The development of digital technology and the emergence of phenomena big data has shifted the paradigm of literary research from in-depth reading of single texts to reflective reading of collective patterns. This article introduces the concept of Digital Reflective Aesthetics (DRA) as a hermeneutic approach that bridges computational analysis with humanistic reflection. Different from purely quantitative approaches in digital humanities, DRA positions literary data visualizations—such as theme maps, character networks, and emotion curves—as aesthetic and cultural artifacts containing philosophical meaning. The DRA conceptual model is built on three main layers: data, pattern, and meaning, which interacts dialogically through Aesthetic, Hermeneutic, Cultural, and Ecological-Spiritual principles. By combining the theories distant reading (Moretti), cultural semiotics (Lotman), and digital hermeneutics (Hayles), this model broadens the perspective on literary data as a landscape of cultural awareness. The results of the study show that DRA not only produces a thematic and emotional mapping of Indonesian literature, but also offers a reflective framework for reading local values ​​such as ngelmu rasa (‘inner knowledge’) and art as education of the soul in a digital context. This concept has implications for decolonizing digital epistemology in Southeast Asia and rehumanizing the relationship between technology and culture. Thus, Digital Reflective Aesthetics becoming a conceptual bridge between computing and contemplation, opening up new horizons for literary research that is characterful, rooted, and relevant to the challenges of the digital era.

Lorand Gaspar was a doctor of many talents (poet, essayist, translator, photographer, etc.), but beyond this simply accumulative vision, my “return” to Gasparian poetics seeks to perceive how these different activities contributed to the implementation of a commitment to perception and practical wisdom, based on the idea of knowledge that is fundamentally open to successive questioning and different forms of otherness. Taking as a starting point his notes on the practices of medicine in Feuilles d’Hôpital (2023), as well as his intermedial discourse in Carnets de Patmos (1998), my aim is to explore the ways of what I call Lorand Gaspar’s “poethics of translation”, which enabled him to anticipate the hermeneutic horizon of solicitude (or “care”) that has in the meantime established itself as a real turning point in the various fields of thought and art alike.

This article has two aims. Firstly, it makes an attempt to shed new light on the representation of sickness in Birgitta Trotzig’s (1929–2011) writings. Secondly, the article, by using its analyses of Trotzig, tries to draw some theoretical conclusions concerning the possibilities of applying a theology of pathology in literary studies. While earlier scholars have interpreted Trotzig’s depiction of sickness by means of secular intertexts, the starting point of this article is Trotzig’s adopting of Christian anthropology as her untranscendable hermeneutic horizon. Thus, it is argued, sickness in her writings should primarily be related to theological contexts. By close reading of a representative text passage, the opening scene of Trotzig’s best known novel Dykungens dotter (The Marsh King’s Daughter, 1985), the article explores which contexts within Christian theology of sickness that would be specially fertile for an interpretation of her sickness discourse. The analyses reveal four theological notions of sickness as intertextually present in Trotzig’s narration: Augustine’s concupiscence, Sören Kierkegaard’s dispair, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s decomposition, and Eugen Drewermann’s neurosis. The main theoretical conclusions of the analyses are: (a) that the theological notions of sickness to a high degree differ from a ”natural” experience as well as from the biblical sources, (b) that these notions can contradict each other and generate conceptual conflicts, and (c) that the notions therefore, when applied in literary studies, demand strong hermeneutic control.

This article aims to theoretically analyse the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and technology in liturgical events (liturgia ex machina). To this end, the first section outlines a hermeneutical horizon that encompasses the meaning and transformation of liturgy in the age of digitalisation and technologization. Building on this, the second section initiates a reflection on AI and technology in the liturgy, dealing with the limits and potentials involved. These relate on the one hand to the forms of the liturgy (sacraments and sacramentals) and on the other to its factors (e.g. acoustic, visual, temporal and spatial). Finally, the main conclusions and prospects for using AI and modern technology in the liturgy are outlined.

