General Propositions Research Articles

Sociological Methods in the Study of History

SOCIOLOGY is a discipline that employs abstract concepts to express general propositions about social behaviour, relationships and processes. From its beginnings, sociology was as much concerned to interpret the past as to explain the present. The early sociologists were historicists and evolutionists who explained the past by imposing a pattern of order upon it, and who readily took the less developed contemporary societies of their own time as images of the remote past of their own societies. It is to those thinkers, Comte, Spencer and Marx, if not precisely to the issues that occupied them, that sociologists still turn in tracing their intellectual descent—not to the early social surveyors, Charles Booth or Frederic Le Play.

A Path Goal Theory of Leader Effectiveness

An explanation of the effects of leader behavior on subordinate satisfaction, motivation, and performance is presented. The explanation is derived from a path-goal theory of motivation. Dimensions of leader behavior such as leader initiating structure, consideration, authoritarianism, hierarchical influence, and closeness of supervision are analyzed in terms of path-goal variables such as valence and instrumentality. The theory specifies some of the situational moderators on which the effects of specific leader behaviors are contingent. A set of general propositions are advanced which integrate and explain earlier fragmentary research findings. Several specific predictions are made to illustrate how the general propositions can be operationalized. The usefulness of the theory is demonstrated by showing how several seemingly unrelated prior research findings could have been deduced from its general propositions and by applying it to reconcile what appear to be contradictory findings from prior studies. Results of two empirical studies are reported that provide support for seven of eight hypotheses derived directly from the general propositions of the theory. A third study designed to test three of the original eight hypotheses is also reported. Two of these three hypotheses are successfully replicated. In the light of these results and the integrative power of the theory, it is argued that the theory shows promise and should be further tested with experimentallas well as correlational methods.

Geography and Retailing

An important contribution to our understanding of the distribution of retail activities, particularly within cities, this book provides a critical review of the literature on the subject. It points out the major general propositions concerning retailing from the geographical point of view, and identifi es key research problems, which need to be examined in order to push forward the frontiers of this sub fi eld of economic geography. It presents a major critique of the central-place model, which has come to hold an important place in the methodology of economic geography, and clearly and decisively shows the model to be static, deterministic, retrospective and of little value for predictive purposes.

Poetry as Fiction

p RADOXES make intriguing titles, but I am not otherwise fond of them and intend, by the end of this article, to dissolve the one that entitles it. I mean to do this by elaborating the proposition that fictiveness is the characteristic quality of what we call when we use the term in the broad sense bequeathed by Aristotle, i.e., to refer to the general class of verbal artworks. My primary concern will be to develop a conception of poetry that allows us to distinguish it from and relate it to both nonpoetic discourse and other artforms. The view presented here was initially, but rather incidentally, proposed elsewhere.' I have found the elaboration of it of continuing interest, however, especially since the grounds for those distinctions and the nature of those relationships remain, to my mind, extremely problematic in contemporary linguistic and aesthetic theory. Since my procedure in what follows may seem initially perplexing, some prefatory remarks may prevent confusion. First of all, I shall be saying a good deal about language in general before I say anything at all about poetry. Any theory of poetry inevitably, though not always explicitly, presupposes a theory of language. Thus, those who have at various times regarded poetry as inspired speech, or embellished prose, or the language of passion, or emotive statements, have obviously had somewhat different notions of what language is when it is not poetrye.g., uninspired speech, plain prose, the language of reason, or verifiable statements. Since, moreover, linguistic theory is now in a very volatile state, no general propositions concerning language can be offered casually or taken for granted. (One can often tell more about a man's politics and metaphysics now from his views of language than one once could from his class or religion.) In any case, although I am by no means offering here anything that could be called a theory of language, the first section of this article will develop some general observations on nonpoetic or what I call natural discourse, particularly in those respects that are most significant in distinguishing it from

