The understanding of a small war as a model of a colonial insurgency was a characteristic feature of the development of the military thought of European empires that were expanding their borders. The authors see this process as a reflection of discussions about the role of military authorities in ensuring the colonial order. Comparison of the Russian and British cases in the first third of the 20th century allows us to move beyond the traditional framework of the “Great Game” in studying the peculiarities of the use of military force in the eastern outskirts of the Russian and British empires. An analysis of the evolution of the military thought of these countries demonstrates that on the eve of the Great War, their professional military communities shared common ideas about the spectrum of priority potential threats to their security in Asia, giving priority to training personnel and officers in conventional conflicts. The study proves that in the Interbellum, the attitude of the military of the Great Britain and the USSR to small wars changed under the influence of new global ideological trends (nationalism, communism, pan-Islamism). We have succeeded in proving that, despite all the differences in ideological approaches and the methodology of analysis, both British and Soviet military thought came to the conclusion that in non-European theaters of small war, military measures represent only a part of the overall policy of appeasement of a particular territory and should be combined with social, economic and political measures designed to overcome the crisis of loyalty in relations with the native population.
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