Impact Of Power Structures Research Articles

How does the power structure affect the acquisition price and inventory decisions in the reverse supply chain

With growing concerns about environmental sustainability, reverse supply chains play a crucial role in recycling, remanufacturing, and reducing waste. Investigating the power structure’s impact on decisions related to acquisition prices and inventory management can provide insights into the integration of sustainable practices. This study analyzes a reverse supply chain with a supplier and a remanufacturer, in which the supplier provides the remanufacturer with sorted used cores. We investigate the acquisition pricing and inventory decisions under different power structures (supplierled Stackelberg model, remanufacturer-led Stackelberg model) through game theory analysis. We first establish the centralized model to explore optimal acquisition decisions and profit of the total system. Then we evaluate the acquisition quantity, wholesale prices, the profit of supplier and remanufacturer in the supplier-led model and in the remanufacturer-led model. Finally, the impact of power structure on the performance of supplier and remanufacturer are explored by numerical analysis, as well as the supply chain system. Our significant findings show that (i) the total profit of the supplier-led and remanufacturer-led reverse supply chain are less than the centralized model due to the double marginalization; (ii) the remanufacturer-led reverse supply chain is superior to the supplier-led model reverse supply chain; (iii) the selected grades in the supplier-led model is proved the same as that in the remanufacturer-led model, which could not been affected by the wholesale price; (iv) the greater the inventory risk (the uncertainty in demand), the greater the profit share for the remanufacturer (supplier) in the supplier-led (remanufacturer-led) model.

Impacts of power structure and financing choice on manufacturer’s encroachment in a supply chain

Impacts of power structure and financing choice on manufacturer’s encroachment in a supply chain

Impact of power structure on decarbonizing investment with uncertain innovation: A triple bottom line perspective

Investing in decarbonizing innovation allows a manufacturer to fulfill social responsibilities and maintain competitive advantages, but the stochastic nature of innovation may deter it from doing so. Apart from this intrinsic factor, power as an extrinsic element correlates with a manufacturer’s profit and therefore reshapes its innovation initiative. In this paper, we develop models with power in a dyadic supply chain to investigate the issues of whether a manufacturer should invest in uncertain decarbonizing innovation and how would power affect the investment incentive, firm profitability, consumer surplus, and system performance. First, we derive the conditions under which the manufacturer is profitable to invest under different power structures. Analysis of those conditions indicates that increasing the retailer’s power weakens the manufacturer’s incentive to invest. Second, we find that power benefits the manufacturer, but it may be detrimental to the retailer when investment happens. Moreover, a powerful manufacturer always harms customers, whereas a dominant retailer may not necessarily do. Third, we reveal that when the two firms have a balanced power, the economic performance of the system is higher than when either party dominates; however, this puts an acute strain on the environment due to the most carbon footprint. Finally, our triple bottom line analysis shows that, in equilibrium, the investment may result in a win–win–win or win–win–lose outcome for the firms (profits), consumers (people), and the environment (planet). In addition, these outcomes are more likely to arise as the manufacturer becomes powerful.

Hybrid Market with Product Competition: How Should a Green Product Survive?

In this study, we focus on the design for the environment practice where manufacturers incorporate the environmental concerns into new product development and explore how the green products with appealing environmental attributes can compete with substitutable normal products in the market. We investigate and compare two cases when the economic attribute of the green product is inferior (reduced quality) or superior (enhanced quality) to the normal product. Additionally, we examine how the power structure between two manufacturers (a green manufacturer and a normal manufacturer) can affect decisions on the pricing and the greenness degree. Our equilibrium analysis for different scenarios under different power structures between the two manufacturers highlights the critical role of green efficiency, which integrates consumers’ sensitivity towards the degree of the product's greenness and the cost coefficient of greenness. The impact of power structure, product quality, and important model parameters on the pricing and greenness decisions have also been analyzed, thereby providing meaningful insights for practitioners onto the sustainable manufacturing paradigm.

