The Guise of the Good: A Philosophical History by Francesco Orsi (review)

Bas van Fraassen’s ‘Constructive Empiricism’, first presented in The Scientific Image, has rightly stimulated widespread, searching discussion and rejoinder. Yet something very fundamental remains to be appreciated about his Constructive Empiricism and how he advocates it. I say ‘advocates’ advisedly, not only because van Fraassen’s view is voluntarist, in exactly the voluntarist strain of fideism tracing back to Augustine, but because his core strategy is quasi-pyrrhonist. To exhibit how so, and why it matters philosophically, I first briefly review some main Pyrrhonian tropes, the Dilemma of the Criterion and Pyrrhonism’s key basis step (§2).² I then summarise my reasons for suggesting that van Fraassen constructs his ‘new’ empiricism with quasi-Pyrrhonist equipollence strategies (§3). To substantiate my suggestion, I recount van Fraassen’s empiricist stance (§4), his own sceptical tropes (§5), and the key basis step of his Constructive Empiricism (§6). I conclude by reflecting philosophically upon method, scepticism, and the philosophical importance of philosophical history (§7). Despite the ‘retreat’ from The Scientific Image announced in an appendix to Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective,³ the same basic Pyrrhonist tendencies persist throughout van Fraassen’s empiricist stance. Van Fraassen, of course, calls his view ‘the empirical stance’, yet he is chronically cavalier or mistaken about so many central empirical matters that his stance is not empirical, but throughout is merely an empiricist stance redux.

The article attempts to examine both philosophy itself and its historical legacy in the status of «history of philosophy» through the prism of philosophical-historical and cultural-historical understanding. To strengthen the academic role of philosophy and vividly illustrate the given topic, a monograph by contemporary Ukrainian thinker S. Taranov was taken into consideration. Various attempts to interpret the history of philosophy as a component of the system of humanities knowledge and outside this context are considered, with a focus on the cultural horizons of historical knowledge as such. The role and influence of the philosophical system of knowledge on the formation of the cultural field in different historical eras is emphasized. The special value of the philosophical worldview in forming a holistic view of man, the world, and the perspective of their existence in comparison with other fields of knowledge is emphasized. A number of promising directions in the genesis of the ontological heritage of fundamental questions of philosophy, which «wander» from era to era and appear on the agenda of the historian of philosophy, are outlined. The role of history and historical methods in the process of renewing philosophical knowledge is highlighted. A separate layer of analysis is the problem of the secularization of cultural space and its inevitable influence on the established traditions of philosophical visions of personality and culture. Creative and innovative attempts by contemporary researchers of philosophy and its history to question some of the established views of academic philosophy on the history of culture are traced. A critical examination of the attempt to unify philosophical knowledge in the context of secular culture and the spread of destructive relativism. An attempt to outline the main provisions of the cultural and ethical code of the contemporary historian of philosophy. The interconnection and mutual influence of history and philosophy in their attempts at axiological analysis of contemporary cultural and historical processes are highlighted. The special philosophical status of man (as a subject of cognition) in the cognitive element of the human spirit as a witness, commentator, participant, and interpreter of history and cultural processes in history is emphasized. The methodological basis for the formation of both the philosophical and historical-cultural picture of the world was considered.

In his Novum Organum, F. Bacon put forward the idea of “prerogative instances” as a means of shortening the paths of putting forward and testing hypotheses. Bacon’s “prerogative instances” are considered in the research as a possible answer to J.S. Mill’s question about why in some cases one example is enough for complete induction, while in other cases even myriads of mutually agreeing examples are not enough for a reliable conclusion. It is shown how the assessment of “prerogative instances” and F. Bacon’s theory of induction itself changed among historians of philosophy and science throughout the 19th-20th centuries. The classification of “prerogative instances” carried out by F. Bacon is analyzed, and its weak points are identified. The author’s classification of “prerogative instances” based on F. Bacon’s ideas is proposed, and the possibility and prospects of alternative approaches to such classification are assessed. The place of “prerogative instances” in F. Bacon’s general theory of induction is considered. It is shown that some of them can be used before compiling the “tables of presence”, “tables of absence” and “tables of degrees” that form the basis of F. Bacon’s method of eliminative induction, another part should be placed in these tables, and the third part can be applied after the corresponding hypotheses have been put forward on the basis of the tables. A distinction is made between induction as a derivation of universal hypotheses from singular premises and induction as a method of empirical research that allows one to put forward and test generalizing hypotheses on the basis of individual facts. It is noted that the fair criticism of induction as an unreliable conclusion was unjustifiably transferred to induction as a method in the post-positivist philosophy of science of the 20th century. The possibility of using “prerogative instances” as heuristic methods of putting forward and testing hypotheses, the effectiveness of which depends on the adopted metaphysical assumptions, is indicated in those modern theories of induction that reject the idea of constructing a universal inductive method.

