Are Large Language Models Really Good Logical Reasoners? A Comprehensive Evaluation and Beyond

The widespread use of e-commerce services by the public shows that buying and selling activities that were previously carried out conventionally have become activities that can be accessed only via smartphones, laptops/computers with an internet network. However, it is not uncommon for consumers to object because goods purchased using the cash on delivery or COD payment method do not match the order when they arrive at the delivery destination. This illustrates that one side of the consumer is the party that is seriously disadvantaged. Meanwhile, business actors still make a profit from selling the goods they make. Based on the problems above, the problem formulation is how to legally protect consumers for losses that can be suffered in transactions via COD and what measures can be taken by consumers for losses suffered in transactions via COD. This research method uses normative legal research. The approach used is the statutory and regulatory analysis approach which is used to answer the problems that have been previously formulated. The analysis technique is carried out qualitatively by describing the issues and then organizing them systematically and connecting them with the legal materials that have been found. Cash on Delivery (COD) means pay on delivery is a payment method that is in great demand in e-commerce. As the name suggests, this payment method allows buyers to make payments in cash when the order arrives at the destination address. Trading by e-commerce actually has a legal basis for ordinary trade. Or in other words, e-commerce is conventional trade that is special because the role of media and electronic devices is very dominant. Transactions using the COD payment method were initially present to facilitate online buying and selling transactions. However, this mechanism also has the potential to cause significant losses for consumers. Enforcement of consumer rights is a necessity in order to ensure legal certainty to provide protection to consumers, including in transactions that use the COD payment method as regulated in Article 4 of the Consumer Protection Law. There are various reasons for goods being returned by consumers who have used COD payments such as products. damaged, non-functioning products, insufficient products, incomplete orders, inappropriate products, and counterfeit products. For disputes that arise due to the COD system, there is a method that has been determined by each marketplace to submit an objection or request a return of goods to the business actor by attaching proof that the goods received do not meet consumer expectations. Meanwhile, consumers who feel their rights have been violated can complain and process their case legally at the Consumer Dispute Settlement Agency (BPSK) or through court.

Neurotypical adult humans are impeccably good social reasoners. Despite the occasional faux pas, we know how to interact in most social settings and how to consider others' points of view. Young children, on the other hand, do not. Social reasoning, like many of our most important skills, is learned. Much like human children, AI agents are not good social reasoners. While some algorithms can perform some aspects of social reasoning, we are a ways off from AI that can interact naturally and appropriately in the broad range of settings that people can. In this talk, I will argue that learning social reasoning via the same processes used by people will help AI agents reason--and interact--more like people do. Specifically, I will argue that children learn social reasoning via analogy, and that AI agents should, too. I will present evidence from cognitive modeling experiments demonstrating the former and AI experiments demonstrating the latter. I will also propose future directions for social reasoning research that both demonstrate the need for robust, human-like social reasoning in AI and test the utility of common approaches.

In a challenge trial, research subjects are purposefully exposed to some pathogen in a controlled setting, in order to test the efficacy of a vaccine or other experimental treatment. This is an example of medical effective altruism (MEA), where individuals volunteer to risk harms for the public good. Many bioethicists rejected challenge trials in the context of Covid-19 vaccine research on ethical grounds. After considering various grounds of this objection, I conclude that the crucial question is how much harm research subjects can permissibly risk. But we lack a satisfying way of making this judgmentthat does not appeal simply to the intuitions of doctors or bioethicists. I consider one recent and structurally plausible approach to critically evaluating the harm question. Alex London defends a social consistency test for research risks: we should compare the risks undertaken by research subjects to relevantly similar risks which are accepted in other spheres of society. I argue there is no good reason not to consider volunteer military service as a relevant social comparison. This implies there is essentially no cap on acceptable risks on the social consistency rationale. In short, if soldiers can be heroes, why can't research volunteers?

