German Idealism Research Articles

S. BALEI AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE: PARALLELS WITH I. KANT

The article presents a conceptual framework for reconsidering S. Balei’s philosophy of self-knowledge, the culmination of his scientific concept of personality. Focusing on the paradigm of practical philosophy enables us to consider Balei’s complex view of human beings and demonstrate his understanding of the relationship between self-knowledge and the ideal personality. Balei’s concept of self-knowledge is analyzed from the perspective of the multilevel nature of the self and the necessity of combining scientific and philosophical approaches. The author justifies drawing parallels between Balei’s concepts of personality and self-knowledge and Kant’s cosmopolitan concept of human vocation. For both thinkers, the central concern is personality and its potential for self-improvement, as well as the broadest possible view of humanity, covering its various dimensions – from individual uniqueness to the dynamic process of development and the moral ideal. The article demonstrates that both thinkers understood personality through the categories of reflection, willpower, character, ideals, actions, overcoming selfishness, and morality. These parallels are clearly traceable, even though Balei did not identify himself as a follower of Kant. His statements about Kant reflect an affinity for Kantian philosophy similar to that of Brentano and Twardowski. They focused exclusively on the transcendental component in connection with German idealism and pessimistic philosophy. The general empirical-analytical attitude and rejection of speculative philosophy characteristic of the Lviv-Warsaw School, particularly Balei, led to the perception of Kant’s philosophy as a «long shadow». However, as the author demonstrates, Balei’s philosophy of self-knowledge and self-creation is paradigmatically related to Kant’s broader cosmopolitan concept of human vocation. This analytical perspective reveals new opportunities for understanding Balei’s legacy within the context of contemporary humanities discourse. Keywords: self-knowledge, personality, reflection, practical philosophy, S. Balei (Baley), I. Kant.

Schelling’s Philosophy of Science

Abstract Does it make sense to speak of a philosophy of science in the work of the German idealist F. W. J. Schelling, despite the ambiguity of the word Wissenschaft at the time and given Schelling’s project of a philosophy of nature? I argue that Schelling does have a relatively consistent conception of science, and that his conception should not be understood solely by reference to his philosophy of nature. I show that Schelling means by science a form of knowledge based on the need to “construct” its objects, which leads him to an original conception of what an experiment is. I also show that it is necessary to distinguish between Schelling’s very early texts (1794–1795), in which science is conceived without reference to experimentation, and texts from 1797 onwards in which experimentation becomes an integral part of what science is. This involves an original understanding of the experimental method, which needs to be distinguished from the Baconian tradition as well as from the German tradition exemplified by Goethe.

Memória e Legado: Bernard Bourgeois e a Atualidade do Pensamento Hegeliano

This article honors the legacy of the French philosopher Bernard Bourgeois, highlighting his significance for Hegelian studies and contemporary philosophy. Marking the first anniversary of his passing, the text recalls the remarkable lecture delivered by Bourgeois in 2006 at the Federal University of Pernambuco, in which he presented Hegelian pluralism as a "Comedy of Action." His innovative interpretation of the dynamics of human action and interaction within Hegelian philosophy provides critical tools relevant for contemporary ethical and political analyses. Furthermore, the article underscores Bourgeois's lasting impact on the dissemination and understanding of German idealism, particularly through his translations and analyses of Hegel's works. It emphasizes the pedagogical and humanist dimensions of his academic activity, as well as his commitment to interdisciplinarity and the practical application of philosophy to current social issues, thus reaffirming his enduring relevance for global philosophical dialogue.

Transcendental philosophical and neuroscientific theories of consciousness

Abstract Contemporary models of neural network function describe the brain as an “active system”, intrinsically generating patterns of activity that pre-structure top-down processing prior to extrinsic stimulation. In this context, self-relatedness is proposed to be one fundamental feature of this spontaneous brain activity. Self-relatedness has been postulated as a neuronal mechanism predominantly involving cortical midline regions ascribed to the so-called default mode network (DMN). This system essentially attributes the degree of self- or non-self-relevance to any interoceptive or exteroceptive stimuli (and by doing this, transforming stimuli in specific self- or non-self-like contents, possibly becoming objects in higher-level processes, particularly self-referential thinking). The focus of this paper is to demonstrate that the model of spontaneous brain activity has some important similarities to central aspects of transcendental philosophical theories of consciousness and subjectivity. For example, in German idealism the term ‘self’ or ‘ego’ refers to a spontaneous organisation capacity of the mind able to generate the very distinction between oneself and other, subject and object within the consciousness, pre-structuring mental processes prior to any specific function (e.g., sensory, cognitive processes). Furthermore, the processing of an informational content across multiple layers of consciousness corresponds to a logical sequence of different states (state of subject-object-undifferentiation, subject-object-differentiation, subject-object-integration). We conclude, from the perspective of transcendental philosophy there must be a structural parallelism between these logical categories defining the essence of mental states, and their neuronal substrate. Otherwise, it would be hardly conceivable how a mapping of two different regional ontological domains, such as mental and neural processes, could occur.

