This paper presents the results of a study of several related dynamic fiscal problems in a simple economic model whose distinguishing feature is that the participants in the economy are assumed to make plans by looking into the future. The competitive equilibrium in the presence of a changing fiscal policy is calculated, and compared to the intertemporal equilibrium in the absence of any change. Throughout, we use the term equilibrium in its Walrasian sense, to indicate that all markets clear. In every case, we calculate the full general equilibrium in the economy, over all time periods and all markets. Part of the contribution of the paper, it is hoped, is in suggesting some methods for the characterization of intertemporal competitive equilibrium. Except for very general properties-existence of equilibrium and turnpike behaviour-this area of study has received very little attention in the literature. Since the actual calculation of the equilibrium is rather tediously algebraic, we have adopted the following organization: In part 1, we describe the model and indicate some of its properties. In part 2, we present, without proof, descriptions of the dynamic effects of a variety of fiscal policies. Finally, in part 3, we develop the analytic method applied in section 2. Four fiscal policies are treated: a recurrent head tax, a consumption tax, an interest tax, and an investment credit. In almost every case, there are important anticipatory effects on the economy in advance of the imposition of the policy. Generally, the anticipatory effects help to smooth the jolt caused by the policy. For example, savings gradually increase in anticipation of the head tax, enabling individuals to maintain a smooth level of consumption in spite of the tax, although eventually consumption must be reduced by the whole amount of the tax. Even when the policy change causes a jolt in the real flows of the economy, as in the case of the consumption tax, the anticipatory effect is in the opposite direction to the jolt. It is also instructive to note how the competitive price system acts to cushion the economy against the impact of a policy change. This is most strikingly illustrated in the case of the investment credit (defined as a negative excise tax on investment goods). In a partial equilibrium analysis ignoring the effect of the credit on interest rates, it appears that no rational entrepreneur would hold capital goods at the instant the credit became available. He could escape the capital loss induced by the credit, seemingly, by selling his capital goods just before the credit became available and buying them back an instant later. In fact, however, the simultaneous desire of all capital owners to sell and buy back causes a dramatic fall in the interest rate, exactly large enough to remove all the incentive to sell in the first place.