Historical Enemy Research Articles

War in Nagorno-Karabakh Shakes Armenian-Turkish Relations

Turkish support for Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war has renewed long-dormant Armenian perceptions of a neighboring threat. Turkey provided direct military support that helped its ally reconquer the ethnic Armenian exclave, leading to the forced exodus of most inhabitants after a final defeat in 2023. Continuing open hostilities stalled efforts to normalize Armenian–Turkish relations and reopen the border following the 2020 war. For Armenians both in Armenia and in the diaspora, including those living in Turkey, the war prompted comparisons to the 1915 Armenian Genocide and perceptions that a historical enemy was once again actively aggressive in a region that had long been considered part of Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Turkey and ‘Turks’ in Postwar Armenia: Anxieties, Meanings, and Politics After the 2020 Karabakh War

Traditionally perceived as a historical enemy, Turkey was ‘rediscovered’ in Armenia after it actively supported Azerbaijan in the 2020 Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh. This article traces some of the cultural-ideational reverberations of Turkey’s ‘return’ within Armenian society. It argues that the war was a (re-)formative moment since it simultaneously resulted in the emergence of new meanings and the revival of traditional ones. It brought the ‘distant’ neighbour into Armenians’ geographical/geopolitical imaginations, reshaping the meaning of Turkey and of the larger region for them. But it also reinforced long-established complex semantics of the ethnonym ‘Turk’, setting the stage for its instrumentalisation in internal politics.

“Hominids with an Infected Brain” Engage in Viral Debate: Agamben and Žižek on the Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on Human Relationships

“Hominids with an Infected Brain” Engage in Viral Debate: Agamben and Žižek on the Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic on Human Relationships

The regional counter-blocs strategy in the context of the Middle East Second Cold War

Iranian Shiite geopolitical theories aimed at forming a transnational ideological project in order to unite the Islamic world and the formation of Iran military and ideological strategically allies in addition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions have shaken the regional alliances system. Adapting to a radical change in regional policy and security requires the use of a counter-bloc strategy with account for questions regarding the structure, formation, motivation, and risk involved with counter-bloc to Iran. For countries with a Sunni ideology, this stage requires reformulating and upgrading their strategy with a regional ally characterized by hostility to Iran and loyalty to USA, in addition to military, nuclear and cyber capabilities and global support to form a counter-bloc. Israel, a historical enemy of the Arab nation became the best option. Turkey’s absence within this structure may impede the success or continuity of the strategy of the counter-Iran bloc.

The Power of the Media on Peace and Reconciliation Processes: Representing Former Enemy Groups as Moral versus Immoral Matters

The efforts of peace-building and reconciliation between historical enemies are faced with many structural and psychological obstacles. Scholars have identified mechanisms that can induce improvements in psychological aspects of intergroup relations, such as intergroup contact. However, establishing direct contact with everyone is impossible. Therefore, the mass media represents an important source through which groups learn about each other. Numerous studies have shown that stereotypical and often negative portrayals of specific social groups through the media produce or reinforce negative intergroup outcomes. In this research, the authors report results from an experimental study conducted in a post-conflict society of Bosnia and Herzegovina ( N = 119). It examined the effects of stereotypical and counter-stereotypical representations of former enemy groups (Bosniaks) through the media on intergroup behavior (reported by Bosnian Serbs). More specifically, in this research the authors explored the effects of representing out-group individuals as immoral (the stereotypical condition) and moral (the counter-stereotypical condition) on specific behavioral tendencies toward the historical enemy group. The results indicate that exposure to primarily moral information about the out-group target facilitated important positive intergroup outcomes. This study extends the literature and research on moral exemplars by demonstrating the effects on relevant intergroup outcomes whilst utilizing current (vs. historical) moral exemplar stories.

Sympathy for the Devil: The Myth of Plato as the Enemy of Rhetoric

It is a disciplinary commonplace to identify Plato as the enemy of rhetoric. While it is also common to suggest a more complex role for Plato and his dialogues in contemporary rhetorical studies, this is often treated as a revision of his traditional role. In this article, I question the historicity of the narrative that Plato is the historical enemy of rhetoric. I investigate the role that Plato played in the rhetorical tradition from Demosthenes to Du Bois and compare it to how he is framed in the contemporary discipline – first, in disciplinary histories and second, in contemporary theory. What I find is a distinct disconnect between his traditional treatment and the contemporary construction of his place in the tradition.

