It seems that the discourse on political action necessitates considerable attention, given the lofty and humanistic dimensions it embodies in an era where action is imposed as an imperative for self-preservation, as a marker of human dignity, and as a solution to numerous humanitarian crises. The political reality of the mid-twentieth century witnessed a political crisis manifested in the phenomenon of totalitarianism and authoritarian regimes. In response to this crisis, Arendt resorted to political action to fulfil the political promise, conceiving of the human being as a political animal within a public sphere. This raises fundamental questions: What are the boundaries of politics and its nature? What is the role of political action in relation to public life? Moreover, how is such action realised within the framework of Arendtian politics?

Nesse artigo, serão analisadas as abordagens de Hannah Arendt relativas ao entendimento assumido por ela acerca da questão do mundo das aparências. Tema esse de sua filosofia política que se associa à ação do homem no mundo juntamente com a questão do dois-em-um do pensamento e da distinção entre trabalho e obra na vita activa, a fim de explicitar as posições e as possibilidades do homem no mundo. Arendt coloca que a natureza fenomênica do mundo e, por definição, a sua pluralidade intrínseca, torna impossível um discurso “eterno e imutável” como medida para os assuntos humanos e o caráter pluralista das coisas. Com isso, o artigo busca demostrar como Arendt nos convida a perceber que, o aparecer ocorre na medida em que o indivíduo singular percebe o mundo. Pois os indivíduos perceberem e serem percebidos ao mesmo tempo, existindo assim, infinitas diversidades de aparências. Pois, essa estrutura de Ser se justifica, para ela, pelo modo de ser do mundo. Estrutura essa que se localiza de forma que os seres vivos, os homens e os animais não estão apenas lançados no mundo, mas são responsáveis por ele, e essa estrutura de mundo, se justifica, através da pluralidade.

El artículo reconstruye algunas de las perspectivas del trabajo de Hannah Arendt que permiten considerar la subjetividad moderna y su conexión con el despliegue de la sociedad capitalista. En dicho intento, se acude a espacios menos transitados de la reflexión arendtiana, como su análisis de la “introspección” en la temprana biografía de Rahel Varnhagen, su lectura de la “transformación del ciudadano en burgués” o su consideración acerca de las masas, el consumo y el entretenimiento. El resultado es la puesta en primer plano de ciertos enfoques originales que permiten advertir algunas de las principales condiciones del sujeto contemporáneo y su relación consigo mismo.

BETWEEN VISIBILITY AND AUTHENTICITY IN DEMOCRACY: THE SPACE OF POLITICS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANNAH ARENDT AND ITS CONTEMPORARY RECONFIGURATIONS The aim of the article is to look at the pluralistic democratic space of politics as a game of appearances devoid of authenticity, and shaped by contemporary media technologies in which political opinions have become a derivative of social cognition, referring primarily to perception (visualisation of politics). In this role, it replaced public debate, diversified in form and content, referring to the principles of rationality, which reflected the competitive system of interests and ideas. The theoretical basis for presenting democratic practice as a theatre game – more precisely, a strictly enacted and inauthentic staging based on diverse visual communication – will be Hannah Arendt’s phenomenological perspective. According to the philosopher, the space of politics is mainly a public area of exchange and confrontation in the dimension of visibility and audibility, where we are dealing with revealing ourselves (political actors) in the space of appearance (the articulation process as a result of subjective activity). The starting point for presenting the tension between authenticity and visibility resulting from Arendt’s assumptions will be a discussion of the attributes of a contemporary pluralistic society from the point of view of her theory of the human condition.

MEDIATOR AND SOURCE OF ALIENATION: THE DIALECTIC OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANNAH ARENDT AND KARL JASPERS

Menjadi pemimpin mengandaikan keterlibatan aktif agensi yang bersangkutan dalam lokus kepemimpinannya. Proposisi ini mengandaikan bahwa seorang pemimpin memiliki relasi resiprokal terhadap dua pihak: konstituen dan non-konstituennya. Kondisi perpolitikan Indonesia saat ini cenderung non-resiprokal terhadap non-konstituen sehingga legitimasi pemimpin menjadi terbagi ke dalam kantong-kantong pemilihan yang cenderung homogen dalam setiap pemilihan umum. Hannah Arendt mengajukan gagasan vita activa dan vita contemplativa, yang sebenarnya merupakan sebuah metode siklik untuk terus memeriksa secara resiprokal sebuah tindakan baik dalam persepsi eksternal-internal (eksterosepsi) maupun persepsi internal-eksternal (interosepsi) dalam kerangka yang diajukan Anil Seth. Di dalam penelitian ini, penulis menggagas sebuah model kepemimpinan yang didasarkan pada evaluasi siklik semacam ini. Sebagai fondasi teoretisnya, penulis mengambil kategorisasi instrumen ideologi simbion mutualis yang digagas oleh J.M. Balkin. Penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa pada kepemimpinan yang evaluatif dalam tahapan interosepsi maupun eksterosepsi dapat memberikan peluang bagi terciptanya sebuah model yang inklusif terhadap konstituen.

