The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted education and training which led academia to revise well-established instructional content and strategies. This report described and evaluated the curricular response of public health preparedness at Penn State to the COVID-19 pandemic. We describe an online, hybrid course focused on the development, approval, and dissemination of the SARS-CoV-2 vaccines. The course was offered in the spring of 2021 and covered real-time laboratory, public health, emergency management, homeland security, medical, and policy aspects of the vaccines. Additionally, we report the student evaluation results of those who completed the course. The median and mode scores for student evaluations were 7, on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest). Students enjoyed the instructors because they were employed in strategic positions and explained real-world challenges. Students reported the course as "timely" and "breaking down complex concepts into simple understanding." Penn State responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with an innovative course that developed students' real-time understanding of pandemic response. Students gained knowledge and skills relevant to the practice of public health. Based on the positive student feedback, the course will serve as a model for future classes on public health and emergency management.

In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act allowing the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all laws at the local, state, tribal, and federal levels to rapidly construct hundreds of miles of barriers between the U.S. and Mexico in response to heightened anxieties about the “war on terror.” Included in these waivers was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the legal anchor of the environmental review process for development projects on federal lands created during the Nixon administration. By 2008, border barriers were no longer legally required to undergo the NEPA review process. In its place, DHS instituted a non-legally binding review process called Environmental Stewardship Plans (ESP) that environmental advocates and other anti-border wall activists argue has little value in comparison to NEPA. However, prior to the 2005 waivers, certain portions of the border wall were constructed having undergone the initial stages of the NEPA process. In this article I analyze the two different environmental review processes for border barriers using the Arizona borderlands as a case study. Through processes of fragmentation , abstraction , and equivalence , I argue that the science as done through NEPA produces an accounting of the borderlands environment that fails to acknowledge true socio-environmental harms. I further present an “excavation” of the ESPs to understand how this process is conducted in the absence of NEPA. I suggest ESPs may be one avenue in challenging the expanding imperialism of the U.S.-Mexico border, as these documents are no longer tethered to any legal anchors.

In this paper, an innovative design of a silicon spiral drift detector (SDD) has been proposed. In this design, gaps under the SiO2 layer between the cathode rings are kept constant, with a minimum value to reduce the surface leakage current. The cathode pitch profile Pr as a function of radius r is allowed to change in an arbitrary way to achieve the optimum field distribution. The concept, design considerations, modeling and electrical simulations have been carried out for this novel structure with a hexagonal spiral silicon drift detector. Using one-dimensional analyses, we obtain the exact solution of the spiral design r=rθ with a near-arbitrary pitch profile Pr=P1rr11η, with η as an arbitrary real number. We also obtained the electric potential and field profiles on both surfaces of the detector. Using a Technology Computer-Aided Design (TCAD) tool, we made 3D simulations of the detector's electrical properties. The hexagonal spiral silicon drift detector has excellent electrical properties: a uniform electric field, smooth distribution of electric potential and electron concentration, and a clear electron drift channel. The distributions of the electric field, electric potential, and electron concentration are symmetrical and smooth, which is beneficial for applications in photon sciences (X-ray) and safeguards and homeland security (particle radiation). The theoretical work and simulation results serve as solid foundations for the detector design and the expansion of semiconductor technology.