Abstract By offering a fresh reading of several partially overlooked passages from Aristotle’s Metaphysics Μ and Ν, this article argues that the identification of Forms and ideal numbers in Plato is not presented as Aristotle’s own reconstruction. Instead, Aristotle sets forth what he takes to be Plato’s views. This reading enhances not only our understanding of the Academic debates with which Aristotle engaged but also his status as a historian of philosophy.

The philosophy of language is considered one of the most important achievements of the Austrian philosopher Wittgenstein in obtaining a philosophical report on logical thought through the path taken by philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century in particular. It is a new approach in philosophy that made language a unique characteristic of logicians and dominated by the theory of meaning. However, the interest of philosophy in language is not a product of this era rather than what preceded it. However, research in the philosophy of language has come to occupy a prominent place in contemporary philosophy as it is a broad field in the search for conceptual knowledge and revealing the relationship between the form of language and its content, in addition to establishing deductive processes that may be about the structure of knowledge that can be established on the basis of what we know about the structure of scientific and logical language. The philosophy of the twentieth century witnessed a significant development in the various frameworks of thought, which was characterized by a clear rebellion against the idealist tendency within the framework of multiple schools and philosophies. From this, the contribution of philosophy and its impact on the idea of man as an existence and being in the twentieth century was a clear concern for most scholars in their quest to direct the world towards new activities of thought bearing conceptual differences through which they search for the nature of thought and the essence of the value it carries in its relationship with language in awareness of the reality of acquiring wide areas of cognitive confrontation with many of the problems that man experiences in his relationship with himself and his relationship with the outside world in intellectual transformations that have become the most accelerating in the world among the various philosophical trends and schools that arose on the ruins of what preceded philosophical history.

In December 2024, the journal Voprosy Filosofii hosted an interdisciplinary “round table”, The Intellectual Legacy of Daniil Mikhailovich Vellansky in the Con­text of Contemporary Problems of the Philosophy of Knowledge, dedicated to the 250th anniversary of the birth of this outstanding Russian philosopher, scholar, medical practitioner, and translator of scientific literature. Russian philosophers and humanities scholars – epistemologists, historians of philosophy, historians of medicine, philologists – discussed source-critical and historiographical prob­lems in studying Russian Schellingianism as a phenomenon of intellectual cul­ture; highlighted the significance of D.M. Vellansky’s conceptual constructions for the development of the philosophy of medicine; identified the fundamental foundations of his organic theory; focused on the reception of his ideas in Rus­sian philosophy and culture; and demonstrated his role as a scholar, teacher, and translator in disseminating philosophical and scientific knowledge in Russia. The participants also addressed the interdisciplinary character of his philosophi­cal and scientific interests, as well as the problem of ‘human-sizedness’ dimen­sions in the philosophy of science, the origins of which can be traced to Vellan­sky’s fundamental reflections. Despite disciplinary and conceptual differences, scholars involved in the discussion agreed that Vellansky’s intellectual legacy, like Russian philosophy of the 19th century as a whole, requires today a prob­lem-oriented reinterpretation and a revitalization of fundamental historical-philo­sophical research aimed at expanding our understanding of the epistemological style of Russian intellectual culture.

The phenomenon of diffraction is a key methodological notion for Karen Barad. This article elaborates on Barad’s comments about diffractive methodology and argues that the approach can be fruitfully applied to the history of philosophy. It deals with potential objections to this application, such as Barad’s rejection of “analogical reasoning” and the possibility that the history of philosophy does not represent a properly interdisciplinary context. Using as a case study the recent books on Lucretius by Thomas Nail, the article also describes three major consequences of extrapolating diffractive method to the history of philosophy: it promises to be more detailed, rigorous, and attentive to specialized arguments than competing “reflective” approaches; it implies that the objects of inquiry (the historical philosophers and their concepts) do not simply pre-exist awaiting representation by a historian or commentator; and the same point also applies to the subjects of inquiry or the contemporary philosophers themselves.

This article explores the theorization of the sovereign subject and human will in Wang Guowei's early essays on human nature, reason, and fate, as well as those on traditional Chinese thinkers and modern Western philosophers, written in the first decade of the twentieth century. The article explores this historical moment when many Western philosophical concepts first reached China, a culture with a philosophical tradition that does not seem to emphasize free will. Wang's original essays show that the idea of free will was not alienating to Chinese thinking, and he tried to integrate and confront related ideas in the two traditions to come to terms with a new discursive environment in which people were told they could change the course of history against a history suggesting otherwise. Wang tried to open up a new intellectual horizon by positing his own nonmetaphysical renjian 人間 (the human world) approach to human subjects, who are relational to each other but must also take their own responsibility seriously. This revisiting of a moment in China's philosophical history also reminds us how thinkers dared to offer new interpretations of their own intellectual legacy, in ways that could make fundamental cultural change possible.