Openness to DiversityKnow: Open to new things, respect and value differences and embrace diversity; To: Act with flexibility and without prejudice of any kind, live harmoniously with those who are different, appreciate, enjoy and produce diverse cultural goods, value local identities and cultures, maximizing actions that promote gender, ethnic and cultural equality, play and interact/ relate to Diversity. Responsibility and ParticipationKnow: Recognize and exercise rights and duties, make ethical and responsible decisions for yourself, others and the planet, developing protagonism, playfulness and the right to make choices, expressing your interests, hypotheses, preferences

Ao trabalharmos o totalitarismo, temos como objetivo a análise desse regime a partir de seus recursos, como: propaganda, violência e terror de modo a demonstrar que sua prática não pode se enquadrar no conceito de regime político. Tomamos como base conceitual a obra de Hannah Arendt.

Este artigo pretende discutir a concepção de aparência desenvolvida por Hannah Arendt na obra A Vida do Espírito (1977), tendo em vista a centralidade da questão como elemento inicial da reflexão sobre as atividades do espírito. Inicialmente, o texto discorre sobre parte dos atravessamentos teóricos presentes na interpretação arendtiana da aparência, concentrando-se no conteúdo de referência em Martin Heidegger. Como resultado, ocorre um afastamento realizado pela autora em relação à metafísica tradicional, e tal postura crítica será compreendida a partir do diálogo com Heidegger e Kant. Assim, na sua transversalidade com a faculdade do pensar e com o ser em geral, entende-se que a crítica à metafísica é consequência direta da concepção de aparência proposta pela autora. Por fim, uma breve elucidação metodológica do conteúdo de A Vida do Espírito será apresentada, com o intuito de justificar seu caráter interpretativo baseado no método fenomenológico-hermenêutico aos moldes heideggerianos, em detrimento de uma descrição fenomenológica de inspiração husserliana.

philosophy in Hannah Arendt and Paulo Freire. We start from the conceptions of Santos; Ax; Alves and Vieira; Maciel; Arajo and Borges; Freire; and Souza. We are based on the qualitative approach Andr (2013); where semi-structured interviews (Ludke and Andr (2013) and The research results show that education is still captive to the perpetuation of an education focused on employability and mechanization of their educational practices, which is opposed to Arendt and Freire in terms of the concept of education based on dialogue and reflection.

RESUMO Neste artigo, ressalto como Arendt mobiliza as noções de compreensão e de sentido de um modo original para orientar sua interpretação acerca dos fenômenos políticos. Cabe perceber que os critérios que a autora pensa para a atividade compreensiva se configuram como uma hermenêutica não elaborada, mas que surge como pano de fundo de seu pensamento. O ponto de partida trata da distinção conceitual que ela faz entre verdade e sentido, este último como objetivo constante e sem fim da atividade compreensiva. Em seguida, resgato dos Diários de pensamento de Arendt as noções de cristalização e desnaturalização como perspectivas hermenêuticas baseadas na noção de sentido, as quais se impõem no lugar do critério da causalidade. Por fim, explicito como o totalitarismo pode ser lido na chave de leitura da hermenêutica.

In my paper, I try to summarize Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the method of political thinking, following them through their genesis. My fundamental assumption is that although she had been preoccupied with the issue before (at least from 1957), she became more seriously interested in it after the controversy following the publication of the Eichmann volume. It is generally known that Arendt believed to have found the pattern for the method of political thinking in Kant’s third critique, the one about judgment; more precisely in the Kantian description of the reflective judgment. This served as a pattern for Arendt for what she sometimes called representative thinking or opinion. If, on the other hand, we examine Arendt’s referring thoughts in their genesis we also come to realize why that was the case. In my opinion, Arendt looked in Kant’s work for a form of political thinking that remained impartial, in other words, it was not committed to one political cause or another, yet did not break its relations to politics, remaining entirely political.

Feminist Interpretations of Action and the Public in Hannah Arendt’s Theory. Arendt’s typology of human activity and her arguments on the precondition of politics allow for a variety in interpretations for contemporary political thought. The feminist reception of Arendt’s work ranges from critical to conciliatory readings that attempt to find the points in which Arendt’s theory might inspire a feminist political project. In this paper I explore the ways in which feminist thought has responded to Arendt’s definition of action, freedom and politics, and whether her theoretical framework can be useful in a feminist rethinking of politics, power and the public realm.

