Edmund Gettier demonstrated that the traditional analysis of knowledge (as a justified true belief) is insufficient. Some philosophers have proposed that virtue epistemology holds the key to solving the Gettier problem. Among them, Zagzebski’s virtue responsibilism has gained significant popularity. This solution posits that knowledge is a belief state originating from acts of intellectual virtue, where these acts are driven by intellectually virtuous motivations, the cognizer successfully achieves the ultimate goal of motivation (truth and understanding) through these acts. In other words, knowledge (truth) is attained because of the operation of one’s intellectual virtues. This revision of the traditional analysis of knowledge purportedly escapes the problems identified in the Gettier cases. In this paper, I argue that Zagzebski’s definition of knowledge is problematic as it cannot be proven that intellectual virtue is a necessary condition for knowledge. Furthermore, in the metaphysical context of mind–things dualism, it is unrealistic to attempt to establish a stable and reliable connection between intellectual virtue (the mind) and truth (the external world). In short, the intellectual virtue of epistemic agent cannot guarantee the acquisition of knowledge. It is not the key to solving the Gettier problem.

If there is any consensus about knowledge in contemporary epistemology it is that there is one primary kind: knowledge-that. I put forth a view, one I find in the works of Aristotle, on which instead knowledge-of - construed in a fairly demanding sense as being well-acquainted with things - is the primary kind. As to knowledge-that, it is not something distinct from knowledge-of, let alone more fundamental, but instead a species. To know that such-and-such, just like to know a person or place, is to be well-acquainted with a portion of reality - in this case a fact. In part by comparing classic Gettier cases to cases in which one has true impressions of but fails to know a person, I argue that this account not only respects our intuitions about knowledge-that - in particular that it is or entails non-accidentally true justified belief - but also explains them, providing a compelling analysis.

ABSTRACT As Northern Ireland marks 25 years since the Good Friday Agreement was signed, the political afterlife of the conflict persists in affecting the everyday lives of communities, kept alive through individual and institutional memories and stories. With state archives continuing to be released and living actors in the conflict still available to interview, they offer opportunities and challenges for researchers trying to understand the Troubles to navigate. This paper reflects on our different research encounters considering how our research has been affected by questions of access and positionality in the making of new and critical knowledges on the conflict in Northern Ireland.

ABSTRACT Let mathematical justification be the kind of justification obtained when we prove theorems. Are Gettier cases possible for this kind of justification? At first sight we might think not: The standard for mathematical justification is proof and, since proof is bound at the hip with truth, there is no possibility of having an epistemically lucky justification of a true mathematical proposition. In this paper, I challenge this idea by arguing that there is conception of mathematical justification which is fallibilist (in addition to infallibilist accounts). I argue that for the fallibilist conception, non-trivial Gettier cases are possible (and indeed actual). I indicate some upshots for mathematical practice, in particular, regarding folklore theorems and pluralism.

Abstract In this article, I present a modified reliabilist theory of knowledge which purports to solve many of the problems currently facing standard reliabilism. With the help of a dispositionally construed reliabilist theory of knowledge and justification (DRK and DRJ), tentative responses to the following problems for reliabilism are offered: The New Evil Demon Problem, The Clairvoyance Problem, The Mr. Truetemp Problem, The Gettier Problem, Barn Cases (Brandom’s and Goldman’s), and The Lottery Problem. Lastly, I argue that, despite diverging from the letter of standard reliabilism, DRK and DRJ remain within the spirit of reliabilist epistemology

The ability to provide culturally safe care is a core expectation of graduates from medical schools in Australia. Yet medical schools often struggle to meet this requirement. Recognising the need for curriculum redesign, this project created, delivered, and evaluated a program on providing culturally safe healthcare to First Nations peoples in the Northern Territory. The program was delivered to medical students enrolled in the Flinders University Northern Territory Medical Program over 9weeks in 2022. To create the program, education theories including community of practice, constructivist principles, and transformative learning were drawn upon. The program also drew on training designed specifically for Northern Territory health staff, which used the podcast "Ask the Specialist: Larrakia, Tiwi and Yolngu stories to inspire better healthcare" to promote critical reflection on racism in healthcare. To evaluate the program, 177 surveys were collected weekly from students and seven students consented to pre- and post-program interviews. Written informed consent was obtained from these participants. Inductive narrative analysis, guided by critical theory and First Nations knowledges, was applied to data. Kirkpatrick's training evaluation model provided a framework to present results. On average, 81% of participants agreed or strongly agreed the program was valuable. Participants learnt to critically reflect on power dynamics and racism in healthcare and learnt skills regarding rapport building, communication and patient-centred care. The pilot demonstrated a successful framework for cultural safety education within medical school curricula which has potential for further adaptation and implementation.

