Government Contracts Research Articles

К СЕМИДЕСЯТИЛЕТИЮ СО ДНЯ РОЖДЕНИЯ Н. А. РИМСКОГО-КОРСАКОВА

August 23, 2023 marked the 70th anniversary of the birth of Nikolai Andreevich RimskyKorsakov. Nikolai Andreevich worked at the Institute of Oceanology for almost half a century and went from an engineer to deputy director for scientific work in the field of Marine Engineering, head of the Bottom Hydrolocation Laboratory, chief researcher, professor, doctor of technical sciences. He is a participant in numerous expeditions to various areas of the World Ocean and inland waters of Russia on ships of various classes and different departmental affiliations. Under his leadership, many different projects, government contracts were completed, numerous technical means were developed and built for the multifaceted study of water areas, the use of which made it possible to obtain a large amount of previously inaccessible data on various underwater objects of natural and artificial origin, including objects posing a radiation threat.

Translating Necessity Modality Verbs in Governmental Contracts Texts from Arabic into English

The present paper goes to discover the notion and types of contracts. Moreover, it tries to find the employment of necessity modality verbs in the governmental contract’s texts. The methodology of analysis employed in this research is Fairclough's (1989) linguistic model, which is used in the analysis and interpretation of the necessity verbs in governmental contracts texts. The Data of this study have been rendered by 15 M.A. students in the department of translation at the College of Arts, University of Tikrit. The translational model suggested by Catford (1965) is also employed.

Corruption under a microscope, a Ghana perspective

Corruption is a global issue and a challenge in Ghana, however in the last few years, it has taken over aspects of the Ghanaian society, from government, public and private sectors, and creating a negative impact on all governance arrangement and performance in Ghana. The prevalence of corruption points to a humongous dishonesty in the Ghanaian society. Some causes of corruption in Ghana are political monetization, low level of literacy, non-enforcement of relevant laws, bureaucracy, and fusing of duties among the arms of governance. Corruption retards economic development and growth, moral degeneration, reduces confidence in government Institutions, Product and poor execution of government projects and contracts. “Perceived” corruption by religious leaders has adversely affected people’s faith in God. Progressively, successive governments have tried to tackle corruption by the introduction of legislation; attempted selective prosecution of persons culpable of corruption; digitizing services, to reduce the interface of humans in service delivery mechanism, but all these have had limited success due to political interferences and selectivity of application. The watchful eyes of Civil and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and world bodies such as the World Bank, United Nations, and Transparency International have all helped in minimizing the impact of corruption to various degrees. The decision to fight corruption is an exceptional one justified by exceptional circumstances. Ghanaians need to make disciplined efforts to produce fundamental decisions that shape and guide how and what they do to fight corruption. Reports from government, NGOs and international bodies were searched and selected according to their relevance to the subject under study and analysed to write this paper. The objective of this paper is therefore to make an exhaustive analysis of corruption in Ghana.

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation of the European Union: A New Instrument Levelling the Playing Field?

The European Union (‘EU’) has adopted a Foreign Subsidies Regulation (‘FSR’) to address potential distortions of competition in EU markets caused by subsidies granted to companies by non-EU governments. The FSR aims to level the playing field for all companies active within the EU and to close a regulatory gap left by existing frameworks (such as the EU’s State aid and merger control regimes or trade defense instruments). This article provides a comprehensive overview of the FSR and the accompanying Implementing Regulation and reflects upon their practical implications for companies engaging in economic activity in EU markets. Has a simple idea (i.e., extending the controls already applicable to government support by EU Member States also to support by non-EU governments) morphed into a bureaucratic monster burdening companies with needless red tape? Will the FSR achieve its goals effectively or will it put too much strain on the European Commission’s resources? Is the FSR about fair competition or is it simply protectionist? European Union, subsidies, mergers, acquisitions, M&A, public procurement, government contracts, State aid, competition, trade defense, Foreign Subsidies Regulation, FSR

