Works by a plethora of 20th-century Spanish thinkers, such as Miguel de Unamuno, José Ortega y Gasset, and Salvador de Madariaga, have played an important role in the history of world philosophy. Philosophical thought in Spain has always been contemplative, characterized by polemical sharpness of judgment and a special rhetorical style. Spanish philosophers did not propose any doctrine as dogma, nor did they seek to create schools; still, their concepts had a holistic approach to the evaluation of phenomena, which is now commonly referred to as interdisciplinarity. Their style of philosophical thinking bore the hallmarks of psychological, sociological, and hermeneutic analysis when it comes to revealing the existential essence of events. This style was marked by a philological depth of understanding of the relationship between language and national consciousness. The Spanish fully inherited the interest in language and speech, which were considered a form of art in antiquity, and lent new perspectives on language in the first editions of Spanish grammar published in late 15th century (the first Spanish grammar was published by Antonio de Nebrija in 1492). Speech as an art and a reflection of the national peculiarities of a people’s life, its instinct (intuition) are ideas in the works of the 16th-century Spanish humanists Juan Luis Vives and Juan de Valdés that were centuries ahead of the European linguistic thought. Language philosophy in Spain in the 19th century developed in line with German idealism, which had the strongest influence on Spanish philosophy in general.The philosophical thought concerning language acquired a new and truly original dimension in the works of Miguel de Unamuno and José Ortega y Gasset, as it gained an ethnopsychological element and took on an existentialist approach to the description of the facts of language and speech production. The views of these philosophers on language manifested themselves in their art as well. The aim of this study is to show how the existentialist dimension of the philosophical thought of Miguel de Unamuno, José Ortega y Gasset, and Salvador de Madariaga helped to reveal the profound mechanisms of speech production, determined the dominant features of national linguistic consciousness, and demonstrated the interdependence of speech behavior and national character. The author uses metalinguistic, psycholinguistic, and ethnosociological methods in the analysis and interpretation of works by these authors.

The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy by Robert E. Pippin (review)

The concept of “mythological thinking” appears in the problematic field of philosophy in the 19th century and receives several interpretations over the next century. The article examines the reception of mythological thinking in the studies of the most significant figure in classical studies of the Soviet period - A.F. Losev. It occurs at the intersection of the dialectical method (inheriting the features of Neoplatonism, German idealism, as well as the philosophy of all-unity of V.S. Solovyov), the tradition of symbolic interpretation of myth (F.W.J. Schelling and E. Cassirer) and domestic and European psychology that was actively developing at the beginning of the 20th century (G.I. Chelpanov, W. Wundt and the Würzburg School). A comparative analysis of the concepts of A.F. Losev and E. Cassirer is carried out in the context of their internal polemics, transferred by Losev from work to work, which allows us to demonstrate the connection between Losev's reception and the intellectual landscape of German philosophy of the 19-20th centuries. With a detailed analysis of the sources and theoretical foundations of A.F. Losev's methodology, it becomes clear what myth is, how it functions and how it underpins mythological thinking. Losev understands myth as a space for the development of thinking, where a special form of cognition of reality grows from the emotional beginning, fixing reality by means of symbols. Mythological thinking here is a special form of thought, where myth, arising as a given, receives a symbolic embodiment, dictated by the figurative-sensory nature of cognition and called upon to fully express the worldview of the ancients.

Abstract Does it make sense to speak of a philosophy of science in the work of the German idealist F. W. J. Schelling, despite the ambiguity of the word Wissenschaft at the time and given Schelling’s project of a philosophy of nature? I argue that Schelling does have a relatively consistent conception of science, and that his conception should not be understood solely by reference to his philosophy of nature. I show that what Schelling means by “science” is a form of knowledge based on the need to “construct” its objects, which leads him to an original conception of what an experiment is. I also show that it is necessary to distinguish between Schelling’s very early texts (1794–1795), in which science is conceived without reference to experimentation, and texts from 1797 onward in which experimentation becomes an integral part of what science is. This involves an original understanding of the experimental method, which needs to be distinguished from the Baconian tradition as well as from the German tradition exemplified by Goethe.

