Hermeneutics Of Facticity Research Articles

Interpretation of the Origin by F. Rosenzweig and M. Heidegger

The research focuses on the problem of interpretation of such a concept as the origin, which is ultimate for philosophical thought and bases existentially oriented constructions of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger. It is argues in this paper the fundamental difference between the interpretations of the origin in “The Star of Redemption» and in «Being and Time”, despite all points of intersection and coincidences that bring closer together dialogical and existential-historical thinking. Such differentiation of positions is determined by the necessity both to neutralize romantic connotations, which expose the origin ( Ursprung ) as abyss ( Abgrund ), and to methodologically clarify the possibility not so much to think as to practically assert a limited and unclosed within itself integral being, including ontological and ethical dimensions. The origin of oblivion and renewal, imposed by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, is contrasted with Rosenzweig's origin of the “eternal overworld”, reconstructed on the basis of Herman Cohen's religio-philosophical intuitions and his analysis of the infinitesimal as a principle of reality. Rosenzweig’s position, which aims at a correlative consideration of the purely logical content of the infinitesimal quantity (almost-Nothing) and the existential experience of the finiteness of everything, is favorably distinguished by the absence of a one-sided focus on recalling, where fore-running although is declared, but it is immediately restrained by being-towards-death. As a result, Rosenzweig’s dialogism turns out to be free from overestimating what Heidegger’s interpretation calls resoluteness, which in fact is not much different from paralysis in the clearance of being. Cohen’s problem of an infinite task's realization, being actualized in Rosenzweig’s conception, allows to go beyond being-towards-death in juxtaposing the trajectories of initial elements into a true gestalt.

Space, Dwelling, and (Be)longingness: Virginia Woolf’s Art of Narration

The supple and ever-present search for the possibilities offered by the narrative form in fictional writing corresponds to the use of the narrative as a mode of understanding and explaining our being-in-the-world in philosophy. The intimate liaison between the realm of fictional imagination and that of human everydayness inspires writers to seek ways to tackle issues of temporality, the conflicting character of human drives, and the ultimately unresolvable tension between finitude and infinitude. As a literary and philosophical category, the narrative remains an inexhaustible space for the exploration of the way we understand our lives. I propose a hermeneutic investigation of the interactions between the art of narration and the categories of space, presence/absence, and (be)- longingness as evoked in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway. This article engages Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, and, more specifically, his notions of homelessness and homecoming, to shed light on the inimitable character of Woolf’s artistic representations of the spatial dimension of human existence, reality viewed as both tremulous and solid, as well as of human embodiment and the disparity/closeness between the corporeal and the spiritual.

Hiatus Irrationalis: Lask's Fateful Misreading of Fichte

Abstract‘Facticity’ is a concept that classical phenomenologists like Heidegger use to denote the radically contingent or underivably brute conditions of intelligibility. Yet Fichte coins the term, to which he gives the opposing use of denoting unacceptably brute conditions of intelligibility. For him, radical contingency is a problem to be solved by deriving such conditions from reason. Heidegger rejects Fichte's recoil from facticity with his hermeneutics of facticity, supplanting Fichte's metaphor of our always being in reason's hand with the metaphor of our always having been thrown. How does Heidegger inherit and diametrically repurpose Fichte's neologism? Whence the reversed meaning of ‘facticity’ in post‐Kantian thought? The answer is Lask's doctoral thesis, which exerts an acknowledged impact on Heidegger's habilitation thesis. Lask interprets ‘facticity’ as Fichte's term for the individuality problem, that is, the resistance of the material particularity of individuals to explanation by the categories genetically deduced from reason. On his interpretation, ‘facticity’ denotes radical contingency in the guise of haecceity, that is, the brute uniqueness of individuals. Lask credits Fichte with registering the problem of individuality, which highlights the world's irreducibly pre‐categorial character. But how is ‘facticity’ transmitted from Lask to Heidegger, given their opposing interpretations of how Fichte understands its meaning? I argue that (1) Lask misreads Fichte as a proponent of facticity, that is, one whose accommodation of radical contingency deflates the Wissenschaftslehre's systematic ambitions, and (2) Lask's misreading, without deceiving Heidegger regarding the sincerity of Fichte's ambitions, encourages Heidegger's own hermeneutics of facticity.

