Objective: This study examines the cohabitation-marriage gap in income pooling across Europe and quantifies the relative importance of selection and commitment mechanisms for couples’ decisions to share or separate economic resources. Background: Prior research has not effectively measured the relative importance of selection and commitment. We argue that, partly, this is because previous studies treated cohabiters and married couples as two homogeneous groups. We therefore distinguish four union types: directly married, married after cohabitation, cohabiters with and without marital intentions. Method: Using data from the Generation and Gender Survey Round 1 and logistic regression models with KHB decomposition, we analyze income pooling behaviors in 11 countries (n=34,061). Results: Findings reveal a gradient in income pooling in seven countries (Germany, France, Austria, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic and Sweden), with directly married couples being most likely to pool their incomes, followed by couples who married after cohabitation, cohabiters with and without marital intentions. Commitment-related variables explain more variation in income pooling between union types than selection-related ones, except when comparing directly married and married after cohabitation, where selection is more relevant. In Bulgaria, Russia, Georgia, and Romania, neither mechanism significantly impacts the minimal gap. Conclusion: Income pooling varies substantially between as well as within marriage and cohabitation. Commitment is generally more influential than selection for understanding couples’ resource sharing, though institutional and cultural settings condition the strength of these patterns.

Abstract This study uses longitudinal data from two waves of the Norwegian Generations and Gender Survey (2020 and 2024) to test whether subjective economic uncertainty predicts fertility intentions and the transition to parenthood, controlling for objective economic uncertainty. The Norwegian welfare state provides an extensive economic safety net and institutional buffer, which could dampen the behavioral impact of perceived financial strain. Nevertheless, among 609 childless adults aged 25–34, reporting difficulties making ends meet was associated with a lower probability of realizing intended first births, even after controlling for employment status and income. Other subjective measures—expectations about personal finances in three years and worries about the macroeconomy—showed no significant effects. Overall, fertility intentions were less influenced by subjective economic uncertainty than was the subsequent realization of those intentions. This suggests that intentions translate into behavior only when external constraints, including individuals’ perceptions of their economic situation, permit it. These results highlight the importance of incorporating individuals’ subjective assessments of their current and future economic situation into fertility research.

EP1.5, e-Poster Terminal 1, September 5, 2025, 13:05 - 13:40AimsMigrant health is a critical public health concern in Europe. However, evidence regarding the mental health of migrants remains limited and inconclusive. This study explores depression among first- and second-generation migrants, focusing on modifiable post-migration factors across occupational, social, health, and economic domains.MethodsWe conducted an analysis of cross-sectional data from the 2020 Generations and Gender Survey, encompassing 64,650 adults in ten European countries. Depression was assessed using a truncated version of the CES-D-20 scale. Weighted prevalence estimates were derived for each country, and weighted population average logistic models examined the association between migration, sociodemographic characteristics, and depression. Risk ratios were calculated to evaluate the impact of modifiable post-migration factors.ResultsDepression prevalence varied significantly, ranging from 15.6% in Estonia (95% CI 14.6–16.6) to 30.3% in the UK (95% CI 28.9–31.8). Among first-generation migrants, aOR for depression were elevated in four countries, ranging from 1.23 in Germany (95% CI 1.06–1.43, p < 0.01) to 1.88 in Austria (95% CI 1.52–2.33, p < 0.001). For second-generation migrants, depression was associated with migration status in seven countries, with aOR ranging from 1.26 in the UK (95% CI 1.01–1.58, p < 0.05) to 1.91 in Austria (95% CI 1.45–2.50, p < 0.001). Factors including poor self-rated health, physical limitations, loneliness, unemployment, job insecurity, housing dissatisfaction, and low education were all significantly associated with an increased risk of depression.ConclusionsPreliminary findings indicate that first- and second-generation migrants are at heightened risk of depression across most countries, with second-generation migrants experiencing more severe outcomes. Modifiable post-migration factors significantly contribute to this elevated risk, while the risk factor profiles for depression remain consistent between generations. These findings underscore the need for targeted policy interventions that address the underlying social and economic inequities to reduce the burden of depression on migrants.NoteThis abstract represents preliminary findings and does not reflect the complete work.

