Hypothetical Necessity Research Articles

Praxis and сriticism of action: reasoning about the role of hypothetical necessity in Aristotle

The article offers an interpretation of hypothetical necessity, which is important for understanding Aristotle’s future contingent events, based on praxis. For this purpose, the concept of becoming, the ways of expanding knowledge and the consequences for them of incomplete information about the conditions for the occurrence of future contingent events are used. Hypothetical necessity is the basis of praxis, where it is created by choice and decision, which allows us to see our actions not as absolutely contingent. It is difficult to indicate the absolute meaning of hypothetical necessity outside the theory of essence and becoming. But its difference from simple (metaphysical) necessity allows us to form a basis for criticizing actions that generate future contingent events. They are determined by the conditions that act in us and can change along with our ideas about the current situation, about the good and about the ways to achieve it. An act is not necessary, and not completely contingent, although it becomes necessary after its commission. The fact that a person himself does not control the formation of moral conditional necessity, and for him changes in opinions and preferences are usually spontaneous, contains the basis for criticism of the act. The latter is justified by speaking about the realization of the essence, and condemned by pointing to moral conditional necessity associated with dubious circumstances, for example, with delusions, prejudices, laziness, lack of will, etc.

Necessary Truths and St. Thomas Aquinas’ Definition of ‘Law’

Abstract What is the nature of law? The question that St. Thomas Aquinas answers in Summa Theologica I-II continues to be a crucial question in contemporary philosophy of law. Various scholars of jurisprudence attempt to identify the necessary features of law. Yet they struggle with the question, what kind of necessity is involved? Is it conceptual necessity? Metaphysical necessity? In this paper, I explore an alternative way of distinguishing different kinds of necessity that is found in Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. I argue that the three kinds of necessity simpliciter, from the formal, material, and efficient cause, and hypothetical necessity, from the final cause, are relevant for understanding how Aquinas’ definition of ‘law’—an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by the one who has care for the community, and promulgated—is a necessary truth. This historically interesting approach offers insights for contemporary jurisprudence.

Giant retroperitoneal liposarcoma with spread to the upper third of the left thigh

Background. Large tumors, such as giant liposarcoma, are a challenge for modern medicine because of difficulty of treatment and possible impact on functions of the adjacent tissues and organs. The review of this clinical case may help develop new strategies and approaches to treatment of similar pathologies. Purpose. Review of the clinical case has a goal to educate medical specialists and students by helping to expand their understanding of rare oncologic diseases and to prove high effectiveness of surgery in locally advanced types of retroperitoneal liposarcomas using the clinical case as an example. Materials and methods. Female patient C., 56 years old, sought for medical help in the clinical unit of State Organization «Grigoriev Institute for Medical Radiology and Oncology of the National Academy of Medical Sciences of Ukraine» in June 2021. The following diagnosis was established: retroperitoneal liposarcoma with spread to the left thigh, St. II–ІІІ сТ3N0M0. An en-bloc surgery (removal of the retroperitoneal tumor with mobilization of the left ureter, intraabdominal removal of the thigh part of the tumor of the left thigh from beneath the inguinal ligament) was performed after the standard preoperative preparation. The surgery went without complications. The wound healed primarily. The follow-up period of the patient was 16 months. Clinical laboratory examination did not show any local recurrences and distant metastases. Results. For retroperitoneal sarcoma, the goal of surgery is to achieve the complete resection of the tumor (R0). Partial removal (R2) tumor should be strongly avoided, as this has been demonstrated to have higher recurrence risk and a detrimental effect on oncologic outcomes. The tumor involvement of organs and structures does necessitate concomitant resection. Resection of one or more adjacent organs is carried out in 58–87% of all cases of primary RPS. Most commonly, ipsilateral nephrectomy and partial colectomy are also performed. In cases of hypothetical necessity of removing all adjacent organs, an extended or compartmental approach to resection is recommended. The main idea is to resect not only evidently affected organs but also surfaces to obtain circumferential «soft tissue margins». This approach is controversial but data from some sarcoma care centers in Italy and France indicate its effectiveness. Conclusions. Treating RPS in specialized centers of oncosurgery with surgical planning based on CT and MRI data is of vital importance, especially using assessment by related surgical specialists. In large RPS, achieving a classic R0 resection level is a challenge, even in a compartmental approach, therefore division of resections into R2 and R0/R1 is reasonable. The choice of approach determines success of the surgery due to the narrowness of the surgical field.