Purpose Law enforcement agencies in the United States are relying on state fusion centers for intelligence to develop actionable, data-driven reports that increase efficiency and improve investigations in crime prevention and homeland security. This study assesses the extent to which artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) are increasingly shaping intelligence operations in law enforcement and the functions of state fusion centers in supporting intelligence-led policing (ILP). The reliance and integration of AI/ML is improving analytic accuracy, situational awareness and information and data sharing and collaboration among law enforcement and homeland security agencies. This study examines the state of contemporary academic literature, assesses AI/ML applications used in law enforcement and builds a conceptual and theoretical framework centered on ILP policing. It also relies on empirical data, case study applications, and DHS assessments to explore the degree to which AI-driven processes and analytics enhance criminal intelligence, investigative efficiencies, situational awareness and predictive policing. The analysis, while focusing on the opportunities and challenges of using AI/ML tools in law enforcement, also highlights the need for ethical governance, transparency and accountability when relying on advanced technologies for crime prevention and policing. Design/methodology/approach This study utilizes qualitative methods, including a thematic content analysis of government and think tank/practitioner reports as well as academic literature on the benefits, costs and ethical factors regarding variations in the implementation of AI/ML tools for law enforcement intelligence products and resource allocation. For cross-validation of operational outcomes, it examines publicly available information in the DHS Fusion Center Annual Assessment, Bureau of Justice Statistics, LEMAS and RAND Corporation assessments of intelligence-led policing. Findings Qualitative Results Federal and state sources report fusion centers and law enforcement agencies integrating advanced analytic and ML-enabled tools into each step in the criminal intelligence lifecycle process. However, ethical and structural challenges limit and constrain technology-driven narratives in fusion centers. Given these challenges, there is a consistent qualitative and thematic pattern: state fusion centers now function as criminal intelligence analytic hubs or resources that leverage the most contemporary analytic and data-driven tools for criminal intelligence and law enforcement investigations. Interrelated themes describe AI/ML technologies in terms of shaping, constraining and complicating the intelligence lifecycle in fusion centers and law enforcement operations. Seven specific themes emerged from latent coding are illustrated in the chart. Research limitations/implications There are limitations on the collection of quantitative data since DHS, leading think tanks and NGOs do not disclose specific figures on the proportion of AI/ML tools. The DHS Fusion Center Annual Assessment process monitors technology adoption and the growth of analytic capabilities throughout the national network of fusion centers; however, the specific quantitative statistics are not disclosed in public summaries (DHS, 2024). Second, publicly available data and information constitute the bulk of empirical sources. Consequently, this study relies primarily on qualitative narrative reporting, not quantitative performance metrics. Third, publication bias is likely present in industry and government sources as these reports may provide overly optimistic observations and conclusions while overlooking ethical dilemmas, failures and challenges. Moreover, qualitative thematic analysis could reflect broader structural narratives as opposed to empirical outcomes. Finally, since AI/ML adoption varies across fusion centers and according to technology levels, qualitative themes identified in this study must be read as representative patterns and not as universally generalizable. Originality/value Fusion center utilization of AI/ML technologies is as much an operational tool as it is a policy, governance and ethical challenge. Successful and professional use in support of law enforcement is about placing technological innovations firmly within institutional accountability and constitutional guardrails. On the one hand, AI/ML tools are enhancing analytical intelligence production by accelerating analytic workflows, predictive modeling and expanding data/information integration capabilities. AI/ML are extending ILP concepts by offering improvements in situational awareness and threat identification and operational efficiencies. On the other, substantial constraints hinder responsible use of these technologies. In the absence of standardized oversight frameworks, data-quality issues, algorithmic bias and the lack of professional development, workforce capacity and critical skills on the part of fusion center analysts will cancel the benefits of these tools.

Summary: Cooper University Health Care serves as the only Level I Trauma Center for all of southern New Jersey and is one of the busiest trauma centers in the region. Due to its high volume and expertise in surgery and critical care, Cooper has become one of the premier sites to train medical providers from every military branch, as well as multiple local, state, and federal government agencies and international partners. Cooper University Health Care’s Section of Military, Diplomatic & Field Surgical Affairs (MILDAF) provides the leadership and organizational support to successfully train a large variety of military and governmental medical personnel. In 2019, Cooper Health and the US Army Surgeon General’s Office established a military-civilian partnership to train Army medical personnel in trauma and critical care. Cooper was the first health system in the nation to provide training for Army trauma teams as part of the Army Medicine Military-Civilian Trauma Team Training (AMCT3) Program. Additionally, Cooper trains Army enlisted medical personnel as part of the SMART Program (Strategic Medical Asset Readiness Training Program) and Special Operations Combat Medics in support of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. In addition to military training, Cooper also helps train members of the Department of Homeland Security, medical personnel, Department of State Guardian emergency management specialists, and Department of Justice medical personnel. Cooper University Health Care can be the prototype of a successful military/governmental and civilian partnership by having 1) executive leadership support and direct reporting, 2) a hospital champion, 3) validated trauma volume, 4) infrastructure, 5) onsite embedded preceptors, 6) simulation/cadaver/live-tissue/research, 7) clear communication for deployment readiness, and 8) hospital staff buy-in and commitment.

