Innate Linguistic Knowledge Research Articles

Unifying Physical Interaction, Linguistic Communication, and Language Acquisition of Cognitive Agents by Minimalist Grammars

Cognitive agents that act independently and solve problems in their environment on behalf of a user are referred to as autonomous. In order to increase the degree of autonomy, advanced cognitive architectures also contain higher-level psychological modules with which needs and motives of the agent are also taken into account and with which the behavior of the agent can be controlled. Regardless of the level of autonomy, successful behavior is based on interacting with the environment and being able to communicate with other agents or users. The agent can use these skills to learn a truthful knowledge model of the environment and thus predict the consequences of its own actions. For this purpose, the symbolic information received during the interaction and communication must be converted into representational data structures so that they can be stored in the knowledge model, processed logically and retrieved from there. Here, we firstly outline a grammar-based transformation mechanism that unifies the description of physical interaction and linguistic communication and on which the language acquisition is based. Specifically, we use minimalist grammar (MG) for this aim, which is a recent computational implementation of generative linguistics. In order to develop proper cognitive information and communication technologies, we are using utterance meaning transducers (UMT) that are based on semantic parsers and a mental lexicon, comprising syntactic and semantic features of the language under consideration. This lexicon must be acquired by a cognitive agent during interaction with its users. To this aim we outline a reinforcement learning algorithm for the acquisition of syntax and semantics of English utterances. English declarative sentences are presented to the agent by a teacher in form of utterance meaning pairs (UMP) where the meanings are encoded as formulas of predicate logic. Since MG codifies universal linguistic competence through inference rules, thereby separating innate linguistic knowledge from the contingently acquired lexicon, our approach unifies generative grammar and reinforcement learning, hence potentially resolving the still pending Chomsky-Skinner controversy.

Generative coda

Generative grammar has its beginnings in the late 1950s with the work of Noam Chomsky and emphasizes innate linguistic knowledge, or Universal Grammar. Children use their innate knowledge and, on the basis of the language they hear spoken, also known as the E(xternalized)-Language, come up with a grammar, also known as the I(nternalized)-Language (see Chomsky 1986: 19–24). Generative grammar focuses on the ability of native speakers to speak and understand grammatical sentences.

To What Extent is the Innate Linguistic Knowledge Involved in Second Language learning?

<p>A number of theoretical possibilities regarding UG and L2 learning have emerged in recent years. Some theories lend support to the fact that UG plays a role in L2 acquisition, where as other hypothesis claims that L2 learners have no access to UG. In this paper, a detailed explanation of these hypothesis in the light of different studies shall be presented, and the claim that L2 learners have no access to UG is falsified by studies that prove the opposite.</p>

Maturation: For better or for worse?

Meisel has argued in favour of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis (FDH), a version of the Critical Period Hypothesis, for L2 acquisition. Most particularly, he has proposed that maturational changes in domain-specific, language learning mechanisms are in evidence as young as four years of age. In a nutshell, the proposal is that for certain domains of morphosyntactic acquisition, if exposure to a language does not begin before 4;0, the developmental sequences will be different from (2)L1, and more like adult L2. Thus, even early child L2 (cL2) can be characterized as fundamentally different from (2)L1 because the configuration of internal learning mechanisms used to develop certain linguistic domains differs between these populations. The FDH, like all critical period hypotheses, casts maturation of the language making capacity (LMC to adopt the same terminology as Meisel) in a negative light. In other words, the system is not only changing, it is changing for the worse: what was once possible is no longer possible, such as mastery of a gender system or alleged error-free acquisition of gender. However, neuro-cognitive maturation need not be considered synonymous with a decline in the LMC in all respects. What I focus on in this commentary is the research evidence supporting a maturational perspective that points to how some domains of the system can change for the better. I would like to argue in agreement with Meisel that neuro-cognitive maturation could result in fundamental differences between cL2 and (2)L1 learners. But, at the same time, I would like to highlight reasons why “difference” should not be treated as a euphemism for “deficit”. Maturational proposals are, of course, not restricted to L2 acquisition, but have also been put forward for L1 acquisition (e.g. Rizzi 1993/1994, Wexler 1998, 2003). Given that in the first five years of life, infants/ children are undergoing extensive neuro-cognitive development, it seems only logical to consider that innate linguistic knowledge, together with domain-specific and domain-general learning mechanisms, might be un-

