Georgian Government Research Articles

Russian Investments in Georgia’s Electricity Sector: How Georgia’s Institutional Framework Encouraged High Levels of Russian Investment

To many observers, the relationship between Georgia and the Russian Federation is one that has long been fraught with tension, mistrust and lack of common ground. Following the brief war in August 2008 between the two countries over the break-away region of South Ossetia and the ensuing political and military dance to seek the support of the international community, this is a logical conclusion. Yet, behind the scenes, economic partnerships are flourishing, particularly regarding Russian investment in Georgia’s assets. With the 2009 Memorandum of Exploitation between the Georgian government and Russia’s parastatal Inter RAO UES on the management of the Enguri hydropower plant, Georgia’s largest electricity generating facility, Russia has become a lead investor in all aspects of Georgia’s electricity chain, from generation to distribution. How this investment — seemingly incongruous with the larger political picture — occurred and whether Georgia could and should have done anything to prevent this will be the subject of this paper.

Defense Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional Reform During Unresolved Conflict

The attempt of the Georgian government to reform and restructure its military forces in the past ten years demonstrates the difficulty of conducting Western-style defense reform in postconflict states, which have not seen a formal end to armed conflict. Western-style reforms were intended to bring Georgia greater peace, stability, and accountability, with the added benefit of training additional soldiers to support regional peacekeeping operations. Domestic political imperatives within Georgia, however, demanded that the government restore the territorial integrity of the state by “reintegrating” South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara. In this context, additional organizational and doctrinal interoperability of Georgian forces was desirable, but only to the extent that it enabled Georgian forces to meet these primary domestic political requirements. For Georgia, a country with a weak military tradition and unresolved domestic conflicts causing political controversy at home, military reform was not just an abstract step toward democracy but a potential means to an end of resolving those same conflicts by force or threat of force.

Still Staging Democracy

Abstract: Georgia's August War with Russia prompted a new wave of political mobilization against the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili after a previous effort faltered in 2007-2008. Despite its renewed vigor, the postwar opposition failed for at least three reasons: 1) increased levels of political discontent did not translate to broad public support for the president's resignation; 2) the opposition remained divided with regard to its methods and aims; and 3) the government successfully represented itself as an alternative engine of democratization. Georgian politics ought to now be replaced by the implementation of desirable constitutional, electoral, and media reform. Keywords: August War, Georgia, Rose Revolution, state-led reform, street protest ********** Waging war, especially a disastrous one, can have dire consequences for ailing regimes. Georgia's August 2008 war with Russia came after a year of political discontent, especially in the capital city of Tbilisi; a slowing economy; and a rising disenchantment with the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili, whose ascent to power following the 2003 Rose Revolution was a hopeful sign of democratic breakthrough in the troubled Black Sea-Caspian region. Although the political opposition to Saakashvili failed to oust the government before the war, it regrouped afterwards, pursuing the president's resignation--a step it insisted was necessary for Georgia's further democratization and security. The defection of some previously high-level officials in Saakashvili's government, coupled with growing criticism of Saakashvili in the Western capitals most supportive of Georgia, encouraged the opposition to believe that its goal was both justifiable and obtainable. However, the Georgian government was not as vulnerable as many in the opposition believed. A post-Rose Revolution record of successful spending on social programs and infrastructure, the population's postwar solidarity in the face of the Russian threat, and foreign aid packages that included substantial budgetary support all provided the Saakashvili administration with a considerable cushion. More generally, the opposition simply underestimated the difficulty of translating social discontent into regime change. A disillusioned (or at least disconcerted) public still failed to view the war as the kind of unforgivable transgression the opposition made it out to be, so there was no sustained collective protest. The opposition's internal divisions also made it more difficult to compete with the state for support. Although the defections from the government may have been significant, there were only a few. By comparison, the opposition remained openly divided, with its leaders joining forces tactically but with no real consensus regarding the ends and means of protest, and often charting a course of action based on personal animosities toward Saakashvili or their personal political fortunes, rather than working to achieve political reforms. At the same time, the government dampened a new bout of revolutionary fervor by successfully establishing itself as part of the solution to the problems that the opposition diagnosed, rather than (as is usually the case in such circumstances) reinforcing the opposition's message through obstinacy and brute force. Government officials, from the president down, consistently acknowledged the system's democratic deficiencies and expressed a willingness to engage in a common effort to remedy them. Rather than retreat into authoritarianism, as might have been expected after a traumatic war, the government hewed to a process of political engagement that maintained its credentials as a democratizing, if not fully democratic, regime. That said, the government also demonstrated a facility for more customary methods of state control. Although the government initiated reform of Georgia's constitutional separation of powers, electoral code, and official and private local broadcast media, the government failed to move as quickly to reform the judiciary and the Interior Ministry--the key foundations of state power--or the ostensibly private nationwide broadcast television stations, which have the power to influence social attitudes particularly outside Tbilisi. …

