Genuine Philosopher Research Articles

Socrates’s Laconic Wisdom

Plato’s Protagoras is famous for Protagoras’s defense of the public practice of sophistry and his great myth, which contains his account of the origins of political life, as well as for Hippias’s rejection of the tyranny of nomos in the name of the natural kinship of the wise. What is perplexing is that Socrates makes no explicit response to these arguments. This essay argues that Socrates’s indirect response is actually contained in his otherwise unmotivated interpretation of the poem of Simonides, where his description of “laconic philosophy” is in fact an indirect description of his own philosophical practice. While the sophists reject nomos without recognizing their own dependence on its stabilizing force, Socrates argues that genuine philosophers, recognizing at once the necessity as well as the defectiveness of nomos, must “unwillingly praise” convention and only present their criticisms indirectly. Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides, then, points the way to his own understanding of the tension between, but also the interdependence of, nomos and physis.

К вопросу об истине в научном и обыденном познании

The phenomenon of truth is an eternal philosophical problem. Aristotle also claimed in Metaphysics that “philosophy is called the knowledge of truth”, and Plato considered it the object of the desires of genuine philosophers. For episte­mology, truth is the foundation of human existence in all its manifestations, in­cluding everyday life. Truth is the goal and the highest value for philosophy and science. There are different concepts of truth. Correspondent and coherent theo­ries of truth are more widespread than others, the problem of truth in everyday cognition has not been fully developed, the relevance of which is related to the search for “reliable ways to orient a person in the world of pseudo-realities and flows of disinformation” (V.A. Lectorsky), with the search for the founda­tions of everyday life, order in the chaos of information and events, as well as with the search for the meaning of life. The very recognition of the truth and the desire to know it affect the character, interests, position of people, form the inner world of a person. The most fundamental and little-explored character­istics of the truth of everyday cognition are revealed on the basis of comparison of understanding truth in scientific and everyday cognition. The prerequisites of the classical (correspondent) and coherent concepts of truth containing the im­plicit idea of their synthesis are clarified. The features of understanding absolute and relative truth in everyday cognition and the criteria for the reliability of ev­eryday cognition are explicated. It is concluded that the truth of everyday cogni­tion is an empirically proven knowledge of the real state of affairs in the human life world, based on the available experience, the experience of communication, as well as the socio-cultural translation of the experience of generations.

Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy

Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy

PLATO'S PHAEDO: ARE THE PHILOSOPHERS’ PLEASURES OF LEARNING PURE PLEASURES?

Though Plato's Phaedo does not focus on pleasure, some considerable talk on pleasure takes place in it. Socrates argues for the soul's immortality and, while doing so, hopes to highlight to his companions how important it is to take care of our soul by focussing on the intellect and by neglecting the bodily realm as far as is possible in this life. Doing philosophy, so his argument goes, is something like dying, if we grant that death is the separation of the soul from the body and notice that genuine philosophers wish nothing else than to be detached from the bodily realm. For indulging into bodily pleasures has detrimental consequences on the soul, impeding the search of truth and distorting reality, and so philosophers should undertake to purify themselves from all bodily concerns and gratifications and love the objects of learning and knowledge without deviation and distraction. On the contrary, ordinary people fall for the bodily realm as the only real domain that should therefore be of priority and of their earnest concern.

Nihilism and the ascetic ideal: on the value of asceticism in Nietzschean genealogy

I investigate in this article the connection of nihilism with the ascetic ideal in the third essay of the Genealogy of Morals . In this essay, Nietzsche contrasts the genuine Philosopher with the ascetic priest, in order to open space for his affirmative philosophical-artistic intentions. While the ascetic priest radicalizes moral nihilism, the authentic Philosopher develops ascetic forms of life to provide the conditions for his creative work. I ask, finally, whether the “Philosopher” is able to overcome the nihilistic crisis of values and the physiological deca- dence of man. Keywords : nihilism, ascetic ideal, value, Philosopher.