Rapid learning of an abstract language-specific category: Polish children's acquisition of the instrumental construction

Rapid acquisition of linguistic categories or constructions is sometimes regarded as evidence of innate knowledge. In this paper, we examine Polish children's early understanding of an idiosyncratic, language-specific construction involving the instrumental case - which could not be due to innate knowledge. Thirty Polish-speaking children aged 2 ; 6 and 3 ; 2 participated in a elicited production experiment with novel verbs that were demonstrated as taking nouns in the instrumental case as patients. Children heard the verbs in sentences with either masculine or feminine nouns (which take different endings in the instrumental case), and were tested with new nouns of the same and of the opposite gender. In both age groups, a substantial majority of children succeeded in generalizing from one gendered form of the instrumental case to the other (especially to the masculine), thus indicating that they have some kind of abstract understanding of the instrumental case in this construction. This relatively early abstract knowledge of an idiosyncratic construction casts doubt on the view that early acquisition requires innate linguistic knowledge.

The nativist perspective on second language acquisition

Two central questions in SLA research are (i) what are the properties of an L2 grammar that give rise to observed performance, and (ii) how does an L2 learner arrive at that grammar? Three arguments are offered to support the view that answers to these questions cannot be achieved without assuming that L2 learners have innate linguistic knowledge that determines the form their grammars take: constraints on grammars that are specifically linguistic, the non-randomness of the features that learners identify in constructing grammars, and selective persistent divergence from native speakers on properties for which there is positive evidence in the input.

Can innate linguistic knowledge be eliminated from theories of SLA?

The extent to which it is possible to eliminate the assumption of innate linguistic knowledge from a theory of second language acquisition is considered briefly. The agreement-with-subject possibilities of copula be discussed by O’Grady (this issue) are reconsidered, and it is suggested that there are some problematic data for a non-linguistic linear processor. It is also argued that some emergentist accounts of the acquisition of plural marking and agreement make assumptions that are tantamount to innate linguistic knowledge. Finally, it is proposed that an appropriate model of input is an important component of a nativist theory of second language acquisition.

A Construction-Based Analysis of the Acquisition of East Asian Relative Clauses

Why are crosslinguistic generalizations like the noun phrase accessibility hierarchy (NPAH) relevant to our understanding of language acquisition? The answer to this question relies on our view of language universals. In generative linguistics, it is commonly assumed that language universals are based on innate linguistic knowledge. In this approach, languages share some of their basic grammatical properties because the core of human grammar is innate (Crain & Pietroski, 2001). However, this view of linguistic nativism is incompatible with what we know about the neurological foundations of the human mind: Although language has genetic prerequisites, it is biologically implausible that these prerequisites consist of prespecified categories and constraints (Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997).

Universal grammar and syntax/phonology parallelisms

I consider a set of putative parallels, often said to be given by UG, between phonology and (what is typically taken to constitute) syntax. These include the claim that syllable structure and sentence structure exhibit serious linguistic parallels [Pierrehumbert, J., 1990. Phonological and phonetic representation. Journal of Phonetics 19, 375–394; Durand, J., 1995. Universalism in phonology: atoms, structures and derivation. In: Durand, J., Katamba, F. (Eds.), Frontiers of Phonology. Longman, London, pp. 267–288; Carstairs-McCarthy, A., 1999. The Origins of Complex Language: an Inquiry into the Evolutionary Beginnings of Sentences, Syllables and Truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford]; the claim that featural composition of phonological and syntactic objects is a specifically linguistic phenomenon, constituting a significant, specifically linguistic, parallelism between such objects; the claim that phonological constituents, like syntactic constituents, may be recursive; the claim that phonological heads are genuinely parallel to syntactic heads (and, relatedly, that phonological objects also contain specifiers, modifiers and complements: [Anderson, 2006; van der Hulst, H., 2000. Modularity and modality in phonology. In: Burton-Roberts, N., Carr, P., Docherty, G.J. (Eds.), Phonological Knowledge: Conceptual and Empirical Issues. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 207–243]); and the claim [Charette, M., 1991. Conditions on Phonological Government. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge] that the notion c-command plays a role in both syntax and phonology. We counter all of these claims. We also argue that the notion ‘movement’ as appealed to in syntactic analysis has no analogue in phonology. We then set these arguments in the context of a more general discussion of the nature of universality and the relationship between phonological knowledge and (allegedly) innate linguistic knowledge.