The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze

The Abkhazian and South Ossetian perspectives on the fighting between Georgians and South Ossetians in August 2008 could not be heard above the noise generated around the geopolitical implications of the larger Russian–Georgian clash. The population of Abkhazia experienced the violence in South Ossetia as though it was occurring on their own territory. This confirmed their complete lack of trust in the Georgian government's commitment to peaceful resolution of the conflicts. In addition, they were disappointed with what they regarded as the international community's absence of criticism of Georgia's actions and lack of concern for the safety and well-being of the South Ossetians. Russia's recognition of South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence has taken the question of Georgia's territorial integrity off the negotiation table indefinitely. It also has set back the formal peace process with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. An essential way forward, toward establishing trust as a necessary foundation for progress in the political negotiations, would be for the US and other interested countries to engage with the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at all levels, demonstrating credible and consistent concern for the safety and well being of all the people affected by the conflict.

Compromising democracy: state building in Saakashvili's Georgia

This article argues that the since the Rose Revolution, the Georgian government led by President Mikheil Saakashvili has created a false dichotomy between democracy and state building. They have prioritized the latter. Initially, in areas such as reducing bureaucracy, combating petty corruption, improving tax collection, service delivery and infrastructure, the government succeeded in rebuilding the Georgian state. However, because issues of democracy were ignored, efforts to strengthen the Georgian state were not as successful as they might have been. Moreover, the absence of sufficient democracy has contributed to poor decision making, most notably in the run-up to the August war, which ultimately has undermined the major state building accomplishments in Georgia since 2004. Accordingly, any efforts to repair the damage from that war and rebuild the state will be unsuccessful unless they incorporate meaningful democratic reforms.

Obstacles to Building a Civic Nation: Georgia's Armenian Minority and Conflicting Threat Perceptions

This article examines the function of conflicting threat perceptions as obstacles to the development of a civic national identity in Georgia. The analysis focuses on threats perceived on the internal and external political arenas, as defined by Georgian government officials and members of the Armenian minority settled in the Javakheti region. It is discerned that the government's policies for national integration are seen as threats in the form of discrimination and assimilation by minority representatives, while incompatible understandings of Russia's role in Georgian politics provide for indirect questioning of the minority's loyalty to the state. It is concluded that conflicting threat perceptions provide a serious impediment to Georgia's ability to build a civic nation.

The Georgian Conflict, Racial Discrimination and the ICJ: The Order on Provisional Measures of 15 October 2008

Until recently, it was rare for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to decide cases based in international human rights law, particularly in its contentious jurisdiction. 1 Yet, the ongoing Case concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination between Georgia and Russia has brought to the Court a dispute relating only, due to the limits of the Court's jurisdiction, to a specialised human rights treaty. Georgia brought the case during the recent armed conflict between it and the Russian Federation, after Russian forces had on 8 August 2008 entered Georgian territory. Russia had ostensibly acted to support the Georgian breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, following armed action against the former by the Georgian government. But the roots of the conflict are much deeper. 2 In the case now before the Court, Georgia complains not only of events in the...