Impacts of financing mechanism and power structure on supply chains under cap-and-trade regulation

This paper develops a low-carbon supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained manufacturer and a capital-abundant retailer where bank loans and early payment are investigated. Under each power structure, there always exists a financing equilibrium, i.e., early payment. Compared with bank loans, early payment could produce lower carbon emissions and higher social welfare in the retailer-led power structure; but it damages environment and social welfare, and leads to the conflict between profitability and environmental goals in the manufacturer-led case. Finally, impacts of power structure on financing mechanism, carbon emissions, and performance are analyzed to provide more managerial implications.

The Impact of Power Structures and Pricing Methods on the Performance of Dual-Channel Low-Carbon Supply Chains

This paper considers a secondary low-carbon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one dual-channel retailer. The four game models of retailer in the two-channel unified pricing and separate pricing and the two power structures dominated by manufacturer and retailer are constructed. The paper analyzes and compares the choice of retailer pricing methods under the same power structure and the optimal decision of supply chain members under different power structures. Research shows that a retailer is more willing to choose separate pricing under the same power structure, and pricing methods have no effect on the manufacturer. Under different power structures, retailer gains more when he leads the supply chain. For the manufacturer, when the carbon emission reduction investment cost coefficient is small (large), manufacturer gains more when retailer (self) dominate.

Coordination of a Green Supply Chain with One Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers under Different Power Structures

The main objective of this research is to examine the role of power relationship in a two-level green supply chain which is made up of one shared manufacturer and two competitive retailers. We develop six game theory-based models to explore the members’ operational decisions in a supply chain taking into account three vertical power structures (Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) as well as two retailers’ horizontal power structure (Bertrand or Stackelberg competition). Then, we design a two-part tariff contract which can encourage the supply chain members to promote cooperation and eventually coordinate the decentralized green supply chain under each power structure. Lastly, to further discuss the impact of the green awareness of consumers and the greening cost on supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits, we employ some numerical examples to conduct sensitivity analysis. The main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the impact of power structure on the supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits mainly depends on the substitutability of the green products, the green awareness of consumers, and the greening cost for the manufacturer. Secondly, the more power the manufacturer has, the lower product greenness will be set. Thirdly, the consumer’s environmental awareness (the greening cost) positively (negatively) influences the manufacturer’s product greenness and wholesale price, the retailers’ sales prices, and the player’s profits under each power structure. Finally, the developed two-part tariff contract is practicable and beneficial for both the manufacturer and the two retailers.

Group Buying between Competitors: The Determinant of Power Structure

Competing firms may engage in group buying to benefit from quantity discount from the common supplier. There are two prevailing power structures in industry practice: Nash group buying in which two competing firms possess similar powers, and Stackelberg group buying in which one firm serves as the leader to initiate group buying contract. We investigate how the competitors' power structure affects their group buying behaviors and the performances of all stakeholders (including the supplier, the two firms, and the end consumers). Our paper is the first to study the impact of power structure on group buying between competitors in B2B context. We employ a game-theoretic framework in which two firms facing Cournot competition can group their purchase if it is beneficial over individual purchasing. As part of the framework, we model firms' group buying based on their endowed power structures. For each power structure, we derive equilibrium firm behaviors and characterize the conditions under which firms have a group buying incentive. We compare the group buying behaviors and performances across different power structures and demonstrate the determinant of power structure: Different power structures may fundamentally alter firms' group buying incentives. Furthermore, different power structures lead to different joint performance and neither form of group buying can dominate the others. Our results suggest that either Nash or Stackelberg group buying between competing firms may achieve Pareto improvement over individual purchasing in the sense that all the parties are better off. One distinctive insight is that when the two firms are highly asymmetric in their market bases, Nash group buying is unattainable due to severe co-opetition conflict and only Stackelberg group buying may be possible. Moreover, under certain conditions, the smaller-firm-led Stackelberg group buying (i.e., the smaller firm moves first and acts as the leader) can be Pareto optimal among all power structures.