With the advent of today’s cross-cultural alterities, the percolating notions of ‘home’, ‘self’, and ‘other’, have undergone radical transformations. This alterity, if at all, has bred a world of changing identities under the indefatigable pretext of a global consciousness. In Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas has made us leery of forging a reality that never existed; a ‘saraband of cultures’ where nomadic figures become rootless subjects. Amid these palpable alterities, the ‘self’ has embraced the transient tropes of a planetary world and a diasporic consciousness. The question remains: how is it possible to think of postcolonial subjectivity amid a world of mobility and displacement? Or, more precisely, how can we conceive of subjectivity and alterity? Overridden by these questions, this article critiques the tacit roots of the poststructuralist subject whose rootless wandering demeans the primacy of historical rootedness. The subject’s errant rootlessness necessitates a thinking that is neither absolute nor homeless. The postmodern nomad forsakes the facticity of home and forges an otherness that is irreducibly errant. In doing so, the nomad grants the ‘other’ its own myths and ideals. Postcolonial subjectivity, as this article underscores, possesses an indispensable rootedness in the facticity of shared existence. This article re-thinks postcolonial subjectivity in accordance with the hermeneutic horizon of ‘factical rootedness’ in a world of impeding prejudices. While the Western hero represents the ‘other’, the postmodern nomad transcends the land. Both models of subjectivity are culturally and politically suspect. Whereas the colonial subject reduces the ‘other’ to an object of experience, the postmodern nomad does not defy the ‘other’s myths and idols. It so happens that instead of forging an alterity that evinces the self/other dichotomy by embracing an absolute otherness, hermeneutic prejudice encourages an alterity that defies the chauvinistic logic of the subject and the ‘other’s’ claim to absolute estrangement. The discussion on hermeneutic subjectivity calls for a radical return to the soil to which only the figure of the prejudiced subject can uphold. In The Waste Land, the Greek seer Tiresias, defied by Eliot’s prejudiced stance, trespasses the threshold of pure subjectivity and forges a transformative subjectivity that illuminates the corrective alterity of prejudice (Vorurteil).

One of Tejumola Olaniyan’s most significant contributions to the analysis of African social formation is his emphasis on approaching the African state as a fundamental “generative canvas” for cultural (re)production. This article engages his thesis in exploring how the state is not only a cultural practice and a site of culture but also a phenomenon that is generative of culture, particularly when culture is approached as central to the conception and practices of the political. I develop this argument through a re-engagement with and reinterpretation of Fela Anikulapo Kuti’s lyrics, which Olaniyan has interpreted in useful ways, as some of the most generative means of understanding the postcolonial state. I develop three perspectives extracted from Olaniyan’s work, that is, “hermeneutic horizon,” “ethics of attention,” and “reformative energies,” to explore Fela’s lyrical theorization of the state/power in postcolonial Africa.

This essay argues that the “common home” metaphor, when applied to planet Earth, falls short in its ability to provide an accurate analogy with the complexity and diversity of the planet itself since it has a limited epistemological, heuristic, and hermeneutical horizon; it is an analogy that proves inadequate in expressing common human representations of home and the two principles that should inspire an Ecotheology: the ontological value of creatures (Gaudium et Spes) and the recognition of the intrinsic relationship between all beings (Laudato Si’). In order to methodologically support this enquiry, a reflexive analysis and a metadisciplinary discourse are used through Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt, and the concept of integral ecology, proposed in Pope Francis’s encyclical letter Laudato Si’. On care for our common home, 21 May 2015. The performativity of the “common home” metaphor is evaluated to review its use in Ecotheology. The conclusion reached is that the category of “common life” might be more appropriate than “common home” to characterize how humans inhabit the world for an Ecotheology, and to represent planetary and cosmic communion and interdependence.

Kirchheimer, within a tradition opened by Carl Schmitt, advocates the thesis according with the absence of a decision for socialism, inWeimar Constitution, would have implicated an undefined space, which would have been therefore occupied by bourgeoise partisans. Behind that thesis lies the unthematized assumption that referred decision would not only be desirable but also possible. Thisarticle proceeds with a reconstruction of the transcendental ground of that possibility, on the hermeneutical horizon, from which critical perspectives about (Social) Welfare State idea of commitment are addressed.It further explores the constitution of that possibility and the way by which, apparently deriving from it, the sovereign decision, on political and constitutional sphere, would impact the hermeneutical activity of Courts. The object of this article comprehends, furthermore, the implications of the positive constitutional field on the courts’ concretization of fundamental social rights and the problem of the assumption, by Schmitt andKirchheimer, of the possibility of a decision like the one referred on the political ground.

