Homicide Law Research Articles

ΕΘΕΤΑΙ and Athenian Courts for Homicide in the Age of the Orators

T HE JUDGES who tried homicide cases at the Palladium and Delphinium courts in the era of Antiphon and Lysias have never been securely identified. The extant copy of Draco's homicide law (IG 13 104) seems to indicate that the traditional body of fifty-one ENpTat still judged homicide cases in the late fifth century, and the testimony of the orators and lexicographers suggests that the Ep*ETat maintained their ancient jurisdiction long after the date of the reinscription (409/ 8). Nonetheless, for over a century most scholars have assumed that, by 403/2 at the latest, trials for unintentional and justifiable homicide came before ordinary juries of the people. The role of aristocratic EpNwTat in the archaic regime has been often treated with great ingenuity, but in recent work the question of homicide jurisdiction in the age of the orators has generally been disregarded as a peripheral issue or a closed case. The prevailing view, that the ephetic courts were occupied by panels of ordinary dicasts chosen by lot from among citizen-jurors-what we may call the model-conforms to the received opinion on democratic reforms of the judiciary at Athens: the system of dicastic panels was, supposedly, an ancient innovation; by the late fifth century even the most archaic and formalistic procedures, where some practical qualifications would seem necessary, were nonetheless alloted to the layman. Much recent work on the extant homicide speeches, in fact, relies upon the assumption that expert logographers could expect to deceive a majority of the jurors on subtle legalities. Thus the competence of the homicide judges is a significant issue for the development of both democracy and rhetoric at Athens. It is the purpose of this study, therefore, to identify, as precisely as the evidence will allow, the judges who tried such cases as Antiphon 6 (Choreutes) and Lysias 1 (On the Murder of Eratosthenes). Adolf Philippi argued long ago that the traditional body of L(pTat, chosen from among the Eupatrids, was replaced by ordinary dicastic juries at the Palladium and (probably) the Delphinium in the reforms of 403/2.1 Half a century after Philippi, Gertrude Smith argued that the

A plea for rationality in the law of murder

It is generally agreed that the law of murder is in need of reform. The scope of the reform necessary has however become the subject of increasingly robust debate. The retreat from Hyam, it has been argued, leaves us with a law of murder which is both too wide and too narrow to justify the continued bifurcation of murder and manslaughter. believe this objection to be justified but consider equally that the substantive aims of a two-tiered law of homicide are not, as some believe, incompatible with doctrinal rationality. The task of criminal lawyers therefore must be to attempt to effect the necessary reconciliation of substance with form. I shall argue that central to this enterprise is the maintenance of the dividing line between intentional and reckless killings but that a definition of intention must be adopted which incorporates certain categories of risk-taking. As the definition now stands, the wrong categories are incorporated at the expense of the right ones.

Hermarchus,Against Empedocles

The standard histories give notice of a polemical treatise entitledLetters on Empedocles, 'Eπιστολικὰ. περὶ 'Eμπεδοκλέους (Diog. Laer.Vitae10.25) in twenty two books by Hermarchus, Epicurus' favourite pupil and successor. The work survives in some twenty fragments of more than probable ascription. The most important of these is an extensive extract preserved by Porphyry atDe Abstinentia1.7–12 on the origin in human history of justice, homicide law, and expiatory purifications, which has been the subject of much discussion. Porphyry himself never names the title of Hermarchus' treatise, though he makes it clear that it was in the form of a polemical attack on the views of Empedocles. A recent papyrus find gives the title not asLetters on Empedocles, but as φρὸς 'Eμπεδοκλέα (Against Empedocles). In what follows it will be convenient to show that this is no mere variant but in fact the original and correct form of the title, and to determine what can be known with certainty as a result about the make-up of the work.

Unintended murder and corporate risk-taking: Defining the concept of justifiability

The Film Recovery Systems and Ford Pinto cases are examples of the use of conventional homicide laws to prosecute harms arising out of business activities. When workers, consumers, or members of the public die due to the reckless conduct of corporations or corporate executives, one legal option available in many states is to charge the reckless parties with unintended murder. This article reviews the variety of definitions of unintended murder and applies these to examples involving corporate defendants. This analysis highlights a special issue in relation to corporate defendants—the role of risk assessment efforts in establishing culpability. Definitions of unintended murder, in relation to corporate defendants, must attend to both the mens rea of corporate decisionmakers and the justifiability of risks that result in death.

Codification of the law of homicide.

Codification of the law of homicide.