Особенности аудита комбинированной финансовой отчетности

The article deals with the procedures for auditing combined financial statements. It is noted that combined financial statements are becoming important for investors, due to the sanctions policy of the external environment, which required changes in the designation of the ultimate beneficiaries of corporations and holdings. Changes in the organizational structures of large holdings and corporations are primarily associated with the division of business into separate economic entities, legally unrelated to each other, which entails the need to determine the value of total assets and determine the results of groups of companies, legally unrelated to each other, but which are under common control or perform a joint important national economic task (e. g., a government contract, including a government defense order) or investment (e. g., a government contract, including a government defense order). The audit of combined financial statements is governed by auditing standards, which provide for the preparation of financial statements in accordance with special rules. At the preliminary stage of the audit, at which the possible risks of activity and environment of the economic entities whose reports are included in the reporting perimeter are analyzed, the auditor checks the reasonableness of inclusion (or not) in the combined financial statements, accounting reports of individual economic entities, which may correspond to the fulfillment of the task set in the preparation of combined financial statements.

Bringing home the bacon: do politicians on boards increase firms’ government contracts?

Purpose The US Federal Government awards contracts worth hundreds of billions of dollars each year. Many firms that rely on these contracts have appointed former government officials to their corporate boards in the hopes of securing government contracts. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between these government experienced directors (GEDs) on boards and firms being awarded government contracts. Design/methodology/approach The paper compiles a panel data set from 2017 to 2020 for S&P 500 firms. This includes hand-collected data for government-experienced directors on boards. This is tested using both regression and analysis of variance methodologies. Findings Results find that former government officials on corporate boards increase the amount of government contracts secured by the firm, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of firms’ revenue. There are significant industry level effects for the health care and financials sectors. Government-experienced directors on boards are also positively related to firms receiving COVID contracts. Lobbying was not found to be related to the securing of regular government contracts but was positively related to firms obtaining COVID contracts. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature by using panel data, an expanded definition of GEDs and data on COVID contracts. The “revolving door” between government and firms is paying off for companies.

Assessment of Factors Influencing the Effective Implementation of Public Projects: The Case of Selected Public Projects Financed by Botor Tolay Woreda Administration, Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia

Purpose: The main purpose of the study was to assess the factors that influence the effective Implementation of public projects: The Case of Botor Tolay Woreda, Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia.
 Methodology: The study was both descriptive and explanatory research design and applied Quantitative and qualitative research approach. The primary and secondary data was used, the primary data was collected by using questionnaires and observation while the secondary data was through analysis the documents. Purposively select 26 expertise and experienced employee from the government office and Contractors. The collected data was analyzed by using descriptive and inferential statistics. To ensure the relationship between independent and dependent variables the Pearson correlation and multiple linear regression was applied. The data was analyzed by using Statistical package for Social Science (SPSS) version 25. The study Result was presented through the using of table and figures.
 Finding: The study focuses on the four major factors that affecting the success of public project implementation those planning and scope cause of delays, Client related, Contractor related and external factor related delays of the public project implementation. The findings of correlation and regression show that there was a positive and significant relationship between Project implementation and, Planning and scope of the project, Client, Contractor and external factor related delays.
 Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The researcher recommended that the government body open consulting and supervising office of construction at woreda level for delays of payment approval to successful implementation of the public project, The woreda also practice by improving the delays of client, and planning and scope level delays, the contractor practice their work as schedule, cost and quality.Both government body and contractor develop the methods of resisting the external factors to compact the problemsystems, stakeholder, agency, institutional, and resource dependency theories.