The cybersecurity challenge

The cybersecurity challenge

Investment Climate in Georgia and Attracting Foreign Direct Investment

This paper focuses on the levels of foreign direct investments coming to Georgia. The main areas addressed by this study include: how to create a favorable investment climate in Georgia and on the possible means of encouragement of FDI inflows in the Georgian economy. This paper aims to fill the knowledge gap in the area of foreign direct investment (FDI) research in Georgia. Various dimensions of FDI were analyzed from a comparative perspective drawing on the case studies of investors in Georgia. The analysis first focused on major obstacles that investors face while performing. Then, attractive features of business climate of Georgia were investigated. Finally, performance issues confronting FDI firms were analyzed. The study results indicated that reasons to invest in Georgia are geopolitical situation and having empty market, and incentives to improve the investment climate of Georgia were State guaranties, tax holidays, political stability, development of infrastructure and advertisement. Another result of the study was that Georgian Government does everything to have free market conditions and do not intervene to the economy. Although the issue of safety affects foreign investors, it does not act as a major deterrent of FDI inflows. The most serious problem influencing the performance of FDI firms were found to be not enough skilled and educated local labor force, economic and political uncertainty. In general, however, it was found that foreign investors have been satisfied with their performance largely due to the relatively smooth competition and the availability of several market niches in country market.

Georgia’s Cyber Left Hook

the very near future, many conflicts will not take place on the open field of battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with the aid of information soldiers.... This means that a small force of hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of the current armed forces. --Former Duma member Nikolai Kuryanovich (1) On 19 July 2008 an Internet security firm reported a distributed denial of service (DDoS) cyber attack against Web sites in the country of Georgia. (2) Three weeks later, on 8 August, security experts observed a second, more substantial round of DDoS attacks against Georgian Web sites. Analysts noted that these additional DDoS attacks appeared to coincide with the movement of Russian troops into South Ossetia in response to Georgian military operations launched a day earlier in the region. By 10 August the DDoS attacks had rendered most Georgian governmental Web sites inoperative. (3) As a result of these attacks, the Georgian government found itself cyber-locked, barely able to communicate on the Internet. In response, the government took the unorthodox step of seeking cyber refuge in the United States. Without first obtaining US government approval, Georgia relocated critical official Internet assets to the United States, Estonia, and Poland. (4) Georgian-Russian hostilities in South Ossetia have generated a substantial amount of analysis and speculation regarding the accompanying cyber conflict. (5) Most of the focus has centered on identifying the parties who conducted the cyber attacks. The Georgian cyber event provides an intriguing opportunity to examine a more subtle and perhaps overlooked aspect of cyber conflict--the concept of cyber neutrality. The Georgian case raises two fundamental questions: (1) How did the combined actions of the Georgian government and US information technology (IT) companies impact American status as a cyber neutral? (2) Can the United States remain neutral (or cyber neutral) during a cyber conflict? The underlying implications of the overall issue should be of great concern to US policymakers and strategists. Even if the United States is not a belligerent in a cyber conflict, incursions against the US Internet infrastructure are likely. Private industry owns and operates the majority of the Internet system. During a cyber conflict, the unregulated actions of third-party actors have the potential of unintentionally impacting US cyber policy, including cyber neutrality. There is little, if any, modern legal precedent. The fact that American IT companies provided assistance to Georgia, a cyber belligerent, apparently without the knowledge or approval of the US government, illustrates what is likely to become a significant policy issue. Although nations still bear ultimate responsibility for the acts of their citizens, applying that dictum to the modern realities of cyber conflict is a complex challenge. Georgia's unconventional response to the August 2008 DDoS attacks, supported by US private industry, adds a new element of complication for cyber strategists. Cyber Neutrality: A Basic Rubric In the United States, the executive branch can choose to follow a neutrality policy as a matter of its constitutional authority regarding foreign relations. In 1908, Woodrow Wilson, then president of Princeton University, posited, One of the greatest of the President's powers I have not yet spoken of at all: his control, which is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation. (6) At the beginning of World War I, President Wilson declared the United States a neutral nation, yet American banks provided loans to Britain and France, and American industry sold armaments to those nations. The German government eventually responded by waging submarine warfare and maritime commerce raiding against the United States. Wilson's neutrality stance was more rhetorical than real, in that he did not exercise executive authority to halt US loans and arms shipments to belligerents. …