A Wolf in the City: Tyranny and the Tyrant in Plato's Republic by Cinzia Arruzza

Reviewed by: A Wolf in the City: Tyranny and the Tyrant in Plato's Republic by Cinzia Arruzza Kevin M. Cherry ARRUZZA, Cinzia. A Wolf in the City: Tyranny and the Tyrant in Plato's Republic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. 296 pp. Cloth, $74.00; ebook, $72.99 In this clearly argued work, Cinzia Arruzza focuses on the presentation of the tyrant—the titular wolf—in Plato's Republic. [End Page 132] Maintaining that tyranny is, if not "the heart of the dialogue," then at least "one of its main threads," she traces its influence from the opening argument with Thrasymachus to the concluding Myth of Er. Arruzza's approach to the dialogue is thus a holistic one. She takes seriously both its literary and philosophical dimensions as well as its political and ethical arguments, highlighting "the reciprocal interaction between moral corruption of the individual and political and moral sickness of the city." In the first part of the book, Arruzza provides valuable context for readers of the Republic, exploring the political and philosophical context in which Plato wrote and the dramatic personae and setting of the dialogue. She argues that Plato does not intend his description of tyranny to match a particular historical tyrant. To be sure, the tyrant reflects the political context of Athens during and after the Peloponnesian War, with some specific traits that clearly recall Alcibiades. Plato's intention, however, is to adopt a wide range of literary and philosophical tropes critical of tyranny, appropriating "the democratic critique of tyranny and turn[ing] it into a weapon against democratic principles" by showing how tyranny arises, perhaps naturally, from democracy. There are two reasons for this connection. The first of these is institutional: Although the demos possesses political power, it is simply unable to use that power well, leaving it susceptible to "the political charisma of ruthless and self-interested politicians." More important, though, is the way that "tyrannical natures are literally created" by democracy insofar as that regime emphasizes freedom, understood as "the indiscriminate satisfaction of all their desires." The latter, ethical problem of democracy leads to the second part of the book, which is likely to be of greater interest to specialists. Arruzza develops Plato's account of the way in which the soul of the tyrant is deformed, concluding that the tyrant is "a man with a philosophical nature gone astray." Although persuasive, this conclusion is not, as she acknowledges, wholly original. More original, though, is her account of what the deformed rational and spirited parts of the tyrannical soul are like. Without the guidance of reason and "inflamed" by lawless desires, the spirited part of his soul behaves savagely in the pursuit of "absolute power" in order to satisfy those desires. Despite its savagery, the tyrannical soul is also fearful because of the constant need for its calculating part to assess threats to the tyrant's position. The tyrannical soul is therefore incapable of satisfaction: Not only does "spatio-temporal existence" limit the tyrant's ability to pursue all pleasures at once, but "prudential considerations—primarily, concerns for self-preservation and for the preservation of his power" will also frustrate some of the appetites he has. The result of the domination of the appetitive part of the soul over the spirited and rational parts is not the desired freedom but rather slavery for both the tyrant and those whom he rules. It is only in the conclusion that Arruzza alludes to the contemporary interest in tyranny, suggesting that Plato offers a "faithful psychological portrait of a number of contemporary tyrants." She denies that Plato can [End Page 133] ever be reconciled with democracy, although she is more open to the possibility of reconciling him with liberalism insofar as Plato's dialogues value "diversity, openness, freedom, and common inquiry." Her Plato is thus "anti-democratic" without being "proto-totalitarian." Although most philosophic natures will, in democratic times, be corrupted, Arruzza insists that a genuine philosopher must be ready and willing to take control "whenever the appropriate circumstances allow it." Left unsaid is what such a philosopher would do once in power in order to bring about the "radical political transformation" she envisions...