Russia and the Caucasus in the Polish Ethnopolitical Myth

The perception of the Caucasus by Polish society is analyzed in the light of the Polish ethnopolitical myth, according to which Russia appears as an “historical enemy.” The myth’s influence is also traced in the concept of national security, formed by politicians. This myth has noticeably been manifested since Poland restored its independence after WWI but was not apparent for obvious reasons during the existence of the Polish People’s Republic, when the image of the “historical enemy” was formed in relation to Germany. The author concludes that the ethnopolitical myth predetermines Poles’ attitudes to movements for independence of ethnic groups that have no statehood at present. This attitude is of a positive hue primarily toward those movements that are aimed against Russia and that can allegedly hinder the political leverage of Poland’s “historical enemy.”

Russian Liberal of the Beginning of the 20th Century in Politics

The article examines the political views and practices of Russian liberals in the early twentieth century. Russia’s political destiny of this period directly depended on building constructive relations between the authorities and society. Liberal ideas had a significant impact on the educated public. At the same time, the constructive cooperation between the liberals and the government was the most important condition for the possibility of application of these ideas in domestic political practice. The article examines the political experience of the two largest liberal political parties in Russia – the Cadets and the Octobrists. The author comes to the conclusion that the Russian liberal politician of the early twentieth century could not get out of the role of an idealist oppositionist. He was incapable of recognizing the existing realities and the need for political compromises, which were often perceived as a sign of impotence or immorality. The liberals perceived themselves as the only force capable of bringing Russia to the right, «civilized» path. In the opinion of the liberals, this path was inevitable, therefore, under any circumstances, the liberal movement should have retained its leading role. In the spring of 1917, the liberal opposition was able to defeat its historical enemy (autocracy), but retained power for a very short time. The slaughter of the state machine, which the liberals themselves did not intend to preserve, led them to defeat. Thus, the state was the only guarantor of the existence of a liberal movement in Russia.

Klauzura północno-wschodniej Azji na mapach średniowiecznych i wczesnonowożytnych

The present article explores 44 medieval and early modern world maps. The subject of research are three graphic topoi, that evoke the image of the biblical and historical enemy from the north: Gog and Magog, Caspian Gates (Portae Caspiae) and the inclosed nations (inclusae nationes). These topoi were localized in north-east Asia. For this reason the title of the article includes the concept of the enclosed area of north-east Asia. There are also analyzed vignettes of the cities, which are located on the territory of the enclosed area. The aim of the article is to show the changes which over several centuries have occurred within the in­terpretation of these three topoi. This evolution has been closely associated with the expansion of geographical horizon of Europeans. Geopolitical and historical changes were also an important factor of this evolution. All these elements have an impact on the way of looking at the enclosed area of north-east Asia. Important factor was also philosophy and theology. Slows fear of the enemy from the north gave way to curiosity, and curiosity prompted the Europeans to get to know this part of Asia. Graphical topos has been replaced by geographical knowledge, that has been transferred to the maps.

Commemoration of Independence Day in the Republic of Estonia 1919–1940 [Vabariigi aastapäeva pühitsemine Eesti Vabariigis 1919–1940

World War I led to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, generating widespread political upheaval across Europe that provided numerous ethnic groups within those former empires the opportunity to break free and begin the process of independent nation-building. New nations need to create a history for themselves and their people to legitimate their existence. Estonia was one such nation. It was forced to fight a War of Independence at the very beginning of its existence as a separate entity to establish its right to statehood. This war served as Estonia’s founding myth and even while it was still being fought, the war was integrated into the narrative of the Estonian people’s great, centuries-long struggle for liberation from the yoke of Baltic German oppression. The achievement of independence was seen as the culmination of Estonian history. This article explores the customs that evolved for commemorating Independence Day from the perspective of performative, collective memory. These customs form the basis for analysing the shifts that took place in the politics of memory and history when a coup d’etat carried out in March of 1934 established an authoritarian regime in Estonia in place of parliamentary democracy. Thenceforth the narrative was adjusted so that the culmination of Estonian history was no longer merely the achievement of independence. Instead, the narrative claimed that independence was won when Estonians defeated their Baltic German historical enemy once and for all. The way that such ideological precepts were reflected in commemorative practices is examined together with the corresponding implications for the creation of a national Estonian identity. KEYWORDS: Estonian history, collective memory, commemorative practice, Independence Day, national days, national flag, national identity, propaganda

Kolm tuld: Jüriöö, võidupüha, laulupidu [Abstract: Three fires: St. George’s Night, Victory Day and the Song Festival

