Franco-German Cooperation Research Articles

The economic integration has been the most important agenda since the Second World War particularly in Europe because many European nations were heavily destroyed and ruined. After the severe destruction, European political leaders started to rethink how to restore Europe economically and politically in order to establish a long-term peace in Europe. The two major countries, France and Germany, initiated this based on reconciliation processes and signed on the Elysee Treaty that is legally binding and known as the de jour approach. Unfortunately, East Asian countries, Japan and South Korea took a different path, without reconciliation processes, based on the de facto approach only for economic cooperation. As a result, it is not solid yet, but contains fragile risks for the two countries to cooperate in a sustainable way. This paper investigates how and why Franco-German tandem has played core roles in the EU integration. Furthermore, it argues what are successful factors for Franco-German cooperation. Last, but not least, it analyzes whether the Franco-German model can be adapted for the Japan-Korea economic cooperation or not. Received: 31 January 2024Accepted: 05 March 2024

Thank you very much for agreeing to this interview. Several bilateral treaties and agreements between institutions have sought to deepen cultural cooperation between Germany and France in recent years. What could be the critical factors that will influence and shape Franco-German cooperation in the museum sector? Julie Sissia (JS): The Franco-German Berlin Declaration, signed at the end of the Franco-German Council of Ministers on 31 May 2021, defined as priorities in the field of museum cooperation the study of collections from colonial contexts, as well as youth, civic initiatives, digital technology, and mediation. 1 * Julie Sissia is the scientific project manager of the French-German Research Funding for Provenance Research on cultural goods from sub-Saharan Africa and is currently based in Berlin at the Centre Marc Bloch. She has been a Research Fellow at the German Center for Art History in Paris (Deutsches Forum für Kunstgeschichte, or DFK Paris) and holds a PhD in Art History from Sciences Po Paris. Her research focuses on the history of exhibitions and art criticism through the lens of Franco-German relations from the second half of the 20th century to the present. She has been awarded several postdoctoral fellowships, including one from the Anna Polke Foundation in Cologne. At the DFK Paris she had worked within the ERC funded project "OwnReality. To Each His Own Reality. The notion of the real in the fine arts of France, West Germany, East Germany and Poland between 1960 and 1989" (https://www.dfk-paris.org/en/ownreality).

In this article I describe the evolution of German media studies, and I do so with an awareness of the selection, exclusion, and canonization at work in this procedure. I explain the emergence of media studies in Germany from a cultural studies research desideratum. I do this with a concern for the establishment and institutionalization of media studies in Germany within the mainly German-national scientific community as well as German-language cultural studies. I focus primarily on the first two decades of the institutionalization of media studies as an academic discipline, with an attendant concern for the social and intellectual forces at work during that epoch. I then link all of this to more recent turns in media studies, with a concern for its central questions and methodological approaches. I conclude with a note regarding the outlook for German media studies. Though film studies has a certain place in media studies, and many scholars see film studies as the core discipline in media studies, I do not discuss film studies in this article. It deserves an article on its own. Neither do I address some of the crucial progenitors of media studies, including media theories of the 1920s or the relevant writings since Greek antiquity that reflect on textual media and cultural artifacts.

The article examines the prerequisites for european monetary integration after the World War II, as well as the stages of the formation of the EU Economic and Monetary Union. The aim of the study is to identify the internal and external factors of european monetary integration, as well as the role of Franco-German cooperation in this process. As a result of the study, the author comes to the conclusion that the european monetary integration was facilitated by both external factors: the influence of the United States in the post-war recovery of destroyed european economy and financial system, as well as the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates; and internal: the successful economic integration of countries and the further desire to remove all barriers, including financial ones, to internal trade. Franco-German cooperation played a significant role in european monetary integration. The positions of the countries on the basic principles of the functioning of the euro zone differed: France defended the flexibility of the monetary union, and Germany, fearing to lose control over the stability of the economy, advocated the harmonization of the economic policies of states. Nevertheless, the countries were able to form a common position and to end the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union on time, introducing the euro.