Michael Gagarin, Drakon and the Early Athenian Homicide Law

Michael Gagarin, Drakon and the Early Athenian Homicide Law

Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law

Journal Article Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law Get access Gagarin Michael, Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. 208 pp. $22.00. Irwin Merker Irwin Merker Rutgers-Newark Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Journal of Legal History, Volume 28, Issue 3, July 1984, Page 288, https://doi.org/10.2307/844705 Published: 01 July 1984

Israelite Homicide Law and the Term "Enmity" in Genesis 3:15

Biblical translation is partly science and partly the ex parte efforts of translators subtly to support their various theologies. Genesis 3:15 is a case in point. The Revised Standard Version (Protestant) translates it as: I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed; he shall bruise your head, and you shall bruise his heel. Protestant tradition sees Jesus as the ultimate “he” in 3:15c. The Catholic tradition elevates Mary to equal status here and, indeed, visitors to Catholic churches can often find statuary depicting Mary treading upon a serpent. Understandably, Jewish tradition has no use for either of these ideas. The new Jewish Publication Society translation (1962) has “they” and “their” for “he” and “his.” Because the three parties to this polite dispute have a heavy theological stake in their own interpretation, none of them has paid much attention to the rare and curious term ' eyvah that characterizes the relationship between Jesus or Mary, humanity and serpentkind.

Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law

Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law

Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law

Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law

Michael Gagarin. <italic>Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law</italic>. (Yale Classical Monographs, number 3.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. xvii, 175. $20.00

Journal Article Michael Gagarin. Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law. (Yale Classical Monographs, number 3.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. xvii, 175. $20.00 Get access Gagarin Michael. Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law. (Yale Classical Monographs, number 3.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. xvii, 175. $20.00. W. R. Connor W. R. Connor Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 87, Issue 4, October 1982, Pages 1057–1058, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/87.4.1057 Published: 01 October 1982

Negligence and Ignorance

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and to relate to each other two topics: (a) the admissibility of ignorance and mistake of fact as defences against negligence in crime; and (b) the inadmissibility of ignorance and mistake of law as defences against criminal charges. I am in (a) not concerned at all with torts negligence, only with criminal offences (whether common law or statutory) which can be committed negligently, where negligence suffices for liability, as in the law of homicide. This produces an untidy classification of elements, one or other of which is needed to provide the required mens rea (the exception of strict liability offences is here ignored): intention ( = purpose or aim), knowledge (or belief), recklessness and negligence. It is untidy, because the last does not belong on the same list as the other three, each of which can appropriately be called a state of mind in what we might say to be a positive sense, for each of them includes some degree of awareness of and/or attitude to relevant facts. If negligence is to be called (partly) a state of mind, it is so in a very stretched and negative way: to be told that a person was not attending to, thinking of or noticing something that he should have been is to be given some information, of a negative sort, about his state of mind, but it tells us very little, for it eliminates only one of an unlimited range of states of mind (in the positive sense). His not attending, noticing, etc., is equally compatible with his daydreaming (not attending to or noticing anything) and with his concentrating hard on something else. If negligence requires inadvertence, as is commonly maintained, then there was a state of mind which the agent should have been in but was not; if, as I would argue, it does not require inadvertence, then there was a state of mind which the agent should have been in, and maybe he was not in it, maybe he was in it. (In the present state of English law most offences of criminal negligence do require inadvertence, the notable exceptions being traffic offences such as careless driving. On the other hand, the proposal in the Law Commission Working Paper, No. 31 (1970) would not require it; the definition runs, ‘a person is negligent if he fails to exercise such care, skill or foresight as a reasonable man in his situation would exercise’. However, that is only a proposal; at present advertent negligence is rare in criminal law, although common in torts.) On this view, the questions are (1) whether his performance fell below scratch, (2) what are to be the excusing conditions for such a performance, and (3) if the answer to (1) is yes, whether his performance was covered by the excusing conditions.

A Better Kind of Hatchet: Law, Trade, and Diplomacy in the Cherokee Nation during the Early Years of European Contact

John Phillip Reid's latest book, A Better Kind of Hatchet: Law, Trade, and Diplomacy in the Cherokee Nation during the Early Years of European Contact, 1 is ostensibly a study of trade relations between South Carolina and the Cherokee Indians during the first third of the eighteenth century. But taken in conjunction with his earlier book, A Law of Blood. The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation, 2 the new book is, in truth, much more. At the deepest level, Reid's achievement in the two books is to suggest to white Americans, first, some ways in which our understanding of other more primitive peoples with whom we have come into contact has been limited; second, the wounds sustained by those other peoples as a result; and third, how the limitations upon our understanding of other cultures are simultaneously limitations upon our understanding of our own. In some respects, Reid's first book, A Law of Blood, resembles many earlier studies of American Indian legal systems, notably the classic study by Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence.' In his effort to understand the law of the Cherokee, Reid begins A Law of Blood in much the same way that Llewellyn and Hoebel began The Cheyenne Way-by describing the social and political context in which Cherokee law grew. Reid then proceeds, as did Llewellyn and Hoebel, to discuss various fields of substantive law, such as the law of homicide, the law of marriage, property law, the law of inheritance and status, international law, and the law of capture and adoption.