Elon Musks Twitter Buyout: Game-Changer in Social Media

The $44 billion acquisition of Twitter is full of drama, according to Elon Musk. It could even serve as a case study for future industry leaders. But Twitter is a complete mismatch with Elon Musk's existing or ongoing business units. At the same time, Musk is trying to enforce his will with a new acquisition strategy that has sent certain messages. He said he was buying Twitter for freedom of speech. By comparing his company's business model to its industry. Twitter as a media platform doesn't fit with Musk's original business landscape, but he has a new acquisition strategy that is getting its message across. Musk's wealth comes largely from his stakes in Tesla and SpaceX. Both companies were funded by private investment and government contracts and have grown and succeeded. Before the acquisition, Twitter had been struggling with financial challenges. Musk may have seen the potential to turn around Twitter's finances, using the platform to influence public opinion and have more control over the narrative on the platform. Elon Musk's acquisition of Twitter highlights the potential impact on a struggling business of a chief executive with a large stake in a number of successful companies. Despite business model mismatches, Musk's experience in growing and growing his company, combined with his belief in the power of social media, could lead to a successful future for Twitter.

Enhancing Usability Through Cross-Enterprise Design Standards: The Luxce Model

Managing a large, cross-enterprise portfolio raises challenges of usability at scale. Usable systems incorporate consistency and standards across the various components, with the sum being a seamless user experience even when developed by different teams. While this usability principle is well-known to user experience practitioners, implementing design standards for consistency is a continual challenge in the Department of Defense, with both government and private contractors working separately on different pieces of software. The Lean User Experience Center for Excellence (LUXCE) is a living example of a cross-institution collaboration aimed at identifying and applying standards to next-generation mission planning software. Our successful model of government-industry collaboration results in design standards applied daily to interfaces across a large, multi-faceted enterprise suite. We describe our process of establishing and maintaining LUXCE design standards with an emphasis on practical advice for enterprise-level government system development.

Greater Washington Society of CPAs Government Contracting Conference

Greater Washington Society of CPAs Government Contracting Conference

Optimal government and manufacturer incentive contracts for green production with asymmetric information.

Governments commonly utilize subsidy policy to incentivize manufacturers to produce green products, promoting sustainable development. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, some manufacturers may dishonestly misrepresent the green degree of their products to secure higher subsidies. This study examines different incentive contracts between the government and a green product manufacturer who keeps private information of a product's green-degree in a principal-agent model. Lump-sum transfer and fixed- and flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contracts are proposed to investigate screening and improving green-degree issues. To further enhance the flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contract, we construct a non-linear coordinated contract based on the Nash bargaining solution. The revelation principle and Nash bargaining are performed for comparison and analysis of the contracts. We find that the lump-sum contract reveals true green-degree information but fails to impel manufacturers to improve product's green-degree in developing countries where green product development is in initial stages. In contrast, both fixed- and flexible- proportion benefit-sharing contracts are effective in reveling and enhancing green-degree. The non-linear coordination contract optimizes resource allocation and achieves Pareto improvement. An applied case study for inkjet printer operations and numerical experiments corroborate our model findings.

Public Sector Unionization and Government Contracting: A Meta-analysis of Four Decades of Empirical Evidence

Within the large body of literature on government contracting, the effect of public sector unionization on contracting out is still unsettled even after decades of research. Previous literature proposes that unionization may both inhibit and motivate contracting out, making the net effect difficult to predict. Through a meta-analysis of 232 effects drawn from 49 existing studies spanning over four decades, we find that jurisdictions with higher levels of public sector unionization generally contract out more in public service delivery. Further metaregression analysis suggests that unionization has a weaker effect when governments engage in intergovernmental contracting but a stronger effect when governments contract out for technical services. Unionization also has a stronger effect on how much a government contracts out than on whether a government contracts out. Overall, unionization is a relevant, but not necessarily robust, factor in driving contracting out, and its exact effect may vary slightly by context.

Lobbying for government appropriations

AbstractThis article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small. Lastly, I find that increasing competition in procurement generally results in less lobbying.