The study is focused on the COVID 19 pandemic as a challenge for Franco-German leadership in the European Union. The authors investigate whether joint actions by Berlin and Paris can strengthen the EU’s resilience to crises. As it is shown, the first isolationist reaction of the EU states to pandemic was followed by their attempts to find a common decision. The negotiations on an anti-crisis plan were complicated by the division of the European Union states into opposing camps. Two projects proposed by them – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the “coronabonds” – reflected the narrow interests of rich, frugal “Northern” and economically modest “Southern” groups, and failed. In contrast, the Franco-German cooperation became a breakthrough. In March-April 2020, Germany and France opposed each other, supporting ESM and coronabonds, respectfully. In May-June 2020, A. Merkel and E. Macron agreed to a compromise and came up with a unified position. While Germany left “frugal” group by agreeing to allocate money to support the “South” without insisting on mandatory reforms, and endorsed the idea of joint debt obligations, France refused to support the “Southern” coronabond project and agreed to the mediation of the EU Commission. That gave new breath to negotiations where a new regrouping of countries took place: the “South” states failing to defend coronabonds supported the Franco-German plan based on subsidies, while the “frugals” put forward an alternative based on loans. The EU Commission’s project which included both proposals was discussed in July 2020: at that moment, the Franco-German tandem backed by the “South” states had to persuade both the “frugal” and the East- European states. Finally, the EU Commission’s plan promoted by Merkel and Macron was adopted, though with serious adjustments. The authors conclude that the Franco-German alliance has confirmed its capability to strengthen the European Union resilience, but its leadership is no longer unconditional, and in the future, they should take into account the interests of the EU regional groups. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

In light of increasing doubts about US security guarantees, the idea of a greater role for the French nuclear deterrent in European security has gained a certain amount of traction, including among...

For the first time in Russian-language historiography on the basis of an analysis of the most important components of Franco-German cooperation in the field of higher education the evolution of cooperation between higher education institutions of France and Germany in the post-war period is presented. The prerequisites for Franco-German cooperation after the Second World War are determined. The evolution of academic mobility between these countries is considered. The results of activities to create equivalents of documents on higher education in France and Germany are revealed. The Franco-German joint institutions of higher education are characterized. The aim of this work is to consider the evolution of cooperation between France and Germany in the field of higher education in the post-war period of time through the prism of its key aspects. The relevance of this study is due to the lack of research on this issue in Russian-language historiography. In addition, the study of Franco-German relations in the field of science and higher education in the post-war period is also of practical importance, since the experience of this cooperation, or its individual aspects, can be used in the field of higher education and science of our state. As a result of the analysis of key aspects of the Franco-German university cooperation, the following stages were identified in bilateral cooperation. 1. Establishment of Franco-German educational cooperation (1949–1963) – a period of post-war contradictions and the emergence of academic mobility between universities in France and Germany. The intensification of Franco-German cooperation in higher education was due to the unfolding Cold War and the ongoing process of European integration: the cultural sphere acted as a means of overcoming Franco-German antagonism. 2. Franco-German cooperation after the conclusion of the Treaty of Elysee (1963 – the end of the 1970s) – a period of expansion of academic mobility and the creation of new tools for its implementation; at the same time, this period of cooperation was marked by a shift in the attention of the governments of France and Germany towards national education issues. 3. The beginning of the process of institutionalization of Franco-German cooperation (late 1970s – 1993). The transition to the third stage of cooperation is due to the emergence of new trends in bilateral educational partnerships: the creation of coordinating institutes and joint educational institutions and the beginning of solving the problem of equivalence of diplomas. 4. The cooperation of France and Germany after the formation of the EU in 1993 – the Franco-German partnership at the present stage and within the European Higher Education Area. The implementation of the provisions of the Bologna Agreement in practice significantly unified the higher education systems of France and Germany, which facilitated bilateral academic exchanges, and the two countries’ participation in European educational programs became an additional incentive for their intensification.

This report investigates the politics of Differentiated Integration (DI) in France between 2004 and 2020. It looks at the salience of DI in government discourse, on conceptual grounds and on more concrete references. The report also aims to define the position of the French government (broadly understood as a set of institutional actors) on differentiated integration over time and to assess its stances on specific mechanisms and instances of differentiated integration. It shows that the salience of differentiated integration (DI) has increased over time in France. Notably, Emmanuel Macron engages more than his predecessors with European issues and DI in terms of concepts and models. On the other hand, DI mechanisms are more salient in parliamentary debates, particularly during two EU institutional crises: the 2012 eurocrisis and the 2016-2018 Brexit crisis. In both cases, the emphasis put on enhanced cooperation or opt-outs relates to economic issues. Conceptual references to differentiated integration in political discourse in France are generally neutral or positive. Two factors seem to be shared by all the French presidents: a need for enhanced cooperation on strategic issues (defence, foreign affairs, economic issues) and an emphasis put on Franco-German cooperation. Debates in parliamentary committees on differentiated integration and different models of it reflect a consensual position: DI is desirable, but needs to be debated with caution. To this end, multi-speed Europe is generally connoted negatively, while references to multi-end Europe are more positive. Positions on DI mechanisms follow a pro-European line: the French government (in the broad sense) usually views enhanced cooperation positively and opt-outs negatively. In particular, the French government seems to actively promote enhanced cooperation on economic issues. It is noteworthy that opt-outs are usually associated with a critique of the British influence on European integration.