The Karen Ann Quinlan Case

<h3>To the Editor.—</h3> It is somewhat surprising to see a thinker of the stature of Richard A. McCormick, SJ, compound the confusion that already exists about the Karen Ann Quinlan case. The tone of his editorial (234:1057, 1975) indicates that something occurred in her case that has very reprehensible overtones for the medical profession. For example, he speaks about the fear of malpractice, outmoded homicide laws, and intrusion into the patient-family-doctor relationship, all of which, he says, forebode great catastrophes for the medical profession. It is not clear what aspect of the case he is relying on to support this parade of horrors, but the opinion written by Judge Muir does not substantiate Fr McCormick's thesis. Father McCormick complains that the case did not belong in the courts in the first place. With this I would agree, with one caveat, which<i>supports</i>and enhances that relationship. In his 50-page opinion,

The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600

The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200-1600

Justifying “Wholesale Slaughter”

In a recent trial in the United States a physician was convicted of manslaughter during the performance of a hysterotomy on a woman pregnant from twenty to twenty eight weeks. Some members of the jury, in their deliberations, were much impressed by seeing a photograph of a fetus of about the same age. The experience apparently provided some jurors with reason to conclude that the fetus which did die during or immediately after the hysterotomy was a human being or a person or, at least, was so like a child that the killing of it was prohibited by the law of homicide. If being a human being is not the same as being a pre-natal progeny of homo sapiens, it is difficult to understand how one could “tell by looking” whether the fetus is a human being. But the sight of a fetus of twenty weeks or longer does, I think, tempt us to think that from a moral standpoint we ought to extend the same treatment to such fetuses, or virtually the same, as we extend to newborn babies and young children. The visual similarities between middle or late stage fetuses and newborn babies is striking.

Some Aspects of the Sudan Law of Homicide

The Sudan Penal Code (henceforth abbreviated as S.P.C.) was, with minor modifications, copied in 1899 from the Indian Penal Code (henceforth abbreviated as I.P.C.), which in its turn was to some extent based on 19th-century English criminal law. Since its enactment, the S.P.C. has been revised and re-enacted once in 1925, but no significant changes were then effected. Law makers in the Sudan are at present engaged in the revision and reformulation of the laws of the country in an attempt to bring them into line with the modern needs of a changing society. It is the feeling of the present writer that the field of criminal law warrants the least intervention or modification because the S.P.C has, in its 75 years of existence, been largely satisfactorily interpreted and applied, resulting in what could legitimately be called the criminal law of the Sudan. This, however, is by no means tantamount to saying that the Code is satisfactory in all aspects and that there is no room for improvement. At any rate, it is not intended to discuss in this article what possible changes should be brought about in the Code as a whole, a task which would evidently need much more time and space. It is merely hoped to discuss critically some aspects of the law of homicide as laid down in the Code (and applied by the courts). In so doing it is hoped to show that in some respects the Sudanese law of homicide calls for modification of some of the provisions, while other provisions of the Code are so satisfactory that they may contribute to the resolution of problems faced by other legal systems.

Reforming the Law of Homicide

Reforming the Law of Homicide

The Nature of Premeditation in Athenian Homicide Law

An inscription (IG i2 115) consisting of a prelude and then of Drakon's law of homicide has long been known. The prelude dates it 409/8 B.C.; it was evidently part of the recodification of Athenian law carried out by Nikomakhos and a board of anagrapheis in most of the years 411/0–400/399 B.C. Drakon's law was on a separate stele, of which the upper part, probably about half, survives. In some period since Antiquity the marble was used as pavement, and the resulting wear has deterred study of it since the edition of 1867. Recently, however, R. S. Stroud has published a new edition of the code inscription and this has stimulated renewed interest in the Athenian law of homicide. Stroud has provided not only a new and much expanded text of the code but also some persuasive solutions to problems that have long perplexed scholars. The code deals with unpremeditated (μὴ ἐκ προνοίας) homicide. This very aspect—the precise scope of the code—receives, oddly, scant treatment. I propose to look into it.By scope I mean what sorts of homicide were covered by the extant portion of the code. Another, and I think inevitable, way of looking at this problem is to ask, Where did the missing portion of the code, dealing with premeditated homicide, stop, and where did the surviving portion start, i.e. where was the line drawn in Athens between premeditated and unpremeditated homicide? Thus stated, the question makes it clear that one cannot deal with the problem of premeditation in vacuo; it must be examined in the context of Athenian homicide as a whole.