Per una vita che sia vita: studi su Carlo Michelstaedter by Ilvano Caliaro

 Reviews is is a very interesting book not only for scholars of d’Annunzio and Pascoli, but for anyone interested in fin-de-siècle Italian culture and in the ways in which philosophical debates impact on artists’ aesthetics. U  Z S B Per una vita che sia vita: studi su Carlo Michelstaedter. By I C. Florence: Olschki. . vii+ pp. €. ISBN ––––. [e following review was inadvertently printed in an uncorrected state in the April issue of this volume, and is here repeated with the required alterations in place.] e starting point for this book is the idea that Carlo Michelstaedter (Gorizia, –) represents at the same time a solitary voice, speaking ‘a se stesso e per se stesso’ (p. ), and an original synthesis of many voices coming from the past, some very ancient and some more recent. ese voices resonate in La persuasione e la rettorica, but also in a vast mass of diverse materials which the premature and tragic death of the author le in various stages of incompleteness. Among these voices, Ilvano Caliaro identifies in particular those of Socrates, Jesus, Petrarch, and Tolstoy as being more salient in the composite polyphony of Michelstaedter’s thought. Within the cohort of the philosophers, a privileged place is reserved for Socrates, whose teaching is fundamentally a reawakening of the consciousness, aimed at achieving not only a new capacity to understand, but also a transformation of the way of living itself. It is the role of the (true) philosopher to lead the interlocutor to become aware of himself, to generate his own wisdom, and to identify the individual value on which a life worth living may be built. is is the meaning of ‘persuasion’ for Michelstaedter: that is, the state of someone who, first of all, refuses to create or accept for reality a meaning that it does not have, and then—guided by reason— pursues the absolute good, namely justice. ‘Man is, as opposed to merely existing, when he is “just”’ (p. ). e genuine philosopher is in unavoidable antithesis to the ‘professional’ philosophers (best represented by Aristotle), the ‘builders of systems’ or encyclopedias who, by pursuing a false and mercenary semblance of wisdom, create a model of a man who does not ask why, does not reason, but obeys, and avoids the challenge of truth. Tolstoy represents for Michelstaedter, at the same time, the ultimate proof that there should be no difference between art, life, and thought, and the example of someone who slowly and painfully manages to free himself from all social, ideological , and emotional constraints to reach a state of personal freedom, coinciding with universal love for the whole of humanity. For Tolstoy what made this transformation possible was the encounter with Jesus, not a figure of transcendence but a ‘maestro di vita’, an educator on the path from ‘rettorica’ to ‘persuasione’. Similarly profound is the impact of Jesus on Michelstaedter, probably mediated via the reading of Tolstoy (in particular What I Believe); the message that he extracts from Christ’s teaching, and even more from his life, is uncompromising: only those who are prepared to lose their (inauthentic) life will find their (true) life. MLR, .,   Petrarch is, for the Goritian, above all the author of the Triumphi, and primarily a philosopher, whose fundamental preoccupation is to locate the ubi consistam: the stable place where authentic ‘persuasion’ can be achieved. e difference between Petrarch and Michelstaedter (according to Caliaro) is that, for the former, stability can be projected only in the dimension of religious transcendence, whereas for the latter it is only in the complete possession of the present that absolute value can be found. e fih and final chapter of the work is devoted to a thematic comparison between Michelstaedter and the Triestine writer Scipio Slataper (–). It is not known whether the two knew each other, although both attended, in partially coinciding years, the Istituto di Studi Superiori in Florence, and the latter reviewed the first volume of Michelstaedter’s writings when it was published in . One point of contact between the two is, once more, the interpretation of Christianism and, in particular, of the figure of Jesus and his teaching, seen as attributing value to...