The subject of this article is the relationship between cultural memory and national identity, and ritualistic activities and symbols as a medium for this relationship. Joint ritual activities – functioning as national symbols contained within and also transmitting cultural memory – are the constructers of national identity. Commemorations and celebrations as ritual actions affirm a sense of community, but they can also be used for ideological purposes. The use of the symbols strengthens the impact of rituals, and therefore the symbols are concentrated expressions of national identity. In this article, I have analyzed three rituals which are transmitted through Estonian cultural memory: the Uprising of St. George’s Night (Jüriöö ülestõus) and the celebrations of Victory Day and the Song Festival. I have paid particular attention to fire – as fire is a central symbol of all three rituals. I have observed how St. George’s Night and Victory Day are preserved in cultural memory and how their survival is ensured. In the case of the Song Festival I have focused on the event itself, as it has been preserved. In addition, I have paid attention to the propagandistic writings and newspaper articles accompanying these rituals. There is little historical information about the St. George’s Night Uprising, so the festivities have a literary origin. Victory Day is celebrated as a victory over the Baltic Landwehr (Baltische Landeswehr) in the Estonian War of Independence in 1919. This victory did not end the war, but its importance lies in the victory over an historical enemy – Germans. Both events are part of the “Estonians great struggle for freedom” narrative that forms the struggles against the Germans into one coherent story. The Estonian Song Festival is one of the basic national myths, characterized by the term “singing oneself into a nation”. Through the Song Festivals, the nineteenth century rise in national self-consciousness found a means to express and introduce its objectives. The new “awakening” a hundred and twenty years later symbolically took the first one as a model and tied the two together. Using fire as a symbol in all these practices allows us to compare these events. In glorifying and justifying, texts draw out the symbolic meanings attributed to the celebrations. Fire refers to continuity and unity. Unity is important in two aspects: it involves both the direct and symbolic unity of people, but also a bond reaching over time – past, present and future are linked together. But fire is also seen as a symbol of victory. Victory is directly related to the celebration of Victory Day, and “liberation through singing” can also be seen as a victory. These rituals are the result of socio-political changes and have transformed over time, but their essence has remained unchanged. All these rituals have gone through different political conditions and the “remembering” or “forgetting” has been closely linked to the governing regime. Different meanings are attributed to symbols associated with the rituals. The Upraising of St. George’s Night has been celebrated in pre-war Estonian Republic, during the Soviet era and in re-independent Estonia. However, the basis of the celebration was quite different during the Soviet era from what it was and is in the Estonian Republic. Victory Day as a moment of victory in Estonia’s struggle for freedom was not celebrated during the Soviet occupation. The Song Festival has been maintained throughout various authorities, and ideological demands has continued as a national ritual. All three practices are continually in service of Estonia’s national identity. KEYWORDS: symbol, ritual, national identity, cultural memory, The Uprising of St. George’s Night, Victory Day, Song Festival, Estonia.

Tentatives de l’empereur Charles VI au congrès d’Utrecht en 1712

During the congress of peace in Utrecht in 1712, emperor Charles VI strived to acquire the whole Spanish monarchy. Since his election as emperor and the death of his elder brother Joseph I, England and the Netherlands, who aided this Habsburg ruler during the War of Succession, abandoned him, and tried to reach a rapid agreement with France, his historical enemy up till that time. In order to maintain his claims to the Spanish crown, Charles left his wife in Barcelona as regent before his return to Vienna. However, as they had no children, in the summer of 1712, the Viennese diplomacy wanted the archduchess Mary Elizabeth, one of the King’s s sisters, to succeed the empress. But this plan was not carried out, because meanwhile England had agreed to that the rival of Charles VI, Philip V (Bourbon) could obtain the Spanish crown lands.