Before Empirical Turns And Transcendental Inquiry: Pre-Philosophical Considerations

I approach the idea of empirical turns and transcendental theories indirectly. I do not start “post-“ or “neg-” anything; instead I begin pre-philosophically—that is, before everyone has a position and opposes other positions—with Heidegger’s “preparatory hermeneutical” question: As whom and with what concerns do empirically or transcendentally minded philosophers of technology respond to their experience of technoscientific life? For example, in his second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche identifies his concern as one of “taking advantage” of historical knowledge “for life,” that is, he understands himself to be motivated by a life-driven, not scientific “need.” But how are “needs” in Nietzsche’s sense to be distinguished? The question leads straight to Heidegger’s idea of a hermeneutics that comes “before philosophy”—a “hermeneutics of facticity” that considers “what goes on in [i.e., motivates] a philosophy before it becomes what it is”? I argue that once Nietzsche’s notion of need is expanded and deepened in Heidegger’s direction, we gain some clarity about how to appropriate any information “for life,” whether it is science-based, culturally operative, or phenomenological. I then consider Ihde, Stiegler, and the future prospects of empirical turns and transcendental theories in light of this idea.

Creating New Pasts: Reality, Facticity and Interpretation in Peirce and Heidegger

Only recently have the striking parallels between Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatism and Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity been fully acknowledged and assessed–the profound differences that, of course, exist between them, notwithstanding. This essay draws relationships between the central assumptions of the two theories and establishes between them what can be called a dialogue.

초기 하이데거의 현사실성의 해석학 ‒현사실성과 해석학의 관계 문제를 중심으로‒

초기 하이데거의 현사실성의 해석학 ‒현사실성과 해석학의 관계 문제를 중심으로‒

La dimensión hermenéutica de la afectividad en las primeras lecciones de Martin Heidegger

Este trabajo se centra en el papel que juega la afectividad en la conocida como transformación hermenéutica de la fenomenología llevada a cabo por el joven Martin Heidegger. Tras establecer en la introducción la estrecha vinculación que existe entre la afectividad y la facticidad, tomo como hilo conductor la noción de movilidad (Bewegtheit) de la vida fáctica. En un primer momento explico la peculiar significación que adquiere este término en la filosofía del joven Heidegger. En segundo lugar me detengo a analizar la doble “movilidad fundamental” (Grundbewegtheit) del amor y el odio como la matriz intencional del curare (Bekümmerung) en la interpretación heideggeriana de las Confesiones de San Agustín durante las lecciones del semestre de verano de 1921. En un tercer momento considero la doble movilidad del pathos y de la disposición afectiva (Befindlichkeit) en las lecciones de 1924, Conceptos fundamentales de la filosofía aristotélica. Y, finalmente, explicito la “lógica del corazón” que subyace a la hermenéutica de la facticidad desde la confluencia de la tradición neotestamentaria del affectus (Agustín) y la tradición griega del pathos (Aristóteles).

Afinidades electivas entre la mitología nazi y la ontología heideggeriana, según el joven Levinas”

Desde su inicial estadía en Friburgo entre 1928 y 1929 hasta sus primeros escritos de la década de los años treinta, Emmanuel Levinas expresó su entusiasta adhesión a la nueva orientación fenomenológica alemana, en particular a la filosofía existencial de Martin Heidegger. Sin embargo, tras la toma del poder del nazismo en 1933 y la adhesión del maestro de Friburgo al nuevo régimen, el filósofo francés llevó a cabo una revisión crítica de los fundamentos de la “hermenéutica de la facticidad” como de su posible afinidad electiva con la “filosofía del hitlerismo”. El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar las reflexiones levinasianas sobre aquel trasfondo compartido entre la ontología heideggeriana y el nazismo, a partir de tres mitos presentes en la convocatoria palingenésica nacionalsocialista: la apelación a la “comunidad de la guerra”, a la “comunidad del trabajo” y a la “comunidad de la sangre”.