Abstract The rapid ageing of the European population in recent years has brought a significant increase in old-age care needs. While families remain the main care provider in most European countries, their capacity to care has decreased in the face of intensified pressures, calling for a strengthening of public care services. In this context, the discussion on whether families or the public sector should be responsible for providing old-age care gains relevance, and the preferences of family caregivers appear fundamental to ascertain whether families will continue to carry the main load or welfare states will need to step up. This longitudinal study tests whether transitioning into family old-age caregiving increases demand for public care provision and whether this effect is mediated by the impact of caregiver burden on well-being, using data from the Generations and Gender Survey for a three-wave panel sample of 4,587 respondents in France. Data are analysed through a causal mediation approach using linear fixed-effects and propensity score weights. The results suggest that starting to give old-age care increases demand for public services among women but makes men more supportive of family provision. These findings align with evidence of a gender gap in welfare attitudes.

Does intensive parenting come at the expense of parents' health? Evidence from Sweden.

Understanding the alignment of Eastern European immigrants’ attitudes with those of their host societies in Western Europe is critical for exploring cultural convergence and divergence, particularly in the context of mass migration and freedom of movement within the European Union (EU). This study examines the extent to which Polish migrants’ attitudes towards non-marital family forms − cohabitation, divorce, and single motherhood − align with those of both their host (Dutch) and sending (Polish) societies, thereby increasing understanding of the challenges involved in cultural assimilation processes in Europe. Using data from the Polish and Netherlands Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) and the Families of Poles in the Netherlands (FPN) survey, we estimate a series of regression models to assess how nativity status influences attitudes towards non-marital family forms. We further examine the role of social integration indicators − such as Dutch language proficiency and usage, post-migration education, and having a Dutch partner − in shaping these attitudes among Polish migrants. Polish migrants show greater acceptance of cohabitation and divorce than Polish non-migrants, although their attitudes regarding divorce are more aligned with those of Dutch non-migrants than Polish non-migrants. They exhibit less acceptance of single motherhood than both Polish and Dutch non-migrants, and these attitudes are not significantly influenced by social integration factors typically associated with host-country assimilation. Our findings suggest that Polish migrants’ attitudes towards non-marital family forms reflect a mix of assimilation and sui generis adaptation, combining elements of origin and host cultures with views shaped by the unique conditions of migration. This study advances the literature on migrant acculturation by identifying unique patterns of attitudes among Polish migrants in the Netherlands. It also suggests that migrants are at the forefront of cultural encounters, contributing to greater convergence on some, but not all, attitudes across EU member states.

BackgroundPersistently low fertility in the European Union has drawn attention to the gap between desired and intended fertility, often linked to enduring gender inequalities. Clarifying how individual, partner, and contextual factors jointly shape short-term fertility intentions can inform policy across diverse gender regimes. Objective: To examine short-term fertility intentions among partnered individuals in Finland, Germany, and Spain, representing Scandinavian, Continental, and Mediterranean gender regimes, respectively.MethodsWe use harmonized data from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) and Spain’s National Institute of Statistics (INE). We apply Classification and Regression Trees (CART) to capture non-linear interactions among individual, partner, and contextual factors (including employment status, caregiving responsibilities, and gender values), and to identify profiles associated with higher vs. lower short-term intentions to have a child.ResultsFamily size, caregiving burdens, and economic stability emerge as central determinants of fertility intentions, with marked gendered and contextual differences across countries. Patterns are particularly pronounced among individuals with no children or one child, where combinations of stable employment and lower caregiving loads align with higher intentions, while economic insecurity and heavier (gendered) care burdens depress intentions. CART uncovers country-specific thresholds and configurations consistent with each gender regime.ConclusionShort-term fertility intentions reflect unmet gender-mediated needs and serve as an early indicator of latent potential for social and political mobilization. Our findings highlight the influence of gender regimes on reproductive decision-making and support policies that address structural inequalities, especially in employment and care, to enable the realization of reproductive desires across heterogeneous socioeconomic contexts.

