ABSTRACT This paper is about N-person cooperative games embedded in a set of N linear programs. In the 1975 seminal paper about linear production, Owen showed that an optimal dual vector of the Grand Coalition (of the Producers) provided the key for determining a solution in the Core. This Core solution depends entirely on the resources (right-hand sides) of the N linear programs; the technology matrices and objective coefficients have no role. We provide a Shapley inspired alternative Core solution which includes the impact of technology and prices missing in the Owen Core solution.

Horizontal collaboration in distribution networks can reduce transportation costs and environmental impacts, yet many initiatives fail due to rising coordination expenses and fragile trust among partners. This paper proposes a bi-objective, two-stage robust optimisation model for designing coalition-based supply chain networks under uncertainty, explicitly accounting for collaboration costs and measurable trust between carriers. The model captures how first-stage coalition decisions may be affected by potential disruptions in the second stage, where trust levels determine coalition feasibility and influence worst-case recourse flows. To handle realistic coalition sizes, we develop a decomposition-based solution approach using a column-and-constraint generation algorithm that incrementally adds the most informative coalition and disruption constraints. Computational experiments across multiple spatial network structures show that partial coalitions with strong inter-firm trust often outperform grand coalitions, yielding lower total costs and reduced disruption exposure. Results further reveal that transportation savings increase with coalition size only up to a threshold; beyond that point, collaboration costs dominate, producing an optimal coalition range rather than a single best partner set. The model also identifies strategic distribution centers and carrier relationships whose trust characteristics disproportionately influence coalition stability. Overall, incorporating trust as a formal decision factor leads to more resilient and cost-efficient coalition structures.

A growing body of literature explores the nature and effectiveness of opposition electoral strategies under competitive authoritarianism. One such strategy is the formation of broad pre-electoral coalitions. But what happens when both the incumbent and the opposition require grand coalitions to win elections? How do their coalition-building strategies interact, and what are the implications for electoral outcomes? This study addresses these questions by examining the ruling party- and opposition-led pre-electoral coalitions in Turkey’s 2023 elections. The multi-party opposition coalition in Turkey was defeated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led-alliance of (far-)right parties. This paper argues that the ruling coalition successfully obstructed the formation of a grand opposition alliance, devalued the opposition coalition once it was formed, and delegitimised it by associating it with terrorism. Combined with the opposition’s internal weaknesses in coalition formation and maintenance, these strategies enabled the ruling bloc to sustain its image of competent governance. The analysis demonstrates that populist autocrats in polarised societies can transform coalition-building into an election-winning strategy for themselves and a liability for the opposition. While the strategic missteps of the opposition contribute to its failure, authoritarian manipulation can prove more decisive in shaping the electoral outcome.

This presentation begins by outlining and briefly discussing seven critical problems and gaps in global integrated healthcare. These are the productivity gap, the resource gap, the equity gap, the adoption gap, the sustainability gap, the digital gap and the overarching gap, the management gap. This presentation then describes a grand coalition approach to tackle the overarching problem, the management gap based on key management insights from leading management thinkers such as Drucker, Crosby and Deming. Deming estimated that 85% of all systems problems are management problems. Perhaps there is no greater challenge and indeed opportunity for management than improving the global healthcare industry and systems. Drucker famously said “Every organization, whether a business or not, needs a theory of the business. Indeed, a valid theory that is clear, consistent, and focused is extraordinarily powerful”. While we have such remarkable progress in global health over two centuries, with average life expectancy more than doubling, it is now clear that there is a significant crisis in Healthcare and I believe that Healthcare’s theory of the Business is broken. Driven by the ‘rule of rescue’ too often care is delivered in the most expensive place, i.e. an acute hospital and at the last possible moment, often in an ED department. Michael Porter of Harvard University has said in Healthcare, “too many people get paid more to pay the wrong thing” which is additional evidence that the theory of the business and associated business model for health is broken. A gigantic opportunity exists to radically transform health by simultaneously using digital technology and a next management initiative. We are working to build a Digital Health and Wellness Capability Maturity Framework (CMF), collectively developed which when applied can help drive a structural change in the global health industry and radically improve health outcomes. Capability Maturity Frameworks (CMFs) are breakthrough management tools which originated from Philip Crosby’s seminal work “Quality is Free” and subsequently evolved by leaders such as Watt Humphrey into capability maturity models (CMM) at the Software Engineering Institute. Subsequently the author evolved the concept into a broader Capability Maturity Framework which also focussed on outcome maturity and not just process maturity to create the IT Capability Maturity Framework which has been used by many healthcare organizations to assess and improve IT capability. Peter Drucker said The most important contribution that management needs to make in the 21st century is to increase the productivity of knowledge work and knowledge workers. We can be encouraged by the productivity improvements achieved in manual labour with Drucker saying “The most important contribution of management in the 20th century was the fifty fold (50X) increase in the productivity of the manual worker in manufacturing”. With a new focus and use of breakthrough management tools such as capability maturity frameworks we can be hopeful that we can invent and innovate a new better and more sustainable healthcare system, accelerating the adoption of the Stay Left, Shift Left-10X paradigm and the IFIC nine pillars of integrated care.