Deterrence and Specific Offenses

Deterrence should not be treated as a monolithic problem. General propositions accepting or rejecting deterrence ought to belong to the past. The question is not whether punishment has deterrent effects, but rather under what conditions and to what extent the deterrent purpose is effected. It is important initially to distinguish between the deterrent effect of the threat of punishment (general deterrence) and the deterrent effect of the imposition of punishment (special deterrence).' Professor Chambliss has suggested that the distinction between general and special deterrence, perhaps useful in the abstract, is difficult to maintain in empirical research and may in fact obscure more than it clarifies.2 His own discussion, however, demonstrates that failure to make the distinction may lead to mistaken conclusions. Chambliss concludes, on the basis of research showing high rates of recidivism among drug addicts, that drug addiction, like murder, is relatively unaffected by either the threat or imposition of punishment.3 This statement may be correct if restricted to those users who have already become addicts, since the great physiological need for drugs may vitiate the deterrent effect of punishment. But it is not correct to presuppose, as does Chambliss, that the limited success in the treatment of drug addicts necessarily suggests a similar failure to deter non-addicts and drug dealers. In fact, statistics concerning recidivism among drug addicts reveal nothing about the deterrent effect of drug laws on nonaddicts and drug dealers. Howard Becker's study of the marijuana user may be instructive.4 Becker identifies three stages in the career of a marijuana user: beginner, occasional user, and regular user. The be-

Administrative Law and Legitimacy in Anglophonic Africa

Lawrence Friedman (1969: 29) has written that “many basic questions of the relationship of law to social change and to cultural development have been completely neglected. … How does law brighten or darken the road to political… stability. … What happens when laws are borrowed from more advanced countries?” This paper examines the reception of English administrative law in Anglophonic Africa in an effort to discover some general propositions to answer Professor Friedman's questions.

The Concept of Man as Presupposed by the Historical Studies

I should like to begin by removing a misconception to which the title of this lecture may possibly give rise. My concern is not with general propositions regarding certain fairly well-attested human characteristics of the kind to which historians may, from time to time, advert in the course of their work or to which they may appeal in support of the account provided of some particular event or occurrence. I am not myself an historian, and for me to make ex cathedra pronouncements on such topics as these might well seem to constitute an unjustifiable intrusion upon a field about which I am not qualified professionally to speak. My subject lies within the sphere of philosophy of history rather than of history proper; it belongs, in other words, to a branch of philosophical inquiry, and as such relates, not to empirical facts and events of the sort to which the practising historian addresses himself, but to those assumptions, categories and modes of procedure that are, or are believed to be, intrinsic to historical thought and discourse. In this general context I wish to discuss two approaches to the problem of elucidating the character of historical knowledge and explanation. Both of the approaches I have in mind have achieved a considerable measure of support at the present time; they have also been widely understood as offering profoundly divergent — indeed, diametrically opposed — views of what is central to the structure of historical thinking and to the type of activity upon which the historian is essentially engaged. It has on occasions been suggested that what — amongst other things — divides adherents to the views in question is the fact that they are committed to radically different conceptions of the subject-matter of the historical studies; that is to say, of human beings and their activities. In the light of this fundamental disagreement, it is argued, many of the more intractable controversies that have arisen concerning the concepts and interpretative schemes in terms of which it is possible or legitimate to treat the human past become readily intelligible. In what follows I want to examine this claim. First, however, let me give a brief, and necessarily somewhat crude, outline of the two positions I have referred to, starting with one that is often described as ‘positivist’.