La nueva “patética” de la fenomenología alemana. Reflexiones sobre el carácter “religioso” del ontologismo heideggeriano y su aproximación a la “filosofía del hitlerismo”, según el joven Levinas

Desde su inicial estadía en Friburgo (1928-1929), las reflexiones levinasianas permanecieron cautivadas por la “hermenéutica existencial” y la fascinación ejercida sobre los jóvenes discípulos por el nuevo profeta de la fenomenología: Martin Heidegger. A comienzos de los años treinta, Levinas mantuvo su fidelidad a la nueva orientación frente a las acusaciones lanzadas por sus adversarios contra los ambiguos compromisos filosófico-políticos de la fenomenología alemana derivados de un presunto “misticismo de lo concreto”. Sin embargo, tras el ascenso del nazismo al poder y la adhesión de Heidegger al nuevo régimen, su inicial fascinación por aquella corriente, con su nuevo ideal de vida, casi una nueva “religión”, derivó en una revisión crítica del “campo magnético” del ontologismo heideggeriano. El objetivo del presente artículo será determinar el modo en que Levinas interpreta la nueva “patética” de la “hermenéutica existencial” y, con ello, la afinidad electiva de Heidegger con la “religión política” y “filosofía del hitlerismo”.

Heidegger y la indicación formal: hacia una articulación categorial de la vida humana

<p class='p1'>Este artículo aborda el complejo problema heideggeriano de cómo acceder adecuada y correctamente al ámbito de manifestación inmediata de la vida humana. Partiendo del concepto de hermenéutica de la facticidad, se analiza la propuesta heideggeriana de articulación categorial de la existencia humana, la cual recurre al instrumental analítico de los indicadores formales, esto es, a los conceptos básicos que sirven para explicitar reflexivamente la comprensión que la vida, el ser-ahí, tiene de sí misma. En este contexto, se intenta concretar el significado y la función de esos indicadores en la mencionada explicitación categorial de la vida: por un lado, se rastrean sus antecedentes en el caso de la comunicación indirecta de Kierkegaard y de las expresiones ocasionales de Husserl; y, por otro, se pretende mostrar hasta qué punto la posibilidad de esa explicitación se alimenta del concepto husserliano de intuición categorial.</p>

L’intériorité de l’être dans le monde : le jeune Heidegger, lecteur d’Augustin et de Luther

From the Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie of 1919-1920, Heidegger seems to drop the idea of an interiority of the self : he explains that the examination of the pure life, in which he intends to be engaged, is not an internal examination. However, it should not lead us to conclude that the first Heidegger totally breaks away from the idea of interiority. One concept, forged during the first lecture courses of Freiburg (1919-1923), testifies in particular to the persistence of this idea in the young Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity : the concept of Selbstwelt , world of the self. The point of our article is to determine the real meaning and the sources of this conception of the self’s interiority. According to us, it directly comes from Heidegger’s phenomenology of religion, and more precisely from his interpretations of Augustine and Luther. Thus, we dwell on two texts of Heidegger : the lecture course of the 1921 summer semester, entitled Augustine and neoplatonism , and a talk entitled The problem of sin in Luther , given in Marburg in Februar 1924 within the context of a seminar of Rudolf Bultmann on Paul’s ethics. We attempt to demonstrate that the young Heidegger looks for, in particular in Luther, and more precisely in his interpretation of Paul’s inner man, a genuine conception of interiority, compatible with the life’s being in the world. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21747/21836892/fil33a8

Formalne wskazanie jako zasada metodyczna w myśleniu hermeneutycznym Martina Heideggera

Formal indication is one of the central concepts of Heidegger’s hermeneutics. Formal means that something is to be fulfilled. Indication indicates the direction of fulfilling. Heidegger developed the so-called by him, „formal indication”, respectively „formally indicative concepts” as a methodological justification of the philosophical terminology. The term „formal indication” aroses in the context of the phenomenology of life, where Heidegger introduces his „hermeneutics of facticity”, which is also referred to as „formally indicative hermeneutics“. This is about something crucial for Heidegger’s thinking. The epistemological and transcendental tradition of viewing finds here a turn into the existential and historical. The indication always remains at the distance of pointing, that is, someone to whom something is shown, must see for himself. Formal indication indicates the direction for seeing. What can be seen, one must learn to say, to say in the own words. The old problem of the concretization and the conceptualization, which runs through German idealism, gets here a new expression.