Equity in government contracting: Analyzing the performance of small disadvantaged businesses

AbstractSet aside programs, which preference disadvantaged businesses, have long been among the largest government equity programs in the United States. Set asides ensure government revenues spur economic growth in firms and communities that have traditionally lacked representation in systems of power. However, there has been skepticism about whether set aside programs are compatible with the efficiency objectives of government contracting. Few empirical studies have assessed the comparative performance of small, disadvantaged businesses and other firms to determine if there are differences. Using contract level data from the Federal Procurement Data System: Next Generation, we test whether set aside contracts are associated with a reduction in the government's ability to secure “best value.” We find few performance differences between small, disadvantaged businesses, and other vendors across a range of goods and services, suggesting mutual benefits and no outsized risks when governments engage in contracts with disadvantaged firms.

Do innovations and external collaboration influence public procurement contracts’ success? evidence from catching-up Visegrád Group economies

In recent times, the attention given to innovations and informal competitions and their ability to stimulate demand-side policies such as public procurement contracts have mounted among policymakers and researchers. However, fewer studies have focused on analysing these relationships, especially in catching-up countries. This paper, therefore, aims to investigate whether innovations and, its related activities, and informal competitions play important roles in influencing firms’ decisions to secure public procurement contracts. We employed the logistic and treatment effect regression models using pooled cross-sectional data from the 2019 World Bank Enterprise Survey to test these relationships. The results, based on a cross-sectional sample of 2,606 firms, revealed that product innovation and informal competitions positively influence firms’ abilities or willingness to secure public procurement contracts. On the contrary, we find that process innovation does not influence firms’ ability to obtain public procurement contracts. The results also demonstrate that patents and external collaboration significantly influence firms’ abilities to successfully secure public procurement contracts. The main practical implication of the research is that firm managers in catching-up economies such as the Visegrád Group aiming to be successful in the tendering process should consider engaging in innovation and collaborative bidding to stand a better chance of securing these competitive government contracts.

A Qualitative Study of Safety Issues in Industrialised Buildings in China

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the safety issues of industrialised buildings in China, with a particular focus on the differences between conventional and industrialised projects. To achieve this, interviews were conducted with 20 people from different professional backgrounds. The results of the study indicate that safety concerns in industrialised construction in China can be grouped into four main factors: shortage of skilled workers, challenges in lifting operations, lack of managerial responsibility, climatic factors and unexpected accidents. The results of this study could guide policy makers, including government officials and contractors in industry, in developing a new safety prevention approach. These findings will also inform the future management of safety in industrialised construction in China.

Using foreign aid contracts to pursue participatory approaches to development within large foreign aid agencies

AbstractParticipatory development has become, ‘development orthodoxy’, receiving widespread proclamations of support from foreign aid agencies. Participatory development engages international development beneficiaries in making decisions about project activity selection and design. Yet, many foreign aid donors deliver project assistance through top‐down, highly controlled systems that may constrain the flexibility needed to delegate decision‐making power to project beneficiaries. This paper explores whether and under which conditions these foreign aid agencies delegate decision‐making power to project beneficiaries, focusing on the key mechanism for delivering foreign aid: government contracts. The analysis relies on a novel dataset of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) projects that incorporates contract specifications for beneficiary decision‐making during project implementation. Despite an expectation that delivery system constraints would prohibitively exclude contract specifications for beneficiary decision‐making, donors are found to commonly use contracts to delegate decision‐making power to beneficiaries, but within pre‐determined parameters. The results suggest that USAID is using contract specifications to engage in bounded delegation, providing some decision‐making power to beneficiaries, but using boundaries to ensure the right ‘fit’ with institutional goals and constraints. By focusing on contract specifications and variation within these specifications, this study identifies widespread use of a ‘middle ground’ in how donors motivate participatory development.