In this interview, conducted by Mahdi Ranaee, Professor Karin de Boer discusses key aspects of her research in Kantian philosophy, with a particular focus on the Critique of Pure Reason and its historical context. She reflects on the interpretive challenges posed by Kant’s texts, the influence of German Idealism, and her methodological approach to philosophical scholarship. The conversation also touches on the contemporary relevance of Kant’s thought and the importance of situating his work within broader philosophical traditions.

ABSTRACT In this paper, I explain how Kant's attitude towards Judaism can best be understood in terms of conceptual design, how this explanation can account for the many peculiarities in Kant's take on Judaism, and why this issue is much more central to Kant's moral philosophy than is usually recognized. I then examine to what extent Mendelssohn's conception of Judaism contrasts with Kant's. I conclude by suggesting some general reflections concerning the conception of Judaism in the context of German Idealism as a whole.

abstract: This paper aims to fill a gap in the literature by investigating Fichte’s application of the genetic method to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I claim that Fichte’s main source for developing this method is Ernst Platner’s conception of logic as a pragmatic history of the human faculty of cognition. To support this claim, I argue (1) that Platner himself reworked Kant’s account of the faculties by using this method, (2) that Fichte engaged extensively with Platner’s approach to Kant, and (3) that he employed a nonpsychological version of Platner’s method to recast Kant’s transcendental logic in the Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Science . In my view, Fichte’s development of the genetic method within a transcendental framework is one of his most influential contributions to the further development of German Idealism.

This special issue is devoted to the philosophical legacy of Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950), one of the most compelling and systematic thinkers of twentieth‑century philosophy. In recent decades, Hartmann’s work has attracted renewed scholarly interest, particularly in light of contemporary debates in ontology, philosophical anthropology, epistemology and the theory of values. Researchers have begun to rediscover the depth and relevance of his layered ontology, his concept of the real, and his critical engagement with both Neo‑Kantianism and German idealism. They are also starting to explore the Russian context of Hartmann’s thought.

Abstract The term ‘German Idealism’ is used to describe the philosophy of thinkers from Kant to Hegel or, alternatively, from Kant to Schelling. The article shows why Hegel, in contrast to the commonly held idealistic understanding of his philosophy, had to carry out the essential part of his project in a post-idealistic way. His starting point was the figure of absolute reflection against the background of Jacobi’s diagnosis of nihilism. Hegel’s sublation of absolute reflection through the intrusion of external reflection introduces the consideration of the other, in the strong sense, into the logical process. It is instructive to contrast Hegel’s proposal with the models of two other authors, Jacobi and Adorno, whose critiques of absolute reflection are strikingly similar to one another. Both are concerned with the assertion of a “double mode of behaviour” rather than the immanence of a continuous movement of thought. This has conceptual consequences for theory design: a genuine impulse from outside is indispensable which is not reflection but experience.

Abstract Michael Rosen’s The Shadow of God offers a rich account of ideas of secularization in the German Idealist tradition. In this short article, I contend that, despite its sophistication, the book misses the extent to which questions about Jewish emancipation were central to these debates. I focus on how, as Hegel misconstrued Judaism as the heteronomous religion of a people of ‘slaves,’ this leads Rosen to neglect some significant antisemitic underpinnings of broader philosophical and sociological arguments on secularization.

Abstract This essay responds to nine critics of The Shadow of God. They challenge the book’s ideas in some areas but also seek to extend them. The essay welcomes particularly the discussion of whether the ideas of The Shadow of God can be extended to non-Western societies, the opportunity to explain more clearly what is meant by “discursive transcendentalism”, and the discussion of alternatives to personal immortality in an afterlife. At the same time, it defends The Shadow of God’s criticisms of Hegel and does not accept that neglect of the alleged anti-Semitism to be found in German Idealism undermines the book’s arguments.