The Concept of Man as Presupposed by the Historical Studies

I should like to begin by removing a misconception to which the title of this lecture may possibly give rise. My concern is not with general propositions regarding certain fairly well-attested human characteristics of the kind to which historians may, from time to time, advert in the course of their work or to which they may appeal in support of the account provided of some particular event or occurrence. I am not myself an historian, and for me to make ex cathedra pronouncements on such topics as these might well seem to constitute an unjustifiable intrusion upon a field about which I am not qualified professionally to speak. My subject lies within the sphere of philosophy of history rather than of history proper; it belongs, in other words, to a branch of philosophical inquiry, and as such relates, not to empirical facts and events of the sort to which the practising historian addresses himself, but to those assumptions, categories and modes of procedure that are, or are believed to be, intrinsic to historical thought and discourse. In this general context I wish to discuss two approaches to the problem of elucidating the character of historical knowledge and explanation. Both of the approaches I have in mind have achieved a considerable measure of support at the present time; they have also been widely understood as offering profoundly divergent — indeed, diametrically opposed — views of what is central to the structure of historical thinking and to the type of activity upon which the historian is essentially engaged. It has on occasions been suggested that what — amongst other things — divides adherents to the views in question is the fact that they are committed to radically different conceptions of the subject-matter of the historical studies; that is to say, of human beings and their activities. In the light of this fundamental disagreement, it is argued, many of the more intractable controversies that have arisen concerning the concepts and interpretative schemes in terms of which it is possible or legitimate to treat the human past become readily intelligible. In what follows I want to examine this claim. First, however, let me give a brief, and necessarily somewhat crude, outline of the two positions I have referred to, starting with one that is often described as ‘positivist’.

Generating Press, Bold Ideas, and Stubbornness: The Impact of Celebrity CEO's

Our purpose is to investigate and discuss the impact of celebrity CEOs. Numerous CEOs have attained celebrity status through infusion into media coverage. Consequently, CEOs routinely enter into American popular culture. We offer general propositions that successful CEOs gain positive media coverage, and thus gain celebrity CEO status. Subsequently, celebrity CEOs are vulnerable to becoming rigid in their business strategy and also fixate on increasing firms’ corporate social responsibility operatives, both of which are enhanced by narcissism. Under negative conditions (i.e., poor performance, bad press), celebrity CEOs tend to escalate their commitment as opposed to admitting a change is necessary.

Światopogląd i etyka

The first part of the present article is an essay to describe various interpretations relating to the conception of Weltanschauung. The author distinguishes the interpretation of Weitanschauung as a special kind of description of assumptions and conclusions presented by certain systems and tendencies of philosophy. In this meaning the Weltamschauung is a complex of general propositions reflecting attitudes of par.ticular doctrines – above all of those philosophical doctrines which, in consideration of multiformity of their resaerches and decisions, deserve to be called universalistic conceptions (e. g. stoic and christian philosophy, phenomenology, marxism). Within limits of just such universalistic sys.tems and tendencies, as their components or branches, ·conceptions of normative ethics are formed. The historical examples of the normative ethics are formed. The historical examples of the normative ethics, involved in mare wide contexts of philosophy, entitle to set up a problem of mutual relations of philosophy (Weitanschauung) and ethics. The .author proposes a preliminary distinction of particular kinds of these relations. According to him conceptions and conclusions in ontology determine the range of ethical researches: materialism and idealism, as ontological attitudes, imply, e. g., distinict differences of ranges of normative ethics which arise in the sphere of these attitudes. In addition to the re1ation of such a general character, also other ones may be distinguished, e. g. influence of philosophical visions of the world upon the hierarchy of values and ethical norms (evident in stoic and christian doctrines), influence of philosophical solution of the problem of causality upon ethical decisions (maral responsability, patterns of attitude towards the world etc.). Gnoseological attitudes, e. g. rationalism, empirism, intuitionism, are sometimes transferred from philosophy to ethics that determines involving of normative ethics into mare general patterns of systems and tendencies which are nowadays called metaethics. However, gnoseological relations between philosophy (Weitanschauung) and ethics do not seem to have any palpable importance as a factor determining the ethical-normative researches. The relations between philosophy (Weltanschauung) and normative ethics are likely to arise also in a form of influence of ethical ideas upon the tendency of philosophical researches as well as upon their results. This possibility is suggested by examples of extremely moralistic conceptions in which the ethical ideas and criteria are to be considered as universalistic way of thinking.