Multi-RNA co-transfection is starting to be employed to stimulate immune responses to SARS-CoV-2 viral infection. While there are good reasons to utilize such an approach, there is little background on whether there are synergistic RNA-dependent cellular effects. To address this issue, we use transcriptome-induced phenotype remodeling (TIPeR) via phototransfection to assess whether mRNAs encoding the Spike and Nucleocapsid proteins of SARS-CoV-2 virus into single human astrocytes (an endogenous human cell host for the virus) and mouse 3T3 cells (often used in high-throughput therapeutic screens) synergistically impact host cell biologies. An RNA concentration-dependent expression was observed where an increase of RNA by less than 2-fold results in reduced expression of each individual RNAs. Further, a dominant inhibitory effect of Nucleocapsid RNA upon Spike RNA translation was detected that is distinct from codon-mediated epistasis. Knowledge of the cellular consequences of multi-RNA transfection will aid in selecting RNA concentrations that will maximize antigen presentation on host cell surface with the goal of eliciting a robust immune response. Further, application of this single cell stoichiometrically tunable RNA functional genomics approach to the study of SARS-CoV-2 biology promises to provide details of the cellular sequalae that arise upon infection in anticipation of providing novel targets for inhibition of viral replication and propagation for therapeutic intervention.

The DF-4 defibrillator standard has been rapidly adopted due to its convenience at implantation. There are however trade-offs compared to the traditional DF-1 standard that are underappreciated. This viewpoint outlines the advantages and limitations of current defibrillator lead standards that should be kept in mind, as they impact the options that are available to deal with issues that may arise.

Priority setting is inevitable to control expenditure on expensive medicines, but citizen support is often hampered by the workings of the ‘identified victim effect’, that is, the greater willingness to...


 
 
 This article examines if bottom-up artificial moral agents are capable of making genuine moral judgements, specifically in light of David Hume’s is-ought problem. The latter underscores the notion that evaluative assertions could never be derived from purely factual propositions. Bottom-up technologies, on the other hand, are those designed via evolutionary, developmental, or learning techniques. In this paper, the nature of these systems is looked into with the aim of preliminarily assessing if there are good reasons to suspect that, on the foundational level, their moral reasoning capabilities are prone to the no-ought-from-is thesis. The main hypothesis of the present work is that, by conceptually analysing the notion of bottom-up artificial moral agents, it would be revealed that their seeming moral judgements do not have proper philosophical basis. For one, the said kinds of artifacts arrive at the understanding of ethically-relevant ideas by means of culling data or facts from the environment. Thus, in relation to the is-ought problem, it may be argued that, even if bottom-up systems seem prima facie capable of generating apparent moral judgments, such are actually absent of good moral grounding, if not empty of any ethical value.
 
 

What drives MPs' constituency focus in party‐centered systems? Party‐centered systems are expected to offer fewer incentives for constituency‐focused behavior as it is parties rather than candidates that primarily drive competition. However, MPs in these systems may find good reason to cater to constituents’ interests as it allows them to attain multiple goals and satisfy competing principals. This study develops a theoretical model of constituency focus comprising individual, party, and district‐level factors and tests it in South Africa, a party‐centered system. Drawing on 22,724 questions submitted by MPs to the parliament between 2006 and 2023, as well as biographic data and interviews, it demonstrates that variation in MPs' constituency focus is explained by their level of electoral vulnerability, and to a lesser degree their seniority and local ties. Moreover, whether MPs belong to clientelistic parties and their constituency is a party stronghold are also relevant factors. The findings highlight the importance of incentives that go beyond electoral institutions and reaffirm the relevance of constituency links in party‐centered systems.

Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified—and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope...