Abstract In his work The Shadow of God, Michael Rosen shows how much the authors of classical German philosophy were driven by existential questions about how to deal with suffering and evil; in particular, Hegel’s philosophy of history is read as an attempt to develop a means of consolation through the concept of historical immortality. This contribution argues that Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Hegel also experiment with another attempt to offer consolation: the idea of instantaneous eternity.

The article presents a conceptual framework for reconsidering S. Balei’s philosophy of self-knowledge, the culmination of his scientific concept of personality. Focusing on the paradigm of practical philosophy enables us to consider Balei’s complex view of human beings and demonstrate his understanding of the relationship between self-knowledge and the ideal personality. Balei’s concept of self-knowledge is analyzed from the perspective of the multilevel nature of the self and the necessity of combining scientific and philosophical approaches. The author justifies drawing parallels between Balei’s concepts of personality and self-knowledge and Kant’s cosmopolitan concept of human vocation. For both thinkers, the central concern is personality and its potential for self-improvement, as well as the broadest possible view of humanity, covering its various dimensions – from individual uniqueness to the dynamic process of development and the moral ideal. The article demonstrates that both thinkers understood personality through the categories of reflection, willpower, character, ideals, actions, overcoming selfishness, and morality. These parallels are clearly traceable, even though Balei did not identify himself as a follower of Kant. His statements about Kant reflect an affinity for Kantian philosophy similar to that of Brentano and Twardowski. They focused exclusively on the transcendental component in connection with German idealism and pessimistic philosophy. The general empirical-analytical attitude and rejection of speculative philosophy characteristic of the Lviv-Warsaw School, particularly Balei, led to the perception of Kant’s philosophy as a «long shadow». However, as the author demonstrates, Balei’s philosophy of self-knowledge and self-creation is paradigmatically related to Kant’s broader cosmopolitan concept of human vocation. This analytical perspective reveals new opportunities for understanding Balei’s legacy within the context of contemporary humanities discourse. Keywords: self-knowledge, personality, reflection, practical philosophy, S. Balei (Baley), I. Kant.

This article honors the legacy of the French philosopher Bernard Bourgeois, highlighting his significance for Hegelian studies and contemporary philosophy. Marking the first anniversary of his passing, the text recalls the remarkable lecture delivered by Bourgeois in 2006 at the Federal University of Pernambuco, in which he presented Hegelian pluralism as a "Comedy of Action." His innovative interpretation of the dynamics of human action and interaction within Hegelian philosophy provides critical tools relevant for contemporary ethical and political analyses. Furthermore, the article underscores Bourgeois's lasting impact on the dissemination and understanding of German idealism, particularly through his translations and analyses of Hegel's works. It emphasizes the pedagogical and humanist dimensions of his academic activity, as well as his commitment to interdisciplinarity and the practical application of philosophy to current social issues, thus reaffirming his enduring relevance for global philosophical dialogue.

This paper offers a philosophical account of the specific form of romantic love underlying the ideal of love-based marriages. Rather than examining the institution of marriage, it considers marriage as the promise of infinite love between finite persons. Although this promise may seem irrational, even those who never formally marry still invoke phrases like ‘I love you forever’. In three steps, this paper explores what we could possibly mean by infinite love and how it can be rationally promised throughout a finite life. First, I trace the concept of infinite love back to the metaphysical discussions surrounding the emergence of the love-based marriage among German Idealists and Jena Romanticists. Next, drawing on John Searle’s speech act theory, I examine how the ideal of infinite love can be articulated as a promise. Finally, I turn to early existentialist thought—particularly the notions of passion (Lidenskab, Leidenschaft), repetition (Gjentagelsen, Wiederkehr), and the moment (Øjeblik, Augenblick) as developed by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche—to justify the meaning of the marital promise. In short, I propose that instead of interpreting the marital promise as a description of an expected reality, we should approach it as a passionate necessity that discloses the world in a fundamentally indeterminate way. By reframing the marital promise in this light, I aim to show that marital love is compatible both with the ideal of personal autonomy and with an alternative conception of rationality and temporality.