Plato onSunaitia

Abstract I argue that Plato thinks that asunaitionis a mere tool used by a soul (or by the cosmicnous) to promote an intended outcome. In the first section, I develop the connection betweensunaitiaand Plato’s teleology. In the second section, I argue thatsunaitiabelong to Plato’s theory of the soul as a self-mover: specifically, they are those things that are set in motion by the soul in the service of some goal. I also argue against several popular and long-standing interpretations, namely, thatsunaitiacorrespond to Aristotle’s idea of hypothetical necessity, thatsunaitiaare the ‘how’ in an explanation (whereas the true cause is the ‘why’), and that Plato’s causal views should be read through Aristotle’s fourfold schema. I conclude the article by surveying the history ofsunaitiaafter Plato’s usage.

The Ethics of Monadic Identity in Leibniz's Thought

The system of pre-established harmony proposed by Leibnizian ontology gives perspective to a Universe thought of as a perfect machine, or as a "perfect kingdom, governed by an absolute Prince". In this „best of all possible worlds”, the occurrence of evil requires an extremely thorough justification. With regard to the prospective motivation and argument in favor of existence of evil in the world, the ethical positioning of the human soul, conceived of as a superior monad, capable of true understanding and a reflection of divine grace, can also be outlined. What place, therefore, does evil occupy in the Leibnizian universal equation and how is it possible to embody it from the perspective of free will? In a system of such predetermined order, what possibility is there for the existence of freedom? In this universal order, what place does absolute necessity, hypothetical necessity and moral necessity occupy? And what is their connection with the essential cosmic logical, geometrical and metaphysical principles? Do reason, will, and power, as absolute features of the Godhead, contribute to guaranteeing the ethical responsibility of higher monads? How does Leibniz bring together the predetermination and typology of fatality expressed through the paradigms: fatum mahometanum, fatum stoicum and fatum christianum? "Divinity as the first agent and man as the patient and second agent" - is a Leibnizian interpretation of the relation of predetermination. Evil and free will are recognized only in the framework of hypothetical necessity. So, therefore, in the present work we will analyze, among other things, the Leibnizian interpretation of the ratio of predetermination, recalling the difference between being inclined and being forced in making a decision.

Mecanicismo y teleología: resonancias de la concepción aristotélica de lo viviente en la fenomenología de M. Merleau-Ponty

Se plantea una aproximación conceptual entre la caracterización de lo viviente en Aristóteles y Merleau-Ponty. Partiendo del concepto de necesidad hipotética, se sostiene la compatibilidad de causas materiales y finales en el corpus aristotélico, relacionando los tratados biológicos con De Anima y Metafísica. Siguiendo a Allan Gotthelf (1987), se afirma la irreductibilidad de los procesos orgánicos. Posteriormente se presenta la noción merleau-pontyana de forma y su análisis de la teleología. Se destaca la reivindicación de lo viviente en la fenomenología merleau-pontyana, en tanto prioriza las funciones sobre los elementos componentes, y explicita las deficiencias y ambigüedades explicativas de las teorías dualistas o reduccionistas clásicas. Finalmente, se concluye que Merleau-Ponty reconoce a lo viviente las mismas características distintivas que Aristóteles.