This article considers how ad tech companies in the early twenty-first century developed an infrastructure and algorithmic experience that quantifies users as consumer subjects. From the start, these quantifications have been supported by the American security sector, but after 9/11 the Homeland Security state has increasingly appropriated these tools and their constructed subjectivities. The author looks at Gary Shteyngart’s Super Sad True Love Story (2010) and Jarrett Kobek’s Do Everything Wrong! XXXTentacion Against the World (2018) to analyze contemporary predictive analytics and the production and securitization of the “neoliberal data subject” after 9/11.

Radiation anomaly detection using continuous wavelet transform and Zernike moments.

Disaster exercises are a vital strategy for enhancing Emergency Medical Services (EMS) operational preparedness. This study aimed to extract “Golden Keys” for Design, Implementation and Evaluation of earthquake exercises aligning these key components with the internationally recognized Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) Framework from the perspective of experienced Iranian prehospital technicians. A qualitative study was conducted using a directed content analysis. Data were systematically gathered through in-depth semi-structured interviews with 11 prehospital technician that purposefully selected based on their demonstrated expertise in prehospital exercise management. Data analysis was conducted in five steps following Granheim and Lundman’s approach and the study used Lincoln and Guba’s recommendations to assess data trustworthiness. After multiple rounds of data analysis and summarization 386 initial codes, 13 subcategories, and five main categories were identified. These main categories included “Exercise Foundation and Program Governance”, “Exercise Design, Coordination, and Control”, “Operational Implementation of the Exercise”, “Performance Evaluation and Capability Assessment” and “Learning, Workforce Empowerment”, and “System Improvement”. Earthquake preparedness exercises must be sustained as an ongoing effort to enhance prehospital system resilience. The indicators identified in this study provide an actionable, evidence-based framework for EMS managers and policymakers to design, implement, and evaluate exercises aligned with system priorities. Translating exercise outcomes into actionable evidence facilitates informed decision-making targeted resource allocation and evidence-based policy formulation. Future research should focus on contextualizing this framework within localized programs and conducting quantitative validation of the proposed indicators.

Can I check a pulse? I'm a physician! As an emergency medicine physician, my duty is to care for individuals in distress regardless of their political affiliation. However, that clip has served as a startling reminder of a shift in federal policy. It highlights the departure from established understandings that health care spaces should be treated as neutral ground, protected from law enforcement action that interferes with medical care. Medicine in the United States has been grounded in the principle of medical neutrality [2]. This principle emphasizes the necessity of noninterference with medical care regardless of political circumstance. While medical neutrality is often considered in the context of war, it applies even in domestic political conflict or unrest. The United States previously came under scrutiny regarding interference of medical care during the 2020 George Floyd protests [3]. At that time, police destroyed tents with medical equipment intended to provide care for individuals who were peacefully protesting. The Declaration of Geneva, which informs professional oaths around the world, obliges physicians to not allow political affiliation, legal status, or nationality to intervene in their duty to their patients [4]. This oath has worked in a parallel understanding with government institutions that medical care takes priority. Until recently, federal policy reflected that understanding. In 2011 the Director of ICE, John Morton, issued a memorandum outlining restrictions on searches, arrests, interviews and surveillance in certain sensitive locations including hospitals, to avoid “unnecessarily alarming local communities” [5]. In 2021 Secretary of Homeland Security, Alejandro Mayorkas, reinforced that policy, establishing protected areas from ICE enforcement including healthcare facilities due to concerns of how enforcement activity may prevent patients from seeking necessary care [6]. That guidance was rescinded on January 20th, 2025 in an announcement by Secretary of Homeland Security, Benjamine Huffman, citing concern that the former policy restricted agents from ensuring domestic safety [7]. The new policy encourages agents to exercise common sense when enforcing federal law. Since this reversal, there have been numerous stories of ICE activity near schools and churches, prompting increasing concern for the safety and sanctity of other previously “sensitive” locations including healthcare spaces. An incident of a California emergency department nurse being prevented from triaging a patient in visible distress by agents without identification highlights the dangers of allowing ICE to exercise their own judgment when enforcing federal law in healthcare settings [8]. The video of agents preventing a physician from caring for Renee Good only furthers that concern, that healthcare will not be treated as a neutral priority above all else. The impacts of the shift in federal policy go beyond any individual circumstance and could potentially extend into our workplaces, where we are entrusted with providing care for everyone. Patients fearing detainment may delay seeking care or opt to forgo treatment altogether [9]. Those decisions carry public health consequences from untreated infectious diseases to unchecked chronic illness. These interactions may divert providers from clinical care and create ethical conflicts between professional duties, patient privacy, and law enforcement demands. Several professional organizations have warned about these risks, issuing statements and creating resources to assist healthcare providers in navigating encounters with ICE agents [10]. While these efforts are incredibly valuable, they're incomparable to federal policy that establishes protections for patients. Individual providers cannot be expected to carry the consequences of policy shifts nor negotiate these ethical conflicts in moments of crisis. Reinstating protections for health care spaces will reaffirm the necessary principle that medical need, not legal status, should determine priority. The concern raised by the footage of Renee Good's death is not simply whether a physician should have been allowed to intervene but rather if the United States will protect spaces where human vulnerability is most acute and where interference comes with irreversible consequences. When medical neutrality erodes, trust follows. The sustainability of the medical system is put at risk when clear boundaries are not drawn to distinguish it from a site of law enforcement activity. Health care must remain a space where the dignity, safety, and health of our patients come before all else. Amna Nawaz: writing – original draft, conceptualization, writing – review and editing. The atuhor declares no conflicts of interest. Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