In his latest book, The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy, Robert Pippin reads Heidegger’s critique of German idealism as an effort to re-ground philosophical thought in the thinking of finite, mortal, concretely situated, embodied human beings. Pippin’s argument reminds one of another critique of German idealism: Marx’s. While Pippin acknowledges that Marx and the materialist tradition suggested another way out of the self-enclosed rationalism of idealism, he ultimately supports Heidegger’s hermeneutic solution. I will argue that historical materialism is a more complete and coherent alternative to idealism than Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. Despite the fact that it prioritises concrete social and historical research, it is not an anti-philosophical empirical research program but implies a new way of understanding core philosophical problems. I will contend this this new, historical and materialist way of doing philosophy is a more coherent articulation of the dispositions and fundamental concerns of finite human beings. The historical materialist conception of human finitude exposes Heidegger’s understanding of human finitude as one-sided and abstract.

Confronting the German Idealist Tradition. Jakob Friedrich Fries, the Friesian School and the Neo-Friesian School

This is a hermeneutic study of the relevance of language in Nietzsche’s philosophy and its legacy for the contemporary world. In order to achieve this, the paper begins by analyzing the plastic phenomenon in the philosopher’s dialogues with part of German idealism in the context of Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872) and its developments in subsequent writings. Thereafter, two important understandings of language and rhetoric found in the texts produced for the lectures from 1872 to 1875 are analyzed: rhetoric conceived as δύναμισ and language conceived as rhetoric. Both analyzes investigate the conceptual development of the expression plastic force (plastische Kraft) between the 1870s and 1880s and its effects on the thought cycles of Die Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen (1873-1876), Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882/1887) and Jenseits von Gut und Böse (1886). The concluding interpretation identifies plastic force as a relational mechanism between these three phases and as an essential feature of Nietzschean philosophy.

Abstract Contemporary models of neural network function describe the brain as an “active system”, intrinsically generating patterns of activity that pre-structure top-down processing prior to extrinsic stimulation. In this context, self-relatedness is proposed to be one fundamental feature of this spontaneous brain activity. Self-relatedness has been postulated as a neuronal mechanism predominantly involving cortical midline regions ascribed to the so-called default mode network (DMN). This system essentially attributes the degree of self- or non-self-relevance to any interoceptive or exteroceptive stimuli (and by doing this, transforming stimuli in specific self- or non-self-like contents, possibly becoming objects in higher-level processes, particularly self-referential thinking). The focus of this paper is to demonstrate that the model of spontaneous brain activity has some important similarities to central aspects of transcendental philosophical theories of consciousness and subjectivity. For example, in German idealism the term ‘self’ or ‘ego’ refers to a spontaneous organisation capacity of the mind able to generate the very distinction between oneself and other, subject and object within the consciousness, pre-structuring mental processes prior to any specific function (e.g., sensory, cognitive processes). Furthermore, the processing of an informational content across multiple layers of consciousness corresponds to a logical sequence of different states (state of subject-object-undifferentiation, subject-object-differentiation, subject-object-integration). We conclude, from the perspective of transcendental philosophy there must be a structural parallelism between these logical categories defining the essence of mental states, and their neuronal substrate. Otherwise, it would be hardly conceivable how a mapping of two different regional ontological domains, such as mental and neural processes, could occur.

After helping to inaugurate the Anglophone Hegelian revival, Pippin offers a striking reassessment of that revival in The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy. Pippin’s main claim is that Heidegger “understood the Idealist tradition and its significance better than anyone had hitherto.” However, this claim overlooks the depth of Schelling’s understanding of German idealism and the strength of his critique of Hegel. Schelling mounts a formidable critique of Hegel that anticipates crucial aspects of Heidegger’s critique, including aspects missing from Pippin’s account. I rehearse the development of Pippin’s pursuit of a defensible account of Hegel’s argument for the speculative identity of thought and being. I then present Pippin’s post-idealist turn in The Culmination by summarizing the book. Finally, I demarcate the Schellingian lacuna in Pippin’s endorsement of Heidegger’s critique of Hegel.