Georgia and NATO

Georgia's progress towards membership of NATO hangs in the balance as the Alliance's April 2008 Bucharest summit approaches. Divisions between members on whether to grant a Membership Action Plan widened after the Georgian government violently dispersed a rally in November and temporarily imposed a state of emergency. Although President Mikhail Saakashvili then called and won early elections, Georgia's domestic instability and unresolved internal conflicts could mean that NATO will make it wait.

The Threat of the Thief: Who Has Normative Influence in Georgian Society?

This piece gives an account of the Georgian government's recent attempts to crackdown on the institution of thieves-in-law [vory-v-zakone] within Georgian society. The events surrounding the problematisation of the thieves-in-law are examined and different answers are offered to the underlying question of the article: what threat does this subversive group pose to the government? It is argued that the vory do not represent a potential criminal revolution but are victims of a resurgent state producing a politics of law that seeks to stamp out subverting influences within society. The thieves' world represents an alternative moral order which is attractive in a country which suffers from acute alienated statehood. Thus the fight against the vory should be understood as a battle to win back the hearts of the Georgian people for the state and for the law.

Hotbilder och nationell samhörighet i Georgien

”Threat Perceptions and National Community in Georgia” addresses perceived threats as obstacles to the development of national community in the country. The article focuses on the interaction between threatening perceptions of the other on the internal and external political arenas, as these are formulated by Georgian government officials and members of the Armenian minority settled in the Javakheti region respectively. The material partly consists of previous research in this field, but primarily of interviews conducted during a field study in Georgia during May and June 2005. The article elaborates on how problems in government-minority relations are reinforced due to differing threat perceptions, which adds to the difficulties of constructively managing Georgian interethnic relations. The problematic nature of this relationship becomes all the more obvious when put into relation with threat perceptions on the external arena, specifically the parties quite different views on Russia’s role in Georgian politics. It is concluded that differing threat perceptions is a pressing issue in today’s Georgia, since these provide obstacles to societal inclusion of minorities and hamper the development of a national community crucial to a civic conception of the nation.

National haemophilia programme development in the Republic of Georgia

After the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991, haemophilia care in the Republic of Georgia was negatively affected because of the expense of treatment products, lack of clinical and diagnostic facilities, and the need for trained personnel throughout the country. In 2001, the Georgian Government, working through the Ministry of Health, in collaboration with Georgian Association of Haemophilia and Donors, the Institute of Haematology and Transfusion, and the World Federation of Haemophilia, initiated a National Haemophilia Programme. As part of this programme the first Georgian Haemophilia Treatment Centre (HTC) was established. In this paper, we will describe (i) our outreach efforts to identify patients with haemophilia (PWH), (ii) the diagnostic and clinical services provided to patients by the HTC, and (iii) the results of a patient survey designed to assess patient satisfaction with the care provided. Total of 216 PWH were diagnosed, mean age was 25 years (range 4 months to 75 years); 43% had severe, 33% had moderate and 24% had mild haemophilia A or B. Overall, 183 (85%) had haemophilia A and 33 (15%) had haemophilia B, giving a ratio of 5.6. During the 2-year period, 77% of the expected number of PWH was identified by our outreach programme. Vast majority had comprehensive evaluation including joint assessment and over 60% were tested for blood-borne infections within a year and half period. Our findings showed that haemophilia care was considerably improved since the beginning of the National Haemophilia Programme and the survey of PWH showed a high degree of satisfaction with services provided in the HTC. In conclusion, close collaboration of the government, non-government entities and medical professionals in a Georgian national haemophilia care model; resulted in the successful delivery of the much needed services and care to the people living in Georgia with haemophilia.