Nietzsche on creating and discovering values

ABSTRACTThis article considers Friedrich Nietzsche’s claims about value creation alongside his proclamation that ‘nature is always value-less’ (GS 301), assessing their implications for his metaethics. It begins by weighing the evidence for a recent constructivist interpretation of Nietzsche’s metaethics, arguing that despite several apparent interpretive advantages, Nietzschean constructivism ultimately fails. Through a close reading of GS 301 and related passages, the constructivist interpretation is shown to be misguided in taking Nietzsche’s talk of value creation as expressing (or playing a significant role in) a metaethical view according to which the evaluative attitudes of philosophers ground what is valuable. Against this, it is argued that GS 301 should be understood as an assertion of the status of philosophers as the causal sources of new evaluative outlooks that shape the held values of their respective cultures, a claim developed through analysis of passages in which Nietzsche discusses his ideal of the ‘genuine philosopher’ and contrasts this figure with ‘critics’ or ‘philosophical laborers’ (BGE 210–211). It is next argued that, insofar as it is best understood as describing a social or anthropological phenomenon rather than a metaphysical one, GS 301 is a poor piece of evidence not only for the constructivist interpretation, but in fact for any account of Nietzsche’s metaethical position—including radical anti-realist interpretations informed by his statement that ‘nature is always value-less’. The paper then concludes by appealing to another passage, GS 55, which hints towards a very different—and plausibly realist—picture of Nietzsche’s metaethics

Nietzsche and The Birth of Tragedy

<i>Nietzsche and</i> The Birth of Tragedy

"Ultimate Skepsis": Nietzsche on Truth as a Regime of Interpretation

PresentationThis article is the first English translation of French scholar Patrick Wotling’s extensive research on Nietzsche. In order to understand Nietzsche’s work, Patrick Wotling follows closely Nietzsche’s well-known injunction to his readers: “learn to read me well!” Hence, he seeks to do a close reading of Nietzsche’s texts, which often resemble a seemingly random juxtaposition of ideas, looking for signs that allow the reader to follow Nietzsche’s thought and weave together a correct interpretation. In so doing it is imperative to reject any reading based on an interpretive framework that is not found in the text itself. This approach is tied to the specificity of Nietzsche’s work in that unlike philosophers before him, he does not hold the pursuit of truth to be the genuine goal of philosophy, and therefore does not write traditional systematic treatises. It is thus necessary to use this close reading approach to reveal the new patterns of thought that Nietzsche uses in place of traditional logical frameworks. Using this method, P. Wotling contends that Nietzsche’s thinking is organized along two tightly bound lines: on the one hand there is a genealogical inquiry, which consists of identifying and evaluating the value of values, and on the other hand there is a concern for the cultivation, or breeding (Züchtung) of human life, which aims at putting in place certain values with the goal of elevating humanity and creating human flourishing. The second goal implies the first, meaning that before knowing what values should be instituted, it is necessary to establish the hierarchy of values, in order to identify which ones are the most useful for the cultivation and enrichment of humanity. AbstractWhat are Nietzsche’s reasons for criticizing truth? How far does such criticism extend, and how does Nietzsche understand the consequences of his position as regards the philosophical praxis? The discovery of a radical opposition between truth and thought shows that being irrefutable cannot be assimilated to being true, and, at the same time, that truth is interpretation. On closer scrutiny, it appears to be not an essence, but a value, that is to say a type of error that has become essential for the continuation of our life, linked to a long process of physical-psychological absorption, and now productive of a deceptive feeling of necessity. As a consequence, philosophy cannot be equated with the pursuit of truth any longer: first, because, as a free spirit, the genuine philosopher is to be thought of as a lover of riddles, shaped on Epicurus’ pattern rather than on Plato’s; and more importantly, because the philosopher’s real aim is to investigate the value of all particular values (including “truth”) for the development of human life, and, in accordance, to create and impose new “truths.”

The Politics of Plato and His Objection to Democracy

AbstractAncient Greek philosopher, Plato, had not only had political desires but had also tried to engage in active politics. But after a big frustration, especially with the trial of Socrates, he turned away from politics and criticized the political phenomena of his own time under the name of democracy. In his fascinating works we find his political ideas, ambitions, adventures, approvals and disapprovals. For Plato society or an ideal state must be organized and controlled not by masses, but by persons who really know what the norms are. The troubles of mankind will never cease until either true genuine philosophers attain political power or the rulers of states by some dispensation of providence become genuine philosophers.