The Displacement of Human Judgment in Science:The Problems of Biomedical Research in an Age of Big Data Paul Scherz (bio) in the human condition, hannah arendt lamented the state of the mathematical natural sciences. While recognizing their power to transform the world, she thought that they leave much to be desired in terms of providing an explanation for the world once they lose contact with human senses and intuitions. Surveying fields like quantum mechanics in which we still do not have a good picture of the world described by the equations, Arendt suggested that science was being reduced to mere technical intervention into nature rather than an understanding of it. "But the mathematization of physics … had in its last stages the unexpected and yet plausible consequence that every question man puts to nature is answered in terms of mathematical patterns to which no model can ever be adequate" (Arendt 1998, 287). Understanding is lost, leaving "us a universe of whose qualities we know no more than the way they affect our measuring instruments" (261). Of course, similar critiques were levelled throughout the mid-twentieth century by many other scholars—Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Hans Jonas, and Georges Canguilhem. As Husserl put it, "This arithmetization of geometry leads almost automatically, in a certain way, to the emptying of its meaning" (1970, 44). Physical science had lost hold of the original [End Page 957] intuitions underlying the quantification of nature, driving it from the grasp of human understanding. To many scholars who shared this critique, one natural science seemed like an exception: biology. Heidegger argued that "all sciences concerned with life must necessarily be inexact just in order to remain rigorous. A living thing can indeed also be grasped as a spatio-temporal magnitude of motion, but then it is no longer apprehended as living" (1977, 120). Because of the rich complexity of organisms, it was not thought that they could be understood purely mathematically. Instead, one needed to understand their purposes, aims, and goals; that is, their teleology. Even those like Ernst Mayr, attempting to mathematize biology as part of the Modern Synthesis of evolution, understood this need, although he preferred the cybernetically derived term "teleonomy" to the older "teleology" (Mayr 1989). For example, a complete, detailed description of the chemical and signaling reactions that lead to birds migrating would still be a deficient explanation if we did not also include an account of why birds migrate. Because it deals with living things, biology requires richer forms of judgment and explanation than other natural sciences. This exceptional feature of biological explanation had been recognized already by Immanuel Kant, who argued that science needed something beyond the mathematics of Newtonian physics. While he would have liked to submit all of nature to that mathematical form of description, it was impossible because living organisms demanded this richer teleological description (Kant 2000, 386–88). Most philosophers in prior generations shared Kant's view. A science of purely mathematical relations between entities could not capture the complexity and goal-directedness of biological life. Then, two decades ago, the Human Genome Project brought a sea change. Biology began to be inundated by massive amounts of genetic and other data, much of which was produced and interpreted by machines. Analogous to developments in other fields like medicine and education, human judgment began to look inadequate to the task of analyzing this data and using it to develop the therapies that [End Page 958] had been promised in exchange for the massive public and private investment in the machine infrastructure. Scientists began suggesting that these vast accumulations of data, "mined" and interpreted by machines, could reveal knowledge. For instance, an editorial in Nature entitled "Can Biological Phenomena Be Understood by Humans?" quoted a biologist arguing that scientists "have to free [themselves] from the hypothesis-driven approach" and rely more on computer models (Anonymous 2000). After 2000, practicing scientists and philosophers of biology joined a broad debate over the relationship between the scientist, computer-analyzed data, and human reason in biological knowledge production (Allen 2001a, b; Gillies 2001; Smal-heiser 2002; Kell and Oliver 2004). The argument for the seeming promise of artificial intelligence in science was put...

Abstract This article traces the concept of 'civil power' in Jeffrey Alexander's book The Civil Sphere. Doing so leads to an interpretation of the work as operating in the space between the different theories and definitions of power in the work of Max Weber and Hannah Arendt. Read in this way, The Civil Sphere becomes not only a Durkheimian argument about solidarity, but also an argument about the consequential ways in which acting together and not acting together constitute a space of variation in the degree to which power and violence can reined in, in so far as they are reigned out in the making of democratic sovereignty.

O presente artigo propõe uma reflexão acerca das relações existentes entre educação e pensamento à luz das ideias de Hannah Arendt sobre tais conceitos. Com base na noção arendtiana de que o pensamento consiste em uma atividade do espírito que se dá por um diálogo interno, no qual o sujeito se cinde em dois para examinar uma experiência e a ela atribuir sentido, pretende-se discutir possíveis intersecções entre a formação das novas gerações e o exercício do pensar, problematizando o papel da escola e do professor. Desse modo, trata-se de um estudo de cunho filosófico que tem como objetivo central a reflexão sobre o significado de uma educação que tem como fundamento a apresentação e a inserção de jovens e crianças no patrimônio histórico cultural acumulado, com vistas a torná-los familiarizados com o mundo e cônscios do lugar em que o apreendem.