A sliding filament model of amoeboid motion

The capacities of muscle proteins to solate, to gelate, and to contract form the basis for a sliding filament model of amoeboid motion. The discovery of actin-, myosin- and actomyosin-like proteins in amoebae tends to support the model. Filaments of 80 A in diameter are present in both ectoplasm and endoplasm. Some of these filaments are capable of dephosphorylating ATP. It is assumed, therefore, that these protein filaments are comparable to actin, myosin, and actomyosin of muscle. Emphasis is placed on the specific parallel alignment of those filaments at the interface between ectoplasm and endoplasm. Posteriorly this interface is a dynamic region of solation with an active displacement of actin and myosin from actomyosin by formation of myosin ATP. Conversely, in the anterior region there is a gelation, a binding of ATP, and actin combines with myosin forming actomyosin. The general propositions, however, formulated by Mast in 1926 are retained. Therefore,' the driving force for movement of the plasmasol is a pressure differential produced by contraction of the plasmagel tube. Contraction of the plasmagel tube decreases the volume of the tube in this region, and simultaneously at the plasmagel tube and plasmasol interface some of the actomyosin splits into actin and myosin ATP becoming sol-like. Gelation would occur anteriorly where actin and myosin combine to form actomyosin This model emphasizes the capacities of proteins to solate, geate, and contract focusing investigations anew into these fundamental states in living cells.

Adolescent antecedents of cigarette smoking: Data from the Oakland growth study

This report of data from a follow-up, at roughly age 40, of subjects who had been intensively studied in adolescence supports three general propositions: (1) the antecedents and correlates of adult smoking are markedly different for men and women; (2) there were substantial differences in personality as manifest in adolescence associated with different levels of smoking; and (3) some, but by no means all of these differences persisted two decades later.

The Structuring of Mass Politics in the Smaller European Democracies: A Developmental Typology

There is a curious awkwardness about discussions of “types” in comparative politics. Aristotle and Montesquieu taught us to proceed by classifications of regimes, and the current generation of computer enthusiasts have offered us more and more powerful tools for the handling of wide ranges of attributes of political entities and for the establishment of complex multi-dimensional typologies. Yet as soon as we are confronted with a concrete table of alternative types and look over the lists of cases assigned to each cell, our first reaction is almost immediately to add further distinctions, to reject the imposition of similarities across historically distinct units. The student of politics is torn between two sets of super-ego demands: he feels an obligation to reduce the welter of empirical facts to a body of parsimoniously organized general propositions but he also feels under pressure to treat each case sui generis, as a unique configuration worthy of an effort of understanding all on its own. This is of course a dilemma common to all social sciences but is particularly difficult to handle in the study of such highly visible, amply documented macro-units as historical polities. Students of census records, elections and survey data have an enormous analytical advantage: they deal with large numbers of anonymous units and can therefore proceed with the analysis of their data with a minimum of interference from exogenous “noise”. The student of comparative politics is roughly in the position of a social scientist asked to analyze the census records or the survey responses of a set of close friends: he cannot prevent himself from bringing into his analysis of the coded data on the punched cards a wide range of uncoded “surplus” information acquired through years of acquaintance with the subjects. The standardized sample survey derives great methodological strength from its programmatic insistence on equality, anonymity and distance in the treatment of the information collected: the data are given once and for all in the protocols or on the IBM cards and there is no allowance for fuzzy interaction with the subjects outside that framework.

