Abstract: In Existentialism Is a Humanism, Jean‑Paul Sartre outlines the fundamental principles, the alpha and omega, of existentialist philosophy. He begins his iconic lecture with the central claim that existence precedes essence, asserting that human beings first exist and only later define their essence through their choices, attitudes, and actions. According to Sartre, individuals must therefore assume full responsibility for the decisions they make, leaving no room for predetermined values or moral codes imposed by society or religion. In this sense, existentialism emphasizes subjective freedom and moral autonomy. Sartre further argues that existentialism does not lead to despair or nihilism. On the contrary, it empowers individuals by making them the creators of their own destiny. By declaring that life has no inherent or pre-given meaning, Sartre does not suggest that life is futile; rather, he insists that each person must create meaning through authentic commitment and action. Freedom thus becomes the central principle of existentialism, yet this freedom is inseparable from immense responsibility. Every individual, through their choices, implicitly affirms values not only for themselves but for humanity as a whole. Responding to critics who accuse existentialism of promoting moral chaos, Sartre defends the deeply humanistic character of his philosophy. He emphasizes existentialism’s concern with human reality, personal freedom, and ethical responsibility. Rather than endorsing moral nihilism, Sartre argues that existentialism calls for a profound ethical awareness grounded in individual responsibility rather than externally imposed moral systems. Consequently, it encourages individuals to develop an authentic moral code through conscious choice and responsible action. Key words: Existentialism, Humanism, Existence precedes essence, Freedom, Responsibility, Anguish, Abandonment, Despair, Subjectivity, Authenticity, Self-creation, Individuality, Moral responsibility, Consciousness, Nothingness

This article critically examines the fundamental tenets of neurodeterminism in the discussion of free will, focusing on three key methodological issues: the personification of the brain as an independent actor, the assumed direct correspondence between neural processes and mental states, and the relationship between action predictability and free will. Through a comprehensive theoretical analysis and four empirical studies involving native Russian and English speakers, the research challenges the neurodeterministic perspective. The studies reveal that, at the level of basic linguistic intuition, free will can coexist with action predictability. Participants consistently interpreted actions as free when they were consciously performed, regardless of their predictability. The research highlights that a necessary condition for discussing free will is conscious awareness of the action, with bodily movements outside conscious control not being considered free.

ABSTRACT There are several important philosophical problems to which quantum mechanics is often said to have made significant contributions: Determinism: quantum theory has been taken to refute determinism; Free Will: in turn, this is thought to open the door to free will; The mind-body problem: relatedly, it is sometimes said to shed light on consciousness; Idealism: more radically, quantum theory is assumed to have refuted realism and to have placed the observer at the centre of the world; Reductionism: even granting realism, it has been claimed that quantum theory undermines reductionism. Our main thesis in this paper is that none of this is either necessary or desirable. By adopting the de Broglie–Bohm theory (or Bohmian mechanics), one can straightforwardly account for quantum phenomena without endorsing any of these claims.

Previous studies have examined different variables related to trust in science and associated trust in science with personal or psychological variables. In this study, we assessed the role of personal agency beliefs (free will, scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability) and personality traits, focusing on the psychological underpinnings of trust in science. The study, which was conducted with 1019 individuals from a Turkish sample, revealed that psychological factors were more strongly predictive of trust in science than demographic factors. The results showed that free will and scientific determinism were associated with trust in science. In addition, individuals with conscientious personality traits were found to have higher confidence in science. By emphasizing the role of psychological factors, our study reveals the importance of supporting the relationship between science and society with more comprehensive research in the future.

Previous research suggests undermining free will belief can have detrimental effects, but few studies have examined whether there may also be benefits to tempering a belief in free will. Two experiments examined whether exposure to arguments for determinism would increase forgiveness of self and others. In Study 1, 260 participants wrote about a time they hurt someone, then were exposed to either a free will or determinism condition, where they read material consistent with those positions. Those exposed to arguments in favor of determinism were subsequently more self-forgiving. In Study 2, 262 participants exposed to arguments in favor of determinism were more forgiving and less hateful toward a transgressor after writing about a time they were hurt by someone else. Results indicate that undermining free will belief may encourage forgiveness of self and others, and suggest there may be potential upsides to tempering a belief in free will.