Перипетии опыта. «Опытное познание» у Канта и «явления» Гегеля

It was not until German Idealism that philosophy briefly regained the importance it had in antiquity. This is indicated precisely by the “peripeteia” in the concept of experience. When Kant and Hegel write about experience, they mean quite different things on the other. Kant’s concept of experience is law-like, invariant and rigid. Only for this reason can it form the basis for a critical reflection on the validity of knowledge. However, Hegel’s analysis of object experience “dynamises” Kant’s concept in various ways: firstly, he provides an interpretation of the process of how perception and its contents ultimately become the “play of forces” via the life of things. Secondly, Hegel works out the self-referentiality of the subject in this process of experience. Finally, Hegel shows how the experience of objects refers beyond itself to more complex forms of knowledge. In the chapter “Power and Understanding” of his Phenomenology of Spirit he undertakes a subtle differentiation of what Kant calls “objective cognition” and shows, on the one hand, which process is already necessary in order to grasp a thing even sensually. On the other hand, he analyses the different levels of experience that are already involved in the simple process of perception. The authors analyse this process as a silent dialogue between Kant and Hegel and show why Hegel’s concept of experience can claim to contribute more to the understanding of man than Kant’s.

Scholarly authors as self-translators

Abstract This paper examines traces of (self-)translation in the work of the Egyptian philosopher Hasan Hanafi (1935–2021), whose academic career reflects the increasing globality of the academic field. The paper analyses Hanafi’s academic migration to France to complete his doctorate, his self-translational efforts to adapt to the French academic tradition, and the influence of his (physical and linguistic) migration on his later philosophical texts in Arabic. Hanafi was convinced that the ‘archaic’ Arabic language alienated Muslims from their own heritage, and in his later philosophical texts he thus sought to renew the Arabic language and to re-express fundamental concepts of the classical Islamic teachings. The concepts he aimed to re-express were already translated into French in his doctoral thesis. This article addresses these terminological translations into French and back into Arabic, and discusses the conceptual transformations that occurred on the way, inspired by Hanafi’s reading of Husserl and the German Idealists.

Foucault’s failed “death of man”: its structure, problems and relevance

The article clarifies Foucault’s thesis on “the death of man”, identifies its weaknesses and relevance today. The background of this thesis and the misconceptions in its interpretation are briefly written out. It is not about human as a subject, a biological species or a biosocial being, but about Man as a historical a priori, or a modern episteme formed at the turn of the XVIII–XIX centuries. As a transcendental condition, it determines the nature of modern forms of knowledge and thinking, for example, German idealism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and various kinds of naturalistic reductionisms. Human became possible thanks to the idea of transcendental finitude associated with Kant’s Copernican turn. However, his birth is associated with betrayal of the transcendental project — a mixture of the transcendental and empirical levels. The general structure of Man is a transcendence, defined on the basis of human sciences and their empirical objectivity. It is shown that, contrary to popular simplifying interpretations, the sciences of man are understood by Foucault specifically: they combine sciences (linguistics, social sciences, biology) with Man as a doubling. The stability and difficulty of overcoming a Person are set by the paradoxical nature of his structure, which mixes empirical and transcendental finiteness: empirical instances (language, labor, biological life) define a person in objective time, but are possible, like time, only thanks to the structure of cognition. A critique of Foucault’s idea of Man is given. Using the example of a cerebral subject identifying a personality with the brain, the relevance of a Person today is shown at least beyond philosophy in the concepts of subjects that rely on scientific knowledge and circulate in discourses and practices in the social space.