Francesco Filannino. <i>The Theological Programme of Mark: Exegesis and Function of Mark 1:1, 2–15</i>

In spite of the increasing presence of religion in international relations with various publications observing this presence and numerous authorities calling for the inclusion of religion into mainstream research, there is no universal consent to recognize religion’s role in IR. In our opinion, the only way to reconcile IR with the international reality in which religion has been and will remain present in the foreseeable future is for the researchers themselves to construct—especially those oriented towards broad, non-Western perspective—a new face of the discipline, the face which in this article we call the post-secular identity of IR study. Assuming that identity is first and foremost a form of knowledge that tells us how we can define ourselves against the background of the surrounding world, our purpose is to look at the post-secular identity from two different perspectives which are analyzed in the two distinctive parts of the paper. On one hand, post-secular identity would mean the socio-political but also cultural phenomenon of the “knowledge of the self” expressed in the form of ideas, interests and goals of various state and nonstate actors, both religious and secular ones, that are more or less conditioned by religious determinants. We propose looking at them through the prism of a new kind of “partnership” emerging as a result of post-secular thinking in the area of IR. On the other hand, we want to look at post-secular identity as the badly required transformation within the area of IR study that, as we claim, needs to construct more inclusive views of IR scholars adopting a deliberative and pluralistic approach to the reality they examine based on widening their epistemological and hermeneutical horizons. This redefinition would be framed by recognizing religion as rational and adopting the view that the limits of the scientific methods do not coincide with the boundaries of rationality. We also adopt the view that along with the cognitive expansion of the universe, the concept of transcendence has been broadened.

This paper deals with a research hypothesis tying the legacy of German idealism to the first foundation of Michel Henry’s “phenomenology of life”. Based on a series of archive documents, the paper reconstitutes the hermeneutical horizon in contrast with which the young Henry (1946–1963) defined his conception of phenomenology, philosophy, and religion, i.e., the French existential–Hegelian debate (Wahl, Kojève). The reconstitution of this dialogue between the young Henry and the French Hegelianism of the 20th century will provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the “religious attitude” in Henry’s philosophy and in his attempt to rethink the transcendental connection between phenomenality and (philosophical) discourse.

Investigating the Social, Cultural, and Moral Consequences of the formalistity theology in Mulla Sadra's View

What is the philosophical significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Japanese notion of kotoba (言葉) for Japanese philosophy? Was his conversation with Tezuka Tomio a real dialogue or not? To answer to these correlated questions, I elucidate Heidegger’s 1954 essay “A Dialogue on Language” by following a topological mode of thinking, and I inquire into the way-making of a “thinking conversation”. First, I problematize whether Heidegger engaged in a genuine dialogue with Tezuka. To that end, I distinguish the hermeneutic horizon of the actual encounter between Tezuka and Heidegger from Heidegger’s essay which places Tezuka (the Japanese) and Heidegger (the Inquirer) in a fictional philosophical conversation. Second, I argue that Heidegger’s topological method of interpretating kotoba can be read as a poetic means of thematizing East-West dialogue. Third and finally, exploring the topological sense of kotoba, I engage with third generation Kyoto School thinker Ueda Shizuteru’s idea of “hollow words” of language, situated in a twofold view of the world. I conclude that the true character of Heidegger’s conversation with Tezuka can be identified neither in Heidegger’s “actual” encounter with Tezuka, nor merely in Heidegger’s “hollow” essay. Departing from Ueda’s account of kotoba, it appears that a genuine conversation with language can be located in the dialogue of actuality and hollowness, which finds it expression in poetic language.

The Qur'an with the basic assumption as the idea of ​​God that is eternal, universal, and trans-historical, when it has to be communicated to humans who live historically, then the basic content of the Qur'an must of course adapt to the character of the Arabic language and culture that was a historical reality at the time. The research departs from the many developments of methods and approaches that are so diverse in the interpretation of the Qur'an, so that it often causes debate among commentators. This study is basically an attempt to find out how maqa&gt;shid al-Shari&gt;'ah hermeneutics is a method in the interpretation of the Qur'an and how to apply maqa&gt;shid al-Shari&gt;'ah in the interpretation of the Qur'an. . This study aims to answer these two problems. The nature of this research is qualitative and uses the hermeneutical-analytic method, namely by analyzing the data in the hermeneutic circle and then drawing various conclusions. The data obtained will be analyzed in accordance with scientific theories with the provisions in the analysis guidelines and in accordance with the rules of writing scientific papers. The results show that the maqa&gt;shid al-Shari&gt;'ah hermeneutic method in interpretation cannot ignore three important horizons in hermeneutics, namely text, author, and reader. So the resulting form of interpretation will not only reveal the meaning of the text but will emphasize maqa&gt;shid. While in the application, namely with ta'li&gt;li and istisla&gt;hi patterns. The pattern is considered by the qiya&gt;s and maslaha&gt;h mursala&gt;h methods in ushu&gt;l fiqh.