Morphological Response to Discharge Reduction in a Partially Abandoned Channel of the Catawba River, North Carolina, USA

Morphological Response to Discharge Reduction in a Partially Abandoned Channel of the Catawba River, North Carolina, USA

Freedom of Indifference: Its Metaphysical Credentials According to Crusius

In the history of philosophy, voluntarists—that is, philosophers committed to some version of the freedom of indifference—have worried about its metaphysical credentials, but only a few, at least to my knowledge, have attempted to argue for more than its mere existence. Freedom of indifference is the option to choose between opposites in a given situation. In this paper, I present the ambitious attempt of the German pre-Kantian philosopher Christian August Crusius (1715–1775) to argue for the claim that we have freedom of indifference as a matter of hypothetical necessity. The point is that, in his view, there can be no actual world without freedom of indifference. This is not a logical but a metaphysical truth. I argue that a possible (motivational) reason for Crusius’s choice to tread this slippery path is that he attempts to bestow some metaphysical dignity on the freedom of indifference. As a consequence, this metaphysical value of freedom of indifference shapes the relation between the divine and free, rational agents in a way that is completely different from a rationalist’s conception such as Leibniz’s. In this paper, I give a plausible interpretation of a metaphysical argument that has been neglected in the relevant literature.

Leibniz y la contingencia en los años previos al "Discurso de Metafísica"

Leibniz’s treatment of contingency proceeds by degrees and develops in parallel to the systematizations of his thought. In the time about the Confessio Philosophi, he sustains the idea of contingency on the possible as such, in the hypothetical necessity and in the divine creation. In the years previous to the systematization of the Discours de Métaphysique(1680-1686), Leibniz defends the idea of contingency through the following factors: the complete notion of substance, the infinite analysis of the truths and the first decree of the divine will.

The Symbiosis of Philosophy and Theology in Blondel’s Supernatural Hypothesis

Maurice Blondel’s philosophy makes strong claims about the theological enterprise. Namely, philosophy and theology achieve their fulfillment only in mutual dependence and both court superstition to the extent that they attempt self-sufficiency. This symbiotic relationship drives Blondel’s seminal work Action, which not only deduces a hypothetical necessity for the supernatural from a realist phenomenology but also establishes strictly philosophical exigencies with theological import: a true revelation in sensory signs, a historical Savior as Mediator, and a sacramental practice, a robust response to the Enlightenment critique of the Christian religion.

Hobbes’s De Corpore on Modalities and Its Contemporary Critiques

Hobbes considered as unambiguous and unproblematic his demonstration in De Corpore that every effect past, present or future is necessary, since it always requires a sufficient cause that cannot be sufficient without being necessary, so that nothing is possible which will not be actual at some time. Now, this approach to necessity and possibility was received by his contemporary readers as missing its aim. Two immediate criticisms of De Corpore by Moranus and Ward exhibit from this viewpoint an interesting difference as to their common argument that only hypothetical necessity can result from Hobbes’s premises. My essay relates this argumentative difference to the absence (Moranus) or presence (Ward) in the background of the free-will dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall. From there, I examine also different interpretations of the ‘hypothetical necessity-argument’ in the indirect critical reception of De Corpore, when the target is Hobbes’s necessitarianism in the controversy with Bramhall, based on significant material from his De Corpore project. Remarkably, although Leibniz agrees with Bramhall that Hobbes only proves a hypothetical necessity, Leibniz’s understanding of hypothetical necessity is not that of Bramhall. Another striking difference is displayed in the use of the ‘hypothetical necessity-argument’ by More, which as it were blurs the connection of the free-will issue with Hobbes’s general doctrine of causality.

The Demand for Systematicity and the Authority of Theoretical Reason in Kant

Abstract Kant’s notoriously unclear attempt to defend the regulative principle of systematic unity as the supreme principle of theoretical reason in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic has left its status a source of controversy. According to the dominant interpretation, the principle ought to be understood as a methodologically necessary device for extending our understanding of nature. I argue that this reading is flawed. While it may correctly affirm that the principle is normative in character, it wrongly implies that it binds with mere hypothetical necessity. I offer novel grounds for thinking that if reason’s principle is normative, then it binds agents categorically instead.