Israelis and Palestinians have off-loaded the cost of their conflict to outsiders. The massive subsidies for Palestinians should be gradually withdrawn and Israel should pay rent for the settlements and lands it occupies. This rent will fund the Palestinian economy and act as compensation in lieu of the right of return. The Palestinian state will be demilitarized and neutral, and become viable through economic ties to Israel and international aid. Two states will coexist along the 1967 Green Line, and East Jerusalem will be made part of “Jerusalem: one city, two capitals.” Peace-making will be backed by the major international stakeholders and the agreement will be legitimized by voters in both countries. No one is under any illusions about the obstacles to an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Yet ideas that seem far fetched in time become actionable: for decades no one expected that majority rule in South Africa would be peacefully achieved, and few anticipated that Franco-German cooperation and alliance after two bloody World Wars would give birth to the European Union.

W artykule zawarto analizę dotyczącą funkcjonowania francusko-niemieckiej stacji ARTE, wskazując źródła sukcesu tego unikatowego projektu na rynku europejskich mediów – francusko-niemieckiej, europejskiej telewizji kultury. Cel: Wykazanie zgodności warunków decydujących o sukcesie i rozwoju telewizji ARTE z modelem stabilnego funkcjonowania europejskiej sfery publicznej, wyznaczonym przez Jürgena Gerhardsa. Metody badań: Analiza strategicznej i programowej działalności ARTE na podstawie tekstów naukowych, dokumentów korporacyjnych i zwartości programowej stacji. Wyniki i wnioski: Warunki stabilnego rozwoju ARTE to: wola polityczna, stabilny rodzaj finansowania, rozwój technologiczny, wolność i niezależność medium, wysoka jakość programowa – te warunki są zgodne z założeniami modelu Jürgena Gerhardsa. Dodatkowymi czynnikami sukcesu są założenia polityki medialnej Unii Europejskiej i ścisła współpraca francusko-niemiecka. Wartość poznawcza: Artykuł odpowiada na pytanie dotyczące warunków, jakie muszą być spełnione, by tak ambitna, dwunarodowa telewizja kultury jak ARTE mogła zaistnieć i ugruntować swoją stabilną pozycję na audiowizualnej mapie Europy.

SummaryObjective: The diversity and volume of health data have been rapidly increasing in recent years. While such big data hold significant promise for accelerating discovery, data use entails many challenges including the need for adequate computational infrastructure and secure processes for data sharing and access. In Europe, two nationwide projects have been launched recently to support these objectives. This paper compares the French Health Data Hub initiative (HDH) to the German Medical Informatics Initiatives (MII).Method: We analysed the projects according to the following criteria: (i) Global approach and ambitions, (ii) Use cases, (iii) Governance and organization, (iv) Technical aspects and interoperability, and (v) Data privacy access/data governance.Results: The French and German projects share the same objectives but are different in terms of methodologies. The HDH project is based on a top-down approach and focuses on a shared computational infrastructure, providing tools and services to speed projects between data producers and data users. The MII project is based on a bottom-up approach and relies on four consortia including academic hospitals, universities, and private partners.Conclusion: Both projects could benefit from each other. A Franco-German cooperation, extended to other countries of the European Union with similar initiatives, should allow sharing and strengthening efforts in a strategic area where competition from other countries has increased.

The research analyzes the French-German contacts in the field of defense and security. The purpose of the study is to clarify the limits of cooperation be-tween France and German and explain the content of the term ‘strategic culture’. The author has to abandon the analysis of the Aachen Treaty of 2019 since this instrument has not been properly consid-ered from the defense and security perspective in commentaries available. At the same time, many points of the treaty related to the promotion of the Franco-German cooperation were to be implement-ed in 2016-2018. Without the analysis of the events of these years, it is difficult to understand the chal-lenges the two countries still have to overcome. This research is based on official documents. Because of the analyzing facts, the theoretical aspect does not play a major role.

How “European” is the new Franco-German bilateral treaty signed in Aachen on 22 January 2019? And what kind of “Franco-German leadership for Europe” does it stipulate? The article starts by establishing a model of Franco-German cooperation and leadership in the European Union, which then allows to analyse the content of the treaty. The treaty can be seen as a strategic commitment to European integration and to Franco-German leadership. It outlines far-reaching ambitions in foreign policy cooperation as well as in the areas of security and defence, where the established European model is particularly prone to bilateral leadership. The treaty is more nuanced in the field of economic and social politics, where a Franco-German economic area shall be established. While this could potentially balance Franco-German asymmetries, it will also raise questions particularly amongst Eastern European Member States.