The Qur'an with the basic assumption as the idea of ​​God that is eternal, universal, and trans-historical, when it has to be communicated to humans who live historically, then the basic content of the Qur'an must of course adapt to the character of the Arabic language and culture that was a historical reality at the time. The research departs from the many developments of methods and approaches that are so diverse in the interpretation of the Qur'an, so that it often causes debate among commentators. This study is basically an attempt to find out how maqa&gt;shid al-Shari&gt;'ah hermeneutics is a method in the interpretation of the Qur'an and how to apply maqa&gt;shid al-Shari&gt;'ah in the interpretation of the Qur'an. . This study aims to answer these two problems. The nature of this research is qualitative and uses the hermeneutical-analytic method, namely by analyzing the data in the hermeneutic circle and then drawing various conclusions. The data obtained will be analyzed in accordance with scientific theories with the provisions in the analysis guidelines and in accordance with the rules of writing scientific papers. The results show that the maqa&gt;shid al-Shari&gt;'ah hermeneutic method in interpretation cannot ignore three important horizons in hermeneutics, namely text, author, and reader. So the resulting form of interpretation will not only reveal the meaning of the text but will emphasize maqa&gt;shid. While in the application, namely with ta'li&gt;li and istisla&gt;hi patterns. The pattern is considered by the qiya&gt;s and maslaha&gt;h mursala&gt;h methods in ushu&gt;l fiqh.

Abstract The belief in heaven's mandate (tianming 天命) in earlier documents referred to divine‐ethical sanctions of political rulers. It later developed multiple implications such as an individual's destiny or fate and became one of the most fundamental concepts in Chinese intellectual and cultural history. In modern times, this concept has received long‐lasting attention in the field of Chinese philosophy, and almost all major scholars have more or less been involved in discussions and debates, especially on the topic of the classical Confucian conception of heaven's mandate. Their discussions on this topic have largely focused on two major controversies: (i) whether early Confucians view heaven's mandate as prescriptive ethical command or descriptive amoral fate, and (ii) whether their attitude toward heaven's mandate is voluntarist or fatalistic. While this scholarship has been fruitful and insightful, it has continued for almost a century with certain variants. Therefore, it is time to address this topic with new approaches and hermeneutic horizons. In this essay, I propose a new approach and horizon to viewing the classical Confucian conception of heaven's mandate as their reflections on individual existence and self‐realization under the constraints of mandate or destiny. I examine the texts associated with Confucius and Mencius such as the Analects and the Mencius, as well as some recently unearthed texts, to suggest that early Confucians accommodate individual initiative and self‐determination of life choices through their conceptualization of heaven's mandate. To them, the vocabulary of heaven's mandate empowers individuals, especially through situating their places in society and the cosmos. By knowing and standing firmly on one's mandate or destiny, the individual not only realizes the value of their existence but also goes beyond the ultimate destiny of death. This fresh reading of heaven's mandate is grounded in the context of the development of Confucian ideas in the early period and presents an optimistic vision of Confucian humanism.

What is the relation between material hermeneutics, bodies, perception and materials? In this article, I shall argue cultural learning processes tie them together. Three aspects of learning can be identified in cultural learning processes. First, all learning is tied to cultural practices. Second, all learning in cultural practice entangle humans’ ability to recognize a material world conceptually, and finally the boundaries of objects, the object we perceive, are set by shifting material-conceptual entanglements. All these aspects are important for material hermeneutics in a technoculture. Postphenomenology has expanded the connection between hermeneutics and phenomenology by focusing on studies of how perception, bodies, materials, the sensual realm and hermeneutics are entwined when we perceive the world through technologies. Following Don Ihde, hermeneutics expands beyond interpretation of texts in the humanities. We can interpret materials as for instance animal bones to make new sense of the Bible. New technologies have expanded material hermeneutics, when we can ‘look’ into bodies and ‘perceive’ below surfaces. Interpretation via such tools in a technoculture, both limit and extend our hermeneutic horizons in the humanities as well as in the natural sciences. Furthermore, from the perspective of cultural learning processes, material hermeneutics in the human and natural sciences depend on more than mediating instruments. Material hermeneutics also involve the material cultural environments of scientific apparatuses and the scientists’ processes of learning in cultural practice. This changes the focus from relations in postphenomenology to processes of relations.