Construction Contractors’ Carbon Emissions Reduction Intention: A Study Based on Structural Equation Model

The high carbon emissions of the construction industry affect China’s sustainable development. Therefore, reducing the carbon emissions of the construction industry is crucial for China to achieve “carbon peak” by 2030 and “carbon neutrality” by 2060. To understand the factors that affect contractors’ willingness to reduce carbon emissions. This study is based on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and incorporates three potential influencing factors: personal norms (PN), government regulation (GR), and policy support (PS). It constructs a structural equation model (SEM) to predict the influencing factors of carbon emission reduction intentions (CERI) among construction contractors. This study analyzes the key factors and mechanisms influencing construction contractors’ CERI. The study collected 311 valid questionnaires, which are suitable for SEM research, and the results indicate that: The results show that the model proposed in the study has an explanatory rate of 69% for developers’ willingness to reduce carbon emissions. The most significant influencing factor on construction contractors’ CERI is GR, followed by PS, subjective norms (SN), and perceived behavioral control (PBC). PN and behavioral attitude (BA) towards behavior do not significantly impact CERI. SN mediate the relationship between GR and CERI, while PBC mediates the relationship between PS and CERI. The research findings can guide the government and construction contractors to improve carbon emission reduction governance mechanisms and achieve peak carbon emissions and carbon neutrality.

Incentive Mechanism of Utility Tunnel PPP Projects with User Involvement

Users of utility tunnel public–private partnership (PPP) projects are productive corporate entities with a specific scope, a limited quantity, and strong bargaining power. They possess the ability and motivation to participate in PPP projects through equity investments. Tunnel PPP projects involving user participation are implemented jointly by consortia comprising construction contractors and users. Given that the government, construction contractors, and users have different interests, significant conflicts of interest arise among them. Furthermore, there exists dual information asymmetry between the government and construction contractors, as well as between the government and users. The government lacks a direct observation of the true ability endowments of construction contractors and users prior to signing PPP contracts, and it cannot directly observe the effort levels exerted by the construction contractors and users after contract signing. The combination of dual information asymmetry and conflicting interests may result in adverse selection and moral hazard on the part of construction contractors and users. Drawing on principal–agent theory, this study constructed incentive models with and without user involvement, examined the impact of user involvement on the effort level of construction contractors and the performance of PPP projects, and designed a reasonable incentive mechanism. The objective is to ensure that construction contractors and users truthfully report their ability endowments during the bidding stage and exert optimal efforts during the construction and operation stages. This research provides new insights for promoting the sustainable development of tunnel PPP projects. A case analysis of a PT tunnel PPP project and an SC tunnel PPP project demonstrates the reasonableness and feasibility of the research findings.

Consideration of hotspots in the selection of supervision schemes to reduce illegal dumping of construction and demolition waste.

Illegal dumping of construction and demolition waste continues to be a problem hindering circular economy efforts. Controlling illegal dumping necessitates establishing an effective surveillance scheme and investigating the proper penalty value. This problem has previously been described as a game theory problem, with the government and construction contractors as the players. Taking into account illegal dumping hotspots, which can often be identified through topographical and geographical characteristics, is also important when establishing supervision strategies. This study develops an evolutionary game-theoretic model that can assist in devising effective supervision strategies to control the spread of illegal dumping, while taking into consideration hotspots. In specific, this study investigates the suitability of two alternative strategies: police patrols and hybrid monitoring through both patrols and the installation of closed-circuit television cameras in hotspots. The model was applied to two case studies, using parameters informed by real-world contexts, to demonstrate its potential for selecting suitable strategies according to local situations. The results suggest that nine possible scenarios govern the stable evolutionary strategies of game players, with five scenarios in which contractors converge to adopt legal dumping. Accordingly, based on the parameters of the region (hotspot areas, cost of supervision, efficiency of patrols, penalties, etc.), governments would be able to assess which of the strategies would lead to long-term compliance of contractors while also increasing their payoffs. Further analysis allowed to determine the minimum efficiency required, and simulations were performed to demonstrate the influence of different supervision efficiencies and penalties on the evolutionary strategies.