This article analyzes the effect of Franco-German cooperation on Economic and Monetary Union reforms, negotiated between 2010 and 2015. We identify three causal mechanisms theorizing how Franco-German cooperation affected the outcomes of EMU negotiations, namely through (a) the elimination of issues from the negotiation agenda; (b) the identification of compromise solutions or the provision of compensations; and (c) the power-based imposition of joint agreements on other member states. We use process tracing to analyze almost the full sample of contested issues included in the ‘EMU Positions’ dataset. Our findings underline that France and Germany indeed eliminated issues to which they were jointly opposed, but they also positively shaped the agenda by proposing compromises and offering compensation. No evidence supports the power-focused perspective of a Franco-German directoire.

Le traité de l’Élysée, conclu le 22 janvier 1963 par le Général de Gaulle et le Chancelier Adenauer, a eu pour objectif politique de sceller la « réconciliation » franco-allemande/germano-française. Il ne constitue certes qu’un renforcement de la coopération, donc une étape dans la coopération progressive qui s’est instaurée entre l’Allemagne et la France depuis l’après-guerre, mais une étape décisive, au moins sur le plan symbolique. Il marque en outre l’essor d’un partenariat institutionnel au sein du « couple » franco-allemand, considéré depuis comme le moteur de la construction européenne.

Germany in a Changing World

René Massigli's considerable contribution to French diplomacy began during the First World War. After being closely involved with many significant developments in French foreign policy during the inter-war years, Massigli then served alongside Charles de Gaulle during the Second World War. Informed by his experience of the 1930s, he adopted a view of western European security that saw him determined to promote greater co-operation between France and Britain to withstand a potential German resurgence and a looming Soviet threat. But following France's efforts after 1950 to promote European integration based on Franco-German co-operation, Massigli re-defined his role of ambassador and openly challenged French initiatives such as the Schuman Plan and, in particular, the European Defence Community, not only because they did not include Britain, but also because they threatened his view of French security. This analysis assesses Massigli's strategic vision and his attempts to overcome the underlying constraints.

Even though the terms “culture“ and “reconciliation“ are absent in the Élysée Treaty, this article looks at forms of cooperation that the Treaty nevertheless generated in the fields of education and youth, as well as foreign affairs and defense. In fact, the Treaty was quite important for the development of cultural and socio-cultural relations between France and Germany and the interactions between states and civil societies. Yet, contrary to the political rhetoric often heard, the Élysée Treaty was not the “year zero“ of Franco-German rapprochement. The Treaty also has to be evaluated in terms of the new impetus it provided for societal initiatives, as well as its limits in the cultural field. The article also assesses recent debates among intellectuals in the two countries: Do the two nations still have something to share at the cultural level or have they distanced themselves from each other? Has the Élysée Treaty really exhausted its integrative capacities regarding socio-cultural matters? In sum, the Treaty has become an important framework for Franco-German socio-cultural cooperation, even if “culture“ was not its main aim, and governments are far from having been the main actors in this field. But, thanks to the joint process of consultation and institutionalization, experiments with bilateral forms of exchanges and cooperation often occurred before being re-applied to a larger framework.

In this article, I focus on connections between textbook revision forums between 1947 and 1952. I examine the interrelations between the textbook activities of UNESCO, the World Movement of Trade Unions, the international historian conferences in Speyer and two Franco-German co-operation projects. I thus try to understand how these interrelations impacted on the development of each of these forums and on textbook revision in general. I argue that the revision projects were not just embedded within a diplomatic and institutional framework but also in a set of relations that closely linked them, irrespective of their institutional and ideological foundations. Further, I propose to conceive of textbook revision not as an entirely fragmented mosaic of bilateral and multilateral projects, but as a more or less coherent transnational field.

An important aspect of early film production which has remained largely unexplored is that related to the manufacture and marketing of cine-film stock. During the international expansion of industrialised cinematography – from 1905 to 1912 – the Parisian film production companies struggled against the norms dictated by the Eastman Kodak Company, which held a virtual world-wide monopoly on the manufacture of cine film. The first part of this essay presents some aspects of the development of cine-film manufacturing and marketing in Europe with particular regard to Franco-German co-operation. The second half focuses on the growth of AGFA's cine-film manufacturing facilities, the Filmfabrik, during the First World War.