Franco-German Partnership Research Articles

France and Germany have historically played pivotal roles in formulating and advancing the economic policy of the European Union. The conceptual frameworks of German ordoliberalism and French dirigisme underpin the dual foundations of European economic integration. The United Kingdom’s departure from the EU has reconfigured the composition of the Union’s core, amplifying Germany’s significance. This shift simultaneously elevates the Franco-German partnership while rendering France’s position within the Union increasingly contingent upon its tangible economic strength. This article seeks to examine the evolving role of France within the EU’s economic architecture, identify critical long-term trends, and forecast possible realignments in the balance of power within EU economic governance. The analysis includes an overview of France’s intellectual and executive contributions to European economic and monetary policies, followed by a comparative assessment of international statistical data, emphasizing GDP dynamics, demographic trends, per capita income, trade balance, and R&D investment.The findings reveal that, despite being the EU’s second-largest economy, France has exerted a disproportionate influence on the Union’s economic governance, surpassing that of any other member state. French representation in the upper echelons of EU economic and financial policymaking has been unmatched. In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, French dirigisme is experiencing a resurgence of relevance.Nevertheless, France’s share of the EU’s overall GDP has been progressively declining, even as its demographic contribution to the Union has grown. With respect to per capita income, France ranks 10th among EU member states, marking the lowest position among the core economies. The aftermath of the global financial crisis and the eurozone debt crisis has led to a significant erosion of France’s international competitiveness. Should these trends persist, projections indicate that France’s GDP per capita will fall below the EU average by the end of the decade, potentially signaling a shift from core to semi-peripheral status. This development would exacerbate the asymmetry within the Franco-German axis, complicating efforts to recalibrate EU economic governance and policy direction.

A significant foundation of European stability after World War II has been the balance of power between the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Germany. The UK’s accession to the European Communities (EC) in 1973 had carried that ‘balance’ into the EC’s institutional framework. In this regard, the UK’s withdrawal from EU structures may lead to an important political and financial vacuum at the center of the Union. In the wake of Brexit, indications of anxiety and concerns about power imbalances have emerged around the question of which country or counties will steer the Union. There exit fresh post-Brexit assessments that indicate that the UK’s departure from the EU may catalyze the differences between Germany and France. This paper will discuss three essential scenarios for the EU’s political and economic future direction, namely, French leadership, German leadership, and a Franco-German partnership, for the post-Brexit period.

With the signing of the EU–UK trade and cooperation agreement in December 2020, the configurations of Brexit have started to become clearer. The first consequences of the UK’s decision to leave the EU have become visible, both in the UK and in the EU. This thematic issue focuses on a relatively under-researched aspect of Brexit—what the UK withdrawal has meant and means for the EU. Using new empirical data and covering most (if not all) of the post-2016 referendum period, it provides a first overall assessment of the impact of Brexit on the main EU institutions, institutional rules and actors. The articles in the issue reveal that EU institutions and actors changed patterns of behaviour and norms well before the formal exit of the UK in January 2020. They have adopted ‘counter-measures’ to cope with the challenges of the UK withdrawal—be it new organizational practices in the Parliament, different network dynamics in the Council of the EU or the strengthening of the Franco-German partnership. In this sense, the Union has—so far—shown significant resilience in the wake of Brexit.

Following the UK’s decision to leave the EU, British foreign and defence policy discourse has been inspired by the “Global Britain” narrative. But this narrative only makes sense as far as Britain is able to establish or maintain ambitious partnerships either with the EU or with individual member states. This paper analyses the rationale behind the deepening of bilateral cooperation with France in order to show that it remains crucial if Britain wants to maintain its role as one of the main actors in European defence and security policy.Ten years after the signing of the November 2010 Lancaster House treaties on defence and security and on nuclear cooperation, this paper uses a role theory approach to recall the strategic, political and economic rationales for bilateral cooperation and examine the current state of Franco-British relations. Brexit puts this cooperation at risk – with Emmanuel Macron calling for a stronger EU based on a reinforced Franco-German partnership – and recent developments in defence cooperation in Europe – with the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the creation of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) – raise questions about the respective roles of France and the UK. But this paper also shows that the current international context reinforces the case for close Franco-British defence and security relations that are beneficial for both partners, as well as for the EU.