Ahiska (Meskhetian) Turks: Source of Conflict in the Caucasus?

This article discusses the rehabilitation of the Ahiska (Meskhetian) Turks to their home villages in southern Georgia from where they were deported by Stalin in 1944 to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The strategic importance of Meskheti-Javakheti is explored considering the 'rehabilitation demands' of the Ahiska (Meskhetian) Turks together with regional as well as international dynamics. Within that context, international obligations of Georgia are emphasised with a special focus on the formal and informal practices of the Georgian government and the position of the countries having interest in this region. The Ahiska (Meskhetian) Turk issue has gained a transnational character, and the role of states and international institutions in creating and shaping ethnic identities has significantly increased.

Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective

The granting of autonomous status to minority populations has gained support among academics and practitioners alike as a way to solve, manage, and even preempt ethnic conflict. In spite of the enthusiasm for ethnofederalism, however, the provision of autonomy to minorities may actually increase rather than decrease the likelihood of conflict. Under certain political conditions, autonomy promotes the separate identity of the minority and increases its motivation and capacity to seek separation from the central state. This article presents a rudimentary theoretical framework identifying which qualities of autonomy solutions increase the likelihood of conflict. It discusses how autonomy relates to other factors conducive to conflict by studying minorities in the South Caucasus and examines the case of Georgia. In Georgia, there were five ethnic minority populations, two of whom—the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians—enjoyed autonomous status and were the only minorities to engage in armed conflict with the Georgian government. This article shows how autonomy, by empowering ethnic elites with control of statelike institutions and by enhancing factors such as leadership, economic viability, and external support, played a crucial role in the escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Conversely, the absence of autonomy mitigated separatist and secessionist sentiments among two of Georgia's other minority groups—Javakheti's Armenian and Kvemo Kartli's Azeri populations.

Turkey and Russia: Axis of the excluded?