Locke on Mixed Modes, Relations, and Knowledge

Locke on Mixed Modes, Relations, and Knowledge DAVID L. PERRY JOHN LOCKE'S TREATMENT Of mixed modes and relations is of interest for its own sake as well as for its role in his account of knowledge. According to Locke, our ideas of relations and mixed modes do not owe their validity to an empirical origin ; indeed, it is doubtful that such ideas can be considered to have an entirely empirical source in Locke's account. Locke sometimes claims that mixed modes and relations are creations of the mind having no reality outside the mind. Ideas of mixed modes are not intended to conform to an external reality; ideas of mixed modes and relations are themselves archetypes which are real and adequate ideas just because they conform to themselves. These features are the basis for Locke's attempt to account for a portion of our alleged knowledge of absolutely certain, yet instructive propositions, specifically, our knowledge of general propositions that do not assert the existence of any substance nor the actual occurrence of any combination of qualities. Locke evidently intended many of his epistemologically crucial observations regarding mixed modes and relations to apply to simple modes as well. His explanation of geometrical knowledge presupposes that ideas of figures, which are simple modes, have the status claimed for ideas of mixed modes. But since Locke frequently mentions only ideas of mixed modes and relations while discussing the features in question, and since his treatment of simple modes involves great additional difficulties, I shall restrict detailed investigation to the mixed type. In what follows I shall critically explore Locke's views concerning mixed modes and relations, and his corollary effort to explain in part the possibility of the kind of knowledge known since Kant as "synthetic a priori." Locke consistently classifies mixed modes as complex ideas, i.e., ideas formed by the combination of several simple ideas. Of modes in general Locke writes, "... Modes I call such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances .... ,, 2 Simple modes are defined as those "which are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other;--as a dozen, or score .... ,, 3 Other examples of simple modes are distances, figures, places, durations, and even tunes. 4 On the other hand, mixed modes are "compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put 1Research for this article was made possible by a summer grant awarded by the Long Beach State College Foundation from funds provided by the College Foundation and the National Science Foundation. 2John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), Bk. II, chap. xii, sec. 4. Subsequent references to Locke's Essay will be cited by book, chapter, and section, e.g.,II. xii. 4. aII. xii. 5. II. xiii. 4, 5, 7; II. xiv. 1; II. xviii. 3. [219] 220 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY together to make one complex one .... ,, 5 They are "such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristical marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas put together by the mind .... ,, 6 Examples of mixed modes given by Locke are beauty, theft, obligation , drunkenness, a lie, hypocrisy, sacrilege, murder, appeal, triumph, wrestling, fencing, boldness, habit, testiness, running, speaking, revenge, gratitude, polygamy , justice, liberality, and courage. ~ An awkward feature of Locke's discussions of mixed modes is the careless manner in which he vacillates between writing of mixed modes as complex ideas and writing of them not as ideas, but as objects of which we have ideas. 8 In defining mixed modes, 9 Locke identifies them with complex ideas of a certain sort, and in discussing their reality, he considers them a kind of idea. 1~ But when he treats adequacy and truth of ideas, he regularly, though not invariably, uses such phrases as "complex ideas of modes," "ideas of mixed modes," and "complex ideas of mixed modes." il In his discussion of the names of mixed modes, Locke employs the additional phrase "complex ideas or essences of...

A complete and consistent modal set theory

1.1. The aim of this paper is the construction of a demonstrably consistent system of set theory that (1) contains roughly the same amount of mathematics as the writer's system K′ [3], including a theory of continuous functions of real numbers, and (2) provides a way for expressing in the object language various propositions which, in the case of K′, could be expressed only in the metalanguage, for example, general propositions about all real numbers. It was not originally intended that the desired system should be a modal logic, but the modal character of the system appears to be a natural outgrowth of the way it is constructed. A detailed treatment of the natural, rational, and real numbers is left for a subsequent paper.

On the Theory of Tax Incidence

Tf9HE aim of this article is to review and extend some of the general equilibrium propositions of incidence theory. Primary emphasis is placed on the calculation of the differential incidence of a number of general taxes, partial commodity taxes, and partial factor taxes, and on the analysis of the factors which determine whether a substitution of one type of tax finance for another type increases or decreases the real income of a particular group. Few of the results presented here are particularly novel, and most of them can be found in the writings of Meade (1955), Wells (1955), Johnson (1956), Musgrave (1959), and especially Harberger (1962), or in related literature on the theory of international trade. However, differences in analytical technique and differences in emphasis by various writers on one or a limited range of taxes have impeded understanding of the differential incidence of a relatively wider range of taxes. This article presents a unified treatment of qualitative (deductive) knowledge in this area of tax analysis. The basic assumptions in the analysis are as follows. Price flexibility insures full employment at all times in an economy where two commodities X and Y * Some of the results of this paper first appeared in my doctoral dissertation submitted to the Johns Hopkins University in 1963. The basic revision was completed while I was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Chicago during the academic year 1964-65. I wish to express my gratitude to R. A. Musgrave, Carl Christ, H. G. Johnson, and especially to A. C. Harberger, for their comments and criticism. are produced under constant returns to scale through the inputs of labor (L) and capital (K). The total supplies of each of the two factors are assumed to be fixed. Capital and labor are perfectly shiftable between sectors, and both factors of production are paid the value of their marginal products. In equilibrium the after-tax rates of return to labor and capital are the same in both industries. Capital goods are durable producers' goods, and the depreciation of capital takes place in a declining balance form at a fixed rate. It is also assumed that the rate of depreciation of capital is the same in both industries. In the analysis no reference is made to a monetary system, changes in absolute prices are ignored, and the discussion of incidence is carried out in terms of relative prices. Although the direction of adjustment to the imposition of indirect taxes and the induced response of the monetary authority may be important for some questions, changes in absolute prices are of secondary importance for incidence, since income will change to the same extent if the imposition of a general sales tax results in an increase in commodity prices at unchanged money incomes or in a decrease in factor incomes at unchanged commodity prices.