The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy by Robert B. Pippin (review)

The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy by Robert B. Pippin (review)

Интерпретация свободы в философии марксизма: к вопросу об исторической преемственности

The authors turn to the Marxist interpretation of freedom, which is viewed as a turning point in the historical paradigm shift in the understanding of this phenomenon. The Marxist idea of freedom is compared here with its preceding version that was suggested by classical German idealism. While in classical German idealism, I. Kant’s works in particular, freedom is conditioned by the intrinsic structure of the human mind, i.e. it is the right of reason and is purely spiritual in nature, Marxism reveals its objective modus: object-transforming activity, being a manifestation of freedom, involves a person in a relationship with nature. Processed objects become mediators between society and nature; freedom is realized in the mutual creation of subject and object. The process of identifying the social subject and object leads to the interpretation of freedom as a social creation. German idealism considers man to be free and does not acknowledge any social prerequisites for freedom, while Marxists, on the contrary, see social communication as a condition for freedom, based on which the subject of freedom is identified. This subject is a socially and historically determined person as a concrete, real and perceptual being. A new stage is the consideration of the socio-biological and objective material foundations of freedom, which makes it possible to discern the ancient prerequisites of the Marxist idea of freedom. This confirms P. Critchley’s (2001) version, according to which Marxism inherits the Greco-German concept of rational freedom. Despite all the differences, the authors conclude that the Marxist approach to the problem of freedom largely continues the line of German transcendentalism. In both systems, freedom is analysed in the aspect of universality and is understood as a way of a person’s self-determination and a prerequisite for implementing one’s essential qualities, as an overcoming of human biological properties and as a form of independence from the physical world. In both traditions, we can trace the dialectic of freedom and necessity. In Marxism, labour is a genuine manifestation of freedom and an eternal natural necessity. For Kant, the essential human characteristics, including morality, necessarily presuppose man’s freedom.

The Theory of Ideas in Schelling's Identity System: A Wittgensteinian Interpretation

Abstract: This article offers an interpretation of Schelling's theory of ideas within his philosophy of identity, arguing that it should be understood as a theory of the intelligibility of being—that is, the capacity for the world to be meaningfully articulated in thought. By placing Schelling's ideas into dialogue with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico -Philosophicus, the author aims to show how Schelling's philosophy might provide valuable insights for contemporary analytic interpretations of German idealism. Schelling's notion of ideas encompasses three key features: (1) they express the principle of identity as the foundation of reality, (2) they constitute totalities or self-contained universes, and (3) they are individuals that are unified within a single totality. The author explains these features and demonstrates how they jointly establish the conditions necessary for the possibility of meaning and coherent thought.

J.B. Erhard and His “Devil’s Apology” (1795) in the Context of Early Discussions about Kantian Philosophy

The philosopher and physician Johann Benjamin Erhard (1766–1827) is a relatively little-studied, but very remarkable figure in the history of post-Kantian German thought. The peak of his creative activity occurred in the last decade of the 18th century – a time of heated discussions around the philosophy of I. Kant, when a number of thinkers, who appreciated the nature of the transformations he carried out, tried to continue his undertaking, challenging the positions of philosophical opponents. Developing some of his claims and moving away from others, they often found themselves in ideological confrontation both with Kant himself and with other Kantians. Along with K.L. Reingold, S. Maimon, J.G. Fichte, T. Schmaltz, L.H. Jacob, C.Chr.E. Schmid and other influential successors (and at the same time critics) of Kantian philosophy, J.B. Erhard was in the thick of these discussions, the course of which is reflected in one of his main works, “Devil’s Apology” (1795). This article, which represents a preface to the translation of this work into Russian, will examine its main within the framework of a number of philosophical problems and disagreements that were of key importance at the dawn of the development of one of the most important traditions of European philosophy – German idealism. Particular attention within the framework of the article will be paid to the position of the personality of Erhard himself in the philosophical context of his time; in particular, his personal contacts with famous contemporaries.

Metametaphysical Monism, Dualism, Pluralism, and Holism in the German Idealist Tradition

ABSTRACT During his Jena period, Fichte endorses a curious dictum: ‘the kind of philosophy one chooses depends on the kind of person one is’. How can Fichte’s dictum support a vindication of German idealism over Spinozism, which he also calls ‘dogmatism’? I will show that the answer to this seemingly straightforward question reveals a rather complex series of metametaphysical objections that shape the development of the entire German idealist tradition. Ultimately, as I will suggest, the series of metametaphysical questions that shape the German idealist tradition must culminate in the question of how to understand the relation between philosophy and its presuppositions. I will conclude by briefly considering a hermeneutical response to this question.