Determining the time of ownership transfer in sales contracts is one of the fundamental and complex issues in civil law, influenced by the parties’ will and the contractual conditions. In the legal systems of Iran and Iraq, the principle of freedom of will plays an important role in this regard, although its scope and limitations differ in each system. Under Iranian law, the parties may freely determine the time of ownership transfer, provided that such agreement does not conflict with public order or good morals. In the absence of an explicit stipulation in the contract, the legislator presumes the time of delivery of the goods or performance of obligations as the moment of ownership transfer. In contrast, under Iraqi law, the parties’ intention is also recognized; however, specific statutory provisions and judicial interpretations can restrict this freedom, particularly when the lack of a clearly defined transfer time may lead to the infringement of one party’s rights or a breach of fairness. In such circumstances, courts may determine the time of ownership transfer based on the contractual terms and the prevailing circumstances. The main difference between these two legal systems lies in their approach to cases where the transfer time is not explicitly determined: Iranian law defaults to the time of delivery or fulfillment of obligations, whereas Iraqi law may leave the determination of this time to judicial interpretation.

On “Free Will”

This paper is an attempt to present Nicolai Hartmann’s philosophy of freedom in the context of selected assumptions in the dispute between compatibilism and incompatibilism. Hartmann’s concept of freedom is based on his ontological theory of stratified reality. The multitude of strata of reality constitutes an ontological field for the category of determination, which affects the subject on many levels. An ontology of freedom rooted in the concept of determination could suggest that there cannot be any place for free will in such a structure. Hartmann, however, argues for the possibility of reconciling free will with numerous forms of determination, but above all for the necessity of the existence of relations between them for the possibility of the existence of free will. According to him, we can speak of free will only when at least two types of determination overlap. Such a view is defined as a concept of determinational pluralism. As Hartmann emphasises, deterministic monism can be a real threat to free will as much as indeterministic randomness, so he criticises ontological assumptions of indeterminism as unable to justify either negative or positive freedom. On the other hand, even the closeness of Hartmann’s deterministic ontology to the assumptions of compatibilists also prevents Hartmann from being unequivocally classified as a compatibilist. Considering this, I will try to show that Hartmann’s complex concept of freedom exceeds both classical positions and their assumptions and proposes an ontological and axiological argumentation for the subject’s autonomy. But not without some antinomies.

The question of patient agency in medical contexts demands frameworks that transcend the sterile dichotomy between mechanistic determinism and abstract libertarian autonomy. This essay builds upon my previous work on hermeneutic medicine, therapeutic tzimtzum, and the sacred-profane dialectic to reconceptualize patient agency as a relational, emergent phenomenon rather than an intrinsic property. Drawing on recent neuroscience (readiness potentials, addiction neurobiology), clinical realities (adherence challenges, chronic pain), and Jewish mystical theology (tzimtzum, Shekhinah, the broken vav), I argue that the therapeutic encounter itself creates the possibility space within which patient agency emerges. This framework has immediate implications for addiction treatment, medication adherence, and the moral dimensions of clinical practice, suggesting that the physician's role involves not assessing pre-existing capacity but co-creating conditions for maximal patient agency through therapeutic presence and sacred attention.

Kamala Das as a Symbol of Free Will: A Critical Study on 'Summer in Calcutta'

The present special issue is a direct result of the research project Providence and Free Will in the Models of Classical Theism and Analytic Theism (PROLITECA: PID2021-122633NB-100), funded by the Ministry of Science and Innovation of the Government of Spain, which sought to address this gap by articulating two central and interconnected hypotheses. The first is that theories of divine providence and human freedom are partly shaped by meta-theological frameworks, including methodological approaches such as Perfect Being Theology, as well as more general views about the aims, scope, and limits of philosophical theology. The second is that different accounts of providence both presuppose and inform distinct pictures of God, especially with respect to divine attributes such as simplicity, immutability, impassibility, which are specific to Classical Theism. Together, these two dimensions suggest that debates about providence cannot be adequately assessed in isolation from broader questions about method and about the nature of God.

In N.A. Berdyaev's work, a significant place is occupied by his studies of Russian history and, within this framework, his research on Soviet history. To characterize N.A. Berdyaev's socio-political behavior in the last years of his life, researchers use the definition “Soviet orientation” that he himself proposed, which he understood as a moment in the actualization of the “Russian idea” that he was the herald of. However, researchers have not always taken into account the contradictory content of this definition, and it is presented as a clear and positive attitude of the philosopher towards Soviet reality. The emergence of the concept of “Soviet orientation” is associated with different understandings of patriotism by N.A. Berdyaev and the Russian diaspora, as well as with their different political positions during the Great Patriotic War and in the post-war period. However, N.A. Berdyaev's recognition of the national character of Soviet statehood made it impossible to reconcile his philosophy of freedom with the practices of Stalin's totalitarianism. The very reality of the situation compelled the philosopher to a decisive break with Stalinist socialism, and in his article “The Third Exodus” he declares his affiliation with Christian socialism, the religious-philosophical justification for which is provided in V.S. Solovyov's teaching on history as a God-human process. By identifying Soviet Russia with “eternal Russia”, N.A. Berdyaev makes the Russian people the main subject of history. In this case, the epithet “Soviet” indicates not the political, but the national content of N.A. Berdyaev's “orientation”.