Heidegger and Hegel: The phenomenological method as the Topos of their confrontation (Studiæ Heideggerianæ I)

In this article the author examines Heidegger?s understanding of the phenomenological method and scrutinizes the coherence of its application in Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1927). The explication of the method is elaborated by focusing on Heidegger?s critique of Husserl and a comparative analysis between Heidegger and Hegel, emphasizing aspects of their respective methods that they have in common and showing the differences. On this basis a critique of Being and Time is developed from the methodological point of view. The most important insight of this insistence on the consistency of the application of the phenomenological method in Being and Time would result in the analytical demarcations between the hermeneutics of facticity - as a procedure of individual self-interpretation of the everyday Dasein, existential analytics - as a philosophical reflection aiming at the universal conditions and limits of Dasein?s hermeneutic of facticity, and the fundamental ontology - as a basis for constructing the philosophical ontology that can address the being as such and its meaning. As it is well known, such distinctions are not present in Heidegger?s work and author argues that this is consequence of the inconsistent application of his proposed method. This is the main strategic weakness inherent in Being and Time as a Heidegger?s central work. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the conception of the phenomenological method as conceptualized by Heidegger leads directly to considerations that would become known only after 1930, that is after the turn (Kehre), as the domain of Heidegger II, which represent investigations into the history of being, and the Event (Ereignis) in the sense of the self-discovery of being.

Art History and Visual Culture without World

Aron Vinegar’s essay explores art history and visual culture’s dependence on a phenomenological conception of world, which is based on a hermeneutics of facticity, intentionality, and ontological difference. He argues that the ‘basic concept’ of world has structured the field of art history and visual culture in implicit and explicit ways, thus dictating many of its commitments and concerns. One of the primary limitations of this commitment to world, is that it has resulted in art history and visual culture’s tendency to concern itself with a very small portion of existence, usually human existence, in its emphasis on hermeneutics and facticity, thus foreclosing on a more generous and speculative ontology, ethics, and politics. The concept of “world” suggests an overarching totality, an interconnected field of meaning and sense, often indicated by a tacit and resonate tonality. But there is no overarching “world” or “world-view” that can provide us with an overview of or container for the myriad worlds of things. An art history that is willing to consider that the world does not exist would acknowledge and embrace the fact that there is no overall focus, which can encompass things and events in all their spatio-temporal complexity. It would entail a practice attentive to a “supple and inflected bathmology” (Vinegar prefers this phrase to “flat ontology”) in its refusal to emphasize “privileged ontological scenes” predicated on hierarchies of ontological difference, and subsuming things and experience within the structures of phenomenological intentionality. To initiate such a practice, Vinegar suggests an embrace of what he terms “ontological indifference,” a robust notion of habit, and a temporal logic that would be fully attentive to a pluriverse of multiple existences and eruptions of substance, which extend well beyond ‘our’ realms of significance and meaning, cares and concerns, laughter and joy, losses and mournings.

English

The phenomenological understanding of religion begins within the ambit of the ontotheological. That is, the relationship between the mortal and the divine is in essence, one of the sharing of a spiritual form of Being. The ‘mode of Being spiritual’ is the factical manifestation of the spirit-Being. That which we are a vehicle for, the breath of life and consciousness becomes conscious for us through the immanence of history. Each event in our own lived time has within it the kernel of the meaning of existence proper. Each moment as spontaneously occurring is thus kerygmatic, or potentially through a reflection of a phenomenology. It is Heidegger perhaps more so than any other phenomenologist who begins this task of represencing the essence of the historical as the momentary existence of the factical. Yet what is this facticity? If the study of Beings can be read as the hermeneutics of facticity, cannot the Being of Beings recur through reflection on the moment of irruptive singularity, the sudden call of the anxious, the realization of the hopeful? It is Heidegger’s reading of Paul and Augustine, respectively anxious and immanent and then aspirational and affirmative, that provides the textuality for our discussion. Key words: Phenomenology, Religion, Facticity, Onto-theology, Hermeneutics, Being.

Heideggerian pathways through trauma and recovery: A “hermeneutics of facticity”.

This article focuses on demonstrating how a Heideggerian sensitivity to the meanings latent in our own challenges of living can serve to orient us, especially in times of difficulty, toward finding our path and, moreover, our foothold on the paths that we have chosen. Presenting my own life experience through the lens of Heidegger's (1927/1962) fundamental modes of disclosedness and care structure, this article examines the notion of one's own existentiell projection into possibilities from the perspective of thrownness and fallenness. From here I present a reflection on the possibility of finding alternative potentialities-for-Being within the context of what had originally presented itself as a rupture of my very Being—a detethering of myself from my ordinary totality of involvements. The reflections here serve as a hermeneutic retrieval (Wiederholung) of the kinds of personal meanings that one lives through in the process of recovering one's life, one's existence, one's Self, in the aftermath of trauma...