Abstract This article examines the Alternative for Germany's (AfD) position following the 2025 federal election, considering whether the party is entering a stage of decline, sustaining its previous support, or moving toward greater ascendancy. The analysis assesses changes in voter demographics, regional dynamics, and issue salience to identify patterns of continuity or transformation in the party's base. We also define potential future issues, including continued dissatisfaction with the previous Ampel coalition and the grand coalition that replaced it, backlash against the end of the debt brake, and the perceived weakness of Friedrich Merz as a leader. In light of recent efforts to classify the AfD as an extremist party, the article evaluates how the party's evolving strategy and public perception may influence its capacity to shape party competition and national policymaking. Finally, it explores whether the AfD's post-2025 trajectory signals a tipping point in the normalization of far-right politics in Germany or a plateau in its influence, with broader implications for democratic stability in advanced democracies.

This study reconstructs An Mu's(安武) wartime participation and organizational role in Korea's independence war. While previous scholarship focused primarily on whether An participated in the Battles of Bongodong and Cheongsanri, this research restores An Mu’s historical standing in a multifaceted way by comprehensively examining the formation and deployment of the Korean National Army, its combined military operations, and the organizational reconfiguration after the Free City Incident. First, through cross-examination of historical sources, the study clarifies An's entry into the Korean National Association (mid-October to early November 1919) and his appointment as Security Chief (January 1920). He was promoted to adjutant in the Three-Unit Alliance (May 1920) and finally appointed commander (August 1920), establishing command authority over the National Army. Second, at the battle of Bongodong, An served as adjutant while the Association contributed approximately 200 troops. In the Cheongsanri campaign, the National Army fulfilled core functions of mobilization, logistics, and reconnaissance, achieving notable success in the independent ‘Yuryeong battle’. Third, the northward movement following Cheongsanri campaign is interpreted as a strategic redeployment aligned with the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea’s plan for military unification and coordination with Soviet Russia. An participated in this grand coalition as the Second Brigade Commander of the Great Korean Independence Corps. Fourth, following the Free City Incident, An led the establishment of the Koryŏ Communist Party Central Assembly, transforming the Association's structure into a communist party system. His embrace of communism was not an ideological conversion but a strategic choice aimed at rebuilding a collapsed independence movement organization. While his experience in the Free City may have carried some ideological influence, this does not constitute sufficient counter-evidence to overturn that conclusion. Based on this analysis, An emerges not merely as a battlefield commander but as a strategic organizer who performed substantive roles in alliance-building and functional coordination among independence forces. His activities provide critical insights into the organizational restructuring and ideological differentiation of the North Gando independence movement in the 1920s.

This article examines the predictors of European Party Groups’ bargaining success in internal negotiations within the European Parliament. It evaluates theories relating to pivotality in the policy space, agenda-setting power, strategic anticipation of interinstitutional bargaining, and internal group cohesion. Understanding these mechanisms is crucial because parliamentary agreements structure trilogue negotiations, ultimately affecting the European Union's legislative outcomes. Drawing on an original interview-based dataset covering 31 legislative proposals in the 9th Parliament (2019–2024), the study directly measures party group preferences and compares them to the positions adopted in parliamentary opinions. The findings show that mandates tend to follow the grand coalition median rather than the body's median as a whole, rapporteurs systematically benefit their groups, and internal cohesion unexpectedly reduces bargaining success. The negative impact of proximity to the Council suggests strategic positioning for trilogues, whereas alignment with the Commission and non-lead committee rapporteurships shows little effect. Together, the results provide a systematic account of bargaining in the modern European Parliament, offering a platform for future research.