Recent advances in the field of neuroscience are currently casting doubts on the existence of something like free will. This has raised a controversy between those who think that the obliteration of free will is incompatible with holding people responsible for their actions and those who think the other way round. This paper seeks to overcome the problem by investigating the possibility that law could do without free will. An argument to this effect has been advanced by Hans Kelsen in the second edition of his Pure Theory of Law. This argument is discussed in sections 2-4 of the paper. The conclusion is that Kelsen’s attempt to found law on deterministic grounds does not fit with his legal doctrine, which seems to imply that the answer to the question in the title of this paper is negative. Nevertheless, there is a point in Kelsen’s rejection of free will, which can be vindicated. Section 5 introduces and discusses an argument that, although alien to Kelsen’s thought, seems to better account for his claim that responsibility does not in any way presuppose free will.

The article aims to present, on the basis of G. K. Chesterton’s selected writings, how significant, if not crucial, the issue of free will is in his thought. References to free will in the writer’s non-fictional works, including, for instance, his Autobiography and Everlasting Man, form the background for a more detailed analysis of the issue under discussion in one of Chesterton’s Father Brown stories, “The Man with Two Beards.” For Chesterton, man’s free will prevents them from being paralysed and enchained, guaranteeing, for instance, the culprit’s potential to become reformed. The writer’s article “The Mediaeval Villain,” with its reflection on mediaeval mentality in the context of approaching villainy/human wickedness and free will, proves to be especially noteworthy when reading it along with the short story mentioned above. Mentions of other selected Father Brown stories featuring motifs relevant to the discussed topic also appear.

The emergence of freedom in the mind and the positioning of will in action is a topic worthy of attention in epistemology and political thought, to understand the reasons for the decline of rationality, the closure of spaces of freedom, and human subjugation in Islamic civilization, which possesses a history spanning several centuries. Approaching and comparing the epistemological and political foundations of two great schools - namely the Mu'tazila school, primarily represented by Judge Abd al-Jabbar al-Mu'tazili as a main theorist of this trend, and the critical idealism school headed by Immanuel Kant, which belong to different eras and distinct civilizations - opens the door to modern answers, especially regarding some fundamental human and political issues such as autonomy and will in the realm of action guided by reason. This leads us to conclude that the epistemological, intellectual, and political problems that have swept society today are, in essence, not related to the absence of necessary materials for progress toward rationality and freedom, and this is not an inevitable fate for this civilization from which escape is impossible, but rather relates to methodology, the context of realization, and the position of reason. The transcendental basis of reason as form and content of will in freedom makes it transcend the law of causality, and free will is not the result of any external cause. This is evident in the Mu'tazila's direct action (as opposed to generated action) and the thing-in-itself (nomena) in Kant, which becomes the basis of autonomy, where humans must be legislators for themselves and subject to categorical imperatives. The thesis of will in Mu'tazila and Kantian thought becomes a solid philosophical foundation for a political theory based on rationality and a democratic consultative contractual system, where will and action are directed toward good and establish a system compatible with universal ethics. The contractual system as consent of the people and ruler in Mu'tazila thought, if it does not fulfill its basic goals, paves the ground for rational revolution and considers it legitimate. However, regarding Kant's political system, the rule of law and constitution always takes priority over revolution, so Mu'tazila political thought is more radical than Kant's political philosophy. The ethical and political principles of Mu'tazila have universal value and represent a bright point in the history of Islamic civilization. However, the problem of philosophical crystallization caused infiltration into their intellectual system, and instead of transcending consciousness by defining the limits of authority's dominance and expanding the scope of freedom, they became an ideological apparatus of the state. When their creative ideas clashed with popular consciousness, people experienced a kind of alienation, and this led to collapse. In contrast to the Kantian project, which became the beginning of Western modernity and the modern state, establishing the rule of law and international institutions somewhat aligned with Kant's philosophical and ethical ideas. Keywords: Free Will, Rational Action, Universal ethic, state of right.