ЛЕЙБНИЦ, ГЕГЕЛЬ И РУССКАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ

The aim of the article is to show the complexity of the genesis of original Russian philosophy in the 19th century, which emerged in the space of a heterogeneous chronotope from different cultural-historical and actual philosophical premises. An integral part of this chronotope was a cultural and intellectual dialogue with the philosophical classics, when the ground for formation was the entire history of philosophy, from antiquity and the Christian tradition to German idealism. As for philosophical personalities, it was their real personal contribution to culture and philosophy that mattered, not their significance and importance. Among them is G. W. Leibniz, whose idealistic dialectic does not fit into the canons of German classics, but influenced the formation of original Russian religious philosophy, starting from A. S. Khomyakov and ending with A. A. Kozlov and L. M. Lopatin. Using the example of the formation of A. S. Khomyakov's ideas with tht hermeneutics and contextual reading, the author shows the elusive incorporation of Leibniz's philosophy into Russian philosophy.

Co mohu poznat, a co jen uznat? Výchozí epistemologické problémy ve filosofii Roberta Spaemanna

The paper analyses two preliminary epistemological problems in Robert Spaemann’s philosophy that have not yet been addressed as mutually linked. The common root of both problems lies in the way Spaemann specifically applies Kant’s statement “being is not a real predicate”. The first problem concerns the criteria for distinguishing between waking and dream cognition, the second the criteria for distinguishing a living being from a simulation. The analysis shows, among other things, the broader context of Spaemann’s epistemological position, its three main characteristics, and Spaemann’s specific use of the term Anerkennung (“acknowledgement”), which he adopted from German idealism.

Marxian critique: from ‘thing-in-itself’ to commodity-form

In grounding critique in the historically situated and concrete, sensuous external object, Marx both preserves and transcends the form of critique present in the work of not only the Young Hegelians, including Proudhon, but the titans of German Idealism—Kant and Hegel. By centering the external object, Marxian critique mediates concrete historical change between the subject and the world of appearance. The aim of this article is to differentiate Marx’s form of critique from his predecessors on the grounds of the external object. This article is broken into two sections, the first being an examination of the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach, and each theorist’s relation to the thing-in-itself. This initial section aims to reveal the abstract and ahistorical manner in which ‘bourgeois thought’ engages the external world of appearance. The second section explores the way ‘bourgeois thought’ eradicates motion and mediation in theorizing the external object of bourgeois society—the commodity. The latter section illustrates how the process of reification [Verdinglichung] hypostatizes the categories of bourgeois society into ‘natural’ categories that are then applied to the world of appearance.

The wonder of being: Varieties of rationalism and its critique

AbstractIn his book The Culmination, Pippin leaves no doubt that he still thinks that German Idealism has achieved a level of understanding and radicality that makes its proponents the best conversational partners to develop an understanding of what philosophy is about. It is the question of the very possibility of understanding that comes to be at the center of their writings and informs every page. Yet this radicality is now seen in a different light. It is now conceived as a culmination, not of an understanding that comes to itself but of a misunderstanding that informs, unavoidably, Western philosophical tradition as a whole. The resources for the idea that there is something fundamentally wrong in the conception of what it is to be a being that is able to know anything at all Pippin finds most vividly and forcefully articulated in Heidegger. I will argue that there is something profoundly true about Pippin's idea that, at the bottom of any knowledge we have of ourselves and the world, there is something that Heidegger calls Stimmung, which is essentially non‐discursive. However, I will argue that to defend the latter thought, one has to read Heidegger's notion of Stimmung in a more radical way than Pippin seems to be willing to.

Places and Non-Places, Being and Non-Being: Main Ideas Developed from the German Idealism

German Idealism profoundly impacted various fields, including philosophy, politics, and aesthetics. Its ideas influenced subsequent philosophical movements, such as existentialism and phenomenology. In philosophical discourse, one finds many perspectives that delve into the intricate relationship between human existence and the spaces we inhabit. Among these renowned thinkers, two voices emerge: Martin Heidegger and Marc Augé’s who share parallel ideas concerning the absence of meaning, disorientation, loss of authenticity, and the impact of modernity on human experience. Both perspectives invite us to reflect on our existence, our spaces, and the deeper connections we seek in a rapidly changing world.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S METAPHYSICAL QUESTION OF 1929-1930: GENESIS AND CONSEQUENCES