The $$\tau$$ -value is the efficient convex combination of the ‘minimal-rights’ and ‘utopia’ vectors in a cooperative game. The utopia amount is the player’s marginal contribution to the grand coalition. The remainder for a given player in a certain coalition containing him is the amount left after the sum of the utopia amounts of all other players is subtracted from the coalition’s worth. The player’s minimal-rights amount is then the largest remainder taken over all coalitions containing him. We deal with the problem that a solution for a cooperative transportation game (CTG), e.g., an allocation of profits, may be required before all worths of the coalitions are known. In CTGs computing the worth of a coalition may involve solving a traveling salesman or vehicle routing problem which are NP-hard, and there are exponentially many worths to determine. Finally, computing the $$\tau$$ -value is NP-hard itself. An inductive $$\tau$$ -value is the efficient allocation closest to the set of all convex combinations of approximations of the utopia and minimal-rights vectors. First, the worth of the grand coalition is determined which (by assumption) is always possible. As long as the time constraint is not met, the worths for all coalitions with cardinality 1 are computed, then for those with cardinality 2, and so on. The utopia and minimal rights vectors of the game restricted to the cardinality at hand are determined, too. If the computation time reaches the constraint while establishing worths for coalitions with cardinality $$U+1$$ , the approximations of the utopia and minimal rights vectors based on the completed calculations up to U are used. If the time constraint is not binding, the inductive $$\tau$$ -value coincides with a natural extension of the $$\tau$$ -value for hyperplane singular games, and with the $$\tau$$ -value for quasi-balanced games. We show that the inductive $$\tau$$ -value satisfies efficiency, symmetry, desirability and two axioms introduced in Joosten & Lalla-Ruiz (Inductive Shapley values in cooperative transportation games, University of Twente, 2019). The latter four axioms incorporate aspects of fairness guaranteed for the computations being based on restricted information.

ABSTRACT We are concerned with the stability of a transferable‐utility cooperative (TU) game. First, the concept of core can be weakened so that the blocking of changes is limited to only those with multilateral backings. This principle of consensual blocking , as well as the traditional core‐defining one of unilateral blocking and one straddling in between, can then be applied to partition‐allocation pairs . Each such pair is made up of a partition of the grand coalition and a corresponding allocation vector whose components are efficient and individually rational for the various constituent coalitions of the given partition. Among the resulting stability concepts, two are universal in that any game has stable solutions. For a game with strictly positive values, furthermore, its imputations possess fractional interpretations. These would allow a certain ranking between games, in what we call “ centripetality ”, to imply a clearly describable shift in the games' stable solutions. When coalitions' values are built on both random outcomes and a common positively‐homogeneous law‐invariant reward function characterizing players' enjoyments from their shares, such comparative statics can help explain the phenomenon that aversion to risk promotes cooperation . Our results can have direct impacts on operations management settings like inventory centralization.

This study addresses a critical challenge in agricultural management: enabling stable cooperation among independent agricultural producers facing both yield and demand uncertainties. We develop a decision-analytic framework based on the cooperative game theory to facilitate the risk pooling through an optimal joint capacity investment decision and a fair cost allocation scheme. By formulating the problem as a stochastic linear program, we leverage duality theory to establish the non-emptiness of the core in the resulting capacity investment game, thereby ensuring the stability of the grand coalition. For coalitions with linear investment costs, we prove the game is convex, implying population monotonicity, which incentivises coalition expansion. We further extend the analysis to concave investment costs, capturing economies of scale, and again establish a nonempty core via a stochastic duality-based allocation scheme. Our results demonstrate that the proposed approach provides a computationally tractable and incentive-compatible mechanism for forming robust production coalitions. The findings offer a-priori planning tool for agricultural producers, underscoring that collaboration under uncertainties is not only beneficial but also sustainable through rationally designed allocation schemes.

Abstract Coalition logic is an important logic in the logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, we first systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are too strong. The first is seriality, i.e. every coalition always has an available joint action. The second is the independence of agents, i.e. the merge of two available joint actions of two disjoint coalitions is always an available joint action of the union of the two coalitions. The third is determinism, i.e. all available joint actions of the grand coalition always have a unique outcome. Second, we present a coalition logic based on general concurrent game models that do not have the three assumptions and show its completeness. This logic seems minimal for reasoning about coalitional powers.