Research model selection decisions in basic and preclinical biomedical research have not yet been the subject of an ethical investigation. Therefore, this paper aims, (1) to identify a spectrum of reasons for choosing between animal and alternative research models (e.g., based on in vitro or in silico models) and (2) provides an ethical analysis of the selected reasons. In total, 13 researchers were interviewed; the interviews were analyzed qualitatively. The ethical analysis was based on the principlism approach and a value judgement model. This paper presents 66 reasons underlying the choice of researchers using animal (27 reasons) or alternative models (39). Most of the reasons were assigned to the work environment (29) and scientific standards (22). Other reasons were assigned to personal attitudes (11) and animal welfare (4). Qualitative relevant normative differences are presented in the ethical analysis. Even if few reasons can be rejected outright from an ethical point of view, there are good reasons to give some more weight than others. The spectrum of reasons and their ethical assessment provide a framework for reflection for researchers who may have to choose between animal models and (investing in) alternatives. This can help to reflect on and ethically justify decisions.

Abstract In the literature on philosophical progress it is often assumed that agreement is a necessary condition for progress. This assumption is sensible only if agreement is a reliable sign of the truth, since agreement on false answers to philosophical questions would not constitute progress. This paper asks whether agreement among philosophers is (or would be) likely to be a reliable sign of truth. Insights from social choice theory are used to identify the conditions under which agreement among philosophers would be a reliable indicator of the truth, and it is argued that we lack good reason to think that philosophical inquiry meets these conditions. The upshot is that philosophical agreement is epistemically uninformative: agreement on the answer to a philosophical question does not supply even a prima facie reason to think that the agreed-upon view is true. However, the epistemic uninformativeness of philosophical agreement is not an indictment of philosophy's progress, because philosophy is valuable independent of its ability to generate agreement on the correct answers to philosophical questions.

Abstract Susanne Langer sees the ‘the public importance of art’ as one of ‘the ultimate questions in a philosophy of art’. Indeed, Langer is often referred to as an authority on the justification of art education and is cited as providing good reasons for incorporating the arts in the curriculum. It is therefore surprising to note, as Elliot Eisner does, that Langer’s theory has had little influence on actual art education. For while many theoreticians in the social sciences and education have found Langer’s contribution to the understanding of the arts highly significant, Eisner laments that ‘alas, the lesson Susanne Langer was trying to teach … in her remarkable book, never took hold in … American public schools’. It seems that policy-makers outside of art education circles remain sceptical regarding the need for art education. The substantiation of art education requires firm ground against scepticism. It is therefore important to understand the ways in which Langer’s project fails to fulfil its promise. In examining Langer’s aesthetic theory, I will show that despite its philosophical acuity, Langer’s argument fails to persuade the art education sceptic who believes that art occupies a minor role in education and should therefore remain marginal in the school curriculum.

Modified and unmodified gradable adjectives give rise to two distinct and opposing varieties of pragmatic enrichment: scalar implicature and understatement. While earlier work in pragmatics took these to be complementary inferences derived from opposing conversational principles, more recent work in the formal tradition has placed the focus firmly on scalar implicature and related phenomena, with no attempt to also account for understatement. In this paper I argue that there are good reasons to pursue a unified treatment of the two, and outline one possible way of doing so, framed within the commitment approach to assertion, where I take the commitments that come with asserting a proposition to encompass not only liability for its truth but also acceptance of the social consequences of expressing it. I further discuss how this approach can shed light on recent experimental findings regarding the role of lexical semantics in the pragmatic inferences available to gradable adjectives, as well as a puzzle that these findings pose.

Ketamine is a fast-acting N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor antagonist that can be used in a range of clinical scenarios in the pre-hospital setting and emergency department (ED). When compared with other anesthetic agents, ketamine has many unique properties, such as the ability to produce dose-dependent analgesic and anesthetic effects with a wide margin of safety. Ketamine may be used in the ED for sedation, pain management, and acute agitation treatment in the cases of benzodiazepine (BDZ)-resistant alcohol withdrawal syndrome (AWS) and substance use disorder. To highlight the efficacy and safety of ketamine, we reviewed the literature, starting with a description of four different cases of patients who presented to our ED and were treated with ketamine.