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The background interviews for this article were conducted by the authors in Ankara, Istanbul, Moscow, Tbilisi and Washington DC with a range of Turkish, Russian, Georgian and American senior government officials, policy analysts, businessmen, journalists and embassy representatives, between July and October 2005. 2. In March 2005, appearing on US television talk shows, Rumsfeld stated that he wished US troops had not been ‘blocked’ from entering Iraq through Turkey, and asserted that this had enabled the post-war insurgency in Iraq to flourish. ‘Given the level of the insurgency today, two years later, clearly if we had been able to get the 4th Infantry Division in from the north, in through Turkey, more of the Iraqi, Saddam Hussein, Baathist regime would have been captured or killed. The insurgency today would be less’, he said, adding that the resulting thrust of the US invasion through southern Iraq had enabled many insurgents to evade capture in the north. See Agence France-Presse, 21 March 2005, at http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=39081; see also CNN's coverage of Rumsfeld's statements at http:// www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/03/20/iraq.anniversary/. 3. The January 2005 BBC World Service Poll, which was conducted in 21 countries, indicated that a record 82% of Turks perceived President Bush's policies as negative for global peace and regional security in the Middle East. See Karl Vick, ‘In Many Turks’ Eyes, U.S. Remains the Enemy’, Washington Post, 10 April 2005, p. A21. According to the German Marshall Fund's (GMF) ‘Transatlantic Trends Survey’ of September 2005, a slightly lower 77% of Turks found the US administration's global leadership to be ‘undesirable’. See the GMF report at http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/TTKeyFindings2005.pdf. 4. Orkun Uçar and Burak Turna, Metal Firtina [Metal Storm] (Istanbul: TimasYayinevi, 2004). 5. In 2005, the Turkish Minister of State for Foreign Trade, Kursat Tuzmen, projected that the trade volume between Russia and Turkey would continue to grow during 2006 and 2007, reaching a projected goal of $25bn in line with the Turkish government's ‘Eurasia Action Plan’. See http://cnnturk.com/HABER/haber_detay.asp?PID=318&HID=5&haberID=56090. 6. See ‘An Historic Turkish–Russian Exchange’, Turkey Now (website of the Turkish–US Business Council), January 2005, at http://www.turkey-now.org/default.aspx?pgID=111. 7. Author interviews with Turkish embassy and Foreign Ministry officials in Washington DC and Ankara, October 2005. 8. Author interviews in Turkey in August, September and October 2005, with a broad range of politicians, government officials, analysts and journalists. For an outspoken and articulate presentation of this view by a leading Turkish commentator, see Hasan Unal, ‘Turkey Would Be Better Off Outside the EU’, Financial Times, 17 December 2004. In 2002, one of Turkey's most prominent generals, Major-General Tuncer Kilinç, the secretary of the National Security Council, was one of the first to suggest in a public presentation that Turkey should perhaps abandon its efforts to secure EU membership and seek out alternative alliances with other neighbours such as Russia or Iran. See Owen Matthews, ‘Europe's Orphan: A Showdown is Brewing Between Turkey and the EU’, Newsweek International, 22 April 2002. 9. It is worth noting, however, that in the GMF's ‘Transatlantic Trends Survey’ of 2005, Russia and the United States now enjoy the same level of popularity in Turkey, and that China's image in Turkey is as positive as the European Union's. 10. ‘Turetskii gambit’, directed by Dzhanik Faiziyev, based on a novel and screenplay by the Russian author, Boris Akunin, released in 2005. 11. Burak Turna, Üçüncü Dünya Savasi [The Third World War] (Istanbul: TimasYayinevi, 2005). 12. Presentation by the Georgian foreign minister at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, Thursday, 3 June 2004; also author interviews with Turkish embassy and Foreign Ministry officials in Washington, DC and Ankara in October 2005. 13. Presentation at TEPAV-EPRI roundtable discussion on ‘Latest Developments in the Caucasus and Russia: A Strategic Perspective for Turkey’, at TOBB-ETU University, Ankara, 12 October 2005. 14. Author interview with senior BSEC representative in Washington DC, 8 July 2005. 15. Author interview with Turkish Foreign Ministry official, Ankara, Turkey, 11 October 2005. 16. Author interviews with senior US Embassy staff in Ankara, February 2005, and senior State Department officials in Washington DC. Additional informationNotes on contributorsFiona HillFiona Hill is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, former Director of Strategic Planning at the Eurasia Foundation, and author of Energy Empire: Oil, Gas, and Russia's Revival.Omer TaspinarOmer Taspinar is the Director of Brookings' Turkey Program, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a columnist for the Turkish Daily Radikal and author of Political Islam and Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey.

The Urartian Cemetery at Igdyr

In 1943 the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian S.S.R. published at Tiflis, as Part XIII.B of the Bulletin of the Georgian Government Museums, a book of 171 pages by the late B. A. Kuftin (1892–1953), entitled Urartskii “kolymbarii” u podoshvy Ararata i Kuro-Arakskii Éneolit [An Urartian “Columbarium” on the slopes of Ararat and the Copper Age of the Kur-Araxes basin]. The terminus technicus “columbarium” (Latin = a pigeon-cot) is translated in German as “Urnenhalle”. More appropriate here would be to call it an “Urn-field” but “columbarium” is retained here as having no adequate English translation. In the original the Russian text is followed by a version in Georgian and a very brief English summary. This book in fact contains two essays, the first dealing with the “columbarium”, the second with the Copper Age remains under the lava to the south of the “columbarium”, and called the “Clay Citadel”. We are here only concerned with the first.