REVIEWS 767 a majorsource of camp 'recruitment'over the ensuingfiveyears -victimized mainlypeasants,when in factthey hit workersjust as hard, and fromlate I 948 onwardsaffectedwhite collaremployees even harder.The editorialapparatus is somewhat lacking. The book has an index of camp names and an index of personalnames, but incrediblyhas no subjectindex. Carol Flath'stranslation is not merely excellent, it is outstanding,but even here there are lapses. She is not always comfortable with social science terminology and quite unfamiliar with Russian terms drawn from Marxism. Thus her rendering (p. I44) of the Hegelian-Marxist concept 'negation of the negation' as 'double negative' unfortunatelynegates one of Ivanova's many wonderful uses of irony. There are some annoying inconsistencies in the translationof place names and the use of abbreviations.The Ministryof InternalAffairsis sometimes referredto as MVD and MIA within one and the same sentence. Readers who do not know Russian are very likely to assume that these are two different organizations only one of which is given in the List of Abbreviations on pp. ix-xi. Department ofSociology andAnthropology DONALD FILTZER University ofEastLondon Junila, Marianne. Kotirintaman asevejf1yttd. Suomalaisen siviilivdestdn ja saksalaisen sotavaen rinnakaiselo Pohjois-Suomessa I94I-I944. BibliothecaHistorica, 6I. SuomalaisenKirjallisuudenSeura,Helsinki,2000. 385 pp. Notes. Tables. Figures.Bibliography.Index. FM i6o.oo. MARIANNE JUNILA has written a pioneering study of an untypical episode of the Second WorldWar.As part of the Barbarossaoperation, a German army operated in northernFinland, alongside a substantialcivilian population, but the Nazi troops found a local population that was friendlyboth at officialand informallevels. This is a verythoroughpiece of research,combining extensive recordsfromboth sides,with evidence fromindividualswho lived throughthe experience. The evaluationof the sourcesis impressiveand itspossibilitiesand limitationsmade clear. The period of co-existence was not expected by either side to last long, since the offensivewould takethe Germansdeep into Russia. In fact, the Germans were halted close to the Finnish border, and for three yearsengaged in positionalwarfarethatrequireda largelogisticaland support network in Finland. For example, their headquartersin Rovaniemi, a small provincial town, had a permanent staff of 3,500, many billeted in Finnish homes. There was also a communication problem at the popular level -the number of ordinaryFinns with any facility in German was very limited, and on the German side, knowledgeof Finnishwas non-existent. The researchrevealsa remarkablesuccessinbuildingapositiverelationship thatworkedat alllevels, and lasteduntilthebreakingof relationsin September 1944. It was grounded on German official policy, laid down by Hitler, requiring undeviating respect by the troops for the local population, which was embodied in army standingordersand propaganda. It was facilitatedby the human relations skills of General Dietl, the local commander until his death in the summerof 1944, who was strictwith his men but forthcomingto 768 SEER, 79, 4, 2001 the Finns. On the Finnish side the Provincial Governor, K. Hillila was firm, but diplomaticin assertingthe rightsof the local population and had excellent relations with the German authorities. The variousjoint liaison committees thatwere establishedworkedwell. The soldiersenjoyed extra-territorialstatus in Finland, and hence were beyond the jurisdiction of the Finnish civil authorities,but althoughthe Germansrequestedto be given local controlover civil populations close to the front, this was alwaysrefusedby the Finns. The ensuing cooperation smoothed away basic causesof friction.In the autumn of 1941 one newly-arrivedGerman unit, facing an arcticwinterwith inadequate equipment, indulged in widespreadillegal requisitioningand looting, but this was quickly stopped and did not recur. On the whole the Germans were meticulous in paying for what they needed, compensating for damage, even agreeing to pay upkeep for the illegitimate babies of servicemen. Their presence brought a considerable economic boom, by hiring labour and servicesat high rates.At thegrass-rootslevel, theyprovidedmuch-appreciated suppliesunofficially,by tradingarmystoresand rationsforlocal farmproduce on a toleratedblackmarket.The Finnishauthoritieshad enforcedprohibition in north Finland, but the German soldiers had abundant alcohol and their willingness to share with, or sell it to civilians was a furtherpositive factor, though a constant irritantto the authoritieson both sides. The only low-level source of conflict was the inevitable drunken brawling between soldiers and civilians, and fatalities from this were remarkablyfew. Trafficwas a further source of trouble;the local people were quite unaccustomed to heavy motor traffic,and the Germanstended to claim absolutepriorityformilitaryvehicles which the Finnsdeclined to recognize, and therewere many accidents. These problemscould be settledby compensation. One obstinateproblemthat could not be resolved...