Despite advances in gender equality in the public sphere, the division of domestic labour remains unequal inside households. This situation can create wellbeing—or discontent—in couples, especially among women. In this number of Perspectives Demogràfiques, we analyse data from Spain and Sweden when exploring how men and women perceive the distribution of domestic tasks and the degree of satisfaction they show in this regard. The present study is the result of a joint project of researchers from the Centre for Demographic Studies (CED-CERCA) of the Autonomous University of Barcelona1 and from Stockholm University who have compared data from two nationally representative surveys: the 2018 Fertility Survey (Spain) and the 2021 Generations and Gender Survey (Sweden). Two research questions guide this study. The first is, how do men and women in the two countries perceive the division of household tasks? The second is, how do levels of satisfaction vary depending on the type of division and country of reference? Differences by gender, age, and country are analysed as is the interaction between the type of distribution of tasks and the satisfaction reported. The initial results clearly show that perception of equality in the distribution is associated with greater satisfaction for both genders and in both countries. Conversely, when there is an imbalance, women—especially in Spain— report lower satisfaction than men. The data also indicate that younger couples perceive a more equal distribution but this does not necessarily imply either convergence between the countries or greater satisfaction when there is imbalance.

Ideations and intentions are important precursors of actual behaviour but are still understudied in the literature on the transition to adulthood. This article provides a descriptive overview of ideations and intentions about the timing of four key events in the transition to adulthood – exit from the parental home, cohabitation, marriage, and parenthood – using cross-national representative data for 33 European countries from the Generations and Gender Survey and European Social Survey. Results show that ideations and intentions about the transition to adulthood are, like behaviours, gendered and display distinctive country differences. The analysis of age-graded ideations and intentions suggests a mismatch between the ideal and actual ages at which key events occur during the transition to adulthood. Young people aged 18 to 34 in Europe consider it ideal to start a non-marital cohabitation, marry, and become parents during their 20s but, on average, experience these events later than their ideal timeline. This mismatch is particularly pronounced among men and for the events of marriage and parenthood.

This study evaluates regional disparities in access to treatment and preventive screenings for high-mortality non-communicable diseases (NCDs) -specifically cancer and diabetes- in Chile, using data from the 2022-2023 National Health, Sexuality, and Gender Survey (ENSSEX). Four key indicators were analyzed: mammography (MAM), Pap smear (PAP), prostate-specific antigen test (PSA), and diabetes treatment (DIA). Disparities were assessed using both general and relative disparity indices (ID) to quantify regional inequalities. The general disparity index (IDg) revealed substantial differences in access to preventive screenings, with regional gaps reaching up to 20% for PSA tests, mammograms, and Pap smears. In contrast, disparities in diabetes treatment access were notably smaller (<5%). Better performance was observed in the northern and southern macrozones, while regions such as Tarapacá, Maule, and Metropolitana showed significant lags. The findings underscore persistent regional disparities in preventive healthcare services in Chile. Targeted decentralization policies and subnational prioritization are crucial to reducing these gaps. Addressing these disparities is essential for achieving Sustainable Development Goal 3.4 and lowering premature mortality from NCDs.