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article:CRIMINOLOGY Controlling Delinquents. Edited by Stanton Wheeler.CRIMINOLOGY The Social Organisation of Juvenile Justice. By Aaron V. Cicourel.CRIMINOLOGY Studies of Female Offenders. By Nancy Goodman and Jean Price. A Home Office Research Unit ReportCRIMINOLOGY Aspects of Social Control in Welfare States (Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, Volume 2). Edited by Nils Christie.CRIMINOLOGY Collected Studies in Criminological Research, Volume 2. European Committee on Crime Problems, Council of Europe, StrasbourgCRIMINOLOGY Who is the Criminal? By Richard Oerton.CRIMINOLOGY Crime in New Zealand. Department of Justice, New Zealand.CRIMINOLOGY Fifth Research Conference on Delinquency and Criminality. Quebec Centre of Criminology.CRIMINOLOGY A Validation Study of Hewitt and Jenkins' Hypothesis. By Elizabeth Field.PENAL PHILOSOPHY The Ethics of Punishment. By Sir Walter Moberley.PENAL PHILOSOPHY Punishment and Responsibility. By H. L. A. Hart.PENAL PHILOSOPHY Law, Morality and Religion in a Seculbr Society. By Basil Mitchell.PENAL PHILOSOPHY The Responsibility of Criminals. By William Kneale.PENAL PHILOSOPHY Law, Liberty and Morality. By H. L. A. Hart.PENAL PHILOSOPHY The Enforcement of Morals. By Patrick Devlin.PENOLOGY Prison. By Michael Wolff.PENOLOGY The Effectiveness of Punishment and Other Methods of Treatment. European Committee on Crime Problems, Council of Europe, StrasbourgPENOLOGY No Easy Road. By Sallie Trotter.PENOLOGY Prisoners' Progress—from mailbags to maturity. By Merfyn Turner.PENOLOGY Capital Punishment: Developments 1961 to 1965.PENOLOGY Growth to Freedom. By Derek Miller.SOCIAL STUDIES The Delinquent Solution. By David M. Downes.SOCIAL STUDIES The Professional Task in Welfare Practice. By Peter Nokes.SOCIAL STUDIES Time of One's Own. By Pearl Jephcott.SOCIAL STUDIES Studies in Child Development: 11,000 Seven Year Olds. By M. L. Kellmer Pringle, N. R. Butler and R. Davie.SOCIAL STUDIES Four Years On. By Stan Gooch and M. L. Kellmer Pringle.SOCIAL STUDIES Adoption—Facts and Fallacies. By M. L. Kellmer Pringle.SOCIAL STUDIES Family Advice Services. By Aryeh Leissner.SOCIAL STUDIES The Community's Children. Edited by Jessie Parfit.SOCIAL STUDIES People of the Streets. By Tony Parker.PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY Crime and Insanity in England. Volume 1: The Historical Perspective. By Nigel Walker.PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY The Guilty Mind: Psychiatry and the Law of Homicide. By John Biggs, Jr.PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY Human Aggression. By Anthony Storr.PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY Psychology and Social Problems. By Michael Argyle.PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY A Study of Brief Psychotherapy. By D. H. Malan.PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY Group Analysis. Volume 1, No. 1: November, 1967. Edited by S. H. Foulkes.PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY Born to Trouble. By R. Lloyd and S. Williamson.THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES Studies in Environment Therapy (Volume 1). Edited by Arthur T. Barron.THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES Q Camp. Edited by Marjorie E. Franklin.THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES The Hawkspur Experiment. By David Wills.DRUGS Social Problems of Drug Abuse. Edited on behalf of the National Association of Probation Officers by Frank Dawtry.DRUGS Drugs and the Police. By Terence Jones.LAW AND THE POLICE A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750. Volume 4: Grappling for Control. By Leon Radzinowicz.LAW AND THE POLICE A History of Police in England and Wales, 900–1966. By T. A. Critchley.LAW AND THE POLICE Anglo‐American Criminal Justice. By Delmar Karlen, in collaboration with Geoffrey Sawer and Edward M. Wise.LAW AND THE POLICE Ransom: A Critique of the American Bail System. By Ronald Goldfarb.LAW AND THE POLICE Law and the Common Man. By C. H. Rolph.LAW AND THE POLICE Magistrates' Summary Jurisdiction—Guide to Powers of Punishment. By John A. Henham.LAW AND THE POLICE A Guide to Law and Practice under the Criminal Justice Act 1967. By David Napley.LAW AND THE POLICE A Short Guide to the Criminal Justice Act 1967. By Brian Harris.LAW AND THE POLICE Introductory Cases on Law and the Legal Process. By Bernard F. Cataldo, Cornelius W. Gillam. Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., John M. Stockton and Charles M. Weber.LAW AND THE POLICE Forensic Science. By H. J. Walls.MASS MEDIA The Press and the Protection of Youth. By H. Michaud and T. E. James.MASS MEDIA Attitude Formation and Change. By J. D. Halloran.BIOGRAPHY Romilly. By Patrick Medd.