The article examines the foundations that constitute the formulation of the metaphysical question in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. The article focuses in detail on the period of 1929-1930, which includes the report “Was ist Metaphysik?” and the lecture course “Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt–Endlichkeit–Einsamkeit”. The introduction to the article and the main problem are three prejudices from Being and Time that make it impossible to ask a clear question about being. The main material is presented on the basis of primary sources: “Being and Time”, “Basic Concepts of Metaphysics”. The peculiarity of Heidegger’s work of the 1929s and 1930s is the approximation of the research methodology in the 1927 treatise to the present. Phenomenological hermeneutics and fundamental ontology were used in relation to the ancient Greeks to develop a metaphysics of ciphers or special words in which Heidegger concentrated the Greek experience of being. During the 1930s, Heidegger would make an effort to realize this experience by looking for points of intersection between Greeks and Germans in German idealism and poetry. Since the Greeks are ruled by aeon (temporal time) and agon (the spirit of competition), modern metaphysics needs to develop a special concept of being that would distinguish who Germans are, where they came from, and where they are going. The article proposes a distinction between higher being - divine, human life-world – social, human essence – cultural, working, shepherd. Being, being and man are subject to metaphysical questioning as the most general concepts. That is, those that immediately or a priori express a certain clarity. Nihilism, as the spirit of the time, demands that metanarratives be questioned and self-evidence be reassessed. An outstanding achievement of Heidegger’s metaphysical question is the distinction being as Seyn. The nationalist or folk Old German definition of being both frees it from academic requirements and accurately captures the open horizon in which the existence of the first half of the 20th century was frozen. Since this essence of man is presented after the linguistic turn, it lacks the main feature of the turn-a specific linguistic ability or words that clarify being. The article aims to study Martin Heidegger’s metaphysical teaching in the 1929-1930s. The article concludes that the metaphysics of the above-mentioned years of Heidegger’s philosophy reveals itself in parallel with the spirit of the time of the then German conservative revolution. As we know, Martin Heidegger did not remove the question of being and selected names for it, because he was looking for an appropriated lawn and a boundary, beyond which the exit to the lawn opens. This article offers a look at this problematic in the contextual name of metaphysic – Seyn.

Aesthetic Transcendence: Fashion's Evolution, Philosophical Reflections, and Societal Impact

This research paper explores the evolution of fashion from its utilitarian origins over 170,000 years ago to its contemporary role as a symbol of cultural expression and individual identity. Tracing the historical trajectory through ancient civilizations, the Renaissance era, and significant societal shifts post-World War II, the study highlights the dynamic interplay between culture, external forces, and fashion. It also delves into the commodification of beauty in the contemporary era, examining the persuasive techniques used by beauty brands in advertisements, such as leveraging emotional states to connect deeply with consumers. The global impact of beauty standards and the perpetuation of white-centric ideals are scrutinized, emphasizing influential figures like Marcus Garvey, who challenged these norms. The study sheds light on the beauty industry's promotion of skin-lightening and hair-straightening products, particularly in Asian markets, and offers philosophical reflections on these beauty standards. Engaging with the works of Hume, Kant, Santayana, and Schiller, the paper dissects the subjective and objective dimensions of beauty, including Hume's emphasis on pleasure and pain, Kant's categorization of beauty, Santayana's concept of objectified pleasure, and Schiller's influence on German Idealism. It culminates with an exploration of Jean Baudrillard's "Death of the Real," examining the implications of a society immersed in creating identities detached from objective reality. This paper weaves together the historical evolution of fashion, beauty brand strategies, and philosophical reflections on beauty, offering a nuanced understanding of the complex relationship between aesthetics, identity, and societal perceptions.

The History of Reception as a Battlefield: French uses of “Spinoza” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

The French reception of Spinoza during the nineteenth and twentieth century shows that what we call the “reception” of a corpus must be understood in a quite different way than the word suggests. The receiver must be disposed to make use of the corpus, and this attitude is determined by the receiver’s position within the structure of the academic or intellectual field. Spinoza was received in France in the early nineteenth century because it played a strategical role in the debate about pantheism as an atheism. But the “Spinoza” that was inherited was a corpus of works, while a certain reading of it had been elaborated in another context for other goals, namely, that of German idealism. Reception is not merely passive: the receivers impose their own structure to what affects them. At first, “Spinoza” was a figure or a label that played a role in a battlefield. This is still true for what we may call (albeit not in an ontological sense) the “materialist” reception in the 1960s. Yet, it was not doomed to give a purely imaginative knowledge of “Spinoza”: a better knowledge of the corpus, international exchanges between scholars of all over the world, and history of reception itself, made a rational knowledge of Spinozism, and even a singular understanding of Spinoza, possible.