This article reassesses Pakatan Harapan’s (PH) 2018–2020 experience through Lijphart’s consociational framework. A qualitative approach is applied, triangulating semi-structured elite interviews with documentary sources and news reports. Findings show that PH built a broad grand coalition across ethnic and regional lines, applied corrective proportionality by granting Malay-based parties disproportionate cabinet weight to secure ethnic legitimacy, relied on improvised rather than institutionalised segmental autonomy and treated mutual veto as informal bargaining rather than a binding safeguard. These design choices produced short-term legitimacy but weak internal cohesion, leaving the coalition vulnerable to defections, culminating in the ‘Sheraton Move.’ The study provides an empirically grounded account of Malaysia’s post-BN hegemonic coalition governance and demonstrates how inclusion without enforceable rules limits the durability of consociational arrangements.

This paper introduces a new concept: asymmetric consociation, which represents a diminished subtype of consociation. Both consociationalists and their critics thus far have not addressed the question of how to approach the differential access of dominant segments to the four consociational elements (grand coalition, segmental autonomy, mutual veto, and proportionality). When an ethnic group is denied access to at least one of the four fundamental consociational elements, this missing attribute produces an asymmetric situation between ethnic groups comprising a society. This paper examines the conditions necessary for the existence of asymmetric consociations, categorizing them into different types and poles. It differentiates between involuntary and voluntary asymmetric consociations. The former is not agreed upon by elites, but rather potentiated by external actors or dominant groups, and is conflict enhancing. The latter is mutually agreed upon by elites and fosters inter-group cooperation. The article examines and classifies the Bosniak-Croat Federation entity and Mostar as involuntary asymmetric consociations. It concludes that some of the conflicts generated are not a result of consociationalism as a prescription, but rather due to involuntary differential access to the four basic elements of consociation.

A novel stable grand coalition for transactive multi-energy management in an integrated energy system

We study a supply chain comprising a downstream retailer and multiple complementary suppliers. Suppliers can form coalitions to jointly invest in sustainable production technologies and enhance the product’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) level. Coalition members benefit from efficiency gains through shared knowledge and information about green production. The retailer sources from these coalitions and sells the product to heterogeneous consumers. We develop a game-theoretical model and use the notion of Nash stability to characterize equilibrium coalition structures and firms’ optimal decisions under three profit allocation rules. Our key findings are as follows: (a) Forming supplier coalitions can benefit all stakeholders (including the retailer, suppliers, and society) but achieving such a win–win–win outcome hinges on two factors: the market’s consciousness rate (i.e., the proportion of socially conscious consumers) and the efficiency gains from coalition formation. (b) The grand coalition that maximizes the retailer’s profit and CSR level is not always stable due to free-riding behaviors. In particular, less efficient suppliers may defect to avoid the cost of sustainable innovation while still benefiting from the high innovation efforts of others (i.e., cross-coalition free-riding). (c) On the supply side, adopting the Shapley value allocation rule exacerbates within-coalition free-riding by assigning greater profit shares to less efficient suppliers. However, it also reduces their incentive to defect, thus enhancing coalition stability. Moreover, greater total efficiency and a smaller efficiency gap among suppliers further improve the stability of the grand coalition. (d) On the demand side, the impact of increasing the market’s consciousness rate is non-monotonic. Improperly influencing consumer awareness may destabilize coalitions and produce unintended consequences, suggesting that the retailer must proceed with caution.

ABSTRACT The centre-left still faces a paradoxical legacy: while some credit it for consolidating Italian democracy, others locate here the roots of Italy’s supposedly uniquely ‘difficult’ democracy as it evolved over the final decades of the twentieth century. This article provides a new window on this question of Italy’s difficult democracy, by comparing the motivations for the centre-left with those for the first coalition between Socialists and Christian Democrats in postwar West Germany. By looking at the different conceptions and narratives of democracy that key politicians put forward, it traces the emergence and dominance of a more consensual and inclusive notion of democracy around the turn of the 1960s. While, based on this standard, Italy’s centre-left did not manage to achieve the aim of a more consensual form of democracy, the article concludes, based on the comparison, however, that we cannot measure democratic consolidation or difficulty by the yardstick of party-political consensus alone.