The study’s main objective is to identify and analyze the attitude toward prayer of teenagers in a denominational school in Romania and the need to use AI-assisted tools. To find a satisfactory answer, we considered it necessary to identify how they pray, i.e., freely or by calling on the prayer book, and whether they questioned whether artificial intelligence could be an agreeable support. The research also takes into account the documents of the Romanian Orthodox Church from which the attitude of the Hierarchy towards new technologies in general and artificial intelligence in particular emerges. How attentive is the Church to these realities, and how open is it to incorporate them? Does it have any good reason to consider tools like e-rosary in the Catholic world or Alexa Pray in the Anglican world in the near future? The introduction addresses Romania’s socio-political, educational, and theological context, and the discussion focuses on how the literature on digital religion and its subchapters is received in the Romanian theological landscape. The research method includes qualitative, questionnaire, and textual analysis; it is an interdisciplinary approach, namely practical theology and the study of digital religions. The questionnaire was administered to 216 respondents, respecting all research ethics requirements. The results reveal that young people prefer to pray freely, use the prayer book moderately, and have not gathered information regarding artificial intelligence that could help them. However, they are open to a future offers from the Romanian Orthodox Church, including AI-assisted tools.

I have often wondered, like many others, where the expression “Homeric laughter” comes from and what is hidden behind it. The spectacular career of the expression, which naturally does not appear in the Homeric epics, can be traced right back to the Iliad and Odyssey. I have insisted on two episodes in which the expression occurs (ἄσβεστος γέλως), one at the end of book I of the Iliad, the second in the Odyssey, book VIII. The gods are involved, Hephaestus in both situations, Ares and Aphrodite in the episode of the Odyssey, and people are also involved for whom this kind of laughter is not characteristic. What is Homeric laughter? The classical expression is ἄσβεστος γέλως, it can be translated by “inextinguishable” or “irrepressible mirth”. The phrase seems to come in English from German – “Homerisches Gelächter”, “unauslöschliches Gelächter” and in German from French: “le rire homérique”, as it appears for the first time in the memoirs of Baroness d’Oberkirck: “le rire inextinguible”. Homeric laughter is, therefore, “inextinguishable”, “unquenchable”, we owe the Latin formula to Ovid, the one from Metamorphoses - superi risere. As for Homer, we know he had no good reason to laugh, Homer couldn’t laugh in a Homeric manner anyway.

If we hope to see values of equality and democracy embodied in our societies’ institutions, then we have a range of good reasons to favor expansive public provision of goods and services, and to oppose many forms of privatization. While Joseph Heath is right to argue that there are at least some forms of ‘anodyne privatization’, and while he is also right to argue for a more nuanced philosophical debate about the different dimensions of choice between forms of public and private provision, Heath fails to register various regards in which private provision can undermine these central public values. We often have strong egalitarian and democratic reasons to protect zones of decommodification; to resist the imposition of user-charges; and to favor insourcing and direct public procurement over various forms of outsourcing of public services. Public libraries provide a totemic illustration of some of the deep virtues of collective public provision in democratic societies. Overall, our reasons to reject privatization are stronger and more diverse than theorists such as Heath might have supposed.