Wilhelm Halbfass and the Purposes of Cross-Cultural Dialogue Dimitry Shevchenko (bio) Introduction The subject of this article is comparative philosophy—its goals and methods—as discussed in the work of Wilhelm Halbfass (1940–2000), a prominent German scholar of Indian philosophy. Halbfass' classical works, such as India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (1988),1 Tradition and Reflection (1991), On Being and What There Is (1992), and Karma und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken (2000) have left a lasting influence on a generation of scholars and students of Indian philosophy. The appreciation of his work and a testimony to its impact can be seen, for instance, in the voluminous study Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies (1997) edited by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, which contains thorough discussions of different aspects of Halbfass' work by twenty-five scholars, with Halbfass' own responses. Karin Preisendanz has also edited a second volume, published after Halbfass' passing, titled Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass (2007).2 Halbfass' distinguished approach is his acknowledgment of the inevitability of prejudices affecting a researcher's understanding of foreign cultures. It is not possible to adopt an impartial vantage point from which one could assess different traditions, nor is it possible simply to adopt the point of view of someone else, to slip into someone else's skin. The process of understanding begins with preconceptions regarding the object of study, which, nevertheless, can be rectified through constant awareness of one's hermeneutic horizon, and through patient attempts to reach the horizon of the other side. Halbfass argues that the privileged position of European conceptual frameworks of understanding does not yet allow us to determine the proper place of Indian philosophy in relation to Western philosophy. At the present stage of the dialogue, our exploration of Indian philosophy must continue without any determinate purpose in view, other than simply trying to understand what the tradition has been saying. As I will argue, Halbfass' contention that Indian and Western philosophers are still found at the preliminary stage of understanding each other,3 [End Page 793] coupled with his methodical demand to exclude purposes from the dialogical pursuit of understanding, should be seen as an obstacle to fruitful philosophical dialogue qua philosophy. Instead, I propose a model of cross-cultural philosophical dialogue, in which the pursuit of understanding is inseparable from the pursuit of human goals. I will focus on the concept of prayojana, the statement of purpose to be achieved by the pursuit of knowledge, formally required in philosophical literature and debates in classical India. Prayojana implies that the accomplishment of understanding is instrumental in bringing about some desirable result. It follows that philosophical dialogue is considered a goal-oriented activity, the initiation of which ought to be motivated by good reasons. This tension between Halbfass' rejection (even if temporary) of purpose as detrimental to understanding and purposefulness of philosophical dialogue in classical India invites some reflection over the role that human goals play or should play in cross-cultural philosophical dialogue. I will further briefly review the reasons Halbfass attributes to the refusal on the part of some Indian traditionalists to engage in a dialogue with Western philosophy. Halbfass examines the "xenological" frameworks of Indian traditions, responsible for various degrees of closure and openness toward foreign cultures prior to Colonialism, its "inclusivism," and the unequal colonial situation—all affecting the Indian side of the encounter with Western philosophy. However, it is not enough to render the isolationist tendencies described by Halbfass as merely defensive reactions to the imposition of European conceptual schemes or as a form of xenophobia. Without denying these external factors, I will argue that purposes as internal factors of philosophizing in India can play a role in the rejection of the inter-cultural dialogue by some participants of the intra-cultural dialogue in India. By reflecting on the role of prayojana in philosophical interaction, I will demonstrate that the resistance to cross-cultural dialogue can be a rational and, in principle, morally justifiable choice. Comparative Philosophy and Dialogic Approach In Halbfass' own words, his book...

“A lot turns on the specific interpretation of the intrusions into the purity of the play that Schmitt describes,” write David Pan and Julia Reinhard Lupton in their introduction to Carl Schmitt’s fecund yet puzzling text Hamlet or Hecuba (1956).1 What is “a lot”—this almost everything, but not quite? A lot turns on the interpretation of intrusion, yes, and not simply for our understanding of the internal integrity of Schmitt’s essay, or his corpus, but also for our hermeneutic horizon. Pan and Lupton’s short appraisal quoted here inaugurates the 2010 Telos special issue encompassing a range of takes on “the time” that intrudes into Schmitt’s theorization of the play; it is my intention to discern the difference in these perspectives on the relationship between the historical and mythic by augmenting the stakes of Schmitt’s genealogical critique and by offering another figure, both alongside and in place of Schmitt’s concrete context, as the ghostly form whose effacement prefigures the sovereign elaboration of representation and the public sphere.

초전법륜(初轉法輪)에 대한 원측(圓測)의 해석학적 지평