Individualism in psychology is the claim that psychological states are taxonomized without essential reference to the environment of the subject possessing them; in other words, they supervene on the subject's intrinsic, physically specifiable, states. Whether or not David Marr's theory of early vision1 is individualistic is a question that has attracted a good deal of attention from philosophers. I have argued ([3], [4]) that Marr's theory is individualistic, despite seemingly persuasive arguments ([1], [2], [7]) to the contrary. Peter Morton, in a recent paper ([9]), disagrees. In this note I defend my interpretation of Marr's theory against Morton's criticisms, and argue that he fails to make a case for a non-individualistic construal of the theory. Marr's theory treats vision as the construction and manipulation of a series of data structures, culminating in a 3-D representation of the distal scene. The view that the theory is non-individualistic depends in part on the claim that (most of) these structures represent features of the subject's normal environment (for example, depth and surface reflectance). The argument from this fact to the claim that the theory taxonomizes visual states by reference to the subject's environment (i.e. non-individualism) depends on a further assumption that visual states and processes are taxonomized by reference to their representational contents. Let us say that the theory is intentional just in case this assumption is true. Interpreters of Marr, individualists and non-individualsts alike, have assumed that the theory is intentional in this sense (see [1], [2], [7], [10], [11]). If they are right, then the individualism issue can be settled by determining whether the contents assigned to the structures posited by the theory are wide (environment-specific) or narrow (supervening on the subject's intrinsic physical states, and hence shared by doppelgangers in any environment). Since the case for wide content is the stronger of the two, the non-individualist construal of the theory appears compelling.2 But if the theory is not intentional, then the dispute about content, while interesting in itself, leaves the individualism issue unresolved. In [3] I argued that Marr's theory of vision is not intentional.3 In his informal exposition of the various visual processes Marr typically charac-