Digital transformation is rapidly changing healthcare delivery, which is changing the functions and responsibilities of the health workforce. The specialist digital health workforce support the frontline clinical workforce through the management of health data and information systems. Gender disparity in this new configuration of the healthcare workforce can undermine organisational aims, workforce wellbeing, equitable care, population health, patient experience, and economic sustainability. The aim of this paper was to identify the nature of existing gender disparities and potential strategies for fostering gender equity in Australia's specialist digital health workforce. The 2023 Australian Specialist Digital Health Workforce Census incorporated gender survey questions from the Telstra Health Understanding Gender Diversity in Australia's Digital Health Sector Special Report 2021-22 for the first time. These data were statistically analysed, examining if there was a difference between women and men in: (1) Education, (2) Professional development, (3) Occupation, and (4) Workforce intention. There were 857 valid responses, of which 595 (69.43%) respondents identified as woman. Women were less likely than men to have a formal digital health qualification. They were less likely to occupy higher paid roles, where both had formal qualifications. Women have fewer opportunities for mentoring and leadership training than men. Men indicated more senior roles than women, and more men were healthcare practitioners than women. More men than women aimed for senior management roles. Both valued work-life balance in employment. Barriers to career progression included age, financial constraints, outside of work responsibilities. Gender disparities are a workforce issue in the Australian digital health landscape. Women are underrepresented in digital health roles, particularly in technology-related roles and analytics. Women have fewer opportunities for leadership training, which is particularly notable as they occupy fewer leadership roles and fewer aspire to leadership roles. Equitable care should be considered one aspect of equity within the workforce. Policy interventions, mentorship and networking, educational reform, and changes in organisation culture are suggested strategies for balancing gender in the digital health specialist workforce.

Abstract People's life trajectories and family dynamics have become increasingly complex, bringing shifts in fertility, gender equality, work-life balance, and economic stability. The scientific challenge is to capture these complexities and understand their causes and consequences. The Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) provides key insights into these developments, serving as a vital resource for researchers and policymakers. The GGS is a cross-national longitudinal survey collecting data on individuals aged 18 to 79 across topics such as union formation, fertility, household dynamics, work, well-being, and gender attitudes. Its key strengths include cross-national comparability, a panel design with prospective and retrospective data, large sample sizes, and multi-mode data collection. The GGS consists of two rounds: GGS-I, launched in the early 2000s in over 20 countries, established a foundation for comparative research, while GGS-II, started in 2020, builds on GGS-I with methodological innovations such as mixed-mode data collection and refreshed samples. This data brief provides an overview of the GGS, outlining its development, design, implementation, and key features. It also highlights the survey's contributions to demographic and social research, and explores the new research opportunities emerging with GGS-II.

Whether couples agree on having a(nother) child is crucial for both individuals and society. While fertility research has long focused on women, recent studies emphasize the need to incorporate both partners’ perspectives. However, analyses that jointly consider men’s and women’s fertility intentions remain scarce. This focus on women has been partly driven by homogamy—the tendency for individuals to select partners with similar traits and values. Given that couples with mixed backgrounds have higher dissolution rates, they may also be less likely to share family-related beliefs. This study examines how agreement on fertility intentions varies among mixed and homogamous couples in Sweden. Using the 2021 Swedish Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) and stratifying by respondents’ gender, we find that most couples agree not to have a(nother) child, reflecting recent fertility declines. Couples where both partners are migrants exhibit the highest agreement, while mixed couples show the most disagreement and the strongest gender asymmetries in reported intentions. However, these differences are small and vary by the gender of the reporting partner. The higher disagreement among mixed couples aligns with broader research on their elevated dissolution risks. However, reverse causality is possible—value differences may be linked to other stressors, making childbearing less desirable. By highlighting the role of couple composition in fertility decision-making, our findings contribute to understanding how family formation dynamics vary across different couple types.