For the first time in Russian-language historiography on the basis of an analysis of the most important components of Franco-German cooperation in the field of higher education the evolution of cooperation between higher education institutions of France and Germany in the post-war period is presented. The prerequisites for Franco-German cooperation after the Second World War are determined. The evolution of academic mobility between these countries is considered. The results of activities to create equivalents of documents on higher education in France and Germany are revealed. The Franco-German joint institutions of higher education are characterized. The aim of this work is to consider the evolution of cooperation between France and Germany in the field of higher education in the post-war period of time through the prism of its key aspects. The relevance of this study is due to the lack of research on this issue in Russian-language historiography. In addition, the study of Franco-German relations in the field of science and higher education in the post-war period is also of practical importance, since the experience of this cooperation, or its individual aspects, can be used in the field of higher education and science of our state. As a result of the analysis of key aspects of the Franco-German university cooperation, the following stages were identified in bilateral cooperation. 1. Establishment of Franco-German educational cooperation (1949–1963) – a period of post-war contradictions and the emergence of academic mobility between universities in France and Germany. The intensification of Franco-German cooperation in higher education was due to the unfolding Cold War and the ongoing process of European integration: the cultural sphere acted as a means of overcoming Franco-German antagonism. 2. Franco-German cooperation after the conclusion of the Treaty of Elysee (1963 – the end of the 1970s) – a period of expansion of academic mobility and the creation of new tools for its implementation; at the same time, this period of cooperation was marked by a shift in the attention of the governments of France and Germany towards national education issues. 3. The beginning of the process of institutionalization of Franco-German cooperation (late 1970s – 1993). The transition to the third stage of cooperation is due to the emergence of new trends in bilateral educational partnerships: the creation of coordinating institutes and joint educational institutions and the beginning of solving the problem of equivalence of diplomas. 4. The cooperation of France and Germany after the formation of the EU in 1993 – the Franco-German partnership at the present stage and within the European Higher Education Area. The implementation of the provisions of the Bologna Agreement in practice significantly unified the higher education systems of France and Germany, which facilitated bilateral academic exchanges, and the two countries’ participation in European educational programs became an additional incentive for their intensification.

This article assesses the influence of the Franco-German partnership on the development of an EU foreign and security policy since the 1990s, in order to see whether political cohesion between the two member states is a necessary and sufficient condition for the EU to emerge as an actor in the international arena. Based on a methodology using secondary literature in a systematic way, the argument unfolds in three parts: first, the article looks at the political cohesion between the two member states in terms of both the building and the content of the EU’s foreign and security policy. Then, it seeks to establish a correlation between Franco-German cohesion and the existence of an EU position, or lack thereof. Finally, the last section explains why the Franco-German cohesion is a necessary but insufficient condition for the EU to gain actorness, by looking at other variables pertaining to: domestic politics, European politics and the international environment. Four models of interaction between the Franco-German cohesion and these other variables are developed: effective consensus; ineffective consensus; diffuse consensus; blocking dissensus.

In late-March 2019 the United Kingdom is scheduled to leave the European Union. Will Brexit lead to Germany becoming the EU’s hegemon? The commentary explores the likely impact of Brexit on policy areas and intergovernmental politics in the EU. It focuses on the sources of German hegemony: structural, ideational and diplomatic power as well as the need for Germany’s role to be legitimate amongst partner states and to have domestic support. Two scenarios are suggested: the Franco-German partnership’s revival or a form of German hegemony.

This article analyses the ideational footprint of the euro in regional monetary integration. Upon the basis of over 70 financial elite interviews in China, Brazil and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries we find empirical evidence to suggest that EMU triggered considerable symbolic effects in stimulating regional monetary cooperation up to the recent Eurozone crisis. Nonetheless, our analysis coincides with Cohen’s in being sceptical about the possibility of monetary unions in Latin America, the GCC and East Asia. This is partly explained by a lack of sense of community in these regions. However, where we revise Cohen’s work is in the notion that monetary unions require a regional leader. EMU stands out because it is primarily based on the Franco-German partnership (which remains crucial for its survival) and not on Germany’s leadership. This joint leadership is absent in our three case study regions and thus might explain why progress towards monetary union has been limited.

Economics was central to Europe’s problems in the early 1980s and its successes after 1985. But to view the European Community solely in this manner disregards the enduring importance of the quest for European peace. European leaders used the integration process as a mechanism to influence East–West relations and the Middle East. Peace rhetoric and symbolism sustained the core Franco-German partnership. European integration was crucial to the continent’s ability to peacefully absorb a huge shock in the form of German unification. And the Community’s role in exporting democracy, first to southern Europe, then to Eastern Europe, confirmed that integration was about more than just the Single Market.