Abstract A frequently asked question about government-funded research and development (R&D) projects is: What is the return on investment (ROI)? We initially addressed this question by conducting a benefit–cost–risk analysis (BCRA) and adapting it to 25 R&D projects funded by the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The net benefits and the associated benefit-to-cost ratios were mostly high for transitioned and used projects. Still, substantial uncertainty remained about the benefits of projects in transition that had not yet been implemented or put to use. Conducting BCRAs on cybersecurity R&D poses additional problems. First, many cybersecurity R&D projects are at a low technology readiness level (TRL). Second, the benefits of cybersecurity are the avoided risks and damages, which are very uncertain. Our objective is to provide a proof-of-concept demonstration of a novel BCRA methodology that accounts for uncertainties in the cybersecurity R&D domain. The innovative methodology described in this paper consists of conducting a BCRA, assuming that the cybersecurity R&D projects will be successfully transitioned and implemented, then discounting the net benefits by the probability of success. Both BCRAs employed a methodology that includes a decomposition of the projects' costs and benefits, characterization of uncertainty through subject-matter expert (SME) assessments, and Monte Carlo simulation via an Excel Add-In to account for uncertainty. We applied this methodology to two cybersecurity projects funded by the DHS. The primary benefit of the first project was automating malware detection, thereby saving time and labor costs. The benefits of the second project were to enhance early detection and removal of malware, thereby reducing the risks and costs of cyberattacks. The BCRA methodology provided estimates of the mean net benefit over 5 years and the benefit–cost ratio for each cybersecurity project. More importantly, the innovative BCRA methodology using Monte Carlo simulation yielded a distribution of net benefits for each project over its expected lifespan, as well as break-even analyses for both projects to achieve positive net benefits.