This study examines patterns of gender roles and division of household labourin Hungary, France, and Sweden, representing three different welfare regimes.The gender revolution has significantly changed the distribution of householdtasks, but these changes have occurred to different degrees across countries.The research aims to explore the patterns of household labour division andto investigate how attitudes towards gender roles and individual characteristicsinfluence the distribution of household tasks. Particular attention is given to thedifferences between families with and without children.Using cluster analysis and multinomial logistic regression models based ondata from the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), we analyse the distributionof household tasks and the effects of individual factors and gender attitudesamong partnered respondents aged 18–49.The findings indicate that gender role attitudes in Sweden are more modernthan in the other two countries, especially among women. Household tasks arealso shared more equally in this social-democratic welfare state. In Hungary attitudesare the most traditional, while France lies between the other two countries.In Sweden individual attitudes towards gender roles do not influence the dailydivision of household tasks, while in the other two countries they do: womenand men with more modern views tend to share household tasks more equally.The division of household labour also depends on background factors such aswomen’s labour market status and the number of children. Even in Sweden, thepresence of young children in the household pushes women to do more housework than if there were no children, and this is also true – to different degreesand depending on the age and number of children – in the other two countries.Despite progress in the gender revolution and greater equality in the labour market,educational attainment also continues to have a significant impact on thedivision of domestic tasks.

ABSTRACT Objective This study examines how mothers and fathers divide childcare tasks that interfere with paid work and whether there is an association with patterns of work and access to work flexibility. Background Childcare encompasses a range of diverse tasks, yet is persistently gendered, with women doing more than men, regardless of work arrangements. Flexible working can exacerbate childcare inequalities among working couples, but less is known about how flexible working is associated with the gender division of childcare tasks that directly interfere with the workday. Method We used the UK Generations and Gender Survey (2022–23), a stratified national probability sample, to study heterosexual couples with children under the age of 12 ( n = 1152). Using logistic regression, we analyze the gender division of specific childcare tasks and associations with work arrangements (i.e., dual earner, male/female breadwinner, and less than full‐time work) and work flexibility (i.e., doing work from home and access to flexible hours). Results Childcare tasks that interfere with the workday (i.e., staying home with ill children, getting children dressed, dropping children off at school or childcare) are particularly gendered. Fathers working from home or having access to flexible hours were associated with a higher likelihood of equally sharing these tasks; the same relationship was not found for mothers. Conclusion Fathers' access to and use of flexible working may help to address one persistent form of gender inequality.

Abstract The provision of formal childcare services holds significant potential benefits in addressing challenges posed by population ageing, labour shortages and welfare dependency. However, existing literature indicates persistent differentials in formal childcare uptake by migration background, with limited understanding of underlying demand-side factors. This study addresses this gap by comprehensively examining demographic, socio-economic, employment-related and attitudinal characteristics as potential explanations for these disparities. Utilising data from the Generations and Gender Survey across seven high-income countries, our findings reveal that whereas differentials for migrants’ descendants are limited and insignificant even without controlling for background variables, the negative differential for migrants disappears almost completely. Socio-economic status and particularly employment potential emerge as a key explanatory factors alongside differential attitudes towards maternal employment, which seem to play a role in some contexts, yet not in others. Cross-country differences in the results are discussed in the face of socio-economic gradients in formal childcare uptake, migrant-native gaps in the labour market and below-demand supply of formal childcare, yet also plead for future research interacting demand- and supply-side factors for a larger set of countries. In conclusion, this study reveals the intricate interplay of demographic, socio-economic and attitudinal factors underlying migrant–native disparities in formal childcare uptake.

Attitudes promoting “intensive parenting” are prevalent in many countries and are associated with mothering and class privilege. Are intensive parenting attitudes widespread and similarly classed in Sweden, which has historically shifted burdens off parents and reduced inequalities? Using the 2021 Generations and Gender Survey, descriptive and latent class analyses identified predominant patterns of intensive parenting attitudes and sociodemographic predictors among Swedes. Moderate population-level agreement with measures of intensive parenting attitudes obscured subgroup variability in intensive parenting profiles and a reversed relationship with class. About half of respondents, disproportionately younger, foreign-born, and female, belonged to concordant latent classes that strongly or moderately subscribed to intensive parenting attitudes. Another third belonged to a discordant class dominated by older, Swedish-born, class-advantaged respondents espousing certain aspects of intensive parenting attitudes in a distinct pattern not yet identified elsewhere. This dissonance in predominant parenting attitudes among Swedes may have interesting implications for norms and policies.