Urban Conditions: General

Solving United States urban problems is an increasingly important concern of the public and of govern ment officials. Social science can make an important contribu tion to solutions by providing urban social indicators. Three general propositions concerning this process are: (1) Social scientists must be prepared for accusations of betrayal from proponents of causes which they have previously supported, if data conflict with objectives of such causes. (2) How indi cators are developed will influence at what level problems are resolved. (3) Social indicators will be developed by profes sors and government executives whose judgments will be based on a value-background different from that of the urban masses being measured. In the light of these propositions, four guidelines for social indicators are suggested: (1) They should be in the realm of disaggregation and correlation. (2) As they cannot be apolitical, they must be pan-political. (3) They should be concerned with the future as well as the present. (4) They should provide comparisons of local, national, and "best practice" data. The indicators should report urban conditions in three categories: (1) people as individuals— numbers, distribution, density, mobility, employment, income, behavior, health, and participation rates; (2) f amilies—un— employment and welfare statistics' correlations and "poverty neighborhood" studies; and (3) institutions—public service and voluntary organizations, business, mass media, education, and urban ecology.—Ed.

Comments

One of the dangers at any conference is that the commentator, rather than doing his assigned task, will deliver still another (and lengthy) paper. In inviting me, the organizers of the conference must have felt they had taken the ultimate precaution against this danger, for they invited a commentator who is no specialist in the history of the Austrian empire. There were, of course, to have been two papers at this session that, at least linguistically, would have provided me some more familiar ground, and I regret for reasons both personal and professional that Professors Valsecchi and Greenfield were unable to present their papers.1 I shall merely allude to the Italian case in putting forth some general propositions which were stimulated by the three papers I have seen—those of Professors Ľudovít Holotík, Stephen Fischer-Galati, and Ivan Rudnytsky.

On the stability of a body with connected moving parts.

This paper presents several general propositions and examples relating to the of bodies with holonomically constrained moving (e.g., gravity gradient-stabilized satellites, spin-stabilized space vehicles). The system may be a combination of particles, bodies, and continuous bodies with internal damping between the parts. Stability of is discussed using theorems based on the direct method of Lyapunov. Stability is proved to depend on the positive definite property of a certain easily constructed (potential) function of the generalized coordinates; asymptotic is demonstrated in the case of complete damping. A theorem on quadratic forms is used to give qualitative conditions under which an equilibrium position of a general system of bodies is stable if the system possesses rigid body stability and if the parts motion is stable. As an example, the of a free, internally damped, quasi-rigid body is discussed; the phenomenon of convergence of the axis of maximum moment of inertia to the axis of total (equilibrium) angular momentum is examined critically in the light of the theory presented. The general theory is applicable to nonlinear systems, and it gives bounds on the configuration-space convergence region.

Planning as Innovation: The Chilean Case

Abstract A distinction is made between allocative and innovative planning on the ground that there are significant behavioral differences between them. Innovative planning is defined as (1) seeking to legitimize new social objectives or effect a major reordering in the priority of existing objectives, (2) concerned with translating general value propositions into new institutional arrangements and concrete action programs, (3) being more interested in the mobilization of resources than in their optimal use, and (4) proposing to guide innovation processes through information feedback of the actual consequences of action. These points are illustrated with data from Chile's urban and regional development program, ending with a discussion of the relation between innovative and allocative planning.