Encore unmot: billets du Figaro par Étienne de Montety

Montety, Étienne de. Encore un mot: billets du Figaro. Paris: Chiflet, 2012. ISBN 9782 -7578-3460-2. Pp. 187. 6,70 a. Montety’s volume is the latest contribution to Le goût des mots, a collection devoted to the dynamic impulses of the French lexicon. As the series editor Philippe DeLerm points out, words must be tamed, played with, and crafted to entertain us (7). Montety, editor of Le Figaro’s literary supplement, is likewise a lexicographer who displays skill and wit in his weekly column, Encore un mot. He is a champion of neologisms, both those that have been naturalized into the French lexical inventory, as well as those he has created to fill a political or social gap. Montety takes pleasure in teasing out multiple meanings in words that have already been granted droit de cité, embellishing them with his dazzling jeux de sons. After the 2011 conflict in Libya, for example, he concocted a new meaning for the word “charia” (37): it is the Libyan law that succeeds the chars of the revolutionary army. But precepts of charia will only apply to a chariotée of legal matters. In fact, charia might recall Mme de Sévigné’s use of charrier droit: to behave in an appropriate manner. Thus, the beautiful women of Tripoli and Benghazi will need to adhere to this conduct. But who will check to see that the local instantiations of charrier droit will conform to la charia? And who will make sure that their husbands “ne charrient pas dans le respect de la charia?” (37). The word plays continue to accumulate. In order to appreciate Montety’s linguistic moves and his humorous social optic, the reader must possess a broad background in international affairs, a keen sensitivity to language, and a more than superficial acquaintance with literary history. Another example of Montety’s démarche: under the keyword “Allemand” (17), the author diminishes the Sarkozy-Merkel couple by citing pejorative terms referring to the historical enemy that have entered the French language. Likewise, he tallies expressions that portray Germans in an unflattering light and notes the French language’s resistance to “frallemand” as opposed to “franglais” (18). Given this linguistic evidence, it is hardly surprising that the budget talks between Sarkozy and Merkel will prove to be une querelle d’Allemand: a futile argument. Both entries I have cited illustrate the strengths and limitations of Montety’s book. The ideal reader is a linguistic and cultural insider with a native-like competency in French language and literature, sensitivity to discursive style, and an intimate knowledge of internal and external politics. Hélas, even the reader who possesses these qualities will have to acknowledge the ephemeral nature of Montety’s discussions. What was a neologism at the time of his writing (for example,“l’autolib”) may no longer prompt any reflection. Likewise, the Sarkozy-Merkel couple has split. Nonetheless, Montety’s openness to linguistic innovation and its valorization over time is a welcome antidote to the conservative guardians of the gates to the French language. Cabrillo College and Graduate Theological Union (CA) H. Jay Siskin 292 FRENCH REVIEW 88.2 ...

The Boy Who Cried 'Wolf!'

Many have heard of the story of the boy who cried “Wolf!” A bored young shepherd boy persistently tricked villagers by shouting that the wolf was coming to attack their sheep. Each time the villagers would run up the hill, only to discover that this was not true. However, when there was real danger and the boy cried for help, the villagers would not listen and the wolf attacked.This fable has been chosen to introduce the Iran-Israel conflict and it serves three purposes.Firstly, it offers a reminder that Israel’s repetitive claims to strike or be attacked by Iran – and vice-versa – may desensitize Western opinion to clearly know, or care, when or whether this will happen. Secondly, it helps to illustrate that the wolf’s face has changed over time and, more importantly, that neither state is a historical enemy to the other. Thirdly, and more interestingly, it reminds us of the impact stories have on children. If this latent conflict is to be resolved, it should be done whilst the generation that remember both states being allies is still there to tell the tale.

Positioning in the Cold War – Swedish and Danish History Textbooks and the Totalitarianism Doctrine. Historical Cultures in Comparison

The Nordic countries Sweden and Denmark have a long and intertwined history. The Second World War, though, formed different experiences in the two countries that led to diverging paths in the Cold War. Denmark became a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while Sweden stayed non-aligned. Thus, it can be assumed that Denmark was more likely to adopt Western foreign policies and doctrines than Sweden. Or was it? On a programmatic political level this may have been the case, but what about cultural perceptions developed in Swedish and Danish ‘minds of men’? Is there a tension between les évenéments and les longues durées? The underlying assumption in this article is that there is a contradiction and a tension between the programmatic political level and historically-inherited enemy images, and that this tension may be studied through the concept of totalitarianism and its position in the historical cultures of Sweden and Denmark in the post-war era. The totalitarianism doctrine was one of the main ideological weapons during the Cold War, serving as a basis for the Truman doctrine. It implies that Nazism and Soviet communism shared common features and may be subsumed under the same label. But would a Dane find it reasonable to view the Red Army, which belonged to the Allies which liberated his or her country, as of ‘the same kind’ as the German occupants? And would it make sense to a Swede to stay neutral to Soviet Russia, the historical enemy? The one who for a Swede is ‘the other’ might for a Dane appear as a historical ally. The empirical sources are history textbooks for senior secondary school students, studied as artefacts of national historical cultures.

Why Ukraine Surrendered Security: A Methodological Individualist Approach to Nuclear Disarmament

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in possession of the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. By 1994, Ukraine had surrendered its entire nuclear arsenal to its historical enemy, Russia. This phenomenon has largely escaped scrutiny. At a time in world history when the question of nuclear proliferation and disarmament has again come to the forefront of international politics, it is important to reexamine the case of Ukrainian disarmament in which standard paradigms of international relations fail to satisfactorily explain historical events. Only by applying the underutilized individual level of analysis can Ukrainian disarmament be clearly understood.