A growing number of studies has explored both partners’ education as determinant of couples’ fertility, acknowledging the fact that the decision to have a child is couple based. Still, those studies have solely focused on children born to the couple, without considering stepchildren. As a result, in studying couples’ birth rates by educational pairing, previous studies did not account for the complexity of family composition, which also affects partners’ decision to have a common child. In this paper, we aim at tackling family complexity and its association with education. Using Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS) data of 14 European countries, we analyse the association between educational pairing and couples’ fertility based on different definitions of couples’ children. Applying standard fertility analysis, overall results show a decline in childlessness among younger cohorts when stepchildren are considered, with strong educational difference. We found that among the younger cohorts, highly educated homogamous couples have less often stepchildren (born from one partner before the union) and remain less often without shared children. Stepchildren, instead, are more common among low educated couples, and among the heterogamous couples. We also found diversity among heterogamous couples: there are fewer stepchildren when one partner is highly educated, stepchildren more often come from the woman, especially when she is low educated.

BackgroundLoneliness is a significant risk factor for both mental and physical health issues, including depression and increased mortality. Loneliness is reported at higher levels during life transitions, such as the transition to motherhood. Loneliness in mothers has far-reaching detrimental impacts on both mother and child, such as an increased risk of maternal depression and child abuse. Understanding the impact of different risk factors for loneliness, specifically in young mothers, may inform potential interventions for this at-risk group. The aim of this study was to determine whether mothers were lonelier than childfree women, and whether there are different risk factors for loneliness in mothers relative to childfree women, both for gender-associated and established risk factors for loneliness.MethodsThis cross-sectional study included partnered mothers and partnered childfree women between the ages of 20 and 29 from the 2020 Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) in the Republic of Moldova. The De Jong Gierveld Loneliness Scale was used to assess overall, emotional, and social loneliness. A total of 11 potential risk factors were considered, across gender, well-being, relationships, and household status. Depending on the nature of the variables and their distributions, Wilcoxon rank-sum tests or Spearman correlation coefficients were used to assess loneliness risk factors for partnered mothers and childfree women.ResultsData from 396 mothers and 113 childfree women in the Republic of Moldova were analysed in this study. There was no significant difference between the mean overall, emotional, or social loneliness scores in partnered mothers and childfree women. A lack of sexual autonomy was a risk factor associated with social loneliness in young mothers, but not in childfree women. This was the only gendered risk factor that differed between populations. Other gendered risk factors were not significant for any types of loneliness in either population. There were differences between mothers and childfree women in several established risk factors for loneliness.ConclusionMothers were not lonelier than childfree women in this study, but a lack of sexual autonomy was a risk factor associated with loneliness only in mothers.

Abstract: This article reports on our 2022–2023 survey of US women's, gender, and sexuality studies (WGSS) practitioners. The objective of the study was to take stock of the field at a moment of accelerating neoliberal pressures experienced in US higher education related to the COVID-19 pandemic and rising right-wing politics targeting our field. Our findings include two apparent contradictions. First, while institutional metrics as reported by respondents demonstrate surprising strength and even growth in key indicators of programmatic health, WGSS practitioners self-report experiencing unprecedented levels of what we call emotional precarity—negative feelings centered around anger and worry for their programs and pessimism about their own willingness or ability to sustain their careers as WGSS academicians. Second, despite long-standing critiques of the field as unsustainable due supposedly to waning student interest in the field and in liberal arts generally, many survey participants note a surge in student enthusiasm leading to robust enrollments in WGSS courses. To understand the results and their implications for the field's future, we place our study within the larger, transnational context of challenges currently and recently facing WGSS academicians globally. Drawing on interviews we conducted with twenty-five leading feminist academics in 2022 and 2023 in countries where the field has come under particularly severe statist attacks, we conclude our report with a discussion of how illiberal targeting of our field may, potentially and paradoxically, reconnect our field to its activist roots in ways that replenish and renew WGSS practitioners' commitment and ability to carry the field forward.