First published in 1924, an Outline of Historiography embodies Li Dazhao's views on historical epistemology, which absorb the essence of traditional Chinese philosophy and the achievements of Western historical philosophy. This paper focuses on the main contents of Li Dazhao's historical epistemology, highlighting three major characteristics: taking historical materialism as the essential core, the macro - historical perspective as the process feature, and dynamic cognition as the dialectical thinking method. The study finds that Li Dazhao's historical epistemology not only provides a useful reference for the development of today's historiography and the construction of history discipline with Chinese characteristics, but also offers philosophical guidance for the shaping of individual outlook on life and the construction of beliefs in human development. By connecting early Marxist historiography with contemporary concerns, this study demonstrates the lasting academic vitality and social significance of Li Dazhao's theoretical heritage.

The legacy of the Russian philosopher and educator S. Hessen has been of active interest to historians of philosophy, education and culture in Russia and abroad for the last decades. One of the urgent tasks of modern Hessen studies should be considered the creation of a full-scale the thinker’s scientific biography on the basis of newly discovered archival materials, unknown and hard-to-access sources, memoirs of contemporaries, official documents of numerous émigré or­ganizations. A special role of epistolary is evident in these circumstances. S. Hessen’s letters preserved in various archives are an important source that makes it possible to reconstruct the details of the scholar’s biography and everyday life, to feel the atmosphere that surrounded him, to reveal the contexts and subtexts of his works. For the Prague period, such a source are the letters to N. Hans, a renown English expert in comparative education and a life-long friend of Hessen. Due to the fact Hessen’s archive was burnt down in 1944 during the Warsaw up­rising, the letters to Hans are of particular value. The correspondence began in 1923 after they met in Prague. The letters from 1926 to 1930 show the pecu­liarities of Hessen’s work as the editor of “Russian School Abroad” journal, his co-operation with European philosophical and pedagogical editions, his partici­pation in international scientific forums, his co-authorship of the English version of the book on the Soviet educational policy, and reveal the circumstances of his life in Prague, his family and financial problems, and etc.

The philosophy of history has a crucial role to play in understanding not only "what happened," but also "why and where" the direction of historical development. One of the figures who made significant contributions to the thought of historical philosophy in Indonesia was Tan Malaka. Tan Malaka presents a perspective on historical dynamics based on historical materialism, class struggle, and socialist vision. This research aims to analyses Tan Malaka's historical philosophical views systematically, especially related to the concept of direction of historical movement, the actors involved, and the purpose of the direction of the movement of history. The research method used in this study is a historical method with a qualitative approach, utilizing historical sources, such as Madilog, Naar de Republiek Indonesia, Aksi Massa, and others. Tan Malaka developed a philosophy of history based on dialectical materialism adapted to the conditions of the colonized society, emphasizing the importance of class conflicts, the power of the masses, and revolution as the main drivers of history. The concept of "100% independence" is at the core of his thinking which demands comprehensive political, economic, and cultural independence. His analysis of the internal contradictions of colonialism, the role of the inferior priayi, and the criticism of the incomplete revolution provides a critical perspective in understanding the history of Indonesia and contemporary issues that must be faced.

Over the centuries, historical and philosophical thought has developed various principles and methods for understanding the historical process, moving from objective-idealism and subjective-methodology to civilizationalism. This article discusses the application of heuristic methods and algorithmic patterns in historical philosophy. The aim of the article is to identify the advantages of the applicability of heuristic methods and algorithmic patterns, the use of which will contribute to conducting historical-philosophical research, also outlining the biases (or, in other words, flawed thinking) of heuristic methods, discussing and revealing the practical and theoretical consequences arising from them. In historical philosophy, there are a number of still unexplored and unexplored problems, and when there is a need to divide them into a predetermined structure and sequence for the purpose of analysis, historical-philosophical algorithms are developed, that is, precise instructions. According to this theory, all cognitive and cognitive processes can be analyzed or divided into algorithmic, semi-algorithmic, heuristic or semi-heuristic content. Heuristic methods and algorithmic patterns make it possible to best identify and compare the stages of development of the historical event under study, the changes that have occurred.

The article treats coexistence of philosophical schools at the pivotal turning points within the history of philosophy. V. P. Goran in his methodology, views such turning points as an integral part of the periodization of the history of philosophy, which implies determination of the historical-philosophical process within his framework. Dealing with historical-philosophical material, apart from Hegelian or Marxist discourse, allows for other interpretations, such as viewing different philosophical trends as philosophical traditions in conflict, with its outcome far from being predetermined. It is thus demonstrated that dependence of historical-philosophical reconstruction on philosophical stance of an historian of philosophy, enables representations of alternative scenarios characterizing pivotal turning points in the history of philosophy, which is not without its relevance in continuing “turns” of the modern age.