On Alexy's Argument from Inclusion

In a recent reply to Eugenio Bulygin's criticism, Robert Alexy puts forward an argument, which he calls the argument from inclusion, to show that normative arguments are necessary in defending the non-positivistic connection thesis. In this paper, I will elaborate upon the structure of Alexy's argument and distinguish between two interpretations of the connection thesis: the first is that moral principles are necessarily incorporated into the legal system (the taxonomic connection thesis), and the second is that moral elements are necessarily included in the conditions of legal validity (the doctrinal connection thesis). I will argue that, first, the argument from inclusion cannot support the taxonomic connection thesis except by adding an auxiliary premise that leads to a doubtful over-inclusion, and second, it can sustain the doctrinal connection thesis only with the help of two additional arguments, i.e., the argument from hypothetical necessity and the correct balancing thesis.

Explanation and Hypothetical Necessity in Aristotle

Explanation and Hypothetical Necessity in Aristotle

Duns Scotus on Time and Existence: The Questions on Aristotle’s “De interpretatione.” by John Duns Scotus (review)

Reviewed by: Duns Scotus on Time and Existence: The Questions on Aristotle’s “De interpretatione.” by John Duns Scotus Allan Bäck John Duns Scotus. Duns Scotus on Time and Existence: The Questions on Aristotle’s “De interpretatione.” Translated with introduction and commentary by Edward Buckner and Jack Zupko. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014. Pp. xiv + 386. Cloth, $69.95. This book offers a translation of two short commentaries by John Duns Scotus on Aristotle’s On Interpretation. It comes with an introduction, notes, and a commentary. I think that this book would be difficult for a novice; perhaps the intended audience is someone with a general familiarity with medieval philosophy, although not necessarily with medieval logic. I do not think that someone just interested in general logical issues, such as existential import or future contingents, will find much to interest her here, despite some remarks in the commentary (e.g. 173). In the introduction, Buckner and Zupko discuss these commentaries and their place in Scotus’s corpus. It seems that they were written by Scotus himself rather early (4, 6–7). They omit some doctrines, such as “the synchronic conception of modality” (9), which Scotus endorsed later in his career (317–18)—although perhaps Scotus is just following earlier commentaries or the curriculum for which these commentaries seem to have been written. The introduction does a good job of placing these commentaries in their immediate historical context, though less so with the Greeks or Arabs. The notes too have references to other texts of Scotus and of his contemporaries, along with many translations of pertinent passages. The comments made on Scotus’s commentaries are generally helpful, in the mode of an explication de texte, although, to repeat, I think that a beginner would be often confused. The comments are not as helpful on logical doctrines. For example, Scotus’s second syllogism at 29 (7) does not look much like its rendition (175). Again, the translators do not consider the standard meaning of ‘perfect syllogism’ from Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 24b22–24 (277 n. 18). Also, the discussion of the role of the copula seems to miss the point. It would be helped by consulting some neglected secondary literature, like the last chapter of Bäck’s Aristotle’s Theory of Predication. Buckner and Zupko try to assimilate Scotus’s theory of predication to the current one (300). In doing so, they obscure some big differences, noted for example by Ignacio Angellelli in Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy. The Aristotelian inference ‘Caesar is a man; therefore Caesar is’ is not well-formed in Frege-Russell logic (52). The texts themselves do not seem to have much originality. If I compare Scotus’s commentaries on On Interpretation with earlier ones, for example, those of Abelard or Albert (or Avicenna), and with those of Greek commentators such as Simplicius or Ammonius, I find them rather elementary—aside from Scotus’s penchant for a complex structure. Like Aquinas, Scotus seems to follow the tradition of Boethius and Proclus/Ammonius, which was rather old-fashioned already with Aquinas. The translators suggest that Scotus was the first in medieval times to allow for “synchronic contingency,” “alternative possibility at a given time” (317)—not in this commentary but in his later writings. However, already Aristotle allows that a coat may or may not be cut up, now or in the future (19a12–13). So what is the innovation? Scotus has the position that future contingent statements are indeterminate in truth value (157)—a standard view from Ammonius onwards. In the commentaries, Scotus accepts the traditional medieval doctrine of those such as William of Sherwood that “if it is false that you are at Rome now, at t1, then it is necessarily false that you are in Rome at t1” (317–18). But all this amounts to is Aristotle’s doctrine of hypothetical necessity (19a23–27); in modern terms, if ├Φ, then├□Φ. In this way, contradictory statements about the present may both be contingent, absolutely, even though hypothetically only one of them is necessary. The translation is readable and reliable, although some technical doctrines, like that of a statement of...