Capturing Otherness: Self-Identity and Feelings of Non-Belonging Among Educated Burmese in Thailand

This paper explores the subjective experiences of migrants engaged in producing alternative modes of self-identification and in creating a new basis for their collective identity. Through the analysis of personal narratives, this article examines the dialectic movement between complex political and social constructions of Otherness and processes of self-identification among English-educated lowland Burmese living in Thailand. It investigates the meanings and perceptions attached to the different terms used as identity frameworks in popular discourse among Thai and among Burmese themselves and looks into how these terms and
 attached meanings are appropriated and acted upon in different contexts. The migrants involved in this research come from vastly different backgrounds and ideologies, but they share in common being from the Burman ethnic majority, or having lived and studied among Burman, and identifying themselves in terms of civic identity, which is reflected by the term 'Burmese'. Once in Thailand, their situation is complicated because in their everyday life they have to face the Thai construction of being Burmese, known as 'Pama', a term associated with the historical enemy in Thai nationalist discourse. The contact that educated Burmese have with Thai classmates or co-workers is relatively limited due to the general mistrust Thai people tend to have towards them. The educated Burmese migrants also have to confront their national Other, the members of minorities from the secessionist states who compose the majority of migrants in Thailand. In this context, their own Burmeseness, which they rarely had to question before they left Yangon or Mandalay, appears suddenly as it is: an identity deeply fragmented that needs to be captured and reappropriated.

Iniquity, Terror and Survival: Welsh Gothic, 1789-18041

Literary critics have recently begun to draw attention to ‘national Gothic’, outlining the importance of themes of conflict and defeated and victorious histories in this form of the Gothic. The contested and unsettled history of Wales provides the perfect conditions for a national Gothic, yet little work has yet been done towards the notion of a specifically Welsh Gothic in the period following the French revolution. This article explores four variations on the theme of writing Gothic in revolution-era Wales: a tourist Gothic, a Jacobin Gothic, a loyalist Gothic and a post-colonial Gothic. It shows how writers of this period used the conflicts and iniquities of the Welsh past equally to illustrate Wales's incorporation within a larger united Britain and to figure its otherness, its familiar difference, relative to its historical enemy – England.

Germany’s policy and the diplomatic agenda of Romanian neutrality (1914-1916). The Prospect of a plan for an alliance with Sweden

In the summer of 1915, concerned about Italy’s entry into the war in alliance with the Entente powers yet encouraged by the victories of its armies on the Eastern Front, the German diplomacy attempted to encourage Sweden and Romania to abandon their neutrality in order to give a decisive blow to Russia. In several reports dispatched from Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, the envoy to Germany who was also Romania’s representative in the Scandinavian countries, raised the possibility of Sweden’s entry into the war on the German side. After he had identified Russia as the common historical enemy of the two countries, the Romanian diplomat suggested forging an alliance under the leadership of Germany. A strong alliance was thought to ensure Sweden’s ascendancy in Finland and the Baltic states, and Romania’s supremacy in the East at the Black Sea. Although this plan was rejected by the liberal government, Beldiman’s initiative in a period of neutrality remains an alternative in the Romanian political circles to Entente supremacy.

Trustworthiness and IT Suspicion: An Evaluation of the Nomological Network

The authors evaluated the validity of trust in automation and information technology (IT) suspicion by examining their factor structure and relationship with decision confidence. Research on trust has burgeoned, yet the dimensionality of trust remains elusive. Researchers suggest that trust is a unidimensional construct, whereas others believe it is multidimensional. Additionally, novel constructs,such as IT suspicion, have yet to be distinguished from trust in automation. Research is needed to examine the overlap between these constructs and to determine the dimensionality of trust in automation. Participants (N = 72) engaged in a computer-based convoy scenario involving an automated decision aid. The aid fused real-time sensor data and provided route recommendations to participants who selected a route based on (a) a map with historical enemy information, (b) sensor inputs, and (c) automation suggestions. Measures for trust in automation and IT suspicion were administered after individuals interacted with the automation. Results indicated three orthogonal factors: trust, distrust, and IT suspicion. Each variable was explored as a predictor of decision confidence. Distrust and trust evidenced unique influences on decision confidence, albeit at different times. Higher distrust related to less confidence, whereas trust related to greater confidence. The current study found that trust in automation was best characterized by two orthogonal dimensions (trust and distrust). Both trust and distrust were found to be independent from IT suspicion,and both distrust and trust uniquely predicted decision confidence. Researchers may consider using separate measures for trust and distrust in future studies.