Determining a fair trading price is challenging, and this complexity is further heightened in power systems as the price must consider network constraints, fluctuating and endogenous electricity prices, and generation cost. This paper proposes a novel Nash-in-Stackelberg model designed to coordinate a collection of independently operated microgrids. Within this framework, the microgrids engage in a bargaining game to collectively decide a fair trading price as well as other operational decisions. We use the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to model this interaction. Microgrids’ trading decisions impact the locational marginal prices of the main power grid. Hence, a Stackelberg game is used to determine these prices. The Stackelberg model considers microgrids as leaders (upper-level problem) and the independent system operator as follower (lower-level problem). The NBS guarantees a fair allocation of the generated profit based on individual characteristics of the microgrids. In specific, in scenarios of higher generation, we achieve a cost reduction of $884 and $904 per microgrid compared with a grand coalition where only one microgrid receives the total cost reduction ($1788). Also we noticed that increasing the amount of solar-generated electricity reduces the nodal price in 1.53% and consequently the trading price in 1.27%.

This study aims to analyze the political dynamics related to the refusal of the National Democratic Party to join the Prabowo-Gibran Government Coalition after the victory of the 2024 Presidential/Vice Presidential Election. The focus of analysis in the research is directed at explaining the political dynamics both internal to the party and external to the Nasdem party after receiving the invitation of president elect Prabowo Subianto to join the Red-White Cabinet. This research method uses a qualitative approach with data collection techniques through in-depth interviews with Nasdem cadres and elites, political observers, literature studies and documentation. Laver & Schofield's (1998) coalition politics theory and Frans Magnis Suseno's (1991) concept of Political Ethics were used to answer the research problems. The results of this study show that the refusal of the National Democratic Party to join the Prabowo-Gibran government coalition is because this party does not have a strong political bargaining power both from the aspect of coalition politics and political ethics. The political implications of this party's political decision have impacted on the absence of opposition politics in the party system and the formation of a grand coalition government as a political consequence of the contestation of the 2024 presidential / vice presidential election and the weak culture of opposition parties in Indonesia since the Reformation era.

This study explores the effects of coalition governments on the strength and effectiveness of opposition parties, using Kenya, Germany, and Italy as case studies. Coalition governments, which form when no single party achieves an outright majority, are a common response to electoral fragmentation in democracies worldwide. While they can provide stable governance by bringing together diverse political groups, they often blur the distinction between government and opposition. This blurring weakens the opposition’s capacity to hold the government accountable, undermining the democratic process. The study employs a comparative case study approach, analyzing key examples of coalition governments in Germany, Italy & Kenya. In Germany’s Grand Coalitions between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) have eroded the SPD’s distinct opposition identity, weakening its electoral base and policy influence. In Italy, frequent coalition governments, necessitated by the country’s proportional representation system, have resulted in policy gridlock and the fragmentation of traditional opposition parties, contributing to the rise of populist movements. Similarly, in Kenya, the 1999 merger between the National Development Party (NDP) and the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU), the 2008 power-sharing agreement following post-election violence, and the 2018 Azimio la Umoja coalition demonstrate how coalition formation can absorb opposition parties into the government, diminishing their ability to challenge government policies effectively. Data for this study is drawn from legislative records, coalition agreements, and a broad range of secondary sources, including academic literature and media reports. The findings reveal that coalition governments often lead to reduced opposition strength, which in turn compromises accountability, policy innovation, and overall democratic health. The study concludes that maintaining a strong and effective opposition within coalition frameworks is crucial for ensuring robust democratic governance, transparency, and responsiveness to the public's needs. These insights are vital for policymakers and scholars seeking to understand the complexities of coalition politics and its implications for democratic integrity.

The problem of efficient allocation of the grand coalition worth in transferable-utility games boils down to specifying how the surplus is distributed among individuals, in the situation where the individual share is well-defined. We show that the Individual Monotonicity axiom for Equal Surplus, together with Efficiency and Equal Treatment, implies Egalitarian Surplus Sharing, while the same axiom for Equal Ratio implies Proportional Division. The results thus illustrate the common structure in deriving two principles of surplus distribution, egalitarian and proportional, from the Individual Monotonicity axioms. We further show that relaxation of Equal Treatment leads to Weighted Surplus Sharing and Shifted Proportional Division, highlighting the common structure in which Individual Monotonicity characterizes the allocations that can incorporate social objectives of a redistributive nature.