The Impact of Power Structure on Sustainable Ecotourism at Chitral Gol National Park Pakistan

This research investigated the issues of power structure and government policies and its implementation towards sustainable ecotourism development in Chitral Gol National Park Pakistan (CGNP). Data was collected through unstructured questionnaires from staff members, community and tourists. The respondents were selected by using purposive sampling technique. Qualitative data techniques such as focus group discussion and in-depth interviews were conducted with the key stakeholders to explore the effect of policies, implementation and power structure on sustainable ecotourism. The results suggest that there is an imbalance of power structure and poor policy implementation that badly affect the sustainable ecotourism at CGNP. This study can be replicated in other National Parks to verify the findings of this study.

Impacts of Power Structure on Supply Chain with a Store Brand

In a framework where both power structure and consumer heterogeneity (brand loyalty and different willingness-to-pay for perceived quality) count, we study six noncooperative games (two Stackerberg and one Nash games with and without a store brand) between a national-brand manufacturer and a store-brand retailer. Our results contribute to the theoretical literature on store brand in four aspects: (a) revealing that the mechanism whereby store brands alleviate double-marginalization problem varies with supply-chain power structures; (b) finding that it is the power manufacturer with a low-loyalty national brand that suffers most from the store brand entry; (c) finding that a category follower retailer is more inclined to introduce its store brand than a power one, and should optimally position its store brand close to the low-loyalty national brand supplied by a power manufacturer; (d) showing that the store brand may lead the manufacturer and the retailer to be trapped in the prisoners’ dilemma.

The Impact of Power Structures on Supply Chain Enterprises with Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions

This paper focuses on analyzing the impact of power structures of supply chain enterprises on their carbon emission reduction decisions. First, three game models (Nash, Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are constructed according to members’ different bargaining power, respectively. Then, the optimal carbon emission reduction decisions and profits of supply chain enterprises in different game models are solved and compared. The research results show that supply chain enterprises have the lowest carbon emission reduction rate in Nash game, and their corresponding profits are the least. As for Stackelberg game, the carbon emission reduction rate as a leader is greater than that as a follower, but the profit as a leader is less than that as a follower. The total profit of the entire supply chain system in Manufacturer Stackelberg model is always greater than that in Retailer Stackelberg model.

Impacts of Power Structure on Sustainable Supply Chain Management

The present paper examines the manufacturer’s operational decisions, e.g., wholesale price and product sustainability level, the retailer’s operational decision, e.g., retail margin, and supply chain efficiency under three supply chain power structures: manufacturer Stackelberg, Nash and retailer Stackelberg. As a benchmark, we first obtain the equlibrium price and product sustainability level in a vertically integrated supply chain. Our analysis provides some interesting findings in a decentralized supply chain: (i) a dominant manufacturer (retailer) always benefits from its power; (ii) the entire supply chain earns the most profit from the Nash game, and the least from the retailer Stackelberg game, respectively; (iii) as the power shifts from the manufacturer to the retailer, product sustainability and retail price increase; (iv) dominant manufacturer does not necessarily imply low wholesale price that would benefit the retailer. Managerial insights are provided for the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively.

Impact of power structure on supply chain performance and consumer surplus

AbstractIn this study, we consider a game theory based framework to model power in a supply chain with price‐dependent stochastic demand and to investigate how power structures (dominant retailer, dominant manufacturer, or balanced power) and demand models (expected demand and demand shock) affect supply chain efficiency, members’ profits, and consumer surplus. We analyze all of the problems in this framework and characterize their equilibrium outcomes. In comparison, we demonstrate that a firm often benefits from its power except that a power manufacturer might suffer in a supply chain with isoelastic demand and additive shock. A balanced power structure is often conducive to the whole supply chain, but this structure might not perform very well in a supply chain with isoelastic demand and additive shock. Power structures and demand models act on consumers in much the same manner that they do on supply chain efficiency. In other words, consumers often prefer a balanced power structure and thereby do not profit from power retailers. Additionally, we find that the retail price can play a pivotal role in determining supply chain efficiency and consumer surplus. Specifically, the lower the retail price, the higher the supply chain efficiency and consumer surplus. In contrast, the service level has a less preeminent influence on both of them.