ALEXANDER ON PHYSICS 2.9

Abstract In this paper, Bob Sharples considers a report regarding Alexander in Simplicius’Physics commentary, which touches on the problem of hypothetical necessity and how it relates to unqualified necessity. Simplicius seems to think that for Alexander, necessity imposed by matter is not purposive. This is why bricks do not necessarily give rise to a brick house. He here exploits the genuinely Aristotelian idea that form and end account for the matter, rather than vice versa; yet Alexander will have been motivated also by his opposition to the Stoics.

Eloquent Silence: The Doctrine of God in the Synopsis of Purer Theology

This article sketches the theological profile of the Synopsis Purioris Theologiae (1625) by focusing on its exposition of the doctrine of God. Earlier disputations by Leiden theologians Franciscus Junius (1545–1602) and Franciscus Gomarus (1563–1641) are discussed as a background for the theology of Antonius Thysius (1565–1640), the author of the disputation in the Synopsis on God’s nature and attributes. For a further specification of the doctrinal position presented in the Synopsis, it is contrasted with the more innovative accounts proposed by Jacob Arminius (1559–1609) in his disputation “De natura Dei” (1603) and by Conrad Vorstius (1569–1622) in his Tractatus theologicus de Deo (1606). This analysis yields the conclusion that both Arminius and Vorstius advocated a structural differentiation between God’s inner essence and his outward operations, which leaves room for human freedom and independence. While the Synopsis does not explicitly discuss their views, in its own formulations itmaintains the common Reformed orthodox notion of divine simplicity, and keeps the balance between—on the one hand—the (hypothetical) necessity of God’s foreknowledge and decree, and—on the other hand—the contingency and freedom in the created world.

Necessidade e contingência do efeito da causa primeira: uma comparação entre Tomás de Aquino e Avicena

O presente artigo trata do caráter contingente ou necessário da relação causalentre a causa primeira e seu efeito, tal como apresentada por Avicena e Tomás de Aquino.Para tanto, aborda o paralelismo no tratamento da inteligência e vontade divinas por partede ambos os autores. Ambos aceitam que Deus conhece a si mesmo e, conhecendo-se,conhece aquilo que lhe é distinto. Aceitam igualmente que Deus quer ou ama a si mesmoe, querendo a si mesmo, quer acidentalmente o que lhe é distinto. No entanto, discordamcom respeito à necessidade ou contingência do mundo. Para Avicena, o mundo é possívelem si mesmo, mas “necessário por outro”. Para Tomás, que Deus queira o mundo comnecessidade hipotética corresponde mais à necessidade do querer divino, sem que issodetermine a contingência ou necessidade do mundo. Com efeito, na visão tomista, épreferível um universo no qual haja mescla de necessidade e contingência, pois isso representamelhor as múltiplas perfeições divinas.

Aristotle on Natural Slavery

Abstract Aristotle's claim that natural slaves do not possess autonomous rationality (Pol. 1.5, 1254b20-23) cannot plausibly be interpreted in an unrestricted sense, since this would conflict with what Aristotle knew about non-Greek societies. Aristotle's argument requires only a lack of autonomous practical rationality. An impairment of the capacity for integrated practical deliberation, resulting from an environmentally induced excess or deficiency in thumos (Pol. 7.7, 1327b18-31), would be sufficient to make natural slaves incapable of eudaimonia without being obtrusively implausible relative to what Aristotle is likely to have believed about non-Greeks. Since Aristotle seems to have believed that the existence of people who can be enslaved without injustice is a hypothetical necessity, if those capable of eudaimonia are to achieve it, the existence of natural slaves has implications for our understanding of Aristotle's natural teleology.