ABSTRACT While adversaries operationalize generative AI for financial fraud, infrastructure attacks, and influence operations, the U.S. homeland security apparatus responds with voluntary frameworks and process-oriented measures. This study examines this critical governance gap through qualitative content analysis of 23 documents including federal strategies, audit reports, congressional testimony, and industry frameworks (January 2023–June 2025). Drawing on Beck’s risk society theory, the analysis reveals a fundamental mismatch between exponentially evolving AI threats and linear bureaucratic adaptation. Federal agencies default to managing calculable social harms – bias, fairness, transparency – while ignoring incalculable security threats. Government audits confirm systematic failures: DHS lacks implementation plans for its AI strategy three years post-drafting; financial regulators cannot legally examine AI vendors processing trillions in daily transactions. This constitutes what Beck termed “organized irresponsibility”—conscientious proceduralism that masks collective security failure. Misaligned institutional incentives and incompatible stakeholder risk definitions reinforce this pattern.The temporal dimension proves particularly damaging: AI capabilities double every six months while policy cycles require 18–24 months. The evidence shows systematic inability to match adversarial innovation with defensive adaptation, not isolated failures. Without fundamental reconceptualization from voluntary to mandatory security controls, including proposed red-teaming requirements and procurement mandates, current trajectories point toward systematic defensive failure by 2027, when AI-enabled attacks on critical infrastructure will be limited only by adversary imagination rather than technical constraints.

One of the fundamental reasons why history is so important is that it essentially provides access to a vast collection of “lessons learned” accessible to those willing to study and understand them. In the realm of international relations, national defense, homeland security, regional geopolitics, strategic foresight, and societal resilience, history becomes essential. This article undertakes a brief literature review in order to understand whether professionals continue to regard “lessons learned” as a valuable tool. Furthermore, it includes a comparative analysis of recent wars and their aftermath, in order to address a central question – which are the challenges we can expect to face and how will the world look like once the war in Ukraine reaches its conclusion? Historical evidence suggests that, regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, we will be looking at a much more volatile security environment throughout the world. This will be due, especially, to the proliferation of emerging technologies, new military equipment and the new expertise developed in the war in Ukraine, which will be exported worldwide.

Abstract Background Migrants detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are thought to have a high risk of preventable infectious diseases due to crowding and poor healthcare access. Prior studies had limited data access and none report post-pandemic trends. We assessed epidemiologic patterns of three vaccine-preventable diseases across ICE facilities. Three month sliding average of case rate (per 100,000 person-months) over time stratified by reporting detention facility from 2019 through 2023. Seasonal analysis of variations in facility-level case rate by month from 2019 through 2023. Bar plots of mean facility-level incidence per year and grouped by month. Panel A. Case rate of influenza; Panel B. Case rate of mumps; Panel C. Case rate of hepatitis A. Note: Variation in Y-axis scale dependent on disease panel. Panel A. Case rate of influenza on linear scale; Panel B. Case rate of mumps on linear scale; Panel C. Case rate of hepatitis A on linear scale; Panel D. Case rate of influenza on log scale; Panel E. Case rate of mumps on log scale; Panel F. Case rate of hepatitis A on log scale. Black line is mean facility-level case rate with a shadow of the standard deviation. Note: Variation in Y-axis scale dependent on disease panel. Y-axis axis on log scale. Methods We obtained ICE detainee data on influenza, mumps, and hepatitis A from January 2019–October 2023 from the Department of Homeland Security for 20 centers. National influenza data came from CDC FluView. Case counts were aggregated monthly, and case rates estimated using annualized average daily populations. Outbreaks were defined as clusters of three or more monthly cases within a facility. We characterized case demographics, system- and facility-level trends, seasonality, outbreaks, and geospatial patterns. Number of outbreaks and outbreak cases over time across the system from 2019 through 2023. Bar plot of number of facilities with active outbreaks per month and line plot of number of system-level outbreak cases over time. Panel A. Case rate of influenza; Panel B. Case rate of mumps; Panel C. Case rate of hepatitis A. Note: Variation in X-axis and Y-axis scale dependent on disease panel. Spatial distribution of average case rate (per 100,000 person-months) from 2019 through 2023 at facility level. Choropleth map of averaged case rate per disease at facility level with circle size and color corresponding to case rate. Panel A. Case rate of influenza; Panel B. Case rate of mumps; Panel C. Case rate of hepatitis A. Note: Variation in legend. Results From 2019–2023, 2,035 influenza cases were reported, averaging 35.1 cases monthly (range: 0–276). The average facility-level case rate was 19.4 cases per 100,000 person-months [P-M]; range: 0–1009.1). December had the highest average facility-level case rate (25.6 cases) and July the lowest (2.7), paralleling national trends. Across 15 facilities, 79 outbreaks occurred involving 1,739 cases with an average duration of 2.5 months (range: 1–13). For mumps, 252 reported cases averaged 4.3 monthly (range: 0–61). The average facility-level case rate (per 100,000 p-m) was 1.4 (range: 0–160.2). June had the highest average facility-level rate (1.3) and February the lowest (0.8); 16 outbreaks across 8 facilities involved 177 with an average duration of 1.8 months (range: 1–6). For hepatitis A, 486 cases were reported, averaging 8.4 monthly (range: 0–40). The average facility-level rate (per 100,000 p-m) was 5.2 (range: 0–273.4). July had the highest average facility-level case rate (5.5) and November the lowest (0.8); 33 outbreaks across 11 facilities involved 158 cases, averaging 1.2 months (range: 1–2). No geospatial clusters were observed. Conclusion ICE detainees have high rates of vaccine-preventable infectious diseases with wide variation across facilities. ICE vaccination campaigns and improved facility procedures could reduce disease burden, protecting migrant and staff health. Disclosures All Authors: No reported disclosures