Waterloo has always been overshadowed by the 1813 Battle of Leipzig in German national memory. Given the salient contribution of Prussian, Hanoverian, Brunswick and Nassau troops to the final victory over Napoleon, this reticence may at first glance seem surprising. Jasper Heinzen contends that Waterloo failed to become a symbol of national achievement in the nineteenth century because of the regional and political fissures it laid bare. If the First World War produced a consensus at last, the price was a subversion of the Anglo-German comradeship so integral to the original event. The resulting mnemonic distortions and, since the Second World War, Franco-German partnership have served to keep Waterloo on the sidelines, yet the battle still holds important lessons for policy-makers today.

Em 2013 o Tratado do Eliseu, de amizade e cooperação entre França e Alemanha completa 50 anos. O modelo de bilateralismo complementar por ele estabelecido instituiu um modelo de cooperação bem sucedido, de cujas características beneficiou-se tanto a dupla franco-alemã quanto o itinerário mesmo da União Europeia. A política externa de Paris e Berlim, tornada política interna à Europa, inspira a arquitetura da política externa e de segurança comum, cujo desenvolvimento somente começou com o Tratado de Lisboa, de 2009, cujos entraves operacionais subsistem. O texto dos tratados ecoa a parceria franco-alemã e registra as superposições institucionais remanescentes.

The need for a new Franco-German partnership in space: A joint policy memorandum

Towards New Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia:Lessons from the Franco-German Coalition

The EPR is a third-generation pressurized water reactor (PWR). Its development was started in 1992 by Framatome and Siemens within a Franco-German partnership. Since 2001 this work has been continued by Framatome ANP, which was formed when the two companies merged their nuclear businesses. The French company AREVA, world market leader in nuclear technology, holds a 66% share in Framatome ANP, with Siemens owning 34%. From the very start, development of the EPR was focused on improving plant safety and economics even further. The new reactor development was jointly financed together with the leading power utilities of both countries. The first steps towards realization of an EPR nuclear power plant were taken at Olkiluoto, Finland in 2004 [1][2], consisting of initial preparation of the construction site. By mid-February 2005 the local municipality – Eurajoki – had issued a construction permit, and the Finnish Government a construction license pursuant to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act. This had been preceded by a preliminary safety assessment prepared by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) for the Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry in which STUK verified that it did not see any safety-related issues opposing issuance of the nuclear construction license. STUK emphasized that the evolutionary design of the EPR had been further improved by AREVA compared to the previous product lines. Concreting work began this spring and the unit will start commercial operation in 2009. Construction of an EPR has also been given the political go-ahead in France. According to the utility Electricité de France (EDF) the new reactor will be built as a forerunner of a later series at the site of Flamanville in Normandy. Construction is scheduled to begin in 2007. An EPR nuclear power plant has a rated electric capacity of around 1600 MW, depending on specific site conditions. Being the product of intense bilateral cooperation the EPR combines the technological accomplishments of the world's two leading PWR product lines – France's N4 and Germany's Konvoi. At the same time it incorporates a new class of safety: its highly advanced safety systems represent a further enhancement of the high safety level already provided by nuclear plants currently in operation in Germany and France. To attain the specified safety goals, measures have been taken to further reduce the probability of occurrence of core damage and to also ensure that all consequences of a (hypothetical) accident involving core melt remain restricted to the plant itself. The EPR has additionally made great progress in terms of low power generating costs, conservation of natural resources, and minimization of waste volumes. From the viewpoint of the European nuclear community, it therefore demonstrates nuclear energy's excellent prospects for the future as an economical option for carbondioxide-free base-load power generation in our liberalized power markets.

Franco-German Cooperation Faced with New Challenges, by Rudolf Scharping The development of Western Europe and, on a larger scale, peace in Europe dépend upon the Franco-German partnership, the reconciliation of the two countries who have been rivals up until the middle of this century, their integration into the Community as a whole and the cooperation between the two. Nevertheless, events in Eastern Europe since 1989 require a more daring Franco-German approach to the new European, or even global situation marked by the inevitable rapprochement between the two halves of our continent and the increasingly urgent problems faced by the southern hemisphere of our planet.