Progress, but not a full solution to the logical problem of language acquisition

MacWhinney argues that the logical problem of language acquisition is no longer. It was a problem back in the 1970s when the guiding premises of the field were that language structure is highly abstract, that the child's input is a poor source of information about grammar, and that the child's learning mechanisms are inadequate to bridge the gap between the input the child receives and the grammar the child acquires. Now, however, we have new linguistic theories which show that language structure is not abstract but arises from cognition, and we have evidence that input is a rich source of information, and we have reason to believe that the child has a powerful array of learning procedures at his or her disposal. The gap between input and acquisition thought to exist in the 1970s has been closed, and thus, MacWhinney argues, there is no need to attribute innate linguistic knowledge to the child.

What Children Know When They Know What a Name Is

Nativist theories of language insist that an infant must possess some abstract concepts about the structure of language or, at the very least, some wordlearning biases to be able to acquire the sorts of skills and knowledge displayed by competent languagespeakers. A direct consequence of Cartesian epistemology, nativism limits the role of linguistic anthropology to validating its claim that children typically acquire language in essentially the same manner, regardless of the culture in which they are raised. It seeks to confine linguistic anthropology to the study of the socialization processes whereby children use their innate linguistic knowledge to become accepted members of their community. Linguistic anthropologists, in contrast, see field studies as a way of discovering what children in different societies actually learn about a language when they learn how to speak. In this nonCartesian approach, children are seen as learning how to do different kinds of things with wordshow to engage in the culturally significant actions that make up their communitys form of life. The case of proper names in AngloAmerican and Navaho culture is here examined as an illustration of the significance of this epistemological shift.

What Children Know When They Know What a Name Is: The Non-Cartesian View of Language Acquisition

Nativist theories of language insist that an infant must possess some abstract concepts about the structure of language or, at the very least, some wordlearning biases to be able to acquire the sorts of skills and knowledge displayed by competent languagespeakers. A direct consequence of Cartesian epistemology, nativism limits the role of linguistic anthropology to validating its claim that children typically acquire language in essentially the same manner, regardless of the culture in which they are raised. It seeks to confine linguistic anthropology to the study of the socialization processes whereby children use their innate linguistic knowledge to become accepted members of their community. Linguistic anthropologists, in contrast, see field studies as a way of discovering what children in different societies actually learn about a language when they learn how to speak. In this nonCartesian approach, children are seen as learning how to do different kinds of things with wordshow to engage in the culturally significant actions that make up their communitys form of life. The case of proper names in AngloAmerican and Navaho culture is here examined as an illustration of the significance of this epistemological shift.

Linguistics and psychology

1. GOALS Since the early sixties, the received view among generative grammarians has been that linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology. On this view, grammars constructed by linguists are hypotheses about psychologically real rules which are responsible for speakers' linguistic abilities and which are causally involved in the production of (some significant portion of) their linguistic behavior. Universal grammar (linguistic theory) is taken to be a theory of the role of innate linguistic knowledge in first language acquisition. I will argue for a different conception in which theories in linguistics are not psychological in this way. It is important to emphasize, however, that my critique of the received view is not an attack on mentalistic accounts of linguistic behavior, nor on cognitive psychology in general. Thus, one must distinguish the following claims: