary research that integrates interdisciplinary research and public engagement, it is desirable for scientists to decide together with the public on what kind of research should be done. In this paper, we both as Japanese scientists and stakeholders collaboratively identify 40 socially relevant research questions on climate engineering with a particular emphasis on stratospheric aerosol injection, using a method designed to encourage science–policy collaboration. While we acknowledge some methodological problems and the difficulty in obtaining active participation from stakeholders, the list of identified questions covers broad interdisciplinary perspectives and diverse interests, and may provide an important foundation for future transdisciplinary research on climate engineering. Given the dynamic nature of climate change and policy responses, research agendas should be periodically and iteratively reviewed and updated through transdisciplinary processes.

Global sea-level rise: weighing country responsibility and risk

Accelerated sea-level rise will be one of the most significant effects of global warming. Global mean sea level has risen more than 0.2 m since 1880 and continues rising at above 4 mm yr.−1. Here we allocate responsibility to countries for global sea-level rise commitment (SLRC) over the period 1850 to 2100 and weigh that against their exposure to inundation from sea-level rise. We bridge two lines of climate-related research by combining assessment of countries’ greenhouse gas emissions with predictions of the multi-millennial sea level response to global warming. Under the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s business-as-usual scenario our findings show that the five most responsible countries for global SLRC are also the most exposed to absolute land loss. This is mostly due to their own emissions, which we call intrinsic risk. We also assess extrinsic risk, defined as a country’s land exposed to inundation due to all other countries’ emissions. We show that for 6 m of global SLRC, the two non-island countries with the highest extrinsic risk are predicted to lose 27 % and 15 % of their own land, yet contributed less than 1.1 % each to the emissions driving SLRC. We anticipate that our findings will directly inform policy discussions in international climate negotiations by identifying the relative degree of country responsibility and risk associated with sea-level rise.

Developed and developing world contributions to climate system change based on carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide emissions

One of the key issues in international climate negotiations is the formulation of targets for emissions reduction for all countries based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. This formulation depends primarily on the quantitative attribution of the responsibilities of developed and developing countries for historical climate change. Using the Commuity Earth System Model (CESM), we estimate the responsibilities of developed countries and developing countries for climatic change from 1850 to 2005 using their carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide emissions. The results indicate that developed countries contribute approximately 53%–61%, and developing countries approximately 39%–47%, to the increase in global air temperature, upper oceanic warming, sea-ice reduction in the NH, and permafrost degradation. In addition, the spatial heterogeneity of these changes from 1850 to 2005 is primarily attributed to the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in developed countries. Although uncertainties remain in the climate model and the external forcings used, GHG emissions in developed countries are the major contributor to the observed climate system changes in the 20th century.

Energy Audits in a Private Firm Environment -- Energy Efficiency Consultantss Cost Calculation for Innovative Technologies in the Housing Sector

During recent international climate negotiations like in Paris 2015, the European Union agreed to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. Policy-makers target the residential sector as a major user of fossil energy because potential to improve the energy efficiency in existing houses is observable. Energy audits have been implemented to offer information to homeowners within the aim of reducing the uncertainty concerning energetic refurbishment. Nevertheless, the impact of energy efficiency consultants (EECs) on retrofit measures is described as low in the literature. We conducted an online survey on German EECs, emphasizing their personal attitudes and contextual conditions, analyzing the implementation of an exploratory energy audit and providing recommendations for improving energy audits. The EECs answered the questions regarding the personal factors in a highly confident way. We explain this using the market framework in Germany, which requires a high-level performance due to the competition on the EEC market. The contextual conditions are evaluated critically, with about 49% expressing concerns about acquiring and managing financial resources for energy audits. The case study showed that EECs recommend innovative technologies to a limited degree, while the upfront costs are estimated very low. Finally, in the survey, the respondents prioritized an information policy improvement.