The Impact of the New Translation of The Second Sex: Rediscovering Beauvoir

The Impact of the New Translation of <i>The Second Sex</i>: Rediscovering Beauvoir

The Impact of the New Translation of The Second Sex: Rediscovering Beauvoir

The Impact of the New Translation of <i>The Second Sex</i>: Rediscovering Beauvoir

Truth and Lies in a Chestertonian Sense: Father Brown and the Fault of the Depraved Saint

I. IN HIS ESSAY, Everybody's Protest Novel, (1) James Baldwin argues that is held together by our need; we bind it together with legend, myth, coercion, fearing that without it we will be hurled into that void, within which, like earth before Word was spoken, foundations of society are hidden. (2) When myths and legends become cages, Baldwin continues, we can turn from them to void if we dare, and from there new can relieve us of adroit lies that saturate social life. Political order is similarly cemented by myth in Republic. Socrates declares, want one single, grand lie which will be believed by everybody--including rulers, ideally, but failing that rest of (3) The lie Socrates tells is actually a story whose logic solidifies certain men in inferior or superior positions. The people are to be told that the rearing and education we gave them were like dreams, that in fact all those who inhabit city are brothers. But brotherhood does not translate into egalitarianism. The god who made them mixed gold in some, silver in others, and iron and bronze in remainder. Thus were born castes of city. (4) Stanley Rosen remarks that for Plato founders and preservers of a order must be very seriously concerned with art in that it is effective than philosophy in persuading us to behave in a particular way. (5) Rosen argues that this is a straightforward statement of need for lying and what is today called 'brainwashing,' (6) which is Plato's conception of price to be paid for establishment of just The philosopher feels to rule entire city, with no restrictions placed upon superior knowledge and Rosen contends that those who are not tempted by this are not genuine philosophers, but neither are those who embrace desire. In Hermeneutics as Rosen studies Immanuel Kant's contingent admission that esotericism--accommodation of truth to expediency [such as] in noble lie--has civilized and moralized us while contending that there is nothing more evil than using deception, the rank growth of weeds of a decent appearance, to preserve a good thing. (7) At same time, Kant argues, it is prudent to display a veneer of certainty over proofs if this is done not out of vanity but from a desire to protect common people from politically dangerous subtleties of reason. (8) We are then put up against wall and asked to answer a question: is prudent omission or obfuscation of facts really different from lying, or is perpetration of prudence as a virtue merely another means of casting a veil over noble lies? In his examination of prudence as it plays out in Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor, Dan Sabia notes that political prudence names both a kind of virtue, or excellence, and a kind of faculty, of judgment. (9) Traditionally prudent few are contrasted with many as they possess philosophical knowledge and are keen observers of human condition, with much experience and thus considerable worldly knowledge that makes them good at fashioning and evaluating moral and principles and ends, as well as particular laws and institutions, policies and actions. (10) Prudent policies are practical enough to work yet are morally or ethically best they can be, given typically constraining, complex, and contingent circumstances in and under which decisions have to be made. (11) Good fiction can help us probe complex and contingent circumstances in order to question difference between prudence and noble lies in concrete dilemmas. In Truth and Politics, Hannah Arendt argues that the function of storyteller is to teach acceptance of things as they are, as this acceptance gives rise to faculty of (12) II. In G. …

