Information acquisition activities, such as accounting disclosure, financial analysis, and marketing research, are major concerns in moder business administration. Business enterprises often invest enormous amounts of time and money in obtaining information for the various tasks of decision making. A growing literature is devoted to addressing the role of information in the production decision and the market structure. However, little effort has been devoted to understanding information acquisition as an essential part of business strategy.' The purpose of this paper is to analyze information gathering as a competition strategy of manufacturing firms and to examine its implications for the welfare of society. Li, McKelvey, and Page [13] and Vives [20] use a two-stage game model to study the information acquisition of oligopolistic firms. However, these authors ignore the strategic aspect of information acquisition. In both [13] and [20], firms are symmetric and produce a homogenous good. Therefore, the equilibrium is also symmetric: all firms gather the same amount of industrywide information. We generalize [13] in several ways. We allow firms to produce differentiated products, and to use the information they acquire to contest the product market. Moreover, the information in our model can be partly firm-specific and partly industry-wide. We adopt a convex information cost function more general than that of [13]. Therefore, [13] can be interpreted as a special case of the model presented here. Novshek and Sonnenschein [14], Gal-Or [6], Vives [19], and Li [12] study the possibility of trading or sharing the exogenous industry-wide information about demand. Okada [15], Fried [4], Li [12], Shapiro [18], and Seidmann [17] examine the incentive for disclosing exogenous firm-specific information about costs in an oligopoly.2 We extend the analysis in this literature
Read full abstract