BackgroundPockets of unvaccinated communities leave children vulnerable, even in areas with overall high vaccination rates. Schools are one of the most susceptible environments for measles outbreaks. This study used 2023-2024 Colorado School & Child Care Immunization Data to predict potential measles outbreaks in schools, providing actionable information to guide prevention and mitigation strategies.Figure 1:SIR Epidemic Curves of Proportion of Facility Population Infected by Day of Outbreak, Stratified by Type of FacilityTable 1:MMR Up-To-Date Rates and Proportion of Children Infected at Each School, Stratified by Type of SchoolMethodsSchool-level immunization data was drawn from Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment annual reports. We developed a deterministic, compartmental Susceptible Infected Recovered model to simulate spread within schools following the introduction of 1 measles case. School-aged children with two MMR doses were estimated to have 97% protection, whereas children in schools or childcare centers with one dose were estimated to have 93% protection. We assumed a fixed contact rate of 95% and recovery rate of 10% (i.e. R₀ = 9.5) for each infection during the outbreak with a 90 day duration.Figure 2:Median Proportion of Infected Students after 90-day Simulated Outbreak Among CO Schools in 9 Department of Homeland Security All-Hazard RegionsFigure 3:Maps of MMR Vaccination Rates and Modeled Measles Outbreaks Across ColoradoA. 2023-2024 Colorado K-12 Schools 2 Dose MMR Up-To-Date % by CountyB. 2023-2024 Colorado Childcare/Preschool 1 Dose MMR Up-To-Date % by CountyC. Geospatial Colorado Statewide Plot of Simulated School Outbreaks by MMR Up-to-Date Rate and Proportion of School Infected by End of 90 Day OutbreakD. Geospatial Colorado Statewide Plot of Simulated School Outbreaks by MMR Up-to-Date Rate and Total Number of Infected Children by End of 90 Day OutbreakResultsSimulated outbreak size in 2,524 Colorado facilities ranged from 0.04-99.99% of the specific school population (Figure 1). Proportion infected over the outbreak differed between school types with highest median outbreak size in childcare centers (Table 1). 71% of infections in childcare centers occurred in the first 14 days of the outbreak with only 33-35% in K-12 schools during that time. Median outbreak size also differed across state regions from a median of 0.6% infected in the South to 4.7% in the West region (Figure 2). When plotted geospatially, outbreaks infecting large portions of the facility occurred across the state, even in well vaccinated counties (Figure 3).ConclusionChildcare centers are more susceptible to larger and more rapid outbreaks compared to K–12 schools, underscoring the need for prompt mitigation strategies. Private K–12 schools are more at risk relative to public schools, likely due to higher vaccine exemption rates. Notably, large potential outbreaks were observed even in the densely populated Denver Metro area, despite high overall immunization coverage. These findings highlight the limitations of using aggregated state or county-level vaccination data to assess outbreak risk and indicate that children in and around affected schools remain vulnerable.DisclosuresAll Authors: No reported disclosures