Abstract Safety accounts of knowledge intend to explain why certain true and intuitively justified beliefs fail to be knowledge in terms of such beliefs falling prey to a modal veritic type of luck. In particular, they explain why true and intuitively justified beliefs in “lottery propositions” (highly likely propositions reporting that a particular statistical outcome obtains) are not knowledge. In this paper, I argue that there is a type of case involving lottery propositions that inevitably lies beyond the scope of any reasonable safety account of epistemic luck. I offer counterexamples to accounts of epistemic luck in terms of safety conditions that involve both “locally” and “globally” reliable ways of forming beliefs in nearby worlds. All such counterexamples present a lottery case illustrating the next possibility: the process of selecting the lottery winner might be such that any world in which it delivers a different outcome is extremely far away from the actual world. In addition to being a case of safe ignorance, this type of lottery case shows that, ultimately, either veritic epistemic luck is not unsafe true belief or beliefs in lottery propositions are not epistemically luckily true.

Abstract Higher education is consistently offered as a powerful tool of criminal justice reform. Often presumed to be progressive, it is imperative to interrogate the limits of these orientations. I draw from 41 (n = 41) semi-structured interviews with staff and faculty at 36 criminology departments across Canada to uncover how they understand the role of criminological undergraduate education within ongoing projects of CJS reform. Participants emphasize that change happens from within the system: filling the ranks with good apples who are armed with critical social science knowledges. I interrogate this approach to institutional change, focusing on the expansionist formations that carceral liberalism necessitates. I illustrate the limits of this current criminological imagination and offer opportunities for other possibilities grounded in a transformative framework.

This essay explores the challenges of analyzing knowledge by focusing on the Gettier problem and the notion of sensitivity. The Gettier problem highlights that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Sensitivity is introduced as a condition to address Gettier cases by requiring that a belief tracks the truth of the proposition. However, sensitivity clashes with the concept of closure that states knowledge being closed under entailment. This creates a dilemma: giving up sensitivity or closure. The essay argues for rejecting sensitivity because it has more problems than closure. First, even without closure, it's difficult to reconcile everyday knowledge with the limitations imposed by sensitivity. Second, sensitivity struggles to address all Gettier cases. Finally, a modified Gettier recipe is presented to demonstrate how sensitivity is vulnerable to counterexamples. The essay concludes that both attempts to revise Nozicks conditions of knowledge with sensitivity and the traditional project of analyzing knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions face significant challenges.

ABSTRACT According to experimental philosophers, the diversity and sensitivity of intuitions have posed a severe threat to the traditional philosophical methodology, which relies extensively on intuitions triggered by thought experiments. However, defenders of traditional armchair philosophical methodology argue that experimental philosophers misunderstand the importance of intuitions for philosophy. What philosophers genuinely rely on are arguments, which provide a reliable foundation for their judgments on thought experiments. However, a recent cross-cultural experiment conducted by Wysocki (2017) indicates that arguments do not affect the judgments about Gettier cases as philosophers once expected. That poses a challenge to those philosophers who contend that judgments are based on arguments. In this paper, we expand the experimental investigation of the effect of arguments on judgments about thought experiments. We report the result of three experiments in which eleven thought experiments drawn from multiple philosophical subdisciplines were used. It turns out that arguments have significant impacts on Chinese participants’ judgments in response to most of these thought experiments. These results present new resources for defending the traditional methodology but also bring new challenges.

In ‘The Case of Patient Smith: Pain-Belief, Epistemic Luck, and Acquaintance,’ Elliott Crozat challenged the infallibility of the belief that “I feel pain” by providing a Gettier-type example that shows that such a pain-belief can be fallibly justified and luckily true. We claim that this move is problematic given that the case is not the Gettier sort. To demonstrate this, we first question the causal relation or lack thereof between the subject’s pain-belief and the pain he felt. We argue that this leads us to a dilemma. Either the painbelief and the pain are causally connected or not. If there is a causal connection, the subject’s true belief is justified, not epistemically lucky, and therefore qualifies as knowledge. If we grant no causal connection, we show that this leads to either an unjustified pain-belief or a justified false one. The result of both horns shows that Crozat’s Gettier-type example does not qualify as a bona fide Gettier case.

Recently, Boongaling argued in Logos & Episteme 16 (3), 351-355 (2025) that the JTB+S definition of knowledge, introduced as a solution to the Gettier problem in Logos & Episteme 15 (4), 385-387 (2024), neither solves the Gettier problem nor provides an acceptable account of knowledge. We show that Boongaling's counterargument, while logically correct, fails by showing that it is based on false premises.

This paper critically examines Cabbolet’s JTB+S account, in particular his proposed fourth condition for knowledge: S’s justification for believing that p must be sufficient to exclude ¬𝑝. Since Cabbolet’s proposed fourth condition: (1) does not eliminate Gettier cases, (2) leads to either skepticism or triviality, and (3) suffers from internal inconsistency, I argue that Cabbolet fails to: (4) provide a satisfactory account of knowledge, and (5) provide a correct solution to the Gettier Problem.

Gualtiero Piccinini has recently proposed an interesting new solution to the Gettier Problem: Knowledge is factually grounded belief. But there is a problem with this purported solution: It is both too strong and too weak. In this paper, I provide two counterexamples to substantiate the claim that it is both too strong and too weak. Thus, the view that knowledge is factually grounded belief is inadequate as an account of knowledge.