PHOTO ID 121339257© Designer491| Dreamstime.com ABSTRACT When physicians use their clinical knowledge and skills to advance the well-being of their patients, there may be apparent conflict between patient autonomy and physician beneficence. We are skeptical that today’s medical ethics education adequately fosters future physicians’ commitment to beneficence, which is both rationally defensible and fundamentally consistent with patient autonomy. We use an ethical dilemma that was presented to a group of third-year medical students to examine how ethics education might be causing them to give undue deference to autonomy, thereby undermining their commitment to beneficence. INTRODUCTION The right of patients to choose which treatments they prefer is rooted in today’s social mores and taught as a principle of medical ethics as respect for autonomy. Yet, when physicians use their clinical knowledge and skills to advance the well-being of their patients, there may be a conflict between patient autonomy and physician beneficence. We are skeptical that today’s medical ethics education adequately fosters a commitment to beneficence, which is both rationally defensible and fundamentally consistent with patient autonomy. I. An Ethical Dilemma The impetus for this paper arose when students who were completing their third clinical year discussed a real-life ethical dilemma. A middle-aged man developed a pulmonary hemorrhage while on blood thinners for a recently placed coronary stent. The bleeding was felt to be reversible, but the patient needed immediate intubation or he would die. The cardiologist was told that the patient previously expressed to other physicians that he never wanted to be intubated. However, the cardiologist made the decision to intubate the patient anyway, and the patient eventually recovered.[1] Students were asked if they believed that the cardiologist had acted ethically. Their overwhelming response was, “No, the patient should have been allowed to die.” We looked into how students applied ethical reasoning to conclude that this outcome was ethically preferred. To explore how the third-year clinical experience might have formed the students’ judgment, we presented the same case to students who were just beginning their third year. Their responses were essentially uniform in recommending intubation. While there is likely more than one reasonable view in this case, we agree with the physician and the younger medical students that intubation was the ethically appropriate decision and will present an argument for it. But first, we explain the reasoning behind the more advanced medical students’ decision to choose patient autonomy at the expense of beneficence. II. Medical Ethics Education and the Priority of Autonomy Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics, first published in 1979 and now in its 8th edition, is a significant part of the formal ethics education in medical school.[2] Students learn an ethical decision-making approach based on respect for four ethical principles: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. While Beauchamp and Childress officially afford no prima facie superiority to any principle, the importance of respect for patient autonomy has increased through the editions of their book. For example, early editions of their book opposed the legalization of physician-assisted death compared to recent editions that defended it.[3] As another example, Beauchamp and Childress make paternalism harder to justify by adding an autonomy-protecting condition to the list of conditions for acceptable paternalism.[4] Authority, they contend, need not conflict with autonomy—provided the authority is autonomously chosen.[5] “The main requirement,” they write, “is to respect a particular patient’s or subject’s autonomous choices, whatever they may be.[6] In the principlism of Beauchamp and Childress, autonomy now seems to have a kind of default priority.[7] However, the bioethics discourse has strong counternarratives, noting some movement to elevate the role of beneficence and to respect the input of stakeholders, including the family and the healthcare team. Ethics education achieves particular relevance in the third clinical year when students become embedded in the care of patients and learn from what has been called the informal curriculum. They observe how attending physicians approach day-to-day ethical problems at the patient’s bedside. In this context, students observe the importance of informed consent for serious treatments or invasive procedures, a practice that highlights the principle of patient autonomy. In both the formal and informal curriculum, medical students observe how, in the words of Paul Wolpe, “patient autonomy has become the central and most powerful principle in ethical decision-making in American medicine.”[8] In short, students appear to learn a deference for patient autonomy. This curricular shift in favor of autonomy coincides with legal developments that protect patients’ rights and decision-making with respect to their healthcare choices. The priority of autonomy in medicine benefits patients by reflecting their choices and, in some cases, their fundamental liberty. III. The Practice of Medicine and the Commitment to Beneficence There are many critiques of the dominant place that autonomy has in biomedical ethics,[9] especially considering that autonomy seems to be biased toward individualistic, Western, and somewhat American culture-driven values.