‘Why not Lukács?’ or: on Non-Bourgeois Bourgeois Being

The Lukacs Circle in Szeged, a spontaneous, unofficial organization of young Hungarian scholars and philosophy teachers, characteristically represented Georg Lukacs' influence on young Hungarian intelligentsia in the period of late socialism. In this paper, the author recalls and critically analyses the intellectual milieu and motives that led a considerable part of young Hungarian intelligentsia of that time to make a cult of Lukacs' philosophy. The key to the analysis is the ambiguous character of the political feelings and philosophical orientation of many young people in the period of late socialism and the paradoxical ‘non-bourgeois bourgeois’ character of Lukacs' philosophy. Lukacs' young followers were dissatisfied with the political conditions of ‘real socialism’ and with official Marxism. However, they considered themselves Marxists and were convinced by the anti-capitalist, romantic idea of democratic socialism. In the eyes of his young followers, Lukacs was a genuine philosopher whose teaching was interwoven by his wide-ranging bourgeois middle-class education, promising both a real philosophical alternative to official Marxism and a high-level philosophical foundation for a non-capitalist but democratic future human history. The author argues that Lukacs' philosophy did not satisfy these expectations. In his political philosophy, the philosopher could not move away from the mythological idea concerning the leading role of the communist party and therefore could not elaborate a genuine philosophical foundation for the idea of democratic socialism. Despite the superiority of his philosophy, his methodology and approach to the history of philosophy failed to provide a real philosophical alternative to the Bolshevik tradition of Marxism.

The Socratic Pilgrimage of the Elephant's Child

The Socratic Pilgrimage of the Elephant's Child Howard R. Cell (bio) At his trial, Socrates suggests that it was the question put by his friend Chaerephon to the priestess at Delphi, "whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates," which compelled him to devote his life to philosophical inquiry (Apology 7 [21a]).1 The oracle's response, "that there was no one" (ibid.), had to be true, of course, since it would be improper for the god to lie. But what, precisely, did the god mean? "After puzzling about this for some time, Socrates reluctantly began to interview everyone who had a reputation for wisdom—politicians, poets, skilled craftspeople; and he urges the jury to think of these interviews as a sort of pilgrimage" (7-8 [21a-22a]). Even though this pilgrimage was undertaken as a matter of religious duty, "it aroused against Socrates a great deal of hostility, and hostility of a particularly bitter and persistent kind" (9 [23a]), which eventually led to his indictment and trial. After the jury had determined that he was indeed guilty and had sentenced him to death, Socrates offered the following prophecy to those who voted against him: You have brought about my death in the belief that through it you will be delivered from submitting your conduct to criticism: but I say that the result will be just the opposite. You will have more critics . . . and being younger they will be harsher to you and will cause you more annoyance. [24 (39c, d)] Now, in my view, one of Socrates' more important youthful successors is the Elephant's Child. I do not assume that Kipling had Socrates, or a Socratic pilgrimage, in mind when he wrote "The Elephant's Child." Perhaps, as Socrates claims, "it is not wisdom that enables authors to write their works, but a kind of instinct or inspiration, such as you find in seers and prophets who deliver all their sublime messages without knowing in the least what they [End Page 132] mean" (8 [22c]). But since the concept of pilgrimage is ubiquitous in human experience and in the literary tradition, it is hardly surprising that Kipling would utilize this concept at some point. What may seem surprising are the parallels between a Socratic pilgrimage and the journey of the Elephant's Child to the banks of the Limpopo River. Yet, as I shall argue, the Elephant's Child does replicate the principal features of a Socratic pilgrimage, and she even fulfills Socrates' most preposterous wish.2 One Elephant, but a New Elephant In the Republic, Socrates—with the concurrence of his interlocutor—claims that one "who is finical about his studies, especially when he is young and cannot yet know . . . what is useful and what is not, is not a lover of learning or a lover of wisdom. But the one who feels no distaste in sampling every study, and who attacks his task of learning gladly and cannot get enough of it, him we shall justly pronounce the lover of wisdom, the philosopher" (714 [475b, c]). Now, this claim provides the three essential characteristics of a genuine philosopher: openness to every sort of knowledge, enjoyment in the process of study, and an insatiable appetite for learning. Certainly, the Elephant's Child fits this description. Most obvious is the fact that the Elephant's Child too is "full of 'satiable curtiosity, and that means [she] asked ever so many questions" (Kipling 63). But since the scope of her usual questions encompasses the whole of her immediate sense experience, while her "new fine question . . . 'What does the crocodile have for dinner?'" (64) extends into the unknown, the Elephant's Child also evidences an extraordinary willingness to taste every kind of learning. Extraordinary, that is, because she is never deterred by the predictable reaction of her "dear families" to any of her questions, but especially to this one. Rather, this 'satiable Elephant's Child proceeds undaunted until she encounters the object of her quest. And when the Crocodile confirms his identity, by a distinctive act as well as by an express statement, the Elephant's Child grew all breathless, and panted, and kneeled down on the bank and said...