Iamblichus and the School of Ammonius, Son of Hermias, On Divine Omniscience

E. Tempelis: Iamblichus and the School of Ammonius207 Iamblichus and the School of Ammonius, Son of Hermias, On Divine Omniscience Elias Tempelis An original epistemological view of Iamblichus was used by Ammonius, Stephanus and an anonymous commentator in their discussion on divine omniscience.1 This view is actually what has been preserved from Iamblichus' own commentary In De Interpretatione. The Neoplatonic school of Ammonius offers a possible account of God's experience of the world, which is conceptually defensible. Even though the views of Ammonius, Stephanus and the Anonymous Commentator on the subject are expounded in their commentaries In De Interpretatione2 they argue that the laws of 1 In most cases several scholars have dealt with Ammonius, but within the framework of an attempt to determine Boethius' dependence on him regarding this metaphysical problem. As a consequence, similar or parallel ideas of other members of this school, like Stephanus or the anonymous author of the commentary In De Interpretatione, have received practically no attention. Ammonius (In De Interpretatione 122ff.) was first mentioned by J. Orelli (Alexandri Aphrodisiensis de Fato Quae Supersunt, etc. [Zürich 1824] 335) as a source for Boethius' metaphysics with regard to the concept of necessity. F. Klingner ("De Boethii Consolatione Philosophiae," Philologische Untersuchungen, A. Kiessling and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, eds., vol. 27 [Berlin 1921] 1 1 1) repeats the argument. H.R. Patch ("Necessity in Boethius and the Neoplatonists," Speculum 10 [1935] 401) and P. Courcelle ("Boèce et l'École d'Alexandrie," Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire 52 [1935] 208) refer to Ammonius' distinction between simple and hypothetical necessity. P.T.M. Huber (Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicher Vorsehung und menschlicher Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius [Zürich 1976] 52-3) correctly argues that the doctrine of the twofold necessity was not applied by Ammonius to his own discussion about divine providence and free will. Cf. R.W. Sharpies, "Temporally Qualified Necessity and Impossibility," LCM 3.4 (1978) 89-91. For a detailed examination of the parallels among Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius, see Courcelle (above, this note); Courcelle, "Les Lettres Grecques en Occident, de Macrobe à Cassiodore," Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, vol. 159 (Paris 1948) 268ff.; Huber (above, this note) and L. Obertello, "Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius on Divine Knowledge," Dionysius 5 (1981) 127-64. 2 Ammonius, In De Interpretatione 128.15-135.25; Stephanus, In De Interpretatione 34.5- 208Syllecta Classica 8 (1997) the Aristotelian syllogisms are superficial and not founded upon facts. Thus they do not apply them to the Neoplatonic solution to the problem, which includes not only metaphysical, but also epistemological, ethical and physical considerations as well.3 Nevertheless, this does not mean that what can be said about divine omniscience violates the laws ofhuman logic in general. Ammonius' and Stephanus' arguments should be conceived within their attempt to define the relation between God and the world.4 The answer to the inquiry about how God knows the world in a determinate way is to be sought on a metaphysical level with the assistance of the Iamblichean theory about the relation between the knowing subject and the object known. To start with, Ammonius and Stephanus examine the truth value of two opposing beliefs: Belief (a): The world is governed by fate or the providence of the divine. Therefore, everything in the world occurs determinately and by necessity. This is something which applies also to all eternal realities.5 Belief (b): Some things are produced by particular causes and happen by contingency. Human beings have a free will and, therefore, they ought to cultivate their education and virtue in order to act in a better way.6 Although Ammonius and Stephanus do not state it from the beginning, their main concern is to reconcile the two opposite views. Their argumentation will be pointing to the conclusion that even if God exercises providence, nothing in the material world occurs determinately and by necessity.7 Furthermore, the events 36.38, Anonymous, In De Interpretatione 55.6-56.14. Even though Stephanus generally depends on Ammonius (see R. Vancourt, Les Derniers Commentateurs Alexandrins d'Aristote: L'École d' Olympiodore, Etienne d'Alexandrie...