Nowadays, the challenge of defining JTB (Justified True Belief) by Gettier's cases has not had a satisfying solution. Considering the difficulties caused by the K =df. True belief + X paradigm, this paper replaces belief with competence as a more fundamental component of knowledge. Moreover, by the way of using the safety principle to illustrate knowing-how, necessary conditions for knowledge definition are obtained. This paper aligns with Pritchard's anti-luck virtue epistemology, specifically elaborating on the concept of ability-based knowledge as a robust necessary condition for defining knowledge. Therefore, the main findings of this paper are: 1) taking knowing-how as the basic element of knowledge can strengthen the reliability of the knowledge definition and get closer to the essence of knowledge; 2) the safety principle is compatible with knowing-how; 3) the collaboration of the safety principle and knowing-how as a necessary condition for knowledge definition can effectively avoid the Gettier problem. Through establishing a reliable method for testing knowledge, this approach may ultimately deepen readers’ understanding of what knowledge truly entails.

This study aims to provide theoretical and practical insights into literary work analysis. Theoretically, the research is supposed to advance knowledge of literary criticism, particularly Jung's archetypal ideas. Practically, the research is predicted to be valuable for future studies in using archetypes in literary criticism for individuals eager to investigate and deepen their understanding of hero archetypes. This study adopts a descriptive and qualitative research analysis method. There were found five archetypes from twelve hero archetypes. There are, The Innocent, Ruler, Destroyer, Warrior, and Lover. This study not only focuses on the complexity of character development, but also the reoccurring narrative scenes. A thorough analysis of important scenes, dialogues, and moments throughout the film reveals how each character portrays different characteristics of the hero archetype.

ABSTRACT Although far less visible than international peacekeepers, locally recruited ‘national staff’ play a vital role in UN peacekeeping and exercise agency with respect to core mandated tasks, including the Protection of Civilians (PoC). National staff bring critical local knowledges and communicative access advantages into missions but hold subordinate status within them. To fully capture their agency, I draw on feminist scholarship to conceptualize ‘facilitative agency’ (enabling others to achieve otherwise unavailable impacts) and highlight its importance in UN peacekeeping alongside the ‘direct agency’ of engaging local counterparts to produce outcomes. Feminist scholarship also helps surface the tensions surrounding the distribution of facilitative and direct agency in bureaucratic hierarchies. Drawing on 203 interviews in four UN missions (MINURSO, MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNFICYP), I show that national staff often have facilitative agency and may also have direct agency. I suggest that the type(s) of agency national staff have are shaped by their position type, work location and the specialization and/or transferability of their expertize and access, but also by international peacekeeper gatekeeping. I substantiate this argument by providing examples of national staff facilitative and direct agency for physical and political PoC and noting the conditions creating and limiting these types of agency.

An examination of Xenophanes’ fragment DK 21 B 34 shows how it to some extent anticipates what is known in contemporary epistemological debate as the “Gettier problem.” According to the argument underlying this problem, it is not enough to have a “justified true belief” in order to be able to say that one has “knowledge.” As Xenophanes’ text has it, even if one were able to say something true, one would not know it yet. This is because, according to Xenophanes, no one is capable of grasping the evident truth of things, since only conjectures about everything are available. But while conjectures cannot rise above the level of pure opinion, they are not all equal: as DK 21 B 18 recognizes, they are perfectible. But what is the basis of this position, which oscillates between scepticism and fallibilism? Since perfectibility never reaches the end (namely the truth), this progress is infinite: the basis of Xenophanes’ epistemology may therefore be his physics of the infinite, which, however, is itself only a conjecture. This entails the risk of self-refutation. To avoid this peril, the doctrine of Parmenides will have to batten down the hatches.

This paper presents a counterexample to the view that moral knowledge is necessary for moral worth. Justified true beliefs that an action is right confer the same degree of moral worth, whether or not they constitute knowledge. This is demonstrated with an example called "Texting the Rabbi" in which two people receive answers to moral questions – one from a wise rabbi, the other from a thief who stole the rabbi's phone and gives the same answer as the rabbi by chance. While this makes the questioners differ in moral knowledge, it creates no difference in moral worth.

Lewis (Noûs 13:455–476, 1979) claimed that branching-time(-like) models can be derived from his sphere models. However, he did not present any specific construction of branching-time(-like) models from his sphere models formally. Meanwhile, Hosokawa (in: Modern logic of modality and its philosophical range: counterfactuals, Gettier problem, and information flow, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 2018) presented a logico-mathematically strict manner in which sphere models can be reconstructed from branching-time models. Subsequently, Hosokawa (J Logic Lang Inf 32:677–706, 2023) presented a proof-theoretically refined version of hybrid tense logic for a certain type of conditionals, which is referred to as hybrid tense logic for temporal conditionals (HTLTC). In this paper, we interpret a hybrid version VHC(@,↓) of Lewis’s counterfactual logic V into HTLTC, and then prove that HTLTC is more expressive than VHC(@,↓) on the class of temporal sphere models, i.e., sphere models derived from a type of branching-time models.