Manusia adalah makhluk politik yang eksistensinya tidak terlepas dari kodrat natural sebagai figur yang selalu berada bersama yang lain. Manusia selalu memiliki ikhtiar untuk keluar dari personalitas kepada komunalitas. Dalam realitas komunalitas, akan tampak berbagai peristiwa; entah itu yang konstruktif maupun destruktif. Tindakan politik bisa saja menghasilkan kesejahteraan bersama (konstruktif) tetapi di sisi lain politik bisa menghancurkan humanitas itu sendiri (destruktif). Karena terjadi banyak peristiwa, maka muncul juga banyak perspektif. Hannah Arendt adalah seorang filsuf yang berusaha merefleksikan konteks tindakan politik pada zamannya dan juga menganalisis kondisi totalitarianisme yang mengalienasi eksistensinya dan masyarakatnya. Upaya intelektual yang dibuatnya ternyata mampu menghadirkan begitu banyak perspektif yang menyadarkan publik terutama berkaitan dengan tindakan dalam berpolitik.

Perplexity has often greeted hannah arendt's decision to place an extended historical reflection on anti-Semitism at the beginning ofThe Origins of Totalitarianism, her doleful 1951 postmortem chronicling Europe's twentieth-century descent into the abyss. Seyla Benhabib proposes that to “appreciate the unity of the work as Arendt herself intended it to be read” (64), one must begin not with part 1 (“Antisemitism”) but rather with the chapter in part 3 (“Totalitarianism”) about the extermination and concentration camps. Another of Arendt's best commentators, Margaret Canovan, observes that Arendt's arrangement is “not a very helpful one” because, among other reasons, Arendt's discussion of anti-Semitism deploys key concepts like “imperialism” whose particular meanings to Arendt are only later defined. Canovan chalks up Arendt's organizational decision to “her own initial preoccupation” with anti-Semitism, as well as to “reasons of chronology” (28-29).

as hannah arendt suggests in the above passage, there is a generic problem inherent to the story of the struggle of the working class. In myths humans labor heroically against nature and find victory and glory in their efforts. Even when a hero performs a seemingly ordinary act—for example, cleaning out a stable or competing in a swimming contest —the stakes become magnified far beyond what any other person could expect to achieve. For everyone else, there is only a “relentless repetition” of the struggle against decay and chaos, an interminable battle to maintain life itself. The circularity of labor, which must immediately reincorporate some part of what it produces in order to continue working, forestalls the question of heroism as much as its grinding endlessness overflows narrative bounds. To be recognized as extraordinary, a hero must wrest surplus into his possession, a feat that demonstrates excellence among others. In the narrative of productive labor, there are few of the remainders—wealth, honor, or glory—that allow a tale to be pushed toward climax, conclusion, and repose. Labor power as material phenomenon or human condition exists beyond the horizon of aristocratic genres, like tragedy, epic, and romance, and this exclusivity renders these literary forms unable to represent the actual source of the political power they celebrate. The romance of Havelok (ca. 1295) is an experiment in generic frontiers, an attempt to look into the vanishing point that is the unrepresentable space of labor. It is a narrative profoundly concerned with the human body’s distressing vulnerability in a world of sweat and hunger. It is a story pitched at the grand scale of international political maneuvering, of dynas-

The aim of this paper is to reconsider Hannah Arendt’s most influential works from the point of view of her attitude towards democracy and analysis of the way it may contribute to the contemporary understanding and redefinition of the very notion of what democracy is. The paper begins with the reconstruction of Arendt’s anthropology in order to ground her political reflections. The next part discusses the basic characteristics of counsel democracy in forms of spontaneous, local organizations and associations in which every citizen could freely and equally participate, as they show through her analysis of revolutions. The last part deals with different and contradictory interpretations of Arendt’s attitude towards democracy and the question whether her proposition is a practical, revolutionary proposition or an idealist utopia. The interpretation of Arendt’s project emphasizing her democratic and reformative approach is defended. The conclusion states Hannah Arendt’s important contribution to the contemporary reflection on democracy in view of her recognition of the power of grassroots collective actions and their role in contemporary political sphere and the necessity of such formed at grass­roots and spontaneous level actions and associations as a unique safety valve for the society, as well as a counterbalance for mass society.