Abstract Nigeria's intricate post-colonial journey continues to present a complex tapestry of challenges and opportunities for nation-building. The persistent struggles with national cohesion, aggravated by deep-seated historical grievances, diverse ethnic identities, and significant regional disparities, underscore the critical need for robust national security frameworks. Intelligence agencies, by their very nature, are pivotal in this endeavor, providing foresight and actionable insights essential for safeguarding national interests and fostering a unified society. The nation's security landscape, marked by multifaceted threats such as the enduring Boko Haram insurgency, widespread banditry, and recurrent ethnic conflicts, demonstrably highlights the urgent imperative for effective intelligence collaboration as a cornerstone of sustainable nation-building efforts.ReferencesAchebe, C. (1983). The Trouble with Nigeria. Fourth Dimension Publishing.Adamu, A., & Mohammed, A. M. (2018). Banditry and Kidnapping in Nigeria: A New Dimension of Insecurity. Nigerian Army Resource Centre.Agbiboa, D. E. (2014). The politics of insecurity in Nigeria: A critical analysis of the Boko Haram insurgency. Aljazeera Centre for Studies.Amnesty International. (2021). Nigeria: ‘We are living in fear’: Attacks on rural communities in Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara states. Amnesty International Report.Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), 77-101.Creswell, J. W. (2013). Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. Sage Publications.Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press.Falola, T., & Heaton, M. M. (2008). A History of Nigeria. Cambridge University Press.Fukuyama, F. (2004). State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press.Gill, P., & Phythian, M. (2012). Intelligence in an Insecure World. Polity Press.Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge University Press.Human Rights Watch. (2020). World Report 2020: Nigeria. Human Rights Watch.International Crisis Group. (2017). Nigeria: Containing the Crisis in the Middle Belt. Africa Report N°264.Johnson, L. K. (2005). Blowing the Whistle on the CIA: An Insider's Tale. Yale University Press.Kohn, H. (1944). The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background. Macmillan.Lewis, P. (2007). Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria. University of Michigan Press.National Research Council. (2004). National Security and Homeland Security Enterprise: Emerging Challenges and the Role of the Department of Defense: Proceedings of a Workshop. National Academies Press.Obasanjo, O. (2011). My Watch: Political and Military Affairs. Olusegun Obasanjo Foundation.Olowu, D. (1993). An analysis of the performance of the Nigerian civil service as an institution for promoting economic development. African Administrative Studies, 40, 23-44.Omotola, J. S. (2010). The National Question and the Crisis of Political Leadership in Nigeria. Spectrum Books.Osaghae, E. E. (1998). The Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. Indiana University Press.Schwandt, T. A. (2000). Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry: Interpretivism, hermeneutics, and social constructionism. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 189-213). Sage Publications.Scott, W. R. (2000). Institutions and Organizations. Sage Publications.Smith, A. D. (1986). The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Blackwell.Suberu, R. T. (2001). Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria. United States Institute of Peace Press.Usman, S. (2015). Nigeria's Security Sector: Issues, Challenges and Options. Centre for Democracy and Development.Yin, R. K. (2018). Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods. Sage Publications.

The Emergence of the Shallow State and the Capturing of Twitter

PharmD Degree: A Case for STEM Designation.

Redefining the Homeland Through Visual Propaganda in Contemporary America (Abstract)

Gelatin-based hydrogels as a novel medium for efficient recovery of organic explosives from post-blast residues: A forensic perspective.

Objective. The purpose of this article is to analyze and describe the current state of preparedness of special military operation veteran teachers for pedagogical interaction with children with disabilities in the context of teaching the subject "Fundamentals of Homeland Security and Defense." Methodology and Methods. This article was written using methods such as analyzing regulatory documents, summarizing theoretical materials, and analyzing practical experience. The research methodology was informed by conceptual principles of special education and psychology, inclusive approaches to education, and professional training of teachers. Results. The article reveals the current state and challenges of preparedness of special military operation veteran teachers to work with students with disabilities in the context of teaching the subject "Fundamentals of Homeland Security and Defense" within the context of implementing inclusive approaches that involve co-educating children with disabilities with children without such disabilities. The article identifies the deficits associated with this type of preparedness, and suggests ways to overcome these problematic tendencies.