[10] In addition, many bioethical dilemmas are cast as a conflict between autonomy and beneficence. Our point is that medical students bring to their study of medicine a commitment to beneficence that seems to be suppressed by practical ethics education. We think this commitment is rationally defensible and should be nurtured. It is striking that young medical students have a pre-reflective commitment to beneficence at all. For, as we mentioned, it is not just medicine but Western culture generally that prioritizes autonomy in settling ethical dilemmas. In wanting to act for the good of others (rather than simply agreeing to what others want), physicians are already swimming somewhat against the cultural tide.[11] However, doing so makes sense, given the nature of medicine and the profession of healing. When prospective medical students are asked why they wish to become physicians, the usual answer is some variation on caring for the sick and preventing disease. It is unlikely that a reason to become a physician is to respect a patient’s autonomy. It would be easy to dismiss medical students’ commitment to beneficence as a mere intuition and contrary to a more reasoned and deliberative approach. Beauchamp and Childress seem to minimize the value of physician intuition, stating that justifications for certain procedures are “…supported by good reasons. They need not rest merely in intuition or feeling.”[12] Henry Richardson writes that “situational or perceptive intuition…leaves the reasons for decision unarticulated.”[13] We think this is a crude and rather thin way of understanding intuition. Some bioethicists have defended intuition as essential to the practice of medicine and not something opposed to reason.[14] In the case we describe, we believe the ethical justifications s for the patient’s intubation are fundamentally sound: the patient did not have a “do not intubate” order written in the chart, the emergency intubation had not been foreseen, so the patient did not have the opportunity to consent to or reject intubation; the patient had consented to the treatment for his cardiac disease so his consent for intubation could have been assumed;[15] and the consequences of respecting his autonomy did not justify allowing him to die.[16] While it is possible to have more than one reasonable view on this case, we think the case for beneficence is strong and certainly should not be dismissed out of hand. We do not deny that if a patient makes a clearly documented, well-informed decision to forgo intubation that this decision ought to be respected by the physician (even if the physician disagrees with the patient’s decision). But, in this situation, as in many others in the practice of medicine, the patient’s real wishes and preferences are not well-articulated in advance. There are many cases where a physician acts based on what she believes the patient, or the surrogate, would want, sometimes in situations that do not allow much time for reflection. An example might be resuscitation of a newborn at the borderline of viability. In their ethics education, beneficence would mean acting first to save a life. If the patient or surrogate makes an informed decision to the contrary, a beneficent physician respects that autonomous decision. In the case presented, the patient expressed gratitude to the cardiologist when extubated. But what if he had expressed anger at the physician for violating his autonomy? There are those who could argue that not only was intubation ethically wrong but that the cardiologist put himself in legal jeopardy by his actions (especially if there had been a written refusal applicable to the specific situation). In the example we use, we point out that the cardiologist may not have escaped a lawsuit if the patient had died without intubation. His family, when hearing the circumstances, may have sued for failure to act and dereliction of the cardiologist’s duty to save him. Beyond a potential legal challenge for either action or inaction, there is an overriding ethical question the cardiologist had to address: what course would be most satisfying to his conscience? Would he rather allow a patient to die for fear of recrimination, or act to save his life, regardless of the personal consequences? In the absence of real knowledge about the patient’s considered wishes, it is most reasonable to err on the side of promoting patient well-being. A physician’s co

Plasmids are commonly used tools in microbiology and molecular biology and have important and wide-ranging applications in the study of gene function, protein expression, and compound synthesis. The complex relationship between necessary antibiotic addition, compatibility between multiple plasmids, and the growth burden of host bacteria has plagued the wider use of compatibility plasmids. In this study, we constructed the terminal polymerization pathway of PSA by exogenously expressing the neuA, neuD, and neuS genes after the knockdown of Eschesrichia coli BL21 (DE3). Duet series vectors were utilized to regulate the expression level of neuA, neuD, and neuS genes to study the gene expression level, plasmid copy number growth burden, pressure of antibiotic addition, stability of compatible plasmids, and the level of expression stability of exogenous genes, as well as the effect on the biological reaction process. The results showed that the three genes, neuA, neuD, and neuS, were enhanced in the recombinant strain E. coli NA-05, with low copy, medium copy, and high copy, respectively. The effect of PSA synthesis under standard antibiotic pressure was remarkable. The results of this thesis suggest the use of a Duet series of compatible expression vectors to achieve the stable existence and co-expression of multiple genes in recombinant bacteria, which is a good reason for further research.