Miejsce fenomenu śmierci w ontologii fundamentalnej Martina Heideggera

The text begins with an introduction that sketches the philosophical and cultural context of Being and Time which is followed by three parts. In the fi rst part theauthor explains the reasons why Heidegger’s analysis of human existence, which he calls a “hermeneutics of facticity”, developed into fundamental ontology. In the second part the author discovers an ontological description of death, as contained in this book, which is fundamentally different from any ontic description of this phenomenon. The last part contains the conclusions: 1. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology opens up a new chapter in the history of Western philosophy; it is an original project of a hermeneutic phenomenology; 2. the experience of death belongs, according to Heidegger, to the transcendental structure of a human being. Levinas’s and Sartre’s critique of Heidegger’s description of death is invalid because Heidegger does not describe bodily experience and pain, which accompany the process of dying, but rather the consciousness of being mortal that conditions people’s existential projects. This constitutes a deeper sense of his analyses.

¿Interpretación jurídica o comprensión jurídica? : al menos : comprender para interpretar

La moderna hermenéutica de la facticidad ha supuesto un aporte teórico (y práctico) de singular importancia en orden a la compresión del fenómeno jurídico; dicho de otro modo, acerca de la comprensión de las normas jurídicas. La verdadera experiencia hermenéutica modifica nuestra percepción inicial de las cosas, y también lo hace para el aplicador del Derecho. Así, teniendo en cuenta la función desarrollada por el círculo de la comprensión, el proceder hermenéutico es también en la Ciencia jurídica el que nos permite la comprensión y la concretización. En realidad, tal como demuestra la Hermenéutica, se comprende para interpretar, porque partiendo y pensando la tradición histórica no solo se reconstruye ésta sino que se continúa progresivamente la misma.
 De igual modo, en sentido divergente a lo propuesto por el positivismo metódico y desde la aceptación matizada de las premisas hermenéuticas, asimismo para la Teoría estructurante del Derecho la interpretación y la aplicación carecen de autonomía propiamente dicha; esto es, en modo alguno se autonomizan en el proceso de producción normativa. Porque, la resolución de cada caso requiere siempre una nueva producción hasta lograr configurarse la concreta Norma de decisión y, por lo tanto, la Norma jurídica se entiende como «producto», como resultado de un proceso estructurante.

El giro hermenéutico aceptado desde la teoría estructurante del Derecho

La Hermenéutica ha desarrollado consecuencias teóricas de alcance acerca del conocimiento social, evitando con ello los errores de la autocomprensión metódica de las ciencias del espíritu elaborada durante el siglo XIX. Para la hermenéutica de la facticidad, el contexto objetivo del caso sometido a análisis cobra auténtica relevancia, y la acción de comprender es considerada un saber práctico, un saber actuante. Considerada desde esta perspectiva, la Ciencia del Derecho adopta la forma de reflexión sobre la producción jurídica, y con ello enlaza la concepción sostenida por la Teoría Estructurante del Derecho, para la cual, la hermenéutica filosófica adquiere el valor "de ejemplar desde el punto de vista de la "aplicación" y de una "precomprensión" que abarca al propio intérprete". Considerada a modo de "teoría de la producción del derecho", apuesta por el reencuentro de Derecho y Realidad: el Derecho como realidad práctica. La labor de práctica social propia del trabajador del derecho se entiende creativa, abandonándose la diferenciación entre Norma y aplicación de la Norma, y reconociendo lo inevitable de una complementación jurídica productiva llevada a cabo a través del acto reflexivo de generación jurídica. En este quehacer, en lugar de "aplicar Derecho", la actividad del jurista persigue "extraer el Derecho" en su sentido original y radical, tarea llevada a cabo a través de una concreción progresiva de la Norma adaptada al problema. La Norma jurídica, por tanto, es entendida como "producto", y la resolución de cada caso requiere una nueva producción normativa hasta su entrega como Norma de decisión.

Formal Indication and the Hermeneutics of Facticity

Formal Indication and the Hermeneutics of Facticity