The faces of death.

The individual9s reaction to imminent death depends on his concept of the existential meaning of death. There are two main, but opposing, concepts, one positive and the other tragic. The first sees death as a transition to another mode of being. Within that three main modalities are to be distinguished, in which is considered either as an element in the cosmic harmony, the reintegration of the individual into the universal (the `Tagorian9 mode); or secondly the possibility of man9s external existence through his transfer, together with his entire physical and psychological apparatus, to a realm of legend (the `Mioritic9 mode); or thirdly the culmination of life, the moment of maximum existential concentration overflowing into the universe and encircling it (the `Rilkian9 mode). The second concept, the tragic concept, sees death either as a desired solution, which puts an end to the nothingness of life (the `Tracklian9 mode); or as a nonsense, as an absurd injustice of nature (the `common9 mode); or as a necessity of which we do not know the meaning, a dialectical moment of eternal change (the `Stoic9 mode). The psychological care of the dying involves identification with the patient9s concept of death, in order to maintain his morale and possibly diminish his terror of death. The doctor must therefore be a good psychologist and a genuine philosopher, in the strictest sense of the word.

Rousseau as Philosopher

Rousseau seldom gets a mention as a philosopher in the conventional histories; if he appears at all it is in connection with that strange and rather suspect discipline ‘political philosophy’. Even then there is a tendency to look upon him as an unsystematic thinker, as a ‘philosophy’ rather than as a genuine philosopher. His ideas are held to be interesting, but the connections between them are thought to be emotional rather than logical. Again, Émile is read by students of education, but not by those studying philosophy. This is both because the ‘philosophy of education’ is thought not to be of great importance and again because of Rousseau's lack of logical rigour. Now it is true that Rousseau himself was an emotional figure, and from reading his Confessions it is easy to get the idea that there is no point in looking for interesting philosophical points in his works.

Rousseau as Philosopher

Rousseau seldom gets a mention as a philosopher in the conventional histories; if he appears at all it is in connection with that strange and rather suspect discipline ‘political philosophy’. Even then there is a tendency to look upon him as an unsystematic thinker, as a ‘philosophy’ rather than as a genuine philosopher. His ideas are held to be interesting, but the connections between them are thought to be emotional rather than logical. Again, Émile is read by students of education, but not by those studying philosophy. This is both because the ‘philosophy of education’ is thought not to be of great importance and again because of Rousseau's lack of logical rigour. Now it is true that Rousseau himself was an emotional figure, and from reading his Confessions it is easy to get the idea that there is no point in looking for interesting philosophical points in his works.

Essences and Discovery: Plato, Locke, and Leibniz

According to Plato's Republic, human knowledge in highest form owes its existence to a priori discoveries made during the course of dialectical investigations. Being a priori, such discoveries are neither empirical observations nor conclusions based upon empirical observations, although in some cases they may be “occasioned” by experience. They are matter for intellectual, not literal, vision, and making them is what distinguishes the successful philosopher from the non-philosopher. Thus, in the Phaedo, Plato is in a position to argue that the separation of the soul from the body in death is no evil for a genuine philosopher: he has no need to rely on the bodily senses in order to acquire philosophical knowledge; and he is well free of the errors and confusion generated by the senses, and of the physical desires nourished in the soul as a result of residing in a body.