A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Power Structure on Party Politics and Regime Change in the Political Process: Focusing on main Political parties in Korea and the UK, 1979~1997

A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Power Structure on Party Politics and Regime Change in the Political Process: Focusing on main Political parties in Korea and the UK, 1979~1997

The effect of customer value and power structure on retail supply chain product choice and pricing decisions

Customer value in goods not only affect his purchase decision but also bring about a big challenge for retail supply chain management. A two-stage retail supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer is investigated in this paper. The manufacturer produces two substitute products which belong to two different generations while the retailer determines his product choice decisions and pricing policies with considering heterogeneous customer demand based on different customer value. The key issues faced by the retailer are which products to purchase, single or both? And how to make pricing policies in different power structures? From three different game theoretical perspectives, we found that the retailer's purchase decision criterions are based on two thresholds, and in each power structure the optimal pricing policies of manufacturer and retailer are obtained. In addition, the impact of power structure has been explored and it shows that different power structures have no effect on the retailer's product choice decision criterions and behaviors, however, they have a great influence on supply chain members’ pricing policies and performances. The revenue sharing contract achieves a Pareto improvement and makes a bigger pie, and the power structure determines the pie split between the supply chain members. Additionally, revenue sharing contract will not affect the retailer's purchase decision criterions and behaviors, either.

The impact of power structure on the retail service supply chain with an O2O mixed channel

While the Internet has provided a new means for retailers to reach consumers, it has fundamentally changed the dynamic of competition in the retail service supply chain. The mix of offline and online channels adds a new dimension of competition, and one central issue of this competition is the pricing strategy between the two channels. How to set prices for both online and offline channels? What is the impact of the supply chain power structure on pricing decisions and the performance? This research aims to address these questions by focusing on a retail service supply chain with an online-to-offline (O2O) mixed dual-channel. From the Supplier-Stackelberg, Retailer-Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretical perspectives, we obtain the optimal prices and maximum profits for both the retailer and supplier under different power structures. The analysis result provides important managerial implications, which will be beneficial to retailers to develop proper pricing strategies.

Impacts of Power Structure on Supply Chains with Uncertain Demand

In this study, we use a game‐theory‐based framework to model power in a supply chain with random and price‐dependent demand and examine how power structure and demand models (expected demand and demand shock) affect supply chain members' performance. We demonstrate that whether a firm benefits from its power depends on the expected demand model but not on demand shock model. A firm benefits from its power only for linear but not for constant elasticity expected demand. The impact of power structure on supply chain efficiency depends on the models of both expected demand and demand shock. With additive shock, supply chain efficiency is highest (lowest) when neither firm dominates for linear (constant elasticity) expected demand. With multiplicative shock, the supply chain efficiency is highest with a power retailer (manufacturer) for linear (constant elasticity) expected demand. The manufacturer always benefits from a reduction in demand uncertainty. However, the retailer loses (benefits) from demand uncertainty reduction for linear (constant elasticity) expected demand. With a power retailer, the retail price is always on the higher end for linear expected demand, and the customer service level is the lowest for constant elasticity expected demand. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer.

Macht in konfliktreichen Grossprojekten der Stadtentwicklung

Abstract The paper discusses the impact of power structures on large-scale urban development projects. These projects are characterized by the involvement of a large number of both private and public institutions, changing actor constellations and power asymmetries; thus they are appropriate for analyzing power relations in conflicts. By analyzing a waterfront development project in Buenos Aires, our explorative case study shows the relevance of different power resources during the planning and development process. Furthermore, it reveals the strategies of different actors and the exercise of power. Due to the outstanding importance of public discourse and communication within the professional elite, the paper highlights the complementarity of power and discourse. The management model of Puerto Madero uses a particular form of private-public partnership and demonstrates the changing power asymmetries and their impact on the planning process. Our results show that, despite the complete privatization of rea...