Yury Dombrovsky’s critical legacy is relatively small — at least, judging by the materials available or known to exist to date. This publication, then, appears all the more important: following almost 90 years of oblivion, it reprints his review of a seminal novel of the 1930s, Yury Tynyanov’s Pushkin. Dombrovsky’s review appeared under the pen name D. Yuriev. It is inexplicably missing from all of the writer’s collected works. While not offering truly eye-opening observations, the review is nonetheless of interest because it features Dombrovsky’s ideas about the Soviet historical novel and gives insights about his views of literature and reading list of the day. It seems that, at the time, Dombrovsky the critic was guided by a set of ideologically charged premises he must have believed to be the epitome of historical philosophy. It is also noteworthy that, along with the review, the same issue of the journal Literaturniy Kazakhstan contained Dombrovsky’s first historical novel Derzhavin. The publication of his novel and review heralded the first serious literary ambitions of the future author of The Keeper of Antiquities [Khranitel drevnostey] and The Faculty of Useless Knowledge [Fakultet nenuzhnykh veshchey].

Abstract The article studies a cross‐generic relation between theatrical performance and the outbreak of violence in picaresque contexts across works by Miguel de Cervantes. It then proceeds to contextualize these persistent incidents within the philosophical history of antitheatricality. Expounding how arguments of antitheatricality in Plato, Tertullian, Augustine, and Erasmus can be seen as a via negativa to articulate the power of theater, the article outlines three typical arguments of intellectual antitheatricality. These are applied to investigate how Cervantes' works reiterate these standard arguments while simultaneously mocking traditional claims of the immoral, the arousing, and the demonic. This leads to the conclusion that Cervantes' works convey a very old sense of the power of theater along with the contribution of a new philosophical perspective on the much‐debated issue of Cervantes' relation to the stage.

This paper presents and examines Andrew Baxter’s theory of the origin of dreams. In an essay of over 200 pages, he explores various conceptions and accounts of dreaming, develops a distinctive and elaborate theory of their occurrence, and arrives at the striking conclusion that all dreams are produced by external spirits or immaterial (ghost-like) agents. Remarkably, this extraordinary contribution has received no attention from historians of philosophy. In addition to clarifying the structure and force of Baxter’s argument for the ‘spiritual origin’ of dreams, I aim to make his puzzling conclusion more digestible by showing how he eliminates alternative hypotheses on the basis of principles and assumptions that were relatively widely accepted in his time. Along the way, I also reconstruct his commitment to certain methodological and causal principles, as well as his unwavering adherence to the authority of self-consciousness and mental transparency.

As a core form of deconstructive historical philosophy in the 20th century, the nihilism of historical subject dismantles historical necessity by negating the reality of the subject and objective laws. From the dual perspectives of tracing its intellectual genealogy and critiquing it through the lens of historical materialism, this theory has undergone three major transformations: the relativism of Neo-Kantianism, the linguistic turn of structuralism, and the discursive reconstruction of postmodernism. Through a strategy of decentralization, it obscures the agency of the subject and absolutizes historical contingency. Its formation mechanism is rooted in the value vacuum during periods of social transition, and it constructs a consumer logic of symbolized history through pseudo-positivist data collage and the entertainment-oriented dissemination of digital media. The critique from historical materialism reveals its essence as the ideological cover of the bourgeoisie over the dialectics of history, which dissolves revolutionary potential by severing historical continuity. Based on the reconstruction of practical subjectivity, the reinterpretation of objective laws, and the methodology of class analysis, this paper proposes a pathway to restore historical subjectivity, thereby forming a practical paradigm to resist postmodern nihilism.

My paper will describe and explore the concept of compromise as it was analyzed by the Romanian politologist Alin Fumurescu and then, apply this concept on democracy, as a political regime. Furthermore, I will present the specific aspects of democracy as a regime of compromise in Romania, trying to figure out the real impact of social media on the democratic behaviour of citizens. Thus, compromise will be discussed both from the perspective of the government, as well as from the perspective of relations between citizens in the public sphere. Is compromise still possible in the technological era of social media or are we in a crisis of identity, as Fumurescu states in his book „Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History”?

I wonder how to approach the questions of being and nothing when they are posed to us in all seriousness. In cultural and philosophical history, several conceptions of being and nothing and several ways of solving these questions have appeared. We can find six main ways: the Eleatic (Parmenidean) way of the identity of being and thought, wonder at the fullness of being, which excludes any nothingness, the way through paradoxes, skeptical reticence, recourse to non-classical logics, and the path of spiritual insight into the mysterious interweaving of being and nothing in everything we do, think and speak. Each of them has its advantages and disadvantages. I am trying to show that the last way is the most promising, but only if we overlook how being and nothingness are constantly simultaneously and intertwiningly given to us.