Abstract The debate over ikhtiyār (free will) and divine predestination has long occupied a central place in Islamic theological discourse, supported by various Qur’anic verses and prophetic traditions that seem to affirm both positions. This study aims to compare the perspectives of Ash‘arite theology and Ibn ‘Arabi’s Sufi thought regarding the relationship between human will and divine decree. The research employs a comparative analytical method using a library-based approach. The findings reveal that Al-Ash‘ari explains human agency through the concept of kasb (acquisition), which situates human actions within the overarching will of God. Meanwhile, Ibn ‘Arabi approaches the issue through the concept of ḥukm (divine determination), emphasizing that all human actions unfold within the scope of God’s ontological decree. Both scholars critique the notion of absolute free will and lean more strongly toward predestination. These insights contribute to a more balanced understanding of the interplay between human freedom and divine will in Islamic theology. Keywords: Al-Ash'ari; Free Will; Ibn 'Arabi; Predestination

Abstract This research discusses Jabariyah and Qadariyah thoughts in the qaḍā' and qadar discourse. The skewed implications of the concepts of qaḍā' and qadar from the Jabariyah and Qadariyah discourses are a problem in this research. The difference with previous studies is that it places more emphasis on discourses of thought that develop epistemologically. This research method is library research using a descriptive analysis approach. The findings of this research show that Jabariyah thinking in matters of qaḍā' and qadar leads to placing humans bound by the will of Allah. Qadariyah thinking in matters of qaḍā' and qadar leads to placing humans separately from the will of Allah. The synthesis of Jabariyah thought discourse as thesis and Qadariyah thought as the antithesis is Allah determines human destiny from the very beginning, but humans also have a role in making it happen through effort. The recommendation on the findings of this study has implications for subsequent studies, namely not only analyzing the conceptual aspects of a problem, but emphasizing the analysis of applicable ideas to address the problem comprehensively. Keywords: Free Will; God’s Will; Jabariyah; Qadariyah; Qaḍā’ and Qadar

Abstract This article focuses on addressing the ‘Free Will Objection’ to universalism ( apokatastasis (‘restoration’))—a view held by individuals such as St. Gregory of Nyssa. The objection stems from an apparent conflict between necessary universal salvation and libertarian free will, which requires the genuine ability to reject God. Using Robert Kane’s theory of libertarian freedom, I demonstrate how all rational beings can necessarily yet freely develop characters that ultimately choose divine reconciliation, thus maintaining both the inevitability of universal salvation and authentic free will.

This study examined the relationship between belief in free will (BFW) and job performance among nurses during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a particular focus on the mediating roles of grit and positive affect in this relationship. Job performance is a critical aspect of nursing management, influencing patient care, nurses' career trajectories, and organizational effectiveness, especially during pandemics like COVID-19. Understanding the individual-level psychosocial factors contributing to nurses' job performance is therefore essential. This study used a cross-sectional, descriptive survey design and adhered to the STROBE reporting guidelines. From January 2021 to May 2022, 709 Chinese nurses in Chengdu and Kunming completed a web-based questionnaire survey that included validated measures of BFW, grit, positive affect, job performance, and Big Five personality traits. Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, and common method bias analyses were first conducted using IBM SPSS 25.0 software. Multiple mediation analyses were then conducted using the SPSS PROCESS macro. We found a moderate to large positive relationship between nurses' BFW and their job performance (r = 0.44, p < 0.001). Furthermore, this relationship was mediated by both grit and positive affect, with a significant serial mediation effect observed (p < 0.05 for all). Importantly, our findings remained significant after controlling for Big Five personality traits. Our study reveals a robust link between BFW and job performance in nurses and identifies grit and positive affect as key mediators of this relationship. Nursing leaders can improve their nurses' job performance by cultivating BFW and developing a supportive and empowering work environment to increase nurses' grit and positive affect.

Thefollowing article engages in a philosophical polemic with selected theses from the bookDetermined: The Science of Life Without Free Will by the eminent neurobiologist RobertM. Sapolsky. The aim of this text, though, is not to refute the hard determinism advocatedby Sapolsky, but rather to problematise the cognitive horizon in which is the backdrop forhis arguments for the nonexistence of free will. Therefore, the thesis I will formulate atthe end of this discussion — as a form of opposition to Sapolsky’s claim that science hasreliably and unequivocally proven the impossibility of the existence of free will — is notso much the statement that “free will exists” but rather the assertion that “the belief thatscience has already resolved the free will debate — thereby rendering it moot — is false”.In subsequent sections of the text, I analyse certain philosophical assumptions and conclusions that are central to the coherence of the argument presented in Determined. I begin by discussing Sapolsky’s understanding of the concept of free will and demonstrating that the meaning given to this term by the neuroscientist is de facto paradoxical. Next, I critically examine the concept of determination. I am primarily interested in whether its universal and widespread character truly opens the way to explaining all phenomena. Finally, in the last sections of the text, I will attempt to question the validity of the mechanical­‐reductiveapproach to explaining human activity.