IN SOME WAYS THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES RESEMBLES an Acropolis with the awesome remains of marble pillars lying about the landscape. Surely one of the central pillars of the Constitution is the principle of separation of powers, and its shattered condition is nowhere more visible than in the socalled process. Administrative is a phrase sometimes used to describe the exercise of legislative, judicial, as well as executive power by administrators. That process is widely used at all levels of government in the United States today, and occupies such an important place now that it is no exaggeration to say that a new system of government has evolved in the United States. A quiet revolution has gone on, an administrative revolution, centralizing large swaths of legislative and judicial power in the hands of executives, and that revolution continues to unfold toward ever greater executive power. It is not the result of a conspiracy, but is largely a by-product of technology and of complexity in the work of government. I think we have gone too far in scrapping the principle of separation of powers, particularly of separate and independent judicial power, and I will try, briefly, to show why separation of powers should be at least partially resurrected in formal administrative adjudication. This should be done by making hearing officers independent and their decisions final; or, in short, by making administrative judges out of administrative hearing officers. > Too much of the principle of separation of powers, particularly of separate and independent judicial power, has eroded in the United States. The so-called (a term sometimes used to describe the exercise of legislative and judicial power by executives) is widely employed by all levels of government in the United States and centralizes much power in the hands of executives. Separation of powers should be partially resurrected by making administrative hearing officers truly and completely independent and by making their decisions final. While it would not be easy or wholly satisfactory to make hearing officers independent and their decisions final, the case for doing so